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Abstract
Evolutionary Dynamics on Evolving Graphs
Abstract
At the core of any system of interacting entities lie evolution, its driving force of
change, and a graph, encoding its structure. In this thesis we investigate how the
former affects the latter, and vice versa, whereby we resort to the tools of evolutionary
game theory, population dynamics, and graph theory.
We begin our journey by considering evolutionary dynamics as they unfold in the
absence of population structure from a deterministic and stochastic point of view,
then steer to the realm of static graphs endowed with evolutionary games subject to
a host of imitation processes, and, at last, stop for a while to leverage the knowledge
acquired along the way to develop the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm, a highly
scalable decentralised heuristic approach to cluster detection.
Picking up where we left off, we then expound on more elaborate forms of
imitation dynamics by paying a visit to a plethora of models of contagion, cascade,
and consensus dynamics. Soon thereafter, we leave behind the world of simple graphs,
enter the domain of multilayer and evolving graphs, and examine how they co-evolve
with the evolutionary processes pertaining to them. Finally, we reach our destination,
where we put to use the theory that we have become acquainted with to devise a
model of the flow of the news across a co-evolving graph comprised of a layer of news
providers and a layer of news consumers.
Math. Subj. Class. (2010): 91A22, 91A80, 92D25, 05C57, 94C15, 05C85, 05C15,
91C20, 37N25, 92D15, 91D30, 91B74, 91B69.
Keywords: (evolutionary) game theory, evolutionary dynamics, games on graphs,
dynamical processes on graphs, imitation processes on graphs, mean-field approxima-
tion, graph clustering, clustering algorithms, complex networks, contagion processes,
threshold models, (evolutionary) graph theory, multilayer graphs, (co-)evolving
graphs.
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Povzetek
Evolucijska dinamika na razvijajočih se grafih
Povzetek
V središču vsakega sistema entitet v interakciji se nahajata graf, ki ponazarja
njegovo strukturo, in evolucija kot gonilna sila sprememb. V tem delu raziskujemo,
kakšen je njun medsebojni vpliv, pri čemer posežemo po orodjih evolucijske teorije
iger, populacijske dinamike in teorije grafov.
Najprej si z determinističnega in s stohastičnega vidika ogledamo, kako se evolu-
cijska dinamika odvija, kadar populacije niso strukturirane, tik za tem v zgodbo
vključimo statične grafe, podvržene evolucijskim igram in raznim procesom imitacije,
in ob koncu poglavja spotoma pridobljeno znanje vpletemo v razvoj prirejenega
Petford–Welshevega algoritma, decentraliziranega hevrističnega pristopa k odkrivanju
gruč, ki se zlahka spopade z rastočo količino podatkov.
Nato obrnemo novo stran in preidemo na bolj zapletene oblike imitacijske dinamike,
pri čemer pod drobnogled vzamemo cel nabor modelov dinamike okužbe, kaskad in
soglasja. Kaj kmalu opustimo obravnavo statičnih grafov in se posvetimo večplastnim
in razvijajočim se grafom, kjer preučujemo njihov sorazvoj z evolucijskimi procesi, ki
so jim podrejeni. Pripoved nazadnje sklenemo tako, da z uporabo teorije, s katero
smo se seznanili, ustvarimo model pretoka novic po večplastnem grafu – s plastjo
ponudnikov novic in plastjo njihove publike – ki se spreminja sočasno s potekom
dinamike.
Math. Subj. Class. (2010): 91A22, 91A80, 92D25, 05C57, 94C15, 05C85, 05C15,
91C20, 37N25, 92D15, 91D30, 91B74, 91B69.
Ključne besede: (evolucijska) teorija iger, evolucijska dinamika, igre na grafih,
dinamični procesi na grafih, procesi imitacije na grafih, približek povprečnega polja,
gručenje grafov, algoritmi gručenja, kompleksna omrežja, procesi okužbe, pragovni
modeli, (evolucijska) teorija grafov, večplastni grafi, (so)razvijajoči se grafi.
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Introduction
Motivation
Ever since Charles Darwin brought to light the theory of evolution by natural
selection with the publication of his book On the Origin of Species in the middle of
the 19th century, it has become increasingly clear that its tenets apply to phenomena
beyond biological populations of species and their heritable traits. Along the same
lines, the concept of a graph, which saw the light of day at roughly the same time,
has also stirred immense interest across a myriad of disciplines, although it was
inspired by a rather narrow application – the solution to the problem of the seven
bridges of Königsberg, proposed by Leonhard Euler a century earlier.
This ubiquity is hardly surprising; in fact, where there is (temporal) change, there
is evolution; and where there is (spatial) structure, there is a graph. One could even
argue that these two notions are two sides of the same coin – while one captures
relations in time, the other one encodes relations in space. Apropos, not long after
Darwin’s principles of evolution came to the fore and the term graph was coined,
Albert Einstein embarked on his groundbreaking work on relativity, and if there is
one lesson we should learn from it, it is that the relationship between space and time
is far from trivial.
Incidentally, this also turns out to be the case when both evolutionary dynamics
of a system and its intrinsic interaction structure are taken into account, and even
more so when the latter per se is subject to evolution in the course of time. Their
convoluted interplay takes centre stage in this thesis, with graphs as the scaffolding
for evolution to occur and evolution – which takes on two principal forms – as
the driving force of change. In the first part, evolution is reflected in evolutionary
processes unfolding on the graphs, whereas in the second part, it also pertains to
the graphs themselves.
At the end of the day, our main goal is to gain a deeper insight into intricate
mechanisms underlying the formation and functioning of (evolving) graphs stemming
from phenomena one typically stumbles upon in practice. As such, they are often
not well understood, highly complex, and elusive to a rigorous analytical treatment;
hence, as a general rule, they require resorting to – ideally application-specific –
numerical approaches. To this end, we draw on insight from various fields to guide
our design of heuristics fit for purpose; and, as it turns out, physics lends a hand
once again.
As a matter of fact, a variant of Glauber dynamics is employed not only in
the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm, which we develop in the first part of the
thesis as a tool to extract the latent building blocks of a graph encapsulated in
its clustering structure, but it is also interwoven into the fabric of our modelling
framework designed in the second part with the purpose to uncover the fundamental
characteristics of the flow of the news. In both cases it could well be dubbed as the
15
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Glauben (German for to believe) dynamics; building trust across bonds of the graph
translates into the momentum behind the evolution taking place behind the scenes.
Literature Overview
The three cornerstone topics in this thesis primarily drew from the following selection
of books:
• evolutionary game theory [50, 63, 111] (classical game theory [46]),
• complex networks [10, 107],
• dynamical processes on networks [131].
Hardware and Software Specifications
Hardware
All computer experiments and simulations were performed on a computer equipped
with an Intel Core i7-8550U 1.80 GHz processor with 16.0 GB of physical memory
(RAM).
Software
Both the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm (refer to Algorithm 1) and the NewsFlow
algorithm (refer to Algorithm 2) were implemented in Python and compiled with
Cython [15]. Their respective source codes are available at
• https://github.com/ikicab/mPW,
• https://github.com/ikicab/NewsFlow.
All graphs in the experimental studies were manipulated using the software package
python-igraph [24].
The figures were prepared with the following tools:
• LATEX drawing package TikZ [167] (Figures 2.1, 3.1, and 8.1),
• LATEX drawing package tikz-network [168] (Figure 8.1),
• Python libraries GeoPy [49] and Folium [40] (Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11),
• Python libraries Matplotlib [68] and seaborn [150] (the rest of the figures).
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Contributions
Chapter 4 (the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm [71, 74]) and Section 8.4 (the
model of the flow of the news [72]) present the original work of the author, Barbara
Ikica, who
• designed the modelling frameworks,
• implemented the algorithms (Algorithms 1 and 2),
• planned and carried out the experiments and simulations,
• processed the experimental data, performed the analysis, and interpreted the
results,
• wrote the manuscripts and created the figures.
Ideas for the research were discussed with
• Chapter 4: Janez Žerovnik (University of Ljubljana) and Janez Povh (University
of Ljubljana),
• Section 8.4: Kaj-Kolja Kleineberg (ETH Zürich).
Barbara Ikica has also co-authored the following papers: [30], [31], [32], [73], and [158].
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Part I
Evolutionary Dynamics on Graphs
“ “Begin at the beginning,” the King said, gravely, “and go on till youcome to the end: then stop.” ”
Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 1865
19

Chapter1
Evolutionary Game Theory
This chapter serves as an introduction to the overarching concepts and definitions
that will be referred to throughout this work. First of all, we provide the theoretical
framework for traditional game theory and discuss the historical course of events
that has spurred interest in the field of evolutionary game theory that reformulates
the foundations of static game theory in a dynamic context. Evolutionary dynamics
are then brought into focus, and we cast light on how populations evolve under
various assumptions. The mean-field regime, which neglects stochastic fluctuations,
is followed by an agent-based perspective that remedies this, and finally, transition
between both approaches is studied.
1.1 Basics of Game Theory
Game theory emerged as a scientific discipline during the nascent stage of first-
generation digital computers, around the middle of the 20th century. The book
Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour by John von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
genstern [173] is traditionally considered to be the first comprehensive treatise of
the subject, considering also cooperative games among several players as well as
providing the axiomatic theory of expected utility, which ultimately allowed to treat
decision-making under uncertainty in economics and other applied sciences.
On a fundamental level, game theory is concerned with modelling strategic
interactions between individuals, be it players in a game of chess, workers negotiating
salaries on the labour market, buyers bidding in an auction, rival companies competing
for profit, animal species cooperating or fighting each other in order to enhance their
reproductive success, or protein–protein interactions in cancer cells. Each individual
has several options to choose from, and the outcome resulting from these interactions
crucially depends on the interplay between all individual choices.
More formally, an umbrella term for any such strategic interaction is a game,
and it is typically represented in either extensive or strategic (also normal) form.
In essence, the former hierarchically encodes all possible sequences of choices made
by individuals throughout the course of the game together with their corresponding
payoffs in the form of a tree. This aside, in the following we will restrict ourselves to
the latter form, so let us first provide its explicit definition [50]. Note that hereinafter
individuals interacting in a game will be dubbed players, and the different approaches
to playing the game at a player’s disposal will be referred to as strategies . Essentially,
the strategy that a player follows defines his or her next move in any given situation.
21
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Definition 1.1.1. An n-player strategic (also normal) form game consists of
• a set of n ∈ N players P = {1, 2, . . . , n},
• a set Si of strategies for each player i ∈ P ,
• a payoff function πi : S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn → R for each player i ∈ P .
Further, we also define a strategy profile, an n-tuple s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ S :=
S1× S2× · · · × Sn where si ∈ Si for each i ∈ P . The payoff function πi thus encodes
the payoff πi(s) that player i receives when the strategy profile s is played.
In the definition above, each player i ∈ P chooses actions from the set of pure
strategies Si. However, in a confrontation between rational players, a player who
sticks to a pure strategy may not be the most tactically savvy. Indeed, players who
behave rationally are primarily driven by maximising their utility and choose their
moves according to what actions – and, hence, payoffs – they expect from their
opponents. Thus, a pure strategy, which is deterministic per se, could be deciphered
by a cunning opponent with relative ease. Moreover, as the decision-making processes
and individual behaviours tend to be prone to errors due to the lack of information
at hand, the cost associated with the acquisition of such information, and various
cognitive biases that are at play, pure strategies cannot plausibly be expected in
realistic scenarios.
For these reasons, the concept of amixed strategy, which also reflects the stochastic
uncertainty inherent to strategic reasoning, was introduced.
Definition 1.1.2. A mixed strategy σ i of player i is a probability distribution over
the set of strategies Si = {s1i , s2i , . . . , ski } available to player i, i.e.,
σ i = (σ
1
i , σ
2
i , . . . , σ
k
i ), σ
j
i ∈ [0, 1] for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and
k∑︂
j=1
σji = 1,
where σji := σ i(s
j
i ) denotes the probability with which player i chooses strategy
sji ∈ Si.
Notice that every pure strategy sji ∈ Si can be expressed as a mixed strategy σ i
by setting σji to 1 and all other entries of σ i to 0. Hence, without loss of generality,
we may assume that all players follow mixed strategies and let σ = (σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn)
denote the mixed strategy profile.
This enables us to easily extend the definition of a payoff function to additionally
account for mixed strategy profiles. Namely, we set the value of πi(σ) to the expected
payoff received by player i under the strategy profile σ . Assuming that players choose
their mixed strategies at the outset of the game independently of each other, the
computation boils down to
πi(σ) =
∑︂
s∈S
(︄
n∏︂
j=1
σj(sj)
)︄
πi(s).
One of the fundamental questions that has led to the introduction of game theory
in the first place and that has inspired and intrigued game theorists and behavioural
scientists ever since is how to model strategic interactions in a way that would enable
22
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accurate and robust predictions regarding individual behaviour and the collective
behaviour of the group as a whole.
An important and famous milestone towards this goal is the strategic equilibrium
concept for non-cooperative games by John Nash [103], which is in his honour called
the Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium of a game is a selection of strategies such
that no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate from this by choosing another
strategy, which can be captured more formally as follows [46].
Definition 1.1.3. A (mixed) strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1,σ∗2, . . . ,σ∗n) over pure
strategies available to players is a Nash equilibrium if
πi(σ
∗) ≥ πi(σ∗1, . . . ,σ∗ i−1,σ i,σ∗ i+1, . . . ,σ∗n)
holds for all players i and any other probability distribution σ i over the set of pure
strategies Si. It is a strict Nash equilibrium if these inequalities are strict.
In simpler words, in a Nash equilibrium all the strategies involved are optimal
responses to each other. Its concept was groundbreaking in simultaneously taking
into account the strategic choices of all the players in the game.
As it turns out, Nash equilibria often serve as fairly accurate predictors of game
outcomes. On top of that, in his seminal work on the subject, John Nash also proved
their existence under rather mild assumptions on the underlying game; a precise
statement of his result is given below [50].
Theorem 1.1.4. Suppose that the set of pure strategies Si available to player i is
finite for every i ∈ P. Then the corresponding game admits a (not necessarily unique)
Nash equilibrium in (possibly) mixed strategies.
Nash published two proofs of his existence theorem – in [103], he employed
Kakutani’s generalised fixed-point theorem, whereas in his dissertation he presented
an alternative proof using Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem.
Curiously, although Nash’s existence theorem generalises von Neumann’s minimax
theorem [173], which proved the existence of (what turned out to be) a Nash
equilibrium for a two-person zero-sum game, von Neumann dismissed his work by
saying, “That’s trivial, you know. That’s just a fixed-point theorem.” [102] Later
on, in 1994, Nash was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for his work in game
theory.
Despite the widely recognised importance and applicability of the concept of Nash
equilibrium – even in the setting of evolutionary games that will be discussed shortly
– it can lead to misleading predictions in certain circumstances. An intriguing aspect
of the Nash equilibrium that has baffled researchers for decades is that it is not
necessarily optimal in terms of social welfare and that, as such, it fails to reflect
abundant examples of cooperative behaviour towards a common goal. Cooperation
can be found even at the micro level in interactions between cells in multi-cellular
organisms, and it has been prevalent throughout the human history, as it is already
evident from the early forms of hunter-gatherer societies [112].
To support this point, let us look more closely at the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game [60, 129], a widely used toy example that embodies the problem of cooperation.
Interestingly enough, it was devised in 1950, in the midst of cold war, by Merrill
Flood and Melvin Dresher within the scope of studies of potential application of
game theory to nuclear strategy, which were pursued by the RAND Corporation [138].
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The name Prisoner’s Dilemma was coined by the mathematician Albert Tucker, who
also gave the game its contemporary interpretation in the context of suspects facing
a prison sentence, provided below.
Example 1.1.5 (Prisoner’s Dilemma). The backstory of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game goes as follows [111]. Two individuals are suspected of committing a criminal
offence and are held custody in two separate rooms, which renders any communication
between them impossible. The prosecutor offers both suspects a deal – if they betray
their partner in crime by testifying against them, they may avoid a prison sentence
altogether. The terms of the deal are then disclosed:
• If both parties testify against one another, each of them is sentenced to seven
years’ imprisonment.
• If one of the suspects betrays the other, but not vice versa, the betrayer is not
convicted of crime, whereas the betrayed suspect faces ten years in prison.
• If both suspects choose to cooperate by remaining silent, each one of them has
to serve a lesser prison term of one year.
More rigorously, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a a symmetric two-player game, meaning
that two players P = {1, 2} have identical strategy sets and payoff functions. Thus,
let S = {C,D} denote the set of strategies at their hands, where C stands for
cooperation and D for defection – the two players must simultaneously decide for
themselves whether to cooperate or defect. Moreover, we represent their payoff
function by means of the following payoff matrix
C D[︃ ]︃
C R S
D T P
. (1.1)
Here, the element located in the i-th row and the j-th column for i, j ∈ {C,D}
equals the payoff that a player following strategy i receives against the opponent
who chooses to play strategy j.
Cooperating comes at a cost c to the player implementing it and earns his or her
opponent a benefit b, where b > c. A defecting player yields no cost but also no
benefit to either of the parties.
All in all, if both players cooperate, they both obtain a reward R = b− c. If one
cooperates and the other one defects, the defector earns a temptation T = b and the
cooperator ends up with the lowest payoff – sucker’s payoff S = −c. Finally, if both
defect, each of them receives a punishment P = 0.
Clearly, since T > R > P > S holds, the temptation to free ride on the opponent
is markedly high. Paradoxically, although cooperating is the collective best option
as 2R > T + S > 2P , each individual is better off by defecting regardless of the
opponent’s action.
As the example above shows, the unique strict Nash equilibrium of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game is mutual defection, which obviously leads to the Garrett Hardin’s
tragedy of the commons [58]. He illustrates it in the case of herdsmen maximising
their profits by adding animals to their herds at the risk of overgrazing, a cost
shared by all: “Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his
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herd without limit in a world that is limited.” [58] Such unfavourable outcomes
could easily be amended by a central planner, but in the absence of this, it is on
game theory to provide normative insights how to resolve such social dilemmas –
situations in which personal interests are in dissonance with social interests – and
to provide an explanation how selfish individuals may nevertheless spontaneously
move towards cooperation. Lack of insight into how individuals move towards any
behaviour propelled the development of novel approaches to study their interactions.
A step in this direction is taken in the following section, which offers an evolutionary
perspective on game theory.
1.2 Basics of Evolutionary Dynamics
Since mathematical proofs in classical game theory rely on a number of rather
restrictive assumptions, such as that all players have well-defined and consistent
goals and preferences which can be described by a utility function, that players are
perfectly rational and that this is common knowledge, and that all players have
complete and perfectly accurate information about each other’s strategies, the theory
was soon confronted with its limitations, and its practical use suffered as a result.
The most important generalization to address these restrictions, in a series of
many [8, 59, 151], has been the introduction of bounded rationality, which ultimately
gave rise to evolutionary game theory [63, 156] and to evolutionary dynamics [111]
in particular. Bounded rationality assumes trial-and-error, in which a player continu-
ously monitors their environment and other players, chooses strategies accordingly,
observes their performance in practice, and either retains or discards them in subse-
quent rounds of the game. Bounded rationality accounts for the fact that in many
situations humans and animals respond instinctively, playing according to heuristic
rules and behavioural norms rather than rationally adopting best-performing strate-
gies according to classical game theory. Note that the term bounded rationality is
somewhat misleading, since, for the most part, not the level of rationality but the
scarcity of information is to blame for the poor decisions made by individuals [50].
In addition to bounded rationality, evolutionary game theory also introduces
a dynamical component to game theory, which is missing in the classical version
because the assumption of perfect rationality makes the dynamics to a large degree
irrelevant. As opposed to classical game theory, strategies dynamically propagate
throughout the population by reproduction or imitation.
In order to be able to fully explore the mechanisms promoting evolutionary
dynamics, let us first revise the game-theoretical scaffolding in an evolutionary
context. This approach was pioneered in 1973 by the biologist John Maynard Smith
and the mathematician George Robert Price, who used it to model collective animal
behaviour [157]. Nevertheless, it can be easily adapted to account for various imitation
and learning mechanisms beyond reproduction and natural selection inherent to the
animal kingdom.
1.2.1 Evolutionary Game
The first key difference to the classical setting is in the way how players choose their
strategies. Until now we have assumed that each player i ∈ P has a set Si of strategies
at his or her disposal. Henceforth, we study instead large populations of species,
each of which is associated with a mixed strategy whose underlying pure strategies
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can represent genetic, phenotypic, or cultural traits. Further, every individual in
the population is permanently assigned a strategy (or, equivalently, assigned to a
species) by inheritance or some form of imitation mechanism. This interpretation
enables us to view mixed strategy profiles as distributions of particular traits across
the population.
Accordingly, suppose that the population under scrutiny consists of M species
S = {1, 2, . . . ,M}, which we identify with mixed strategies σ1,σ2, . . . ,σM over the
set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN} of all pure strategies (or traits) within the population.
Furthermore, we assume that the members of the population interact in repeated
random pairings. In each time period, pairs are formed uniformly at random and
each pair plays a round of a symmetric two-player game. Let U = [uij]Ni,j=1 denote
the corresponding payoff matrix, where uij specifies the payoff that an individual
playing strategy si ∈ S receives against an opponent using strategy sj ∈ S. Then
the expected payoff of a member of species k ∈ S against a member of species l ∈ S,
denoted by akl for future reference, amounts to
akl = σk · Uσ l =
N∑︂
i=1
N∑︂
j=1
σikuijσ
j
l . (1.2)
However, since games are played in randomly formed pairs, the long-term expected
payoff not only depends on the specifics of the strategy used but, more importantly,
also on the composition of the species in the population. This was one of the
underlying paradigms, which guided the establishment of the concept of evolutionary
stable strategy, a notion of equilibrium apt to capture the evolutionary setting.
1.2.2 Evolutionary Stable Strategies
Evolutionary stable strategies, which are deemed to be the cornerstone of evolutionary
game theory, were introduced by John Maynard Smith as those strategies that cannot
be successfully invaded by another strategy or a mutant [155, 157]. Assuming that
the population is at an equilibrium state in which all individuals belong to a single
species and thus use the same strategy, evolutionary stability specifies the conditions
that must hold for this species to be uninvadable by a small number of any mutant
type.
Definition 1.2.1. Formally, a strategy σk is said to be evolutionary stable if any
invading strategy σ l that is introduced into the population in a sufficiently small
amount ε > 0 fares worse than the resident strategy σk in pairwise encounters, that
is,
σ l · U(εσ l + (1− ε)σk) < σk · U(εσ l + (1− ε)σk)
for all ε > 0 smaller than some appropriate invasion barrier [63]. The payoffs from
these encounters are encapsulated in the payoff matrix U (as defined above).
Similarly, a cultural form is an evolutionary stable strategy if, upon being adopted
by all members of a society (firm, family, etc.), no small group of individuals using
an alternative cultural form can invade. Evolutionary game theory thus moves from
explaining the actions of individuals to modelling the diffusion of forms of behaviour
(strategies) in society. Although it was initially intended to describe the diffusion
of genotypes and phenotypes within biological species, it soon found its way into
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other disciplines. Ever since, it has been used to study traffic flows, diffusion of
political ideas, epidemics and immunology, formation of social groups, evolution of
market networks, and various evolutionary phenomena occurring in information and
technological systems.
Intriguingly, albeit the concepts of Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stable strat-
egy arose from different assumptions, one can easily derive the following proposition
that relates the two [63].
Proposition 1.2.2. Every strategy that is a strict Nash equilibrium is also an
evolutionary stable strategy. Conversely, every evolutionary stable strategy is a Nash
equilibrium.
Note that, technically speaking, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile, specifying
a strategy for each of the players, and not a single strategy. Nevertheless, in symmetric
games with a finite set of strategies that we are considering, a Nash equilibrium
lends itself to two interpretations. It can either consist of a single mixed strategy
σk = {σ1k, σ2k, . . . , σNk } played by all individuals, or it can correspond to a profile of
pure strategies in which pure strategy si ∈ S is assigned to a fraction of individuals
determined by σik, the contribution of si to the mixed strategy σk [50]. In the
proposition above, the first interpretation is assumed – without loss of generality, we
may refer to a single strategy when the strategy profile assigns this strategy to every
individual in the population.
Evidently, the condition for evolutionary stability can be checked directly with-
out incurring complex dynamics. However, there is also the dynamic aspect of
evolutionary stability, which comes into play when dynamical rules are explicitly
considered. The next section takes a closer look at a few variations of these rules
and the dynamical systems resulting from their implementation.
1.3 Mechanisms of Evolution
Since bounded rationality can be mathematically formulated in different ways, there
are many different dynamical rules governing the evolution of a population one can
consider. Which strategies are favoured by the evolutionary process depends crucially
on the particular choice of the dynamical rule.
In the following, we briefly review two main avenues through which evolutionary
dynamics can be expressed. In the first approach, deterministic rules are applied,
which operate at the population level for the rate of change of strategy frequencies [39,
63], whereas the second approach is stochastic, operating at the microscopic level [99,
111].
1.3.1 Deterministic Approach
The original impetus to study evolutionary processes in populations by means of
differential equations can be traced back to the work of Ronald Aylmer Fisher, John
Burdon Sanderson Haldane, and Sewall Green Wright, who laid the foundations of
population genetics [39]. Further research in this direction culminated in replicator
dynamics [166], variants of which were primarily used in biology but later on also
helped mathematicians, physicists, economists, and sociologists to explore how
societies evolve under principles akin to natural selection [171].
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Replicator dynamics
Replicator dynamics is derived under the assumption that game payoffs to the species
are directly related to their reproductive success, and it subsequently gives rise to
the renowned replicator equation, a system of time-dependent differential equations
that describes how the frequency distribution of replicators, entities that more or less
accurately replicate themselves [50], evolves over time. In our context, replicators
will first represent species and then, after slight tweaking, strategies.
In view of the assumptions outlined in the ongoing discussion of evolutionary
game theory, let x1, x2, . . . , xM denote the frequencies of species 1, 2, . . . ,M ∈ S,
respectively, to which the mixed strategies σ1,σ2, . . . ,σM are assigned. Clearly,
xk ∈ [0, 1] for every k ∈ S and
∑︁M
k=1 xk = 1.
Elaborating on the observation, mentioned in passing in the previous section,
that the success of a strategy depends on the structure of the population, suppose
that the fitness (also reproductive success) fk of species k ∈ S is a function of the
population state (also population density) x = (x1, x2, . . . , xM ), that is, fk = fk(x). It
encapsulates the likelihood with which a strategy replicates – either by reproduction
in a biological sense or by being imitated in a more socio-cultural context. To
enable the derivation of the replicator equation, we impose some further assumptions
– that the population state x evolves as a function of a continuous time variable
t ∈ R, that the population consists of an infinitely large number of individuals, and
that the population state x evolves as a continuously differentiable time-dependent
vector-valued function x(t). To enhance readability, we frequently omit expressing
the dependency on time t explicitly.
In each time period, individuals interact in pairs that are drawn at random with
respect to the population being well mixed, which means that interaction between
any pair of individuals is equally likely. Following these interactions that shape the
fitness fk(x) of each species, an evolutionary process that mimics the basic tenet
of Darwinism is implemented. Individuals reproduce subject to natural selection –
advantageous species grow in abundance, and those that fare poorly given the current
state of affairs are driven out of the population.
With this in mind, let n denote the number of individuals in the population.
Assuming an (infinitely) large population size is crucial to the replicator dynamics
because in the limit of large population size n the actual frequencies nk/n of the
species approximate the expected frequencies xk with increasing accuracy by the law
of large numbers. Therefore, species k ∈ S comprises of nk = xkn individuals, and
the expected change in their number in a short time span of ∆t is approximately
fk(x)nk∆t, which implies
ṅk =
d
dt
nk = fk(x)nk,
leading to
ṅ =
M∑︂
l=1
ṅl =
M∑︂
l=1
fl(x)nl = n
M∑︂
l=1
fl(x)xl,
and, finally, to
ẋk =
ṅkn− nkṅ
n2
= xkfk(x)− xk
M∑︂
l=1
fl(x)xl.
Thus, the rate of growth of species k ∈ S, ẋk/xk, may be expressed as the difference
28
Chapter 1. Evolutionary Game Theory
between the current fitness fk(x) of the species and the current average fitness
f(x) =
∑︁M
l=1 xl(t)fl(x) of the population, which finally yields the replicator equation,
ẋk = xk(fk(x)− f(x)), k ∈ S. (1.3)
By inspection, several properties of the replicator dynamics can be observed. To
begin with, the better the performance of a species, the faster it replicates. While
one would expect this property to hold on average, occasional deviations from the
Darwinian idea of survival of the fittest do occur in reality, and a less fit individual
can, in fact, replace a prosperous one. It turns out that such deviations may be
safely neglected in the limit of large population size, but they can have a drastic
effect in finite populations that are dealt with in practice. In this sense, one may
view replicator dynamics as a mean-field approximation that focuses on the average
behaviour of a typical individual, disregarding the vast complexity of interactions
among all individuals [171]. Our model will be amended in the next section, where
the influence of stochastic effects due to finite population size is taken into account.
Another natural property that follows from the structure of the replicator equa-
tion (1.3) is the invariance of the (M − 1)-dimensional simplex ∆M = {x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xM ) | xk ≥ 0,
∑︁M
k=1 xk = 1} under its solutions. Therefore, since x ∈ ∆M
holds for the initial population state x, the same holds for any point on the solution
trajectory, i.e., x(t) ∈ ∆M for all t ∈ R [63]. In addition, as soon as a species becomes
extinct, it cannot reappear in the population since xk(tˆ) = 0 implies xk(t) = 0 for
all t > tˆ. Although this feature might be justified in some cases, there is a plethora
of situations that fail to substantiate it, prime example being mutations during
replication. These are vital to prevent the population from reaching a stalemate to
which getting stuck in a local optimum in the fitness landscape would lead [165].
Incorporating them into our model leads to the replicator-mutator equation in which
individuals may inherit traits different from their ancestors’ with some (species-
dependent) probability 0 < µ≪ 1 [26]. We will not go into further details here, but
implementing such random exploration mechanisms will prove useful later on when
we leverage game-theoretical principles to develop an algorithm capable of detecting
community structure in networks of interacting individuals.
For now, reproductive success of a species has been studied in isolation from game
theory by observing pairwise interactions in full generality. Let us now restrict our
attention to interactions that may be conceptualised in the form of a game [2]. Thus,
each interaction between a pair of individuals corresponds to a round of a symmetric
two-player game specified by the payoff matrix U = [uij]Ni,j=1. Furthermore, we use
A = [akl]
M
k,l=1 to denote the matrix of expected payoffs, where akl corresponds to
the payoff a member of species k ∈ S deploying strategy σk may expect against
a member of species l ∈ S utilising strategy σ l (cf. equation (1.2)). Eventually,
linking the expected payoff of a member of species k ∈ S in a population state
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xM), where a fraction xl of individuals uses strategy σ l, to the
reproductive success fk of its species yields the following relations
fk(x) =
M∑︂
l=1
xlakl = (Ax)k,
f(x) =
M∑︂
k=1
xk(Ax)k = x · Ax,
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and, finally, plugging these into (1.3), the linear replicator equation
ẋk = xk((Ax)k − x · Ax), k ∈ S. (1.4)
The resulting equation describes how (mixed) strategies propagate by reproduction
across the population according to their relative payoff, thereby mimicking natural
selection. Socio-economic applications, on the other hand, often require other learning
rules, which typically follow some form of imitation dynamics instead.
Imitation dynamics
As we enter the realm of imitation dynamics, the context of reproducing species
seems rather unnatural. Therefore, we rephrase the game under consideration to
make the analysis more readily interpretable [63].
Again, we assume a large population of individuals who are repetitively allocated
in random pairs to play a symmetric two-player game defined by a set of pure
strategies S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN} and a payoff matrix U = [uij]Ni,j=1 that stipulates the
payoffs of all strategies. Frequencies with which these strategies are adopted by
the individuals are summarised by the population state x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN), which
evolves in time under imitation dynamics , which is defined as follows.
In each time period (t, t + ∆t), an individual who uses some strategy sj ∈ S
is randomly selected from the population and offered the chance to revise his or
her strategy. For this reason, another individual who uses some strategy si ∈ S
(not necessarily different from sj) is chosen independently and randomly, and the
first player potentially imitates the second player by switching from strategy sj to
strategy si at a rate fij(x) specified by some imitation rule f that only depends on
the expected payoffs of strategies si and sj given the population state x, i.e.,
fij(x) = f((Ux)i, (Ux)j).
Then the evolution of the corresponding population state can be expressed via the
following system of ordinary differential equations
ẋi = xi
N∑︂
j=1
(fij(x)− fji(x))xj, si ∈ S. (1.5)
More often than not, the imitation rule f is a function increasing in the payoff
difference between the payoff of the imitated individual and the payoff of the imitator,
which captures the natural tendency to be more likely to imitate strategies that are
relatively more successful.
Notice that the imitation dynamics includes replicator dynamics as a special case.
Indeed, using the imitation rule fij(x) = ((Ux)i − (Ux)j)/2, for instance, reduces
the system of equations (1.5) above to the linear replicator equation (1.4).
Before we conclude this section, let us briefly discuss how fixed points of the
replicator dynamics relate to the static game-theoretic solution notions, Nash equi-
libria and evolutionary stable strategies. The following theorem, which succinctly
lists some of the relations among them, only reaffirms that Nash equilibria and
evolutionary stable strategies indeed represent the central pillars of (evolutionary)
game theory.
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Theorem 1.3.1. Let A = [akl]Mk,l=1 denote the payoff matrix of a symmetric two-
player game G and further assume that the evolution of a population of interacting
individuals is governed by the linear replicator equation (1.4) with A as the underlying
matrix. Then the following statements hold [50, 63]:
• If xˆ ∈ ∆M is a Nash equilibrium of the game G, then xˆ is a fixed point of the
linear replicator equation.
• If xˆ ∈ ∆M is a strict Nash equilibrium (and, therefore, also an evolutionary
stable strategy) of the game G, then xˆ is an asymptotically stable fixed point of
the linear replicator equation.
• If xˆ ∈ ∆M is an (asymptotically) stable fixed point of the linear replicator
equation, then xˆ is an (isolated) Nash equilibrium of the game.
To illustrate these results, let us resort to the example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game (cf. Example 1.1.5).
Example 1.3.2 (Prisoner’s Dilemma under the replicator dynamics). Substituting
the payoff matrix (1.1) of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game into the linear replicator
equation (1.4) and simplifying the resulting expression yields the following differential
equation
ẋ = x(1− x)(π(C,x)− π(D,x))
for the frequency x of cooperators, who use strategy C. Notice that the fraction of
defectors, adopting strategy D, is simply given by 1−x. Moreover, we used π(C,x) =
xR+ (1− x)S = bx− c to denote the expected payoff that a cooperator earns in the
population state x = (x, 1− x), and, analogously, π(D,x) = xT + (1− x)P = bx was
used for the expected payoff of a defector. Since R < T and S < P , π(C,x) < π(D,x)
holds regardless of x ∈ [0, 1], indicating that, on average, the payoff to a cooperator
is smaller than the payoff to a defector. Consequently, x = 0 and x = 1 are the only
fixed points of the dynamical system under discussion, and the fixed point x = 0,
which corresponds to a state with no cooperators, is even globally asymptotically
stable. Indeed, as ẋ < 0 holds for every x ∈ (0, 1), every trajectory emanating from
any population state x = (x, 1− x) with x ∈ [0, 1) ends up in a state of full defection
with x = 0. Recall that defection D was also the unique strict Nash equilibrium
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, which is perfectly in line with all statements of
the Theorem 1.3.1 above. On the other hand, this outcome shows that replicator
dynamics per se does not suffice to explain how cooperative behaviour, against all
the odds, continues to prevail in many real-life settings. For this, one needs to look
beyond the mean-field assumption that neglects fluctuations due to finite population
size and spatial effects.
1.3.2 Stochastic Approach
Dynamical systems as a means to model populations of interacting individuals have
numerous advantages – among others, they are often amenable to an analytical
treatment, which, in turn, simplifies stability analysis and analysis of equilibrium
selection. Nevertheless, they may fail to portray all the intricacies of the system
under observation.
For example, the previous section on replicator dynamics has shown that a strategy
that enjoys a payoff above the population average always increases in frequency. This
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was due to the mean-field stance on the problem, which enabled us to shy away from
stochastic fluctuations by observing expected quantities. In reality, this does not
need to be the case as stochastic effects may lead to unforeseeable outcomes in which
even the strategy that is the most well off can plummet into extinction.
Shifting our focus to stochastic dynamics in finite populations [111] calls for a
novel approach as the law of large numbers does not apply any longer. For this
purpose, we will utilise the theory of Markov chains. More particularly, we will
draw on and adapt the Moran process, a simple stochastic process that describes
natural selection and genetic drift in finite populations. It was developed by Patrick
Alfred Pierce Moran in 1958 as a tool to promote the understanding of population
genetics [99].
To begin with, assume that a population of n individuals interacts by playing
an (arbitrary) symmetric two-player game. As before, in each time period, pairs of
players are randomly formed, and each pair plays a round of the game. To simplify
matters, we shall assume that the set of strategies S available to players consists of
two pure strategies, S = {s1, s2}, whose payoffs are characterised by the following
payoff matrix
s1 s2[︃ ]︃
s1 A B
s2 C D
(1.6)
with no special restrictions on the parameters A,B,C and D. Note, however, that
the model could be easily extended to account for a larger number of strategies [110].
Suppose that i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} individuals follow strategy s1, which immediately
implies that strategy s2 is employed by the remaining n−i members of the population.
The expected payoffs from utilising strategies s1 and s2 thus amount to
π(s1, i) =
(i− 1)A+ (n− i)B
n− 1 ,
π(s2, i) =
iC + (n− i− 1)D
n− 1 ,
respectively. To fully define the mechanism under which the population evolves, we
have to specify how strategies propagate across the population in accordance with the
payoffs that accrue to them. As opposed to the replicator dynamics, where payoffs
translate directly into fitness (or reproductive success), a more realistic regime will
be considered now. From a biological point of view, diversity within species that
was shaped by evolutionary forces does not commonly have a significant impact on
the underlying fitness but only a weak one [171], which will be referred to as weak
selection in what follows. For this reason, a parameter ω ∈ [0,∞) that defines the
intensity of selection has been proposed in the literature. It serves as an intermediary
between natural selection and random drift and, as such, can be tuned to balance
the impact of the game payoffs on the fitness and the baseline scenario in which the
game is completely irrelevant. As a rule, the fitness fj associated with using strategy
sj ∈ S is then expressed in the form
fj(i) = F (ωπ(sj, i)), (1.7)
where F is an arbitrary positive, increasing, and differentiable function for which
F (0) = F ′(0) = 1 holds [2]. A popular choice for F is the exponential function
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F (x) = exp(x), resulting in [165]
fj(i) = e
ωπ(sj ,i), (1.8)
or, assuming selection is weak, its linearised counterpart
fj(i) = 1 + ωπ(sj, i). (1.9)
The exponential form (1.8) is predominantly used in the field of statistical physics,
where intensity of selection also goes under the name of effective temperature [171].
For now, however, we will focus on a slight variation of the latter form [111],
fj(i) = 1− ω + ωπ(sj, i), (1.10)
which can be interpreted as neutral drift, i.e., the baseline fitness of 1− ω, subject
to a linear perturbation of amplitude proportional to the game payoff [171].
From this, the role of the intensity of selection ω is evident. If ω = 0, game
interactions play no role in evolutionary processes whatsoever, which reduces evo-
lutionary dynamics to random genetic drift in which all strategies share the same
fitness and the same propensity to proliferate. In the biologically relevant regime of
weak selection, ω ≪ 1, payoffs have a mild influence on how strategies spread, which,
intriguingly, also renders the analysis more tractable compared to the cases with a
larger value of ω. At the other extreme, when ω tends to 1, the effect of random
drift is diluted, and the balance shifts in favour of the underlying game.
Notice that the intensity of selection would be of very little use in replicator
dynamics. Indeed, substituting the ansatz (1.10) in the replicator equation (1.3)
would merely multiply the right-hand side of each differential equation by a factor of
ω, which would only have an impact on the velocities and not on the shape of the
solution trajectories.
The evolution of the population is yet to be specified. Thus, assume that at each
time step, an individual is chosen for reproduction with probability proportional to
fitness and thereby produces an identical copy of himself or herself. At the same
time, a (not necessarily different) individual is chosen uniformly at random to be
eliminated from the population and replaced by the offspring of the first individual.
For ω = 0, this reduces exactly to the classical frequency-dependent Moran process.
In the absence of mutations and while keeping the population size n constant,
each reproduction event can increase the prevalence i of strategy s1 by 1 and decrease
the prevalence of strategy s2 by 1, or vice versa; or incur no change in the population
structure. Thus, the evolution of the population can be described by a Markov
process on the state variable i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. The three aforementioned events can
occur with probabilities
T+(i) =
if1(i)
if1(i) + (n− i)f2(i)
n− i
n
,
T−(i) =
(n− i)f2(i)
if1(i) + (n− i)f2(i)
i
n
, (1.11)
T ◦(i) = 1− T+(i)− T−(i),
respectively. The associated transition matrix is therefore tridiagonal and, since
T ◦(0) = 1 and T ◦(n) = 1, i = 0 and i = n are the only absorbing states. Hence, the
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entire population eventually ends up utilising a single strategy – either s1 (if i = n)
or s2 (if i = 0) – regardless of the initial state i.
A natural question which arises from this observation is how likely each of the
strategies is to become dominant and force the other one out of the population. The
probability zi with which the process reaches the state n from an arbitrary but fixed
state i can be derived with relative ease, by solving the recurrence relation
zi = T
−(i)zi−1 + T ◦(i)zi + T+(i)zi+1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
with boundary conditions z0 = 0 and zn = 1. This yields the following expression [111]
zi =
1 +
∑︁i−1
j=1
∏︁j
k=1 T
−(k)/T+(k)
1 +
∑︁n−1
j=1
∏︁j
k=1 T
−(k)/T+(k)
, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (1.12)
which gives us the probability that i individuals playing strategy s1 ultimately
manage to spread their strategy across the entire population. On the other hand, the
probability of its demise and the success of strategy s2 simply boils down to 1− zi.
But in order to see the big picture and be able to compare the prospects of
various strategies regardless of their current presence in the population, a different
perspective needs to be taken into consideration. Recall that in order to determine
whether a strategy is evolutionary stable, we need to verify whether the majority of
the population playing it is resistant to an invasion by a small number of individuals
using any mutant strategy (cf. Definition 1.2.1). Evolutionary stability hence studies
every strategy from the same vantage point and provides an impartial assessment of
the strategy at hand as it is not biased by the distribution of the strategies within
the population.
Analogously, suppose that the population is homogeneous in the sense that all
n players use the same strategy, say s2 ∈ S. Then we replace one of the resident
individuals with an individual who follows a mutant strategy s1 ∈ S. The probability
that the lineage of this individual successfully supersedes and reigns over the resident
population, z1, will be henceforth referred to as the fixation probability of the invading
individual and denoted by ρ1. It quantifies how well a strategy disseminates through
the population from a single source. Similarly, the fixation probability of an individual
playing strategy s2 against the rest of the population utilising strategy s1 is given by
1− zn−1. After substituting the expressions (1.11) for the probabilities T−(i), T ◦(i),
and T+(i) in (1.12), these remarks may be summarised in the following definition.
Definition 1.3.3. Suppose that in a population of n individuals that have strategies
s1 and s2 at their disposal, one individual plays according to strategy s1 (resp. s2),
which corresponds to the state i = 1 (resp. i = n − 1) of the associated Markov
process. Then the fixation probability ρ1 (resp. ρ2) of this individual amounts to
ρ1 =
1
1 +
∑︁n−1
j=1
∏︁j
k=1 f2(k)/f1(k)
(1.13)
or, respectively,
ρ2 =
∏︁n−1
k=1 f2(k)/f1(k)
1 +
∑︁n−1
j=1
∏︁j
k=1 f2(k)/f1(k)
.
As a general comment, setting the intensity of selection ω to 0 results in f1(k) =
f2(k) = 1 for each k, and the fixation probabilities are reduced to ρ1 = ρ2 = 1/n,
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the case of neutral drift. This is an intuitive result – as ω = 0 corresponds to the
entire population having the same fitness, every individual has the same potential to
reach fixation. This motivates defining a strategy to be favoured (resp. opposed) by
selection if it is more (resp. less) likely to reach fixation compared to the baseline
neutral drift.
Definition 1.3.4. A strategy with fixation probability equal to ρ is said to be
favoured (resp. opposed) by selection if the inequality
ρ > 1/n (resp. ρ < 1/n)
is satisfied, where n denotes the size of the population.
By the same token, one can also balance a strategy against another by evaluating
how favourable they are by selection.
Definition 1.3.5. A strategy with fixation probability equal to ρ1 is said to be
favoured (resp. opposed) by selection over a strategy with fixation probability equal
to ρ2 if
ρ1 > ρ2 (resp. ρ1 < ρ2).
In the limit of weak selection, ω → 0, the cumbersome expression for ρ1 = ρ1(ω)
may be approximated by the first two terms of its Taylor series expansion about
ω = 0 [181], i.e.,
ρ1 ≈ ρ1(0) + ω
[︃
d
dω
ρ1(ω)
]︃
ω=0
=
1
n
+
ω
n
n−1∑︂
i=1
n− i
n
[︃
d
dω
(︁
f1(i)− f2(i)
)︁]︃
ω=0
=
=
1
n
+
ω
6n
[(A+ 2B − C − 2D)n− (2A+B + C − 4D)].
This enables the derivation of the following two propositions that give sufficient
and necessary conditions for a strategy to be favoured by selection and favoured over
an arbitrary opponent strategy, respectively [111].
Proposition 1.3.6. Assuming a population of size n and the limit of weak selection,
ω → 0, strategy s1 (with fixation probability ρ1) is favoured by selection if and only if
A(n− 2) +B(2n− 1) > C(n+ 1) +D(2n− 4)
holds. In the limit of infinite population size, this condition reduces to
A+ 2B > C + 2D.
Proposition 1.3.7. Assuming a population of size n and the limit of weak selection,
ω → 0, strategy s1 is favoured by selection over strategy s2 (with fixation probabilities
ρ1 and ρ2, respectively) if and only if
A(n− 2) +Bn > Cn+D(n− 2)
holds. In the limit of infinite population size, this condition reduces to
A+B > C +D.
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Both propositions indicate that the outcome of evolutionary dynamics depends
significantly on the size n of the population, which is particularly noticeable in small
populations.
However, returning to the example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (cf. Exam-
ple 1.1.5), this is not of much help to resolve the tragedy of the commons. Although
in the present context cooperative behaviour technically does stand a chance against
defection, insofar as random drift permits, its prospects look bleak, and a long-term
fixation is highly unlikely. As a matter of fact, it turns out that ρ1 < 1/n as well as
ρ2 > ρ1 hold regardless of the population size n for the fixation probability ρ1 of a
cooperative individual against the fixation probability ρ2 of a defecting individual.
As we will see later on, additionally taking into account the spatial structure
of the population will provide an effective remedy to the problem of cooperation.
Constraining individuals’ interactions to their immediate neighbourhoods will lead
to tightly knit clusters of cooperators, which will enable them to fend off defecting
individuals along the boundary [60]. The tendency that like begets like also inspired
our clustering algorithm, which we discuss in more detail in the following chapters.
Before we proceed to evolutionary dynamics in spatially structured populations,
we will touch upon the transition from finite populations within the stochastic realm
to the deterministic framework of infinite populations.
1.3.3 From Finite to Infinite Populations
To highlight the relation between the stochastic and the deterministic approach
to population dynamics, we will study a diffusion process derived by taking a
continuous-time limit of the underlying Markov chain. In particular, one can recover
the replicator equation by observing the Moran process in a finite population in the
limit as the population size tends to infinity [70, 170].
Suppose that each of the n individuals in the population uses either strategy s1
or s2. Let x = i/n denote the relative frequency of those that play according to
strategy s1. Furthermore, we introduce the variable t = τ/n, where τ represents the
discrete time steps of the Markov chain. Let I denote the discrete random variable
taking values in the state space {0, 1, . . . , n} and let Pτ (i) denote its probability mass
function.
For n large enough, one can assume continuity of the random variableX, X = f(I)
with f(I) = I/n. As n approaches infinity, the values that the random variable X
can attain get closer to each other, and the length of the time step τ converges to
0. Let p(x, t) denote the probability density function of the random variable X. As
p(x, t) · 1/n represents the probability that X assumes a value within an infinitesimal
neighbourhood of x, (x, x+1/n], we can adopt the following form for the probability
density function
p(x, t) = Pτ (i)n = Pτ
(︁
f−1(x)
)︁
n.
Since the state of the Markov chain can only be i if either a jump from any of
the states i± 1 occurred or there was no transition at all, one can easily acquire the
equation
Pτ+1(i)− Pτ (i) = Pτ (i− 1)T+(i− 1)− (︁T−(i) + T+(i))︁Pτ (i) + Pτ (i+ 1)T−(i+ 1).
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In accordance with the proposed notation and definitions, we can reformulate it as
p(x, t+ n−1)− p(x, t) = p(x− n−1, t)T+(x− n−1)− (︁T−(x) + T+(x))︁p(x, t)+
+ p(x+ n−1, t)T−(x+ n−1).
For large enough n, we can perform a Taylor series expansion of the probability
density function p about (x, t) and expansions of the transition probabilities T− and
T+ about x. If we omit all the terms that follow the second term of the expansion
on the left-hand side, retain only the first three terms in each of the expansions on
the right-hand side, and leave out all expressions that contain (1/n)p for p ≥ 2, we
obtain the equation
∂
∂t
p(x, t) = − ∂
∂x
(︂(︁
T+(x)− T−(x))︁p(x, t))︂+ 1
2n
(︃
∂2
∂x2
(︁
T+(x) + T−(x)
)︁
p(x, t)+
+ 2
∂
∂x
(︁
T+(x) + T−(x)
)︁ ∂
∂x
p(x, t) +
(︁
T+(x) + T−(x)
)︁ ∂2
∂x2
p(x, t)
)︃
=
= − ∂
∂x
(︁
a(x)p(x, t)
)︁
+
1
2
∂2
∂x2
(︁
b2(x)p(x, t)
)︁
.
Here, we have used the notation
a(x) := T+(x)− T−(x) in b(x) :=
√︃
1
n
(︁
T+(x) + T−(x)
)︁
.
In literature, this equation is known both as the forward Kolmogorov equation and
the Fokker–Planck equation, the latter name being typically used in statistical physics,
where it plays a prominent role [48, 149]. It is equivalent to the Langevin equation.
In our particular case, the associated Langevin equation is of the form
ẋ = a(x) + b(x)ξ(t). (1.14)
Thus, we have obtained a stochastic differential equation with drift a(x) and diffusion
b(x), which describes the dynamics of the variable x. The term ξ(t) denotes Gaussian
noise with unit variance and zero mean.
Before we proceed with the derivation of the “stochastic” replicator equation, let
us sketch a proof of the equivalence between the Langevin and the Fokker–Planck
equation [93]. To begin with, we discretise the Langevin equation (1.14) using the
Euler–Maruyama method, i.e.,
x(t+ dt)− x(t) = a(︁x(t))︁dt+ b(︁x(t))︁ξ˜(t)√dt, (1.15)
where ξ˜ also designates a random variable with unit variance and zero mean.
Next, we consider a generic function ϕ
(︁
x(t)
)︁
and approximate the difference
ϕ
(︁
x(t+ dt)
)︁−ϕ(︁x(t))︁ by substituting the first term of the difference with the Taylor
series expansion of ϕ about x(t), explicitly
ϕ
(︁
x(t+ dt)
)︁− ϕ(︁x(t))︁ = ϕ(︂x(t) + a(x)dt+ b(x)ξ˜(t)√dt)︂− ϕ(︁x(t))︁ ≈
≈ ϕ′(x)a(x)dt+ ϕ′(x)b(x)ξ˜(t)
√
dt+
ϕ′′(x)
2
b2(x)ξ˜
2
(t)dt.
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Dividing both sides of the identity by dt and calculating the corresponding expected
values (averages over realisations of the noise) leads us to
E
(︄
dϕ
(︁
x(t)
)︁
dt
)︄
= E
(︃
ϕ′(x)a(x) +
ϕ′′(x)
2
b2(x)
)︃
, (1.16)
where we have utilised the facts that E
(︁
ξ˜
)︁
= 0 and Var
(︁
ξ˜
)︁
= 1.
Furthermore, we choose ϕ
(︁
x(t)
)︁
:= δ
(︁
x(t) − x)︁, where δ stands for the Dirac
delta function, and, finally, we compute all intermediate expected values relevant to
our proof, viz.,
E
(︄
dϕ
(︁
x(t)
)︁
dt
)︄
=
∂
∂t
∫︂
p(z, t)δ(z − x)dz = ∂
∂t
p(x, t),
E (ϕ′(x)a(x)) =
∫︂
p(z, t)a(z)
d
dz
(︁
δ(z − x))︁dz =
= −
∫︂
d
dz
(︁
p(z, t)a(z)
)︁
δ(z − x)dz = − ∂
∂x
(︁
p(x, t)a(x)
)︁
,
E
(︃
ϕ′′(x)
2
b2(x)
)︃
=
∫︂
p(z, t)
b2(z)
2
d2
dz2
(︁
δ(z − x))︁dz =
=
∫︂
d2
dz2
(︃
p(z, t)
b2(z)
2
)︃
δ(z − x)dz = ∂
2
∂x2
(︃
p(x, t)
b2(x)
2
)︃
,
and combine them according to (1.16) to deduce
∂
∂t
p(x, t) = − ∂
∂x
(︁
a(x)p(x, t)
)︁
+
1
2
∂2
∂x2
(︁
b2(x)p(x, t)
)︁
, (1.17)
which is precisely the sought-after Fokker–Planck equation. In the above calculation,
we have used some of the well-known properties of the Dirac delta distribution,
namely ∫︂
f(z)δ(z − x)dz = f(x),∫︂
φ(z)δ′(z)dz = −
∫︂
φ′(z)δ(z)dz.
For the other direction, notice that in the limit a(x)→ 0 and b(x)→ 1, the Fokker–
Planck equation (1.17) reduces to the one-dimensional heat equation. Hence, it is
little wonder that over a short time step ∆t, it is solved by the Gaussian transition
density
p
(︁
x(t+∆t), t+∆t
)︁
=
1√︁
2πb2(x(t))∆t
exp
(︄
−
(︁
x(t+∆t)− x(t)− a(x(t))∆t)︁2
2b2(x(t))∆t
)︄
with mean x(t) + a(x(t))∆t and variance b2(x(t))∆t. This implies, at last, the
discretised Langevin equation (1.15).
Let us now return to the classical Langevin equation (1.14). Recall that the
transition probabilities T− and T+ are given by (1.11). By employing the identity
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x = i/n, we can incorporate them in the Langevin equation. In the limit n → ∞,
the coefficient
√︁
1/n tends to zero. Consequently, the stochastic term b(x) vanishes
for any x and the Langevin equation becomes
ẋ = lim
n→∞
(︄
π(s1, i)− π(s2, i)
1−ω
ω
+ iπ(s1,i)+(n−i)π(s2,i)
n
i
n
n− i
n
)︄
=
(︁
Π1(x)− Π2(x)
)︁
x(1− x)
1−ω
ω
+ xΠ1(x) + (1− x)Π2(x) =
=
x
(︂
Π1(x)−
(︁
xΠ1(x) + (1− x)Π2(x)
)︁)︂
1−ω
ω
+
(︁
xΠ1(x) + (1− x)Π2(x)
)︁ = x(︁Π1(x)− Π(x))︁
Ω + Π(x)
,
where Π1(x) := limn→∞ π(s1, i) = xA + (1 − x)B, Π2(x) := limn→∞ π(s2, i) =
xC + (1− x)D, Π(x) := xΠ1(x) + (1− x)Π2(x) and Ω = (1− ω)/ω.
As we can see from the equation above, we have only managed to recover the
modified replicator equation so far (cf. equation (1.3)), since the denominator contains
the non-constant term Ω + Π(x). A natural question that arises subsequently is
whether it is possible to select such transition probabilities T− and T+ that the
original replicator equation is retrieved in the limit of a large population.
It turns out that this problem has a very intuitive solution. When we carried out
the calculations of the transition probabilities (1.11), we implicitly assumed that the
global information about the population structure is at hand.
However, this is generally not the case. The population normally interacts and
reproduces according to the local structure surrounding each of its members, which
also lies at the core of the chapters to come, where we shift the focus from well-mixed
populations to populations with more intricate patterns of interaction. Therefore, we
will now follow a different update mechanism, which closely resembles the imitation
rule that we studied in Section 1.3.1. At each time step, we randomly choose an
individual, who in turn matches his or her own payoff against the payoff of another
randomly chosen individual. Afterwards, this individual either retains the current
strategy or imitates the strategy of the randomly matched opponent depending
on which strategy leads to a greater profit. We formalise this by introducing the
transition probabilities
T+(i) :=
⎛⎝1
2
+
ω
2
π(s1, i)− π(s2, i)
max
i=1,2,...,n−1
|π(s1, i)− π(s2, i)|
⎞⎠ i
n
n− i
n
,
T−(i) :=
⎛⎝1
2
+
ω
2
π(s2, i)− π(s1, i)
max
i=1,2,...,n−1
|π(s1, i)− π(s2, i)|
⎞⎠ i
n
n− i
n
.
(1.18)
As before, the parameter ω ∈ [0, 1] denotes the intensity of selection. In the case of
ω = 0, players randomly swap their strategies, whilst for ω > 0 players assume the
(locally) best strategies with a probability greater than 1/2.
Putting these considerations together, we obtain the following form of the Langevin
equation
ẋ = lim
n→∞
⎛⎝ω π(s1, i)− π(s2, i)
max
i=1,2,...,n−1
|π(s1, i)− π(s2, i)|
i
n
n− i
n
⎞⎠ = κx(︁Π1(x)− Π(x))︁ =
= κx
(︁
(Ax)1 − x · Ax
)︁
,
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where we have used A to designate the payoff matrix (1.6) and x to represent the vector
(x, 1−x). We have also introduced a constant factor κ = ω ·(︁maxi=1,2,...,n−1|π(s1, i)−
π(s2, i)|
)︁−1. Without loss of generality, we may neglect it as it only affects the time
scale – the resulting equation differs from the original replicator equation only by a
change in velocity, which does not affect the orbits.
To summarize, we have successfully managed to reconstruct the replicator equation
by deriving a stochastic differential equation to describe the transitions of the Markov
chain and observing what happens in the limit of an infinitely large population.
In the next chapter, we will elaborate further on the idea that the majority of
interactions within populations are short-range, occurring in close vicinity to the
focal players, who can only rely on local information and respond to impulses from
their neighbours.
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Underlying Graph Structure
One of the more recent developments in evolutionary game theory has been the con-
sideration of spatial structure and its impact on the outcome of different evolutionary
games [62, 126, 139, 159, 178]. Spatial structure is taken into account by means of a
suitable network or a graph, where vertices represent players and edges define their
limited interaction range. This is in contrast to well-mixed models, where players
interact randomly with one another, and their interaction thus spans the whole
population. There is ample evidence that spatial correlations should not be neglected
if one is to gain a comprehensive understanding of any system of interacting agents.
In the nervous system, neurons transmit information only to neurons with which they
share a synaptic connection, Canada lynx (Lynx canadensis) poses a greater threat
to its prey, the snowshoe hare (Lepus americanus), than to the scrub hare (Lepus
saxatilis), endemic to southern Africa and thus hundreds of miles away, and scholars
tend to form collaborative alliances with researchers with expertise in related areas.
Hereafter, we restrict ourselves to populations with a given structure, represented
in the form of an (undirected) graph G = (V,E). Each member of the population is
associated with a vertex v ∈ V of the graph, and there is an edge uv ∈ E between
two vertices u and v whenever the corresponding individuals can interact with each
other, be it due to their spatial proximity, sharing a common interest, having similar
attributes, working on a joint task, or being in any other (abstract) relation.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, each step of the evolution occurs in
two stages. At first, individuals play a round of the game and receive their payoffs,
which in turn determine their fitness, and then, according to their respective fitness,
they try to outflank their rivals. Note that who plays with whom and who may
replace whom after a reproduction event does not necessarily have to be dictated by
the same graph [2], which can be conveniently formalised using interdependent and
multilayer networks [145, 160, 176, 177]. Nevertheless, we assume that both types of
interactions take place on the same graph and take a closer look at each of them
separately.
2.1 Games on Graphs
The first fundamental building block of our model are games played by populations
with regard to their structure. As before, our main concern will be two-player
games among pairs of individuals. However, pairs will only be formed along the
edges of the graph, and thus each individual v ∈ V will only engage in games with
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neighbouring players, the set of which shall be denoted by N (v). Notably, this
renders the strategic choices and payoff of a player only dependent upon strategies
pursued in the neighbourhood and not on the entire strategy profile, although more
distant individuals do have a latent influence. Indeed, the strategic behaviour of a
neighbour of the focal player is affected by his or her own neighbourhood in turn,
and so forth. These are the basic constituents to the framework of networked games,
formally defined below [165].
Definition 2.1.1. A networked game consists of
• an undirected interaction graph G = (V,E),
• a set Sv of strategies for each player v ∈ V ,
• a payoff function πv :
∏︁
u∈N (v)∪{v} Su → R for each player v ∈ V .
As far as the underlying graph is concerned, numerous models have been proposed
to date in order to describe interaction patterns between individuals. These models
form the backbone of the study of complex networks, a growing area of research that
goes hand in hand with evolutionary dynamics regulating (structured) populations.
Since graphs generated by the random graph model proposed by Paul Erdős
and Alfréd Rényi in the late 1950s exhibited low clustering coefficients, which are
uncharacteristic for the vast majority of real-world graphs, refined models soon
followed. In fact, it has become established that the clustering structure of the graph
and its degree distribution are the topological properties that are the most pertinent
to the evolutionary dynamics on top of it [139].
As researchers embarked on the quest to create a map of the World Wide Web in
the 1990s, the resulting network came as a surprise. A great many of web pages (more
than 80 percent) contained less than four links, and only a handful of them (less than
0.01 percent) provided links to more than a thousand pages [12], which is in striking
contrast to what one would expect if the World Wide Web were a random graph
and its vertex degrees therefore followed a Poisson distribution [10]. For this reason,
attention shortly thereafter shifted to scale-free graphs with a power-law degree
distribution, in which roughly a fraction of k−γ vertices have k neighbours, where the
parameter γ typically falls in the range of 2 ≤ γ ≤ 3 [107]. This characterises the effect
that a tiny fraction of vertices, termed hubs, have a disproportionately large number
of edges, whereas most of the vertices only have a few. The power-law distribution
hence offers a reasonably good fit for the degree distributions observed in a multitude
of real-world graphs ranging from various collaboration, financial, information, and
transportation networks to cellular networks of proteins or metabolites [10, 12]. Its
general ubiquity begged the question as to how the scale-free property emerges and
whether a mechanism that mimics it could be devised.
Two key observations provided an answer to this question – the perpetual growth
of real-world graphs due to the addition of new vertices and edges and preferential
attachment , the tendency of newly introduced vertices to connect to highly connected
vertices [10, 153]. Both can be observed, for example, for the citation network as
it continues to grow both in terms of vertices (papers) and edges (citations among
them) and as highly cited papers are much more likely to attract even more citations,
which is often referred to as the rich-get-richer phenomenon.
These findings further inspired the Barabási–Albert model [11], a simple generative
model of graphs with scale-free degree distributions that relies on the mechanisms
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of growth and preferential attachment. At each time step, a vertex is added to
the graph and connected to a constant fraction of existing vertices, to each with a
probability proportional to its current degree. Ever since the Barabási–Albert model
was introduced, it has also become widely used as a model of graph evolution.
However, as it turns out, this framework requires fine-tuning in order to provide
a more accurate model for the phenomena observed in, e.g., social networks, i.e.,
that newly introduced vertices also tend to connect to their second-order neighbours
– to the vertices neighbouring the vertices that they connected to in the first place.
Accordingly, a model with an update rule that enables linking to neighbours and
even higher-order neighbours was proposed [82].
The mechanism of growth could also be incorporated into the model in a number
of different ways. In some approaches, the network size is kept constant over time,
and graph evolution can only be observed in changes to the edge set. One way
of dealing with this setting is to introduce linking dynamics, where new edges are
formed at different rates and already established edges are broken off in the course
of time [121]. This is yet another characteristic property of social networks, where
the ability to choose who to interact with as well as the duration of each interaction
is bestowed upon members that occupy the vertices of a graph.
Still, not all (generative) models postulate that the structure of the graph is
subject to a growth mechanism or any evolution at all. The model of a small-world
graph, introduced in 1998 by Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz [180], instead
focuses on ensuring that the clustering structure of the resulting graphs resembles
the one found in their real-world counterparts. Watts and Strogatz performed an
empirical analysis of graphs constructed from various data – collaborations between
movie actors, the Western Power Grid of the United States, and the neural network
of the worm Caenorhabditis elegans – all of which showed significant clustering and
markedly small characteristic path lengths, that is, average shortest path lengths.
Not only did these two features underpin the small-world model, but their striking
omnipresence in the real world was revealed by subsequent studies of the matter.
The small-world model, in essence, interpolates between a regular ring lattice
and a random graph [107]. The regular ring lattice sets the foundation for high
transitivity and the formation of clusters, whereas random edge rewiring decreases the
characteristic path length by introducing new shortcuts between far-flung vertices.
Numerous works have since been devoted to the investigation of networked
(evolutionary) games on these and many other types of graphs – small-world [45, 76,
175], scale-free [7, 144], evolving [35, 43, 44, 122, 127, 186], temporal [65], as well as
hierarchical [86] and bipartite [55], to name a few. Evidently, taking the interaction
graph to be complete recovers games in well-mixed populations, where every pair of
players can interact.
Conceptually, the second component of the definition of a networked game 2.1.1,
which outlines the strategies available to the individuals, remained unaltered (cf. the
definition of a strategic game 1.1.1), so we move on to briefly discuss the last part of
the definition, the payoff functions of the players.
Recall that in well-mixed populations individuals receive their respective payoffs
immediately after engaging in a game with another member of the population. Pairs
of players are formed at random, and thus the strategy profile of the population
implicitly affects the effective payoff that an individual receives. Contrastingly, in
networked games an individual v ∈ V , in effect, plays a game with each neighbour
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w ∈ N (v). There are plenty of ways to combine the individual outcomes of these
games into a single payoff to player v. Henceforth, we shall assume that the payoffs
acquired in individual games are aggregated.
More formally, in a symmetric two-player game characterised by the set of pure
strategies S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN} and the payoff matrix U = [uij]Ni,j=1 that specifies
their pairwise payoffs, an individual v ∈ V utilising strategy si that is surrounded by
kj players operating according to strategy sj for 1 ≤ j ≤ N acquires a payoff π(si, k)
of
π(si, k) =
N∑︂
j=1
kjuij, (2.1)
where k = (k1, k2, . . . , kN) with
∑︁N
j=1 kj = deg(v), deg(v) = |N (v)| denoting the
degree of vertex v.
Alternatively, some authors have also considered average instead of aggregate
payoff [91], and others have allowed for weighted graphs by taking the contribution
of each game to be proportional to the weight of the edge over which it occurs [2].
Having gathered all the necessary ingredients for a networked game, we can now
take a look at how (expected) payoffs of strategies translate to their fitnesses and, in
turn, lead to competition among the strategies via frequency-dependent selection.
2.2 Evolution on Graphs
To get a firm grasp on how physiological and behavioural traits compete to exert
control over structured populations to further their influence, we need to revisit the
approach to evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed populations and make some minor
modifications to account for population structure.
One of the earliest ventures into networked games that evolve with the passage
of time was undertaken in the early 1990s by Martin A. Nowak and Robert M.
May, who investigated populations of individuals occupying sites of a lattice and
interacting with their neighbours by playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma and other
games [2, 114]. Successful individuals then spread their strategies throughout the
population – however, in contrast to well-mixed populations, they can only diffuse
to neighbouring sites.
Obviously, this diffusion process can be concisely represented using a finite-state
Markov chain [2]. If a structured population on n = |V | vertices engages in a
symmetric two-player game with the set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN} of (pure) strategies
available to the players, then each state of the corresponding Markov chain can be
described as an ordered n-tuple (sv1 , sv2 , . . . , svN ), where svi ∈ S denotes the current
strategy of the individual occupying vertex vi ∈ V .
In the absence of mutations, the state (sv1 , sv2 , . . . , svN ) can only transition to a
state of the form (s′v1 , s
′
v2
, . . . , s′vN ) with s
′
vj
= svi and s′vk = svk for k ̸= j, assuming
there exists an edge between vertices vi and vj and that vi replicated to vj or,
equivalently, vj imitated the strategy of vi. Notice that, eventually, this Markov
chain will be absorbed into a state in which the entire population follows a single
strategy s ∈ S and, as in the case of well-mixed populations, the analysis of the
underlying stochastic process essentially reduces to calculating fixation probabilities
of the strategies and setting them against each other. Therefore, we have to alter
the definition of the fixation probability (cf. Definition 1.3.3) to take into account
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the spatial structure of the population. Specifically, a mutant strategy s1 ∈ S will
invade a homogeneous population utilising strategy s2 ∈ S at a randomly chosen
vertex, and we will investigate how likely it is to take over the entire population.
Definition 2.2.1. Suppose that a structured population of n individuals that play
according to strategy s2 ∈ S is invaded by strategy s1 ∈ S at a vertex picked
uniformly at random. That is, the initial state (s2, s2, . . . , s2) of the associated
Markov chain sustains a transition to a state with exactly one component equal to
s1 and others equal to s2.
The fixation probability ρ1 of strategy s1 is then defined as the probability with
which this process absorbs into the state (s1, s1, . . . , s1) in which strategy s1 manages
to overflow the entire population.
Before we look at how to integrate game payoffs into fitnesses of strategies, let us
first focus on a special case to provide some insight into evolutionary dynamics in
structured populations. Namely, assume that the fitness of each strategy is constant
and, as such, depends only on the intrinsic properties of the strategy and not on how
it fares in games.
In case the population is placed on a complete graph, its dynamics are governed by
the Moran process, which we discussed in Section 1.3.2. Thus, the fixation probability
of a mutant with a fitness of f1 = r ∈ R>0 \{1} placed at a random location within a
population of size n with a fitness of f2 = 1 is completely independent of the starting
point of the invasion and boils down to (cf. equation (1.13))
ρM :=
1− 1/r
1− 1/rn . (2.2)
In the same way as we categorised strategies as those that are favoured versus
those that are opposed by selection based on their fixation probabilities in com-
parison to the baseline random drift, we may classify graphs as amplifiers versus
suppressors of selection upon probing whether they promote or demote the dispersal
of selectively advantageous strategies when benchmarked against the Moran process
on the complete graph [111].
In particular, a mutant strategy with a fitness of r ∈ R>0 \ {1} is said to be
(selectively) advantageous compared to a resident strategy with a fitness of 1 if r > 1
and (selectively) disadvantageous if r < 1. As the name implies, an amplifier of
selection is a graph that amplifies the forces exerted by selection, that is, that fosters
the survival of advantageous and inhibits the survival of disadvantageous strategies.
A suppressor of selection does exactly the opposite – it shifts the balance towards
neutral drift by hindering the proliferation of advantageous and offering a helping
hand to disadvantageous strategies. Both notions are set out in the definition below.
Definition 2.2.2. Let G denote the interaction graph of a population playing
according to a resident strategy with a fitness of 1. A mutant strategy with a fitness
of r ∈ R>0 \ {1} is then placed on a randomly chosen vertex within G and eventually
reaches fixation with probability ρG. Three cases are distinguished:
• If ρG = ρM , G is ρ-equivalent to the Moran process.
• If r > 1 implies ρG > ρM , and r < 1 implies ρG < ρM , then G is an amplifier
of selection.
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• If r > 1 implies ρG < ρM , and r < 1 implies ρG > ρM , then G is a suppressor
of selection.
Remarkably, graphs turn out to be a convenient proxy for varying degrees of
neutral drift and selection observed in real populations. A substantial body of work
examines how different graph structures correlate with the mechanisms that drive the
evolutionary outcome, namely, which structures amplify random effects as opposed
to selective forces, and for which the reverse holds.
There is a plethora of evidence that the underlying (graph) structure indeed
does have an impact when it comes to the evolution of various (natural) processes
entrenched in our everyday lives and surroundings. For example, topological structure
of a molecule plays a non-negligible role in its thermodynamic properties, which
has led to the development of a whole new field of mathematical chemistry and to
the concurrent introduction of a vast array of quantitative descriptors of molecular
structure. These have proven to be invaluable not only in predicting boiling points
and the heat of formation of alkane molecules but also in preliminary screening of
drugs; pinpointing structures for which their extreme values are realised is hence
of utmost importance if one is to decipher whether a given molecule stimulates or
inhibits an observed chemical reaction [30–32, 158].
As it turns out, in a slightly more general setting of directed graphs, one can
easily construct an arbitrarily strong amplifier or suppressor of selection [111]. For
the purpose of demonstration, suppose that the interaction graph is directed and that
a directed edge −→uv from vertex u to vertex v indicates that a strategy can propagate
from u to v but not necessarily vice versa. Notice that undirected graphs are
subsumed by the class of directed graphs – an undirected graph can be equivalently
expressed as a directed graph by substituting each undirected edge with two directed
edges pointing in opposing directions.
On the one hand, as long as the interaction graph is strongly connected, i.e., there
exists a directed path from u to v and a directed path from v to u for every pair of
vertices u, v ∈ V , as was the case with undirected graphs and well-mixed populations
in particular, the associated Markov chain eventually ends in one of the consensus
states in which the entire populations sticks to a single strategy. On the other hand,
more general directed graphs can realise much richer dynamics and can, inter alia,
enhance the coexistence of two or even more strategies. Coexistence permeates every
sphere of life and as such calls for a mechanism capable of explaining its emergence.
To give an example, let us delve into patterns of interaction between three strains
of the Escherichia coli (E. coli) bacteria [115]. The first strain releases colicin, a
type of a bacteriocin (antimicrobial protein) which is toxic to some neighbouring
strains of E. coli, to hamper the growth of competing bacterial strains. At the same
time, this strain also produces a cognate immunity protein to neutralise the activity
of colicin in order to protect itself against self-destruction. The second strain is
harmless to others and only produces the innate immunity protein, whereas the
third strain neither secretes any bacteriocins nor possesses any immunity to them.
Controlled experiments in the laboratory revealed that growing all three bacterial
strains together in a well-mixed flask, seeding the resulting culture into fresh flasks,
and repeating this procedure for a number of bacterial generations results in a
single-strain population and the extinction of the other two strains. Intriguingly,
exchanging laboratory flasks for agar plates and transferring samples of resulting
cultures to further agar plates whilst preserving the neighbourhood structure leads
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to the survival and coexistence of all three bacterial strains. This further exemplifies
why supplementing populations with a spatial structure is of foremost importance if
one is to uncover their intrinsic nature and functioning.
In the spirit of this observation, we step away from strongly connected interaction
graphs and take a short detour to explore the connection between spatial structure
and evolutionary dynamics in greater generality. More specifically, we impose a
very natural assumption that the interaction graph is weakly connected, which holds
precisely when its underlying undirected counterpart (obtained by discarding edge
directions) is connected. We will show how this suffices to construct an arbitrarily
strong suppressor of selection. Understanding how interaction structure suppresses
selection provides a fruitful ground for enhancing the robustness of a structured
population against adversarial attacks and hostile invasions [25]. Applications
abound in diverse domains and particularly pertain to immunological protein–protein
interactions, electrical power grids, networks of financial transactions, backbone
networks carrying communication traffic, and many other systems, which ideally
should not be vulnerable to unsolicited attacks and prying eyes.
Accordingly, the following theorem [111] asserts that neutral drift can be amplified
to an arbitrary degree. Assuming an arbitrary but fixed (dis)advantageous strategy
and any value of ρ that conveys the extent to which this strategy should be suppressed
by selection, one can easily construct an (appropriately large) graph G such that the
fixation probability ρG of a randomly placed mutant utilising this strategy equals ρ.
Theorem 2.2.3. Assume that a population of size n interacts in a game according to
a resident strategy with a fitness of 1 and let n be large enough such that 1/n ≈ 0 holds.
Further, we introduce a mutant strategy with a fitness of r > 1 (resp. 0 < r < 1) and
choose an arbitrary ρ ∈ (1/n, ρM) (resp. ρ ∈ (ρM , 1/n)). Then there exists a weakly
directed graph G such that ρG = ρ.
Proof. Let us first outline a construction that yields a general class of suppressors of
selection. Next, we formally justify it and, finally, explain how one can adapt the
parameters of the constructed model to attain the desired fixation probability.
As far as the construction is concerned, let n1 ∈ N and n2 ∈ N with n1 + n2 = n
be the model parameters regulating the strength of neutral drift. We choose a subset
of n1 vertices and form a clique (complete subgraph) G1 by adding edges in both
directions between every pair of these vertices. Meanwhile, we also add – for the
moment – undirected edges between the remaining n2 vertices in a random manner
and denote the subgraph thus obtained by G2. To ensure that the resulting graph
G = G1 ∪G2 is weakly connected, we add at least one edge from the subgraph G1 to
the subgraph G2 (but not the other way around) and orient the edges of G2 in such
a way that every vertex in G2 is reachable from G1 along a directed path (refer to
Figure 2.1 for an illustration).
Clearly, a randomly placed mutant strategy can only reach fixation if it ini-
tially lands on any vertex in the subgraph G1, which occurs with probability n1/n.
Assuming this is the case, it then goes on to conquer the complete subgraph G1
with a probability equal to the fixation probability (2.2) of the Moran process for a
population of size n1. As soon as this happens, the fixation on G2 is imminent. All
in all, the fixation probability of a mutant strategy invading from a vertex chosen
uniformly at random amounts to
ρG(n1) =
n1
n
1− 1/r
1− 1/rn1 .
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G1
G2
Figure 2.1: A construction of a suppressor of selection G = G1 ∪G2 with G1 corresponding
to a clique on n1 vertices and G2 corresponding to a random subgraph on the remaining n2
vertices.
It is straightforward to see that r ≶ 1 implies ρG(n1) ≶ 1/n for all n1 > 1 (using the
formula for the sum of the ﬁrst n1 terms of a geometric series with a ratio of 1/r),
but we must still show that ρG(n1) has an upper (resp. lower) bound of ρM provided
that the condition r > 1 (resp. 0 < r < 1) is satisﬁed.
To achieve this, we introduce an auxiliary function f(n1) := ρM − ρG(n1). Evi-
dently, f(n) = 0 holds regardless of r, and, following the same line of argument as in
the proof of ρG(n1) ≶ 1/n, we can derive the estimate f(1) ≶ 0 under the assumption
that r ≶ 1. Last but not least, computing the derivative of f and applying the
inequality ln(x) < x− 1 (which holds for all x ∈ R>0 \ {1} due to the concavity and
diﬀerentiability of the natural logarithm) to the term ln(rn1) results in f ′(n1) < 0
for r > 1 and in f ′(n1) > 0 for r < 1, concluding our proof that r > 1 implies
ρG(n1) < ρM for all n1 < n and that, likewise, 0 < r < 1 implies ρG(n1) > ρM for all
n1 < n.
It is now easy to see that the greater the size n1 of the clique, the more the resulting
graph resembles a well-mixed population, and the closer the ﬁxation probability is to
ρM . Similarly, the smaller the size n1 is, the more random the interactions are, and
the more selection is suppressed. At the extreme end of the spectrum, as n1 → 1, the
role of the ﬁtnesses vanishes, and the dynamics are only subject to neutral drift.
Up to now, only constant selection has been considered, and we examined how
diﬀerent kinds of graphs lead to diﬀering balances between neutral drift and natural
selection. Nevertheless, as we have already seen in the well-mixed regime, the success
of a strategy crucially relies on the abundance of other strategies in its surroundings.
Hence, we will pick up where we left oﬀ and build upon our existing framework.
Recall that in networked games, every payoﬀ to an individual is determined locally,
following interactions with all adjacent players. To be more speciﬁc, in each time
period all individuals play a round of the game with every player in their respective
neighbourhoods and accumulate the payoﬀs thus gained. We continue to denote
the resulting payoﬀ to an individual employing strategy si ∈ S with kj neighbours
utilising strategy sj for 1 ≤ j ≤ N by π(si, k) (see equation (2.1)).
As was the case with well-mixed populations, we posit that the ﬁtness f(si, k) of
such an individual is equal to the latest payoﬀ rescaled according to an appropriately
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chosen function F , that is, f(si, k) = F (ωπ(si, k)), where ω, again, stands for the
intensity of selection (cf. equation (1.7)). Typically, the relation (1.10) is assumed,
i.e.,
f(si, k) = 1− ω + ωπ(si, k). (2.3)
After the fitnesses are updated, selection pressures come into effect, and the
population evolves by reshaping the strategic landscape. Hitherto, we assumed
that under natural selection, a randomly chosen individual is eliminated from the
population and replaced by another individual utilising a (neighbouring) strategy
chosen with probability proportional to its fitness. Still, as we will shortly see, there
exists a myriad of different update rules which govern how individual strategies
vanish and spread throughout the population in proportion to their contemporary
fitnesses. Surprisingly, they can lead to strikingly different evolutionary outcomes in
terms of the traits that they facilitate, as we shall see in the next chapter.
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Chapter3
Imitation Processes on Graphs
In contrast to perfect rationality, where players act towards maximising their utilities
by making arbitrarily complex deductions and thinking every possible outcome
through, the paradigm of evolutionary game theory does not bestow upon them the
capacity to do so.
Hence, deciphering the behaviour of players – especially their strategic choices
– calls for a different approach. It has become standard practice to characterise
strategy shifts by means of diverse agent-based update rules [165]. An update rule is
a policy applicable to every individual in the population that regulates reproduction
events – it specifies how birth (replication of a strategy) and death (deletion of a
strategy) events occur on the basis of underlying fitnesses [2].
Consequently, the course of evolution hinges upon the interwoven effects of the
game being played, the pattern of interactions inherent to the population under
scrutiny, and the specific update rule guiding the dynamics. In this chapter, we
disentangle the effect of update rules from the broader set of other complementary
components and examine it in isolation.
We begin our journey with a short review of some of the most widely used update
rules, then steer the discussion towards the tractability of the resulting stochastic
model and associated approximation schemes, pay a visit to the replicator equation
on graphs as a practical case study of the application of these schemes, and reach
the foothills of understanding altruistic and cooperative behaviour in populations.
3.1 Update Rules Reviewed
As a rule of thumb, agent-based update rules can be divided into two groups [165].
The first type of rules stems from the principal idea behind Darwinian selection and
can be best understood in the context of biological species. Roughly speaking, (unfit)
individuals perish and (the fittest) species reproduce to pass their traits down to the
offspring, who then themselves enter the biological arms race, and the cycle goes on.
The second set of rules, on the other hand, emerges from a more socio-behavioural
perspective. Individuals compare their performance with that of their competitors
and adjust their strategies by imitating those that they perceive to be better.
At the end of the day, an update rule – as the name suggests – dictates how
individuals update their strategies given the (local) distribution of strategies and
payoffs. Let us take a look at how both types of update rules, which will be dubbed
replication and imitation rules, operate in practice.
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3.1.1 Replication Rules
In essence, replication update rules specify how a population evolves in response to
natural selection. Birth and death events are alternately assigned to the members of
the population who are sampled either uniformly at random or with a probability
proportional to the fitness values (optionally, weights of the incident edges can also be
taken into account). It should be emphasised that these random selections involve no
(pairwise) fitness and/or payoff comparisons – the difference between the fitness value
of the individual about to be removed from the population and the individual whose
offspring is to fill the subsequent vacancy has no bearing on the process. In what
follows, we survey two of the most commonly used replication rules, the birth–death
and the death–birth process, respectively [2, 165].
Birth–Death Process
Following an update of all fitness values after a round of the game, the birth–death
process takes place. At the outset, an individual u ∈ V utilising strategy su ∈ S is
chosen to reproduce with a probability proportional to his or her fitness f(su, ku),
where ku denotes the tuple of strategy counts in the neighbourhood of u. The chosen
individual then produces an offspring carrying the same strategy su ∈ S, who goes
on to replace a randomly selected v ∈ N (u) in the neighbourhood of u. As a remark,
in the case of a weighted graph, v ∈ N (u) is often assumed to be chosen with a
probability proportional to the weight auv of the edge uv ∈ E. In the absence of
weights, this reduces to every neighbour being picked with equal probability. All
things considered, the birth–death event outlined above occurs with probability
P(u→ v) = f(su, ku)∑︁
w∈V f(sw, kw)
auv∑︁
w∈N (u) auw
.
Death–Birth Process
In a sense, the death–birth process is very much like the birth–death process with the
order of the reproduction events reversed, which can nevertheless lead to astonishingly
different dynamics.
First of all, an individual is drawn uniformly at random and taken out of the
population, leaving an unoccupied vertex v ∈ V behind. Afterwards, every individual
in the neighbourhood competes for the empty spot, and one, say u ∈ N (v), eventually
succeeds with a probability proportional to the fitness f(su, ku) or, when the graph
is weighted, to the fitness multiplied by the weight auv of the corresponding edge
uv ∈ E, resulting in f(su, ku)auv. This grants the triumphant individual u the ability
to reproduce and place an offspring endowed with the identical strategy su on the
vertex formerly inhabited by v. The probability of this particular death–birth event
is thus
P(u→ v) = 1|V |
f(su, ku)auv∑︁
w∈N (v) f(sw, kw)awv
.
Notice that the Moran process, which we investigated in Section 1.3.2, can be
obtained as a special case of the death–birth process studied above by assuming
the interaction graph to be complete. Apart from the classical death–birth process,
many extensions thereof have also been considered. A popular variant keeps the
death event unchanged and only slightly modifies the birth event. In particular, the
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individual v to be removed from the population can be replaced by an offspring of
his or her own – in addition to the neighbourhood N (v) of v, the individual v itself
also stands a chance to reproduce. Alternatively, this reference scenario can also be
interpreted as permitting a randomly sampled individual to reconsider his or her
strategy based on the fitness values by either imitating one of the neighbours or
committing to stick to the existing strategy. By analogy with imitation learning,
this update rule is usually referred to as the imitation process. However, we do not
use this terminology here and rather refer to it as the imitative death–birth process
to avoid confusion with imitation update rules, which we tackle in the next section.
3.1.2 Imitation Rules
As the saying goes, “like breeds like”, and the simple rationale behind this adage can
aid comprehension of much of the phenomena found in fields as diverse as social
science, neurolinguistics, zoology, anthropology, and child development, among many
others. Imitative behaviour is particularly abundant when individuals only have
scarce information about the environment at their disposal, prompting them to turn
to the players surrounding them for guidance instead [165]. This typically entails
mimicking either the strategy deemed best or the one that is the most widespread.
The latter behaviour is ubiquitous in the animal kingdom and commonly leads
to self-organised coordination and cooperation, which can be seen in birds flocking,
fish schooling, bees swarming, cattle herding, and many other instances of collective
behaviour [80]. Although imitation can, to an extent, also be traced in human
behaviour – e.g., when mass demonstrations break out or contagions spread – it may
not be sufficient to accurately reflect all the intricacies of the human decision-making
process. Strategic choices can often be threefold, involving looking backwards in the
history of interactions, looking around at the contemporaries, and looking forwards
by anticipating future reactions [165]. Whilst predicting what the future might
unfold was a key element in the rationality postulate of classical game theory, and
learning from the past is in the domain of reinforcement learning, which will not be
dwelt upon, we will try to discern the aspect of looking around through the lens of
imitation mechanisms.
Note that we have already touched upon the foundation of imitative behaviour
in the well-mixed deterministic setting, where we studied imitation dynamics (cf.
Section 1.3.1). Pairs of imitators and imitatees were consecutively drawn from the
population at random, offering imitators opportunities to copy the strategies of
the imitatees with whom they were matched should they perceive them as more
successful. Turning back to the stochastic framework for structured populations, we
now present an overview of some of the most relevant update rules in this context.
Replicator Rule
Recall that the replicator dynamics (1.3) promotes the spread of species in proportion
to their fitness values – the higher the fitness of a species, the faster replication
rate it sustains. This motivated the introduction of the replicator rule, defined as
follows [139].
Initially, a randomly chosen individual v ∈ V that employs the strategy sv ∈ S
and has a fitness of f(sv, kv) is assigned the role of the imitator, and then one of
the neighbouring individuals u ∈ N (v) playing according to strategy su ∈ S with
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a fitness of f(su, ku) is picked, again at random, to be the potential role model
for v. As usual, if the graph is weighted, u ∈ N (v) is selected with a probability
proportional to the weight auv. Should the fitness of the imitatee u be higher than
that of the imitator v, the imitator v copies the imitatee’s strategy with a probability
proportional to the difference between their fitnesses. After taking into account the
relation f(s,k) = 1− ω + ωπ(s,k), the probability of this update event reduces to
P(u→ v) = 1|V |
auv∑︁
w∈N (v) awv
max
{︃
0,
ω(π(su, ku)− π(sv, kv))
ϕu,v
}︃
,
where π(s,k) denotes the aggregate payoff of an individual using strategy s ∈ S,
whose neighbours play according to the strategies given by k (cf. equation (2.1)),
and a normalisation factor ϕu,v is introduced to ensure that P(u→ v) ∈ [0, 1]. This
factor only depends on the ranges of payoffs that strategies su and sv can achieve
and the vertex degrees of the vertices u and v. For an obvious reason, the replicator
rule also goes by the name of proportional imitation rule.
The third term of the resulting expression, that is, the probability of imitation,
only depends on the payoff difference between the matched individuals and as such
closely resembles the transition probabilities (1.18) that we used in the derivation of
the replicator equation in the limit of an infinitely large population (cf. Section 1.3.3).
As a matter of fact, using this probability (mutatis mutandis) instead would also give
rise to the replicator equation, only differing slightly in the constant factor affecting
the time scale, which further justifies the name of the replicator rule.
Multiple Replicator Rule
A natural extension of the replicator rule is the multiple replicator rule [139], which
goes beyond the pairwise comparison guiding the replicator rule by enabling randomly
selected imitators to take into consideration their entire neighbourhoods. In line with
this, an individual v ∈ V is sampled from the population uniformly at random and
either retains the current strategy, which altogether happens with a probability of
P(v → v) =
∏︂
u∈N (v)
(1− pu→v),
or imitates the strategy of one of the neighbours u ∈ N (v) with a probability
proportional to pu→v and, optionally, the weight auv of the edge uv ∈ E. Here, we
leveraged on the pairwise probability pu→v of v copying the strategy of u that was
used in the replicator rule, i.e.,
pu→v := max
{︃
0,
ω(π(su, ku)− π(sv, kv))
ϕu,v
}︃
.
Note that the replicator rule can be adjusted in many other ways. Although all
rules that we have seen so far are stochastic, one could also consider deterministic
variations, such as the unconditional imitation rule [114], where the imitator always
copies the best-performing strategy in the surroundings. However, we will not dwell
on this topic but rather focus on stochastic rules.
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Fermi Rule
We conclude our list of update rules with the Fermi rule, which is sometimes also
known as the pairwise comparison rule [2, 119, 139].
Again, an individual v ∈ V with a fitness of f(sv, kv) is chosen uniformly at
random and allowed to reassess his or her strategy by examining and potentially
imitating one of the neighbours u ∈ N (v) with a fitness of f(su, ku) who is selected
either uniformly at random or with a probability that is proportional to the weight
auv of the edge uv ∈ E. The individual v then mimics the strategy of u with a
probability pu→v proportional to the difference between their fitness values, given by
the Fermi function (short for the Fermi–Dirac distribution function),
pu→v =
(︂
1 + exp
[︁− (︁f(su, ku)− f(sv, kv))︁]︁)︂−1 =
=
(︂
1 + exp
[︁− ω(︁π(su, ku)− π(sv, kv))︁]︁)︂−1, (3.1)
hence the name of the rule. The Fermi function was proposed independently by
Enrico Fermi and Paul Dirac in 1926, and it has been omnipresent ever since,
most prominently in the fields of quantum statistical physics and condensed matter
physics [60, 171]. Notably, the Fermi rule resembles the Glauber dynamics of the
kinetic Ising model in many ways. The analogy is clear if we regard the spins as
individuals arranged in the graph, their quantum states (spin up and spin down) as
strategies, and the change in energy ∆E accompanying a spin flip as the difference
between the payoffs of the role model and the imitator [60]. Thus, a spin flip occurs
with a probability of 1/(1 + exp(∆E/kBT )), where kB denotes the Boltzmann’s
constant and T the absolute temperature. The greater the decrease in energy, the
higher the probability of a spin flip, and the spin system is gradually driven towards
equilibrium.
These similarities aside, the game-theoretical Fermi rule is nonetheless different
in some respects. Whilst the spin system as a whole strives for a shared goal of low
overall energy, players (obeying the Fermi rule) aim to maximise their own payoffs
only, even if this comes at the expense of the rest of the population. Our clustering
algorithm, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, builds
upon both aspects – it prescribes an update rule that at the same time optimises
the quantity of interest both locally and globally. This update rule is essentially
an adaptation of the Fermi rule that, akin to the multiple replicator rule, allows
individuals to explore their entire neighbourhoods.
Before we proceed, let us briefly revise some of the main properties of the Fermi
rule. In general, the transition probability pu→v indicates that individuals are more
likely to imitate those strategies that would yield higher profits than their baseline
ones. However, as opposed to the previously studied rules, an individual can err
and act irrationally by adopting a strategy with a lower payoff (albeit with a small
probability). As one would expect, when the imitator and the role model are equally
well off, the transition probability reduces to pu→v = 1/2, which means that, in
principle, the imitating individual leaves the decision of whether to imitate or not to
a coin flip.
The probability pu→v of imitation (3.1) also crucially relies on the intensity of
selection ω. By analogy with the transition probability describing Glauber dynamics,
it is often referred to as the inverse temperature and is assumed to be in the range of
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[0,∞) in this context. It regulates the balance between neutral drift and imitation-
driven selection. If the selection is weak, or interchangeably, the temperature is high,
ω ≪ 1, imitation is predominantly governed by random drift. At the opposite end
of the scale, if the selection pressure is high, ω →∞, there is very little noise and
individuals are biased towards imitating those who outperform them.
Similar effects can also be achieved by using functions other than the Fermi
function, as long as they meet some basic requirements. Effectively, one can take the
probability of imitation pu→v to be equal to F (f(su, ku)−f(sv, kv)) for any increasing
function F that satisfies F (x) ∈ [0, 1] for all x ∈ R and is such that F (x)− F (−x)
is differentiable at x = 0 [2].
As a side note, the Fermi function can also serve a purpose in re-establishing
the replicator equation if we stipulate a finite, well-mixed population undergoing
stochastic dynamics [171]. Indeed, drawing on the notation and hypotheses of
Section 1.3.3, if we replace the transition probabilities (1.18) with
T±(i) :=
(︂
1 + exp
[︁∓ ω(︁π(s1, i)− π(s2, i))︁]︁)︂−1 i
n
n− i
n
,
we can derive, ceteris paribus, in the limit of large population size,
ẋ = x(1− x) tanh
(︂ω
2
(Π1(x)− Π2(x))
)︂
.
Once more, this only recovers a modified replicator equation. But intriguingly,
in contrast to the first attempt outlined in Section 1.3.3, the classical replicator
equation (1.4) can now readily be inferred under the assumption of weak selection,
ω ≪ 1, by expanding the hyperbolic tangent tanh(y) as a Taylor series around y = 0
and truncating it to first order.
Regardless of the update rule that we impose on the Markov chain describing
the evolutionary dynamics on graphs, a rigorous analytic treatment remains, to
a large extent, elusive. Obtaining analytical results, or any reliable estimates for
that matter, is fundamentally difficult as the underlying model itself suffers from
a curse of dimensionality. Even a game with two strategies, let alone more, leads
to a state space that grows exponentially with the size n of the population [165] –
namely, a game with k strategies implies kn states of the Markov chain. What is
more, irregularities in the population structure render the computation of transition
probabilities inefficient, cumbersome, or even infeasible.
While some progress has been made in developing and analysing models to tackle
this problem, the existing studies are lacking in mathematical rigour. A number
of results have only been verified using a numerical approach or in a few special
cases. Typical constraints encountered in the literature are weak selection ω ≪ 1,
large population size n → ∞, regularity or special symmetry of the interaction
structure, and neglecting occurrences of short cycles, just to name a few. To a
degree, this complexity can be ameliorated by invoking several variants of mean-field
approximation, which is the main subject of the next section.
3.2 Mean-Field Approximation
As we have already mentioned in passing, the principal motivation behind mean-field
theory is gathering insight into high-dimensional stochastic systems of interacting
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individuals (or, for that matter, interacting entities of any sort) through the prism of
a prototypical individual responding to the perceived average action taken by other
(neighbouring) individuals. This approximation reduces the multi-agent system to a
centralised single-agent one, thereby circumventing the problem of intractability and
lowering the computational cost. Although the mean-field approach was primarily
used in statistical physics to study phase transitions in systems of interacting particles,
such as gas molecules, it found its way into game theory, agent-based modelling, and
other disciplines shortly thereafter.
It is important to bear in mind that exact calculations are extremely challeng-
ing, if not impossible, even when the underlying graph is particularly simple and
symmetric, e.g., a regular spatial lattice. Already a single individual invading an
otherwise strategically homogeneous population results in the emergence of intricate
configurations of strategies. Indeed, if the invading individual surmounts the initial
obstacles, a cluster employing the same strategy sprouts up, but this cluster is likely
to disintegrate into smaller parts in the course of time, which then in turn evolve on
their own [119].
In the most general sense, mean-field approximations are based on the premise
that spatial arrangements of strategies on clusters of a given order k are independent
of each other, while longer-range topological correlations are neglected [140]. We use
the term cluster in the sense of a section subgraph of a given graph. Under some
natural assumptions, such as compatibility and symmetry, a system of O
(︂(︁|S|+k−1
k
)︁)︂
equations in the same number of variables describing the time evolution of probabili-
ties of strategy configurations can then be derived, and configuration probabilities on
clusters of order larger than k are (approximately) expressed in terms of configuration
probabilities on smaller clusters, which is referred to as closure in the literature [60].
Thus, in addition to frequencies of strategies, as was the case with replicator
dynamics, mean-field approximation also keeps track of configurations on clusters
of order k. In principle, one could study configurations on arbitrarily large clusters,
but this renders the accompanying derivations rather tedious and involved, and it
does not necessarily significantly improve the accuracy or provide any added value.
Consequently, the remainder of the chapter only considers pair approximations , k = 2.
More specifically, we will take a closer look at homogeneous and heterogeneous pair
approximations [20].
Homogeneous pair approximation applies to interaction graphs with a homoge-
neous degree distribution – cycles, spatial lattices, complete graphs, and general
(random) regular graphs. Technically, the model is only valid for infinite Bethe
lattices, cycle-free regular graphs of infinite order with no leaves [119]. Still, it
provides reasonable approximations for suitably large random regular graphs since
they are locally tree-like, and hence the expected number of short cycles becomes
negligible as the order tends to infinity [107].
Formally [60, 140], homogeneous pair approximation is concerned with the time
evolution of the relative frequencies xij of pairs of strategies, where xij denotes the
probability of randomly drawing an edge occupied by an individual using strategy
si ∈ S at one endpoint who is accompanied by an individual playing according to
sj ∈ S at the other one. Furthermore, consistency and compatibility conditions
posit that the global frequencies xi of strategies si ∈ S may be expressed in terms
of frequencies of pairs, namely, xi =
∑︁|S|
j=1 xij, and symmetry implies that xij = xji
for all si, sj ∈ S. Since pair configurations are independent of each other and
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every individual in the population follows one of the strategies si ∈ S, the relation∑︁|S|
i,j=1 xij = 1 also holds. The closure condition now stipulates that the configuration
probabilities on larger clusters can be approximated by using pair configuration
probabilities xij and global frequencies xi of strategies. For instance, the probability
of a three-vertex chain of strategies si, sj, sk ∈ S can be estimated as xijk = xijxjk/xj .
Having established the notation, we can describe how the evolution equations
governing the configuration probabilities xij (and thus the global frequencies xi)
are derived. The approximations heavily rely on the assumption that individuals
further away from the neighbourhood of the player re-evaluating his or her strategy
do not have a direct impact on this process. The probability that a pair of strategies
si, sj ∈ S evolves into a pair of strategies si, sk ∈ S is hence obtained by summing
up the probabilities with which the transition sj → sk occurs from any given
configuration of strategies in the neighbourhood of the focal edge. Each of these
probabilities corresponds to the product of the imitation probability, which depends
on the particular update rule under consideration, and the probability of the specific
configuration of the neighbouring strategies.
Shortly, we will demonstrate more rigorously how homogeneous pair approxi-
mation can be effectively implemented in practice, and the results will attest that
replicator dynamics reveals itself in the context of structured populations as well.
This further substantiates that the mechanisms inherent to replicator dynamics
pertain especially well to dynamically evolving populations – regardless of their
interaction structure.
But before we embark on this, let us spare a few words on the heterogeneous
pair approximation. Recall that its homogeneous counterpart is intended to be used
for regular graphs or graphs with a nearly homogeneous degree distribution. As
a matter of fact, it could also easily be deployed for other classes of graphs, such
as scale-free graphs with starkly skewed degree distributions (see Section 2.1), by
substituting the constant degree of the regular graph with the mean degree of the
arbitrary graph in question.
However, the resulting approximations appear to be somewhat dubious, as was
indicated by numerical simulations, which have exposed some discrepancies between
the approximations and the original model [120]. This is not surprising, though, given
that homogeneous pair approximation discards much information – all individuals are
assumed to be of equal degree and know only how many encounters with a particular
strategy they can expect on average.
To cope with these inconsistencies, heterogeneous pair approximation, an approach
capable of dealing with more complex topologies, was devised [20]. It is particularly
suited for heterogeneous graphs with a broad spectrum of degrees and generalises
homogeneous pair approximation by introducing degree-block variables, which store
the relative frequencies of strategies being played on vertices of a given degree. A
k-block variable xik thus records the density of individuals of degree k utilising
strategy si ∈ S and represents the focal unit of interest for this model.
The approximate formulas are then derived on the premise that the degree
distribution P (k) and the conditional degree distribution P (k′ | k), that is, the degree
distribution of vertices adjacent to a vertex of degree k, are sufficient ingredients
to quantitatively explain the evolutionary dynamics on heterogeneous graphs. To
simplify the calculations, the interaction graph is often assumed to be uncorrelated,
i.e., P (k′ | k) = k′P (k′)/k, where k = ∑︁k′≥0 k′P (k′) denotes its average degree.
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Since the derivation of the mean-field equations now proceeds analogously to the
homogeneous pair approximation, we will not elaborate on it any further. Instead,
we return to our previous approach, homogeneous pair approximation, and use it in
combination with diffusion approximation in order to derive the replicator equation
on graphs [119].
3.3 Replicator Equation on Graphs
As the discussion thus far shows, there is ample evidence that the more details a
model for population dynamics involves, the less amenable to a rigorous mathematical
formulation and an analytical treatment it becomes. By and large, as soon as the
interaction structure comes into play, the complexity of the problem grows and
tractability quickly gets out of hand, which is the main reason why most of the
results until now are based entirely on simulations or on semi-analytical solutions
that are restricted to special cases.
The gap between numerical experiments and a pure mathematical investigation
into evolutionary dynamics on graphs has nevertheless been filled to some extent.
An important advance in bridging this gap has been made by the derivation of
the replicator equation on graphs, the proof of which combines ideas and concepts
explored in the present chapter.
It is, at the very least, surprising that evolutionary dynamics in structured
populations interacting through games could fit into a narrative as simple and elegant
as the replicator dynamics. In fact, when the interaction graph is sufficiently large
and regular, and the selection is weak, ω ≪ 1, the expected frequency xi(t) of
individuals utilising strategy si ∈ S undergoing evolution through the passage of
time t ≥ 0 can be described by the linear replicator equation (1.4) with the matrix
of expected payoffs A slightly modified by the addition of a matrix B reflecting local
interactions [119]. Perhaps the most striking aspect of this result is that confining
the interactions of individuals to their respective neighbourhoods can be captured so
effortlessly in a single matrix B, which at the same time also turns out to be very
intuitive.
In the proof, we will go a step further and assume that not only are the interactions
between individuals limited to their immediate neighbours – the dynamical processes
that they sustain will also only be influenced by local neighbourhoods. This will
enable us to assess the state of an individual directly from the neighbouring states
and to invoke the versatile pair approximation tool, reviewed in the previous section,
that mean-field theory has to offer. Recall that if one is to use pair approximation
with the purpose to generate approximations of high quality, the number of short
cycles ought to be as small as possible. Given that every (finite) 2-regular graph
consists of a disjoint union of cycles, it is only meaningful to consider k-regular
graphs of degree k > 2. The statement of the theorem is as follows [119].
Theorem 3.3.1. Let A = [aij ]Ni,j=1 be the payoff matrix of the chosen game and G a
regular graph of degree k > 2 with n ≫ 1 vertices. Let xi be the relative frequency
of individuals employing strategy si ∈ S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN} and suppose that the
population occupies the vertices of the graph G. In the limit of weak selection ω → 0,
the replicator equation on graphs, i.e.,
ẋi = xi
(︂(︁
(A+B)x
)︁
i
− x · (A+B)x
)︂
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (3.2)
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holds, where the matrix B = [bij]Ni,j=1 pertains to local interactions and depends on
the particular update mechanism considered, as specified below:
bij =
aii + aij − aji − ajj
k − 2 (birth–death process),
bij =
(k + 1)aii + aij − aji − (k + 1)ajj
(k + 1)(k − 2) (death–birth process), (3.3)
bij =
(k + 3)aii + 3aij − 3aji − (k + 3)ajj
(k + 3)(k − 2) (imitative death–birth process).
Note that all three update rules, explicit descriptions of which can be found in
Section 3.1, correspond to distinct local interaction matrices B and induce markedly
different dynamics on graphs, as the next section reveals.
Regardless, the matrices B, which are uniquely determined by the payoff matrix
A, the update mechanism considered, and the degree k of the regular graph, do share
some common features. The greater the benefit aii that individuals using strategy
si ∈ S enjoy from cooperation with each other (compared to ajj that other strategies
sj ∈ S gain from cooperation among themselves), and the more efficient they are
at exploiting other strategies in terms of aij (compared to aji that other strategies
collect from them), the more they flourish. Limited interactions among individuals
enable such strategies to thrive by propelling the individuals using them to reinforce
each other in self-assembled clusters, which also protect them from intruders.
One can also immediately observe that all matrices B are skew-symmetric,
i.e., BT = −B. This is another intuitively plausible property, given that the
advantage that one strategy has against another in successfully dispersing across
the vertices of the graph should be reflected in an equal disadvantage to the other.
This further implies that the average population fitness on a graph coincides with
the average population fitness in the absence of any population structure, namely
x · (A+ B)x = x · Ax, which again is reasonable since the reproductive success of
the population as a whole, when all is said and done, principally depends on the
distribution of the strategies.
Lastly, as the degree k of the regular graph increases, k →∞, the graph becomes
denser and more complete, and the population structure dissolves. Consistently, all
local interaction matrices B disappear, and the classical replicator equation (1.4)
is recovered. The proof, which is outlined below and follows the ideas of [9, 119,
146] and [70], thus also serves as an alternative justification that a finite, well-mixed
population in the limit of weak selection, ω → 0, and large population size, n→∞,
evolves according to the replicator dynamics (see also Section 1.3.3).
Proof. We will only prove the theorem in detail for the birth–death process as the
other two cases follow similar lines of reasoning. Recall that in the birth–death
process, an update consists of three stages. Firstly, all individuals play a round
of the game with each of their respective neighbours and accumulate the payoffs
thus obtained (see equation (2.1)). Secondly, one individual is chosen to replicate
with a probability proportional to the fitness (2.3) and, lastly, passes on an identical
copy of himself or herself to one of the neighbours selected uniformly at random.
We will assume that the configuration of strategies is updated n times in a unit
of time, indicating that, on average, each individual is offered an opportunity to
60
Chapter 3. Imitation Processes on Graphs
reproduce. Accordingly, we will set the time step to be equal to ∆t = 1/n, which
can be arbitrarily small due to the large population size n≫ 1.
Since it clearly matters who is the reproducing individual and who is on the
receiving end, reproduction events will be encoded by directed edges. Hence, we
replace each edge uv ∈ E with a pair of directed edges −→uv and −→vu, one in each
direction, and we postulate that a reproduction event occurring along the edge −→uv
from u to v indicates that the individual occupying vertex u produced an offspring
carrying the same strategy, who then took the place of the individual at vertex v.
Let us now establish some notation. We will use Vi to denote the set of all vertices
adopting strategy si ∈ S, its cardinality by ni := |Vi|, and the corresponding relative
frequency, as usual, by xi = ni/n. Thus,
⋃︁N
i=1 Vi = V and
∑︁N
i=1 ni = n. It is also
reasonable to require that xi > 0 holds for all strategies si ∈ S. If this were not the
case, we could simply eliminate the strategies absent from the start and investigate
the reduced system of replicator equations instead. Indeed, any strategy si ∈ S with
xi = 0 trivially satisfies the equation regulating its dynamics and also has no impact
on the rest of the equations (3.2). Because we are only interested in graphs of a large
enough order n≫ 1 and time increments ∆t = 1/n, we may further assume that the
relative frequencies xi evolve continuously over time. For simplicity, suppose that xi
are even differentiable with respect to t.
Analogously, nij will be used to refer to the number of directed edges pointing
from a vertex on which an individual using strategy si ∈ S is placed to a vertex
representing an individual following strategy sj ∈ S, and the total number of directed
edges will be denoted by m =
∑︁N
i,j=1 nij. As we are dealing with a k-regular graph,
we also have that m = nk. Note that an undirected edge between two vertices of the
same type – that is, between two players using the same strategy si ∈ S – contributes
2 to the variable nii.
Another important quantity of interest will be the relative frequencies xij of the
directed edges running from the vertices to which strategy si ∈ S is assigned to the
vertices employing strategy sj ∈ S, i.e., xij = nij/m. It is evident that xij = xji and
again the differentiability of xij can be hypothesised.
On a final note, the conditional probabilities qi|j that strategy si ∈ S can be
found in the neighbourhood of an individual deploying strategy sj ∈ S will help us
determine the dynamics of the relative frequencies xi and xij.
Much of the proof will revolve around zooming in closer on the local structure of
the graph and studying the evolution of focal players within their neighbourhoods
as per the fundamental principles of the mean-field theory. It is carried out by
proving a series of intermediate claims, and the first one touches upon the conditional
probabilities qi|j.
Claim 1. Let qi|j be the conditional probability that an individual using strategy
si ∈ S is adjacent to a focal individual utilising strategy sj ∈ S. Then qi|j = xij/xj.
By definition, qi|j = P(Vi|j)/P(Vj), where P(Vj) denotes the probability that a vertex
v ∈ V picked out at random is contained in the set Vj and P(Vi|j) the joint probability
of first drawing one of the vertices v ∈ Vj and then randomly selecting a vertex
u ∈ Vi ∩N (v) from the neighbourhood N (v) of v.
It is straightforward to see that P(Vj) = xj, whereas finding P(Vi|j) is a bit more
involved. For any fixed vertex v ∈ V , let ki(v) denote the number of vertices adjacent
to v that are occupied by an individual using strategy si ∈ S, i.e., ki(v) := |N (v)∩Vi|.
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From this it follows immediately that
∑︁N
i=1 ki(v) = k for all v ∈ V and that∑︁
v∈Vj ki(v) = nji = nij for all si ∈ S, which implies
N∑︂
i=1
nij =
N∑︂
i=1
∑︂
v∈Vj
ki(v) =
∑︂
v∈Vj
N∑︂
i=1
ki(v) =
∑︂
v∈Vj
k = knj
and, at last,
P(Vi|j) =
∑︂
v∈Vj
1
n
· ki(v)
k
=
1
nk
∑︂
v∈Vj
ki(v) =
nij
m
= xij.
Altogether, this yields the desired relation qi|j = xij/xj. It takes very little effort to
verify that the associated probability function i ↦→ qi|j is well defined. Indeed,
N∑︂
i=1
qi|j =
N∑︂
i=1
xij
xj
=
1
xj
N∑︂
i=1
nij
m
=
1
xj
· knj
nk
=
1
xj
· nj
n
=
1
xj
· xj = 1.
As a side remark, the conditional probabilities qi|j intuitively represent local
densities of strategies si ∈ S in the neighbourhoods of sj ∈ S, as witnessed by the
fact that
qi|j = xij · x−1j =
nij
m
· n
nj
=
nij
knj
=
nij∑︁N
i=1 nij
.
Having concluded the proof of the first claim, we now move on to the second one,
which is concerned with approximating the dynamics of the global frequencies xi. It
will prove useful to label an individual adopting strategy si ∈ S that is adjacent to
kj vertices occupied with the strategy sj ∈ S as (si;k), where we use the shorthand
notation k = (k1, k2, . . . , kN), which has the property that
∑︁N
i=1 ki = k.
Claim 2. The global relative frequencies xi evolve at a rate proportional to the
intensity of selection ω ≪ 1.
As a starting point, we approximate the derivative ẋi of the relative frequency xi
with respect to time t by taking the ratio of its expected increment E(∆xi) in one
step to the length of the time increment ∆t.
The frequency of individuals playing according to strategy si ∈ S increases by
1/n if and only if one of them, say (si, k), is chosen to reproduce with a probability
proportional to the fitness f(si, k) (2.3), i.e.,
f(si, k) = 1− ω + ω
(︄
N∑︂
j=1
kjaij
)︄
,
and the resulting offspring supersedes a random neighbour of (si, k) that uses any
strategy other than si, which occurs with probability 1− ki/k.
Similarly, xi decreases by 1/n if and only if an individual (sj, k′) with a strategy
sj ∈ S \ {si} is selected instead and replicates its strategy to one of the k′i neighbours
utilising strategy si, which happens with probability k′i/k.
Assembling all these pieces together, we derive the following estimate for the
global relative frequencies xi,
ẋi ≈ E(∆xi)
∆t
=
∑︂
k
E(si, k)
f(si, k)
f
(︃
1− ki
k
)︃
−
N∑︂
j=1,
j ̸=i
∑︂
k
E(sj, k)
f(sj, k)
f
ki
k
, (3.4)
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where the sums over k run over all the possible N -tuples k = (k1, k2, . . . , kN) that
meet the constraints k1 + k2 + · · ·+ kN = k and ki ≥ 0 for all si ∈ S. Moreover, f
stands for the average population fitness,
f =
N∑︂
i=1
∑︂
k
E(si, k)f(si, k),
and we labelled the expected frequency of individuals of type (si, k) as E(si, k),
E(si, k) = xi
(︃
k
k1, k2, . . . , kN
)︃
qk11|iq
k2
2|i · · · qkNN |i = xi
k!
k1!k2! · · · kN !q
k1
1|iq
k2
2|i · · · qkNN |i.
Here, the multinomial coefficient accounts for the fact that the neighbouring strategies
can be shuffled around and rearranged, whereby the neighbours using the same
strategy are indistinguishable from the standpoint of the birth–death process.
Since we are in the regime of weak selection, ω ≪ 1, the factors of the form
f(si, k)/f in the estimate (3.4) above can be expanded as a Taylor series around
ω = 0. We will show that all constant terms of (3.4) cancel out and that what
remains are terms of order O(ω) and higher, which will establish our claim.
It can be easily seen that evaluating f(si, k)/f at ω = 0, which corresponds to
the constant term of the Taylor expansion, amounts to 1. Although it is little wonder
that as soon as every fitness f(si, k) is equal to 1, the average fitness f must also be
1, this could also be ascertained by means of the multinomial theorem, which implies∑︂
k
(︃
k
k1, k2, . . . , kN
)︃
qk11|iq
k2
2|i · · · qkNN |i = (q1|i + q2|i + · · ·+ qN |i)k = 1. (3.5)
The right-hand side of the expression (3.4) therefore simplifies to
ẋi ≈
∑︂
k
E(si, k)−
N∑︂
j=1
∑︂
k
ki
k
E(sj, k) +O(ω) =
= xi
∑︂
k
(︃
k
k1, . . . , kN
)︃ N∏︂
l=1
qkll|i −
N∑︂
j=1
xj
∑︂
k
ki
k
(︃
k
k1, . . . , kN
)︃ N∏︂
l=1
qkll|j +O(ω) =
= xi −
N∑︂
j=1
xjqi|j
∑︂
k1+···+(ki−1)+···+kN=k−1
(︃
k − 1
k1, . . . , ki − 1, . . . , kN
)︃
qk11|j · · · qki−1i|j · · · qkNN |j +O(ω) =
=
N∑︂
j=1
xiqj|i −
N∑︂
j=1
xjqi|j +O(ω) =
N∑︂
j=1
xji −
N∑︂
j=1
xij +O(ω) = O(ω).
Hence, the rate of evolution of the global frequencies xi is very slow, given that the
intensity of selection ω is close to zero. On the contrary, the dynamics of the local
relative frequencies qi|j will turn out to operate on a faster time scale. The same
holds for the relative frequencies xij of directed edges pointing from vertices utilising
strategy si to vertices using strategy sj, which take centre stage in the next claim.
Claim 3. The global relative frequencies xij evolve according to
ẋij ≈ 2
k
xj
(︄
δij + (k − 1)
N∑︂
l=1
qi|lql|j − kqi|j
)︄
+O(ω).
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We proceed as in the proof of the previous claim and approximate the derivative
ẋij by the fraction E(∆xij)/∆t. This time, the frequency xij can vary by at most
±1/(kn) from one step to the next, and the change can arise as a result of an
reproduction event in either direction of an edge between two individuals using
strategies si ∈ S and sj ∈ S \ {si} or an edge between strategy si or sj and any
other strategy sl ∈ S \ {si, sj}.
Only one of the cases will be considered in detail as the same line of reasoning
applies to all of them. In view of this, suppose that an individual u ∈ Vi utilising
strategy si ∈ S was selected for reproduction and invaded one of the adjacent
vertices v ∈ N (u) ∩ Vj inhabited by strategy sj ∈ S \ {si} (refer to Figure 3.1 for an
illustration [70]), the probability of which can be written in the form xjqi|j +O(ω).
si sj
sisk
sl sj
Figure 3.1: A schematic sketch of a replication that was initiated at a vertex with strategy
si ∈ S and terminated at a vertex with strategy sj ∈ S \ {si} (indicated by the red line
in bold). Observe that the frequency of the relative frequency xij is altered by the two
edges between strategies si and sj , which decrease it by 2/(kn) since they turn into edges
between strategies si and si, and the edge between sj and sj , which turns into an edge
between strategies si and sj and increases it by 1/(kn).
Clearly, this event increases the relative frequency xij by 1/(kn) for each vertex
w ∈ N (v) ∩ Vj in the neighbourhood of v that deploys strategy sj, so the overall
expected increment adds up to 1/(kn) · (k − 1)qj|j . In the same way, each neighbour
w ∈ N (v) ∩ Vi of vertex v that plays according to strategy si decreases the relative
frequency by 1/(kn). Combined with the fact that the focal edge, along which
the reproduction occurs, also reduces it by the same amount, this gives rise to the
expected decrement of 1/(kn) · ((k − 1)qi|j + 1). On the whole, this particular case
contributes (︃
1
kn
)︃
xjqi|j
(︁
(k − 1)qj|j − (k − 1)qi|j − 1
)︁
to the total expected increment E(∆xi). If we performed a thorough analysis of
other cases as well, we would eventually arrive at the equation
ẋij ≈ E(∆xij)
∆t
=
2
k
xj
(︄
δij + (k − 1)
N∑︂
l=1
qi|lql|j − kqi|j
)︄
+O(ω), (3.6)
where δij is the Kronecker delta defined by δij = 1 if i = j and δij = 0 otherwise.
This confirms the claim and allows us to separate the time scales of the global and
the local dynamics, which is what we tackle next.
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Claim 4. The local relative frequencies qi|j evolve according to
q̇i|j ≈
2
k
(︄
δij + (k − 1)
N∑︂
l=1
qi|lql|j − kqi|j
)︄
+O(ω)
and rapidly (on a time scale of order O(1)) equilibrate to
q∗i|j =
δij + (k − 2)xi
k − 1 for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N. (3.7)
The first part of the claim is straightforward. Indeed, computing the derivative of
qi|j = xij/xj with respect to time t and taking into account the estimate (3.6) and
the fact that ẋj ≈ O(ω) leads to
q̇i|j ≈
ẋij
xj
+O(ω) = 2
k
(︄
δij + (k − 1)
N∑︂
l=1
qi|lql|j − kqi|j
)︄
+O(ω).
In order to prove the second part, notice first that the local frequencies qi|j evolve on
a much faster time scale than the global frequencies xi. We can thus treat the global
frequencies as constant when deriving the equilibrium q∗i|j of the local frequencies qi|j .
The equilibrium q∗i|j is found by solving the system of equations q̇i|j = 0 for
1 ≤ i, j ≤ N obtained by neglecting the terms proportional to O(ω), which have very
little effect on the dynamics of qi|j. To begin with, equations q̇i|i = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N
can be rearranged as
0 = 1 + (k − 1)
N∑︂
l=1
qi|lql|i − kqi|i =
N∑︂
l=1
ql|i + (k − 1)
N∑︂
l=1
qi|lql|i − kqi|i
N∑︂
l=1
ql|i =
=
N∑︂
l=1,
l ̸=i
ql|i
(︁
1 + (k − 1)qi|l − kqi|i
)︁
+ qi|i(1− qi|i) =
N∑︂
l=1,
l ̸=i
ql|i
(︁
1 + (k − 1)qi|l − kqi|i
)︁
+
+ qi|i
N∑︂
l=1,
l ̸=i
ql|i =
N∑︂
l=1,
l ̸=i
ql|i
(︁
1 + (k − 1)qi|l − (k − 1)qi|i
)︁
.
(3.8)
An obvious solution to this equation would be ql|i = 0 for at least some of the
indices l ̸= i. However, ql|i = 0 coupled with the equation q̇l|i = 0 would imply∑︁N
l′=1 ql|l′ql′|i = 0 and in turn either ql|l′ = 0 or ql′|i = 0 for all 1 ≤ l′ ≤ N . Repeating
this argument for each of these zero components would bring about more zero
components – and the fact that relations ql|ixi = qi|lxl would yield even more has not
even been considered yet. This would inevitably result in qi|i = 1 for some strategy
si ∈ S, which corresponds to the configuration in which every individual following
strategy si is surrounded only by strategists of the same type and so forth, but this
coincides with the entire population playing the same strategy, i.e., xi = 1 and xj = 0
for all other strategies sj ∈ S \ {si}, which has been excluded right from the outset
of the proof.
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It turns out that the equilibrium q∗i|j reached by the local frequencies qi|j that we
are after is the solution of the system of equations (3.8) for which equations
1 + (k − 1)qi|l − (k − 1)qi|i = 0 (3.9)
hold for all si ∈ S and all sl ∈ S \ {si}. To justify this statement, suppose this is
not the case. The local frequencies then settle at an equilibrium qˆi|j that violates at
least some of these constraints. Hence, we can find a pair of indices l1 ̸= l2, both
different from i, such that
1 + (k − 1)qˆi|l1 − (k − 1)qˆi|i < 0,
1 + (k − 1)qˆi|l2 − (k − 1)qˆi|i > 0,
from which we deduce that qˆi|l1 < qˆi|l2 . Resuming our previous discussion, we
also know that qˆl1|l2 > 0, which in particular means that there exists at least one
edge between strategies sl1 and sl2 . But this contradicts qˆi|j being an equilibrium
since reproduction events along the edges between strategies sl1 and sl2 will at
some point shift the values of qˆi|l1 and qˆi|l2 . Thus, the equilibrium q
∗
i|j must fulfil
the conditions specified by (3.9). This further indicates that, at equilibrium, the
conditional probabilities qi|j are independent of j ̸= i, i.e.,
qi|1 = qi|2 = · · · = qi|i−1 = qi|i+1 = · · · = qi|N .
Multiplying both sides of the relation
∑︁N
l=1 ql|i = 1 by xi, bearing in mind that
ql|ixi = qi|lxl, substituting qi|l with qi|j for all l ≠ i, and expressing qi|i in terms of
qi|j via the equation (3.9) at last brings us to
q∗i|j =
(k − 2)xi
(k − 1) for all j ̸= i,
which subsequently implies
q∗i|i =
1 + (k − 2)xi
(k − 1) ,
as claimed.
We are now fully equipped to establish the last part of the proof. Accordingly, we
return to the equation (3.4), which provides an approximate formula for the dynamics
of the global frequencies xi, the Taylor series expansion of which has revealed that
ẋi = O(ω). Without further ado, we assume that the local frequencies qi|j have
already equilibrated at q∗i|j , and we take a closer look at what happens on a time scale
of O(ω) by extracting the coefficient of the term ω in the expansion of ẋi. Applying
the multinomial theorem (3.5), taking into account the relations
∑︁N
l=1 ql|j = 1 for all
1 ≤ j ≤ N , and plugging in q∗i|j finally gives
ẋi ≈ ω (k − 2)
2
k − 1 xi
(︄
N∑︂
j=1
aijxj +
N∑︂
j=1
aii + aij − aji − ajj
k − 2 xj −
N∑︂
i=1
N∑︂
j=1
aijxixj
)︄
,
the replicator equation on graphs (3.2), which concludes the proof. Without loss of
generality, the constant term ω(k − 2)2/(k − 1) may safely be neglected – as usual,
it only affects the time scale of the evolution.
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Far from being merely a theoretical formulation of the dynamics underlying
structured populations, the replicator equation on graphs also serves an important
role in elucidating reciprocity and the tendency to form clusters, both of which
can be observed in various natural populations. The next section explores in more
detail what this entails and provides a stepping stone towards our algorithm, which
leverages imitation dynamics and other ideas discussed so far to uncover the latent
clustering structure inherent in a multitude of interaction graphs.
3.4 Reciprocity and Clustering
As soon as the individuals are only allowed to interact with their immediate neigh-
bours, reciprocity may become both feasible and viable. In fact, limited interaction
range enables individuals following the same strategy to form clusters, within which
they are more likely to reciprocate with each other and collectively fend off com-
petitors. Indeed, one can easily check that, at equilibrium, the local frequencies
q∗i|j, given by (3.7), satisfy the inequalities q
∗
i|i > xi > q
∗
i|j for all si ∈ S and all
sj ∈ S \ {si} [119]. This means that an individual following strategy si ∈ S should
on average be surrounded by more individuals employing strategy si than expected
at random. Moreover, the opposite holds for individuals using strategy sj ∈ S \ {si},
who can expect to perceive less of strategy si ∈ S in their respective neighbourhoods
than expected at random.
This subject has been made particularly popular in the context of the tragedy of
the commons – the social dilemma whether to cooperate or defect (see the discussion
following Example 1.1.5) – by the discovery that spatial structure can promote
the evolution of cooperation [114] through the mechanism that is now known as
network reciprocity [112]. In essence, network reciprocity relies on the fact that
cooperators do best if they are surrounded by other cooperators. If interactions
among players are structured rather than well mixed, the clustering of cooperators is
more likely to be stable since defectors have limited opportunities for exploiting those
that are located in the interior of cooperative clusters [2, 60]. Further promoting
the potency of network reciprocity, which was initially studied predominantly on
regular lattices [113], is the heterogeneity of the interaction network, especially
the fact that scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the evolution of
cooperation [143].
Moreover, considerable attention has also been devoted to studying whether
interdependent and multilayer networks can help promote the dissemination of strate-
gies that exhibit cooperative traits. Several mechanisms have been discovered by
means of which the interdependence between different networks or network lay-
ers may help to resolve social dilemmas, with examples including interdependent
network reciprocity [177], non-trivial organization of cooperators across the inter-
dependent layers [54], probabilistic interconnectedness [176], as well as information
transmission [160].
Although some human experiments indicate that network reciprocity may to
a degree be compromised [56], which is further substantiated by the fact that
human behaviour can be, at the very least, puzzling, there is still ample interest
in understanding how and why networks and graphs influence the outcome of
evolutionary dynamics. Notably, there is also evidence that dynamic social networks
promote cooperation in experiments with humans [134] and that even static network
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structure can stabilize human cooperation [135]. However, while simulation results
to support the experiments abound, there is a notable lack of rigorous mathematical
results and proofs that would put the outcome of simulations and human experiments
on a more solid footing. A comprehensive review of evolutionary dynamics in
structured populations is provided in [116], with some rigorous results on evolutionary
graph theory taking centre stage [18, 87, 118, 119], most prominently the fact that
if all players have the same degree, the evolution of cooperation is favoured if the
benefit–cost ratio is greater than the degree, which follows immediately from the
replicator equation on graphs (3.2) [119].
Indeed, resorting to the running example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (refer
to Examples 1.1.5 and 1.3.2) and assuming the standard cost–benefit form of the
payoff matrix, i.e.,
C D[︃ ]︃
C b− c −c
D b 0
, (3.10)
the replicator equation on graphs (3.2) turns into
ẋ = x(1− x) k
k − 2(−c) (birth–death process),
ẋ = x(1− x) k
(k + 1)(k − 2)(b− kc) (death–birth process),
ẋ = x(1− x) k
(k + 3)(k − 2)
(︁
b− (k + 2)c)︁ (imitative death–birth process)
for each of the three different update mechanisms (3.3), respectively. Here, we follow
the common convention that x denotes the frequency of cooperators, using strategy
C, in the population.
Notice that the evolution under the birth–death process brings no visible benefit
vis-à-vis the well-mixed case – cooperators still have a dismal outlook and are always
overcome by the defectors. The same cannot be said, however, for the death–birth
process and its imitative variant. The former ensures the defeat of defectors as
quickly as the ratio b/c of benefit b to cost c exceeds the degree k of the graph,
whereas the latter fosters cooperation when b/c > k + 2. What is evident from both
cases is that the smaller the degree k, the less stringent the criteria that must be
fulfilled for cooperation to prevail, since smaller neighbourhoods facilitate consensus
and the formation of clusters.
Even a richer variety of evolutionary outcomes can be achieved if we adopt the
more general form of the payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (1.1). A
suitable choice of parameters (i.e., the matrix coefficients T > R > P > S and
the degree k of the graph) can, for instance, lead to bistability or coexistence of
both cooperators and defectors. Both scenarios were absent in the case of replicator
dynamics in well-mixed populations, in which defectors inevitably dominated the
entire population.
The simple but elegant rule b/c > k merits additional discussion. Intriguingly,
both the b/c > k rule for the death–birth process and the b/c > k + 2 rule for the
imitative death–birth process were brought to light by taking a different approach to
the matter – namely, by examining under which conditions it holds that ρC > 1/n and
ρD < 1/n for the fixation probability ρC of cooperators and the fixation probability
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ρD of defectors invading structured populations placed on graphs of order n≫ k in
the limit of weak selection, ω ≪ 1 [118]. What is more, a series of simulations was
performed on a plethora of (non-regular) graphs, such as (regular) random graphs,
cycles, spatial lattices, and scale-free graphs, and it suggested that the rule b/c > k
can produce fairly good estimates even when the interaction graph is not regular if
we substitute k with the average degree of the graph [118]. Nonetheless, the rule
turned out to be only necessary and not sufficient, and, as one would expect from the
assumptions underlying the derivation of the rule, the quality of the approximation
slightly drops if we take the degree distribution to be heterogeneous and the order of
the graph to be rather small.
As a side remark, with a slight modification, the requirement b/c > k applies to
both the death–birth process and the imitative death–birth process. Indeed, given
that the latter allows individuals to replace themselves during reproduction, we can
add a self-loop to each vertex in the graph, and since a self-loop contributes two
endpoints to the degree of the vertex, this claim is evident.
The fact that numerical experiments yielded promising results in support of the
b/c > k rule has prompted the conjecture that it may extend well beyond the realm
of regular graphs. This has spurred a widespread interest in the topic, but the proof
has remained elusive until very recently, when the rule was generalised to the case
in which each player can have a different degree [3]. This problem had been open
for a decade, and it was thought by many to be intractable. Indeed, it was recently
discovered that finding an efficient algorithm for the general problem of games on
graphs for arbitrary selection strength would imply that P = NP [69]. In fact, it
turned out that the evolutionary dynamics on any population structure allows a
general solution only if one supposes that selection is weak – that is, if the game has
only a small effect on reproduction. The solution uses coalescent theory, which is
based on the idea of tracing ancestries back in time as random walks. With this
approach and under the aforementioned assumption of weak selection, it is possible
to formulate a general method for determining whether any game strategy is favoured
on any graph [3].
As a matter of fact, the b/c > k rule has also been established for weighted
graphs, non-negligible mutation rates, separate graphs for game interactions and
replication events, and, importantly, it applies far beyond the particular case of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game [2]. Considering the most general formulation of the payoff
matrix of a two-player game (1.6), i.e.,
s1 s2[︃ ]︃
s1 A B
s2 C D
, (3.11)
and assuming weak selection, ω ≪ 1, strategy s1 is favoured by selection over strategy
s2 (in the sense of the Definition 1.3.5) if and only if
σA+B > C + σD,
where the parameter σ has been dubbed as the structural coefficient and depends
on the (possibly finite) underlying interaction graph, the update mechanism driving
the evolutionary dynamics, and, optionally, the mutation rate µ [165]. Clearly, the
b/c > k rule in the context of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game under the (imitative)
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death–birth process is recovered by setting σ = (k + 1)/(k − 1). Interestingly, in the
case of general uncorrelated graphs, σ = (knn + 1)/(knn − 1) where knn stands for
the population average of the average neighbour degree,
knn =
1
|V |
∑︂
v∈V
1
deg(v)
∑︂
u∈N (v)
deg(u),
was found to provide a better fit [165]. These results can be even further generalised
to games with a greater number of strategies S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN} [2], but we will
not go down this avenue here.
It is striking how ubiquitous the b/c > k rule, in one form or another, is. Yet one
more example demonstrating this is the renowned Hamilton’s rule pertaining to kin
selection, which is a strategy that factors in the biological inclination to sacrifice
oneself for the success of one’s kin even if it comes at the cost of risking one’s life
and/or the potential to reproduce. This can be seen, for example, in honey bee
colonies, where worker bees pass their own prospects for reproduction over in order
to serve the queen bee and tend her offspring instead [111]. The concept of kin
selection was pioneered by Fisher and Haldane in the early 1930s, and Haldane
famously quipped [112], “I will jump into the river to save two brothers or eight
cousins,” which could be thought to have foreseen the next major breakthrough
obtained by William Donald Hamilton in the 1960s, nowadays widely recognised
as the Hamilton’s rule. Essentially, it specifies that an individual subject to kin
selection is willing to cooperate if the condition
b/c > 1/r
holds, where r denotes the genetic relatedness between the potentially sacrificing
individual and the would-be beneficiary. Notice that the relation between 1/r in the
Hamilton’s rule and k in the b/c > k rule is a very intuitive one – as the number of
contacts k that an individual has grows, k ≫ 1, they get lost in the crowd, and the
relatedness r to them dilutes, r → 0 [118].
Not only does studying evolutionary games on graphs arise as a natural extension
of evolutionary dynamics in non-structured populations to decipher the abundance
of cooperative behaviour, there is also evidence that understanding how population
structure affects evolutionary outcomes may be a fruitful approach to proving other
results [3, 100]. For instance, removing a suitable minimal ensemble of vertices that
resulted in a completely fragmented graph and subsequently reinserting them in a
step-by-step manner with respect to the number of clusters they would join, paved
the way to a very efficient model in identifying the minimal set of influencers in a
graph [100, 161].
Motivated by the wide applicability of evolutionary dynamics on graphs, we plan
to explore how it can help pinpoint clusters of vertices in such a way that influence
within them is maximised. In particular, the next chapter will investigate how to
extract clusters by means of imitation dynamics induced by a variation of the Fermi
rule combined with the multiple replicator rule and whether the resulting clusters
agree with the existing ground-truth divisions and simulation outcomes.
Identifying clusters of individuals that influence each other most and determining
their distribution across a graph remains an aspect that is of crucial importance
for developing novel guiding strategies for information propagation and preventing
outbreaks of infectious diseases.
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An Evolutionary Approach to
Clustering
4.1 Introduction and Preliminaries
4.1.1 Motivation
In the era of big data, it is becoming increasingly more important to develop efficient
and scalable techniques capable of subdividing vast amounts of information into
cohesive subgroups, rendering the information comprehensible and more manageable
to analyse. In fact, more often than not, dealing with real-world datasets involves
investigating large, multi-dimensional, and noisy data. This is where clustering, a
form of unsupervised learning, comes in.
Essentially, the goal of clustering is to partition or group data into subsets of
“similar” entities. The very term similar crucially depends on the requirements
of the particular application being considered – the way we define the similarity
measure governs the structure that the clustering imposes on the data. For instance,
clustering genes into several categories based on similar expression patterns enables
us to infer their functional roles [27, 92].
Nevertheless, there are a few general guidelines that a partitioning clustering
method should follow. That is, it should separate a given set of objects X =
{x1, x2, . . . , xn} into non-overlapping groups (clusters) C = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck} that
satisfy the following properties [182]:
Ci ̸= ∅ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, (4.1)⋃︁k
i=1Ci = X, (4.2)
Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k. (4.3)
In addition, other preferable attributes include, but are not limited to, scalability –
reasonable runtime and memory usage performance on complex datasets, robustness
against sampling randomness, stability and reproducibility of results, a small number
of user-specified input parameters, and allowing for arbitrarily shaped clusters [6].
Regardless of this basic scaffolding, since clustering methods are widely applicable
in a plethora of fields – including, inter alia, pattern recognition, computer graphics,
linguistics, and bioinformatics – the concept of similarity between objects is rather
vaguely defined and, consequently, a unified measure of clustering quality remains
elusive.
71
Chapter 4. An Evolutionary Approach to Clustering
To date, we have not even gained an insight into what constitutes a satisfactory
clustering solution, let alone developed an approach that would have proven to be uni-
versally applicable and scalable to an ever-increasing abundance of data. As a matter
of fact, according to the No Free Lunch theorem for community detection, “there can
be no algorithm that is optimal for all possible community detection tasks” [125]. This
has led to the introduction of various application-dependent evaluation criteria and,
accordingly, to the development of many clustering methods intended to optimise
them.
Following a rather coarse-grained classification, these methods can be divided into
a few main categories: partitioning (k-means), hierarchical, grid-based, density-based,
model-based, and graph-based approaches [6, 182], each one with its advantages and
drawbacks. Henceforth, we focus on graph-based approaches in the context of the
overarching problem of graph clustering.
4.1.2 Graph Clustering
Graph-based methods assume that the input data is in the form of a graph (network)
with vertices (nodes) corresponding to objects and weighted or unweighted edges
(ties) connecting these vertices representing the relations among them.
In order to specify a clustering scheme, one first has to pinpoint an appropriate
similarity measure or an objective function to measure the quality of the clustering
solutions. Whereas there are numerous strategies to quantify similarity of vertices in
a graph, here we assume that a “good” clustering ensures close proximity between
vertices assigned to the same cluster and sufficient separation between vertices
assigned to distinct clusters in terms of the graph-theoretical distance. Namely, in
an unweighted (resp. weighted) graph, the distance between two vertices is defined
as the length of a shortest path between them (resp. the weight of a path with the
smallest cost accumulated along the edges constituting it).
In this setting, the problem of clustering often goes under the names of graph
clustering and community detection. Quintessentially, graph clustering is “the task
of grouping the vertices of the graph into clusters taking into consideration the edge
structure of the graph in such a way that there should be many edges within each
cluster and relatively few between the clusters” [147]. Hereinafter, we adopt this
definition along with the requirement that properties (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) hold.
A great deal of work has been devoted to, e.g., clustering social networks, genomic
networks, brain networks, and information networks [10, 41, 90, 182]. Normally,
graph-based methods make use of the extensive foundations and tools of graph
theory [182]. As a downside stemming from this approach, these methods tend to be
computationally expensive.
In spite of the fact that the closely related clique decision problem (whether a
given graph contains a clique of size k for a predefined k ∈ N or not) is much simpler
and well defined, it is actually one of the twenty-one famous problems, which were
proven to be NP -complete as early as in 1972 by Richard Karp [75].
Moreover, even when one is equipped with an apt objective function to be
minimised or maximised, a non-negligible setback to using graph-theoretical tools
can be the inability to probe the entire space of feasible solutions, which tends to
be high-dimensional and messy in many real-world applications. This hurdle can
be overcome by using heuristic techniques, capable of producing near-optimal, yet
meaningful, solutions while trading off their completeness for efficiency [29].
72
Chapter 4. An Evolutionary Approach to Clustering
4.1.3 Our Contribution
For the reasons outlined above, we propose a novel clustering method, herein referred
to as the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm [71, 74], which employs a heuristic
graph-based approach aiming to minimise (resp. maximise) the intra-cluster (resp.
inter-cluster) distances.
In essence, the problem of graph clustering can be interpreted as a dual problem
to graph colouring if one associates a unique colour with each of the clusters. Indeed,
while the latter aims to eliminate all instances of adjacent vertices sharing the same
colour, the former ideally leads to highly monochromatic neighbourhoods – markedly
so when these neighbourhoods form densely interconnected cliques. This observation
led us to tackle partitioning vertices into clusters by adapting a heuristic approach
to graph colouring proposed by Petford and Welsh [128], discussed in greater depth
in the following section.
As a result, the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm has emerged. Being a clustering
method that uses local information only renders it computationally efficient – in
fact, it is linear in the number of edges – and suggests that it would lend itself easily
to a parallel implementation. Both of these are desirable properties in light of the
unprecedented amount of data and the demand to be able to handle it quickly.
Besides, it does not enforce any restrictive assumptions on the data but still has
the capacity to uncover intuitive clusters at different levels of granularity (these can
be specified in advance by the user) when applied to well-structured graphs. This
was confirmed in a variety of experiments, which also showcased that the modified
Petford–Welsh algorithm achieves comparable or better performance than a selection
of state-of-the-art clustering methods. Its random aspect promotes escape from local
minima; thus, it can explore the solution space reasonably well.
In these experiments, we drew on two types of data – graphs encountered in
real-world situations and synthetically generated graphs supplied with embedded
clustering structure. The performance of the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm
was evaluated using the most common internal and external measures of clustering
quality and was benchmarked against eight popular clustering algorithms that require
minimal user input.
Our numerical results suggest that the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm achieves
competitive performance. Its key advantage is considerably low overall execution
time and the ability to properly recover the clustering structure when it is sufficiently
well defined. All data and the source code for the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm
are available at https://github.com/ikicab/mPW.
4.2 Methods
We begin by giving a comprehensive overview of the Petford–Welsh colouring algo-
rithm and proceed, by elaborating on the underlying idea, to pave the way towards
our adaptation.
4.2.1 The Petford–Welsh Algorithm
The original version of the Petford–Welsh algorithm [128], often dubbed as the
antivoter algorithm due to its relation to the antivoter model of Donnelly and
Welsh [34], deals with the decision problem whether a given graph G is 3-colourable.
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More specifically, a graph G = (V,E) is said to be k-colourable if it admits a
proper k-colouring. A k-colouring of G is an assignment of k colours (for convenience
encoded as natural numbers) to the vertices of G, and a proper k-colouring is a
colouring such that no two adjacent vertices have the same colour, i.e., it is a mapping
c : V → {1, 2, . . . , k} so that c(u) ̸= c(v) holds for all uv ∈ E.
The Petford–Welsh algorithm can be easily extended to handle k-colourability
for a general k ≥ 3 [187]. At the outset, a random initial colouring of the vertices is
generated, followed by an iterative procedure. At each step of the iteration, a vertex
v ∈ V with at least one neighbour coloured with the same colour is chosen uniformly
at random. This vertex is recoloured according to a probability distribution which
captures the trend that the less frequent a particular colour is in the neighbourhood
of v, the more likely it is chosen as the new colour for v.
In particular, a colour i is chosen proportionally to e−N (v,i)/T where N (v, i)
denotes the number of neighbours of v of colour i at the current step of the iteration,
and T denotes a parameter, usually called the temperature by analogy with the
simulated annealing heuristics [77]. Notice that the expression e−N (v,i)/T can be
equivalently reformulated as ω−N (v,i) for an appropriately chosen weight ω > 1. The
iteration proceeds until either a proper colouring is constructed or the algorithm
exceeds the permitted number of steps, fed as an input value to the algorithm.
Evidently, whenever the algorithm returns an affirmative answer, the underlying
graph indeed is k-colourable since the algorithm constructs a corresponding proper
k-colouring. Even in the case of a false negative – when the algorithm wrongly
classifies a graph as not being k-colourable – one of its main advantages is that it
outputs an approximate solution, that is, a k-colouring with as few monochromatic
edges as possible (following a fixed random seed).
This motivated us to employ a variant of the Petford–Welsh algorithm to clustering.
As previously discussed, clustering problems typically lack a precise consensus on
the structure of optimal clustering solutions – thus, one ideally wants to optimise
a conveniently chosen measure that captures the characteristics that the solutions
should conform to. As a consequence of the aforementioned property of the Petford–
Welsh algorithm, our modification encapsulates one of the essential criteria to
determine the goodness of a clustering solution – it outputs a solution with as
many monochromatic edges as possible. In terms of clusters, it tends to assign
densely connected neighbourhoods into the same clusters, as desired. Before we state
additional features of our algorithm, let us first present it in full detail.
4.2.2 The Modified Petford–Welsh Algorithm
In what follows, we describe our approach. As mentioned above, it is closely related
to the heuristic colouring algorithm as proposed by Petford and Welsh. Hence,
the terms colour(ing) and cluster(ing) will be used interchangeably. Notice that
in the Petford–Welsh algorithm, it was implicitly assumed that the graph under
consideration is simple and connected, and the directedness of edges (or lack thereof)
was not taken into account. To keep matters simple, we will follow a similar route
and focus solely on simple connected undirected graphs with possibly weighted edges.
Nonetheless, our method can be naturally generalised to accommodate directed and
disconnected graphs as well.
Thus, let G = (V,E) be a simple connected undirected graph with possibly
weighted edges. Furthermore, let A = [auv]u,v∈V denote its (weighted) adjacency
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matrix with the entry auv representing the weight of the edge uv ∈ E (auv = 0 if
uv /∈ E) and assume that, in the case of an unweighted graph, auv = 1 if and only if
uv ∈ E. It will also prove convenient to adopt the notationW(v, i) =∑︁u∈V :c(u)=i auv
for the sum of the weights of the edges incident to vertices of colour i adjacent to
vertex v. As a side note, in the case of an unweighted graph, auv ∈ {0, 1} for all
u, v ∈ V , and the expression W(v, i) reduces to the previously introduced N (v, i),
which is used to denote the number of vertices adjacent to vertex v of colour i in the
original Petford–Welsh algorithm.
For the purpose of the algorithm, we say that a vertex v ∈ V is bad if c(u) ̸= c(v)
for the colouring c currently constructed by the algorithm and some vertex u ∈ V
such that uv ∈ E. Analogously, an edge uv ∈ E that satisfies c(u) ̸= c(v), i.e., a
bichromatic edge, is said to be a bad edge.
The main idea of the algorithm goes as follows. During initialisation, each vertex
gets assigned a random colour. Afterwards, in an iterative procedure, a vertex with at
least one neighbour of a different colour – dubbed a bad vertex – is chosen uniformly
at random and is reassigned colour i chosen proportionally to ωW(v,i). Hence, from a
local point of view, the more abundant a particular colour is, the more likely it will
spread out – even more so when the corresponding vertices form strong bonds with
the rest of the graph.
The recolouring process repeats until there are no more bad vertices or the stopping
criterion, a sufficiently low variance Var in the number of bad edges calculated over a
sliding window of length L ∈ N, is met. To facilitate the computation and subsequent
updating of the sliding-window variance, at each step of the iteration, the algorithm
records the number of bad edges and stores it in the list bad_edges. Hence we can
summarise the algorithm as follows (refer to Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 The modified Petford–Welsh algorithm (mPW)
Input: G, ω, k, tol, L
Output: c
1: generate an initial k-colouring c
2: bad_edges [0]← ⃓⃓{uv ∈ E | c(u) ̸= c(v)}⃓⃓
3: step← 1
4: Var← tol
5: while (bad_edges [step− 1] > 0) and (Var ≥ tol) do
6: choose a bad vertex v uniformly at random
7: choose a new colour 1 ≤ i ≤ k for v with probability proportional to ωW(v,i) if
W(v, i) ̸= 0
8: c(v)← i
9: bad_edges [step]← ⃓⃓{uv ∈ E | c(u) ̸= c(v)}⃓⃓
10: if (step ≥ L− 1) then
11: Var← Var
(︂
[bad_edges [s]]steps=step−L+1
)︂
12: step← step+ 1
13: return c
The algorithm takes as an input a given graph G, a suitably chosen weight ω > 1,
and an initial number of clusters k ∈ N. Optionally, two additional parameters that
serve as a stopping criterion may be specified – a tolerance tol > 0 on the variance
Var in the number of edges spanning distinct clusters and a length L ∈ N of the
sliding window over which this variance is computed. Alternatively – or additionally,
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a pre-given maximum number of steps can be used as a termination condition. Note
that one could instead define a measure of distance between clustering solutions
and terminate the execution of the loop when a relatively small difference between
consecutive clustering solutions is met.
The number of steps that will be needed to achieve a practical solution depends
significantly on the structure of the graph under consideration. A parameter even
more crucial to the performance of the algorithm (and also dependent on the given
graph) is the weight ω > 1. Following a similar procedure as in [152], a self-tuning
mechanism that iteratively optimises ω can be implemented. For the last parameter,
the initial number of clusters k, any bound on the expected number of clusters
may be chosen – the algorithm itself reduces the number of clusters throughout the
course of iterations. Regardless of the choice, the number of colours present in the
graph will drop to its natural level as the iterations proceed. Indeed, as soon as
a colour 1 ≤ i ≤ k disappears, i /∈ {c(v) | v ∈ V }, it cannot reappear ever again
since the prerequisite W(v, i) ̸= 0 is not met by any vertex v ∈ V (cf. line 7 in
Algorithm 1). Note that permanently discarding absent colours also turned out to
enhance numerical stability and consistency of the clustering solutions generated by
the algorithm. When the stopping criterion is reached, a k′-colouring of the vertices
of G for 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k is returned as an output, with each set of vertices belonging to
the same colour class corresponding to a particular cluster.
The analogy between the ways in which a chosen vertex v gets assigned a new
colour in the original and in the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm is clear from the
design of the algorithm itself. While the original version prioritises under-represented
colours in the neighbourhood, its adaptation is more apt to select colours that are
more abundant in it and, consequently, iteratively extends clusters throughout vertex
neighbourhoods.
Moreover, our algorithm generalises the original one in the sense that it allows for
weighted graphs – the more pronounced a certain edge weight is, the more likely the
corresponding edge is to turn monochromatic along the way. Or, to put it differently,
the stronger the relation between two vertices, the more likely they are to end up in
the same cluster.
What is also evident from the outline of the algorithm is that all updates occur
locally. Note that, although it is not explicitly stated in the algorithm, the number
of bad edges stored in the list bad_edges and the sliding-window variance Var are
re-evaluated only by adding and subtracting local contributions. To be more specific,
let bstep = bad_edges [step] be a shorthand notation for the number of bad edges at
step step, and let µstep and Varstep denote the sample mean and the variance of the
number of bad edges at step step over the sliding window of length L, respectively,
i.e.,
µstep =
1
L
step∑︂
s=step−L+1
bs,
Varstep = Var
(︂
[bs]
step
s=step−L+1
)︂
=
1
L− 1
step∑︂
s=step−L+1
b2s −
L
L− 1µ
2
step.
The variance at step step+ 1 is then calculated by first updating the sample mean
according to
µstep+1 = µstep +
1
L
(bstep+1 − bstep−L+1),
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which is immediately followed by
Varstep+1 =Varstep +
1
L− 1 (bstep+1 − bstep−L+1) ·
· (bstep+1 + bstep−L+1 − µstep+1 − µstep) .
Thus, no global information about the structure of the graph is required and the
algorithm runs in linear time O(|E|) in the number of edges, which makes it highly
efficient and scalable to massive graphs.
4.2.3 Tweaking the Algorithm
Let us now turn to potential pitfalls of the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm. It
is apparent that the output of the algorithm in its current form can possess some
undesirable attributes. In particular, due to the randomly chosen initial colouring, it
may occur that two disconnected and thus intuitively distinct clusters get assigned
the same colour in the end if this colour is sufficiently well represented in both
clusters at the initialisation step of the algorithm. We circumvent this shortcoming
after the iterative procedure by decomposing the graph into subgraphs with respect
to the colour assignments of the vertices and, whenever such a subgraph consists
of more than one connected component, introducing a new colour for each of the
components.
Alternatively, this problem can also be solved by means of the co-membership
matrix Cc of the clustering solution c. It is a square matrix, with rows and columns
indexed by vertices of G, whose (i, j)-th entry Ccij is equal to 1 if and only if vertices i
and j belong to the same cluster and 0 otherwise. Running the algorithm sufficiently
many times using different random seeds, computing the co-membership matrix
Cc for each thus obtained clustering solution c, and taking the average of these
association matrices would eliminate random effects and thus render fragmented
clusters improbable. There are multiple ways to compose a new clustering solution
on the basis of the average co-membership matrix C. For instance, the first cluster
can be taken to be the set of vertices 1 ≤ j ≤ |V | that almost certainly belong to the
same cluster as a fixed but arbitrary vertex i1, namely C1 := {j | Ci1j ≥ 1− α} for
some small threshold α ∈ [0, 1). We may continue this inductively on the submatrix
obtained by deleting rows and columns indexed by C1 and take C2 := {j /∈ C1 |
Ci2j ≥ 1− α} for some i2 /∈ C1 to be the second cluster, and so forth.
Another inadvertent issue that one might stumble upon after running the algo-
rithm is the possible occurrence of leftover singleton clusters. This drawback can be
effortlessly addressed by an optional feature in the last part of the algorithm that
loops through all such clusters and recolours their only members with the colour
most frequently represented in their corresponding neighbourhoods.
On a different note, some attention should be devoted to the choice of the
weight parameter ω > 1. Clearly, the smaller the ω, the more random the choice of
neighbouring colours. In particular, in the limit ω → 1, equal weight is given to all
colours. And, similarly, the larger the ω, the greater the probability that one of the
most frequent colours is chosen. All things considered, when choosing ω, the nature
of the problem under consideration and its characteristics should be kept in mind as
the optimality (or even feasibility) of ω may essentially depend on the structure of
the underlying graph. Additionally, as mentioned above, further optimisation can be
achieved by implementing a framework that dynamically adapts ω throughout the
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course of the iterations. However, optimising the choice of ω will be set aside for
now and will be left for future work. In the present study, we will use a constant
value of ω = 6 and examine instead how the algorithm fares in a broader sense.
Shifting focus to the beneficial aspects of our algorithm, the precise number of
resulting clusters need not be predetermined by the user. As already stated, it
suffices to feed in a reasonable upper bound on the expected number of clusters, a
trivial choice being, e.g., the number of vertices in the graph. Nevertheless, should
the user speculate a tighter upper bound, grounded on experimental observations
or justified by a priori knowledge on the subject, providing such a bound would
help speed up the convergence of the algorithm. Estimating the number of clusters
actually present in the data is a widespread concern in clustering, even more so
when handling huge intricate datasets. Despite acknowledging this, many popular
clustering methods require the user to choose the number of clusters in advance, the
prime example being k-means clustering, where the number of clusters is requested
to initiate the algorithm. Similarly, in order for hierarchical clustering to provide
a practical solution, cutting the dendrogram at a chosen height is required in a
post-process step [66].
It has already been stressed that our algorithm per se runs in linear time O(|E|)
in the number of edges. What is more, it can easily be parallelised, which can,
especially in the case of substantial amounts of data, drastically improve the runtime.
This characteristic trivially carries over from the original Petford–Welsh algorithm,
where parallelisation can, on average, lead to constant time complexity on a massively
parallel machine with O(|V |) processors [188]. Indeed, since the computation of
each vertex recolouring is local and therefore – ignoring potential dependencies that
could arise as a result of recolouring a pair of adjacent vertices simultaneously –
independent, recolourings can be performed in parallel.
4.3 Experimental Setup
Having established a theoretical foundation, we can now prepare the ground for
the experimental work, conducted with the aim to assess the performance of our
algorithm. This section is divided into three subsections, organised as follows. The
first subsection briefly describes the clustering algorithms that we benchmark our
algorithm against, the second one provides an exposition of the clustering quality
measures that were used to evaluate the clustering solutions, and the third one serves
as an overview of the graphs on which the experiments were run.
4.3.1 Clustering Algorithms
To reduce bias in our comparative study, we restrict ourselves to clustering algorithms
that can operate without significant interference from the user, i.e., that are able to
generate sensible solutions even if the input parameters are set to their default values.
To this end, we make use of the algorithms integrated into the high-performance
collection of network analysis tools python-igraph-0.7.1, which essentially consists
of the igraph C library that enables the use of a Python interface [24].
Since the base code of our implementation is in Python, the iterative core of
the algorithm is compiled with Cython [15], which converts Python code into C, to
allow a fair comparison with C implementations in igraph. However, note that this
does not hold for the initialisation and the termination routine as they are compiled
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with Python. For an exhaustive review of the clustering techniques available in the
python-igraph-0.7.1 package we refer to igraph’s extensive documentation [24]
and to survey [184], which also reports a useful comparison of their performance. A
brief summary is provided below.
Edge betweenness [51] is built upon the intuition that edges spanning distinct
clusters should have high betweenness scores [107]. To achieve such a clustering
solution, the method gradually discards edges with highest betweenness scores.
Throughout this process, the network structure becomes more apparent, but at a
high cost. Indeed, since evaluating edge betweenness is itself a costly operation,
updating all betweenness scores after each edge removal results in a rather high
computational complexity of O(|E|2|V |).
As the name of Fastgreedy [21] already suggests, this method greedily optimises
modularity, a clustering quality measure that will be introduced shortly. At the
outset, each vertex forms a cluster on its own, and then, step by step, pairs of
clusters that result in the greatest increase of modularity are merged into new
clusters. In general, modularity-based methods may be inadequate to fully capture
the community structure of a graph because they inherit the lack of susceptibility to
small clusters that modularity is known for [42], as will be discussed below.
Along the same lines, Multilevel (also known as the Louvain method) [16] is
another greedy approach to modularity optimisation. At the first level, the method
starts from singleton clusters and then iteratively relocates vertices to neighbouring
clusters in which they attain the maximum contribution to the modularity score.
As it progresses to the second level, the same process is repeated with the clusters
generated in the previous level considered as vertices, and so on. Not only does
Multilevel as a modularity-based method suffer from low sensitivity to detect smaller
clusters, but it also possesses the field-of-view limit [148] that imposes an upper
bound on its detection range in terms of the cluster sizes.
Although Leading eigenvector [106] is also based on modularity optimisation,
it differs from the previous two methods by virtue of being a spectral method.
More particularly, it recursively divides the vertices of the graph into two groups as
determined by the leading eigenvector of the modularity matrix [107].
Infomap [141, 142], on the other hand, resorts to information theory to discover
communities. The main idea of the algorithm, which runs in O(|E|), is to find a
decomposition into modules by efficiently compressing information about a random
walk process on the graph. Again, due to the field-of-view limit [148], Infomap is
also at a disadvantage when it comes to detecting large clusters.
Similarly to Infomap, Walktrap [130] also takes advantage of random walk pro-
cesses, albeit from a different perspective. It is a hierarchical method, grounded on
the idea that a short random walk should, at least in principle, spend a considerable
amount of time within a cluster. For the purpose of the algorithm, the authors
introduce a special notion of distance that reflects some of the key properties of
random walks. Starting from a partition into singleton clusters, these distances
are computed for every pair of adjacent clusters (which, in this case, coincide with
vertices). Then, on the basis of the resulting distances, a pair of clusters is chosen to
be merged into a new cluster, the distances are re-evaluated, and the process repeats.
The whole hierarchical clustering structure is computed in O(|V |2|E|).
Label propagation [133] is a further clustering method with a low computational
complexity of O(|E|). It is based on the premise that the cluster that a vertex should
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be assigned to should be the one that most of its neighbours are contained in. At
the initialisation stage, random labels are assigned to vertices. Afterwards, at each
iteration step, the method traverses all vertices in a shuffled order, and each vertex
adopts the label that the majority of its neighbours has. The process terminates
once a consensus is reached.
In a sense, this method resembles ours – both algorithms are randomised and
thus have to be run several times in order to produce the best solution, and both
progress by locally exploring vertex neighbourhoods. Still, it should be emphasised
that Label propagation deterministically propagates the most frequent label in the
neighbourhood of a vertex, whereas the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm follows a
stochastic scheme in which colours are updated randomly and only in proportion to
the frequencies of the neighbouring colours. The most pronounced differences between
the two approaches are exhibited in practice. Namely, due to its deterministic nature,
Label propagation has a tendency to get stuck in local optima and can, on specific
occasions, even invariably lead to a single cluster encompassing the entire graph. The
modified Petford–Welsh algorithm, on the other hand, can easily evade this since
not only are the colours chosen at random but also the vertices to be recoloured. In
fact, as opposed to Label propagation, vertices are not sequentially looped through,
which also helps to speed up the process.
Lastly, Spinglass [137, 169] draws inspiration from statistical mechanics. Specifi-
cally, as an analogy with the Potts spin-glass model, vertices in the same spin state
are associated with communities, and the ground state is sought after by applying
simulated annealing [77] to the Potts Hamiltonian H in order to minimise the free
energy of the system.
Having reviewed all the algorithms python-igraph has to offer, we can now
turn to discuss various criteria that will be used to assess the quality of clustering
solutions.
4.3.2 Measures of Clustering Quality
In general, clustering validity metrics can be divided into two groups – internal and
external quality measures [182]. Internal measures encapsulate different statistical
characteristics of the clustering solution; for instance, cohesion within clusters and
sufficient separation across different clusters. In contrast, external measures provide
a means to compare the clustering solution to a predefined gold-standard clustering,
which often goes under the name of ground-truth clustering. It should be noted
that such a clustering does not necessarily exist. When it does, it was either
embedded by design, as is the case with several artificially generated graphs [10], or
it was determined through empirical evidence, separately conducted experimental
studies, and direct observation [41]. As both classes of measures stem from different
perspectives, they can lead to inconsistent results, as we shall see in due course when
we briefly introduce some of the most widely used internal and external measures of
clustering quality.
Internal Measures
Internal measures aim to quantify the intrinsic structure of the clustering solution c
with regard to the connectivity of the underlying graph G = (V,E). Thus, they can
be used by themselves to evaluate the quality of the solution regardless of whether
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or not the ground-truth solution is there at hand.
One of the most well-known internal measures of clustering quality is modular-
ity [109], which sets the resulting division into clusters in a given graph against the
exact same division in a graph with randomly distributed edges whilst keeping the
degree distribution fixed. More precisely, it is defined by subtracting the expected
fraction of edges contained within these clusters in a random graph from the frac-
tion of such edges in the graph that was used in order to extract the division into
clusters [107], i.e.,
Q =
1
2
∑︁
u,v∈V auvδ (c(u), c(v))
|E| −
1
2
∑︁
u,v∈V
deg(u) deg(v)
2|E| δ (c(u), c(v))
|E| =
=
1
2|E|
∑︂
u,v∈V
(︃
auv − deg(u) deg(v)
2|E|
)︃
δ (c(u), c(v)) .
Here, δ denotes the Kronecker delta and deg(u) the degree of vertex u ∈ V , i.e.,
deg(u) =
∑︁
v∈V,v ̸=u auv. Evidently, the more edges fall within clusters in comparison
to what could be expected by chance, the greater the value of modularity. Although
theoretically its values are bounded from above by 1, experimental studies have
shown that modularity in the range of 0.3 ⪅ Q ⪅ 0.7 indicates significant community
structure [109].
Despite its widespread popularity, modularity suffers from several disadvantages.
First and foremost, it tends to fail to detect clusters of size smaller than O(|E|1/2),
the resolution limit [42]. Indeed, merging such clusters leads to an increase in
modularity. As a consequence, modularity-maximising methods (cf. Section 4.3.1)
may not be well suited to address community detection problems on a finely grained
level. Secondly, a sufficient amount of singleton clusters can result in a reduced value
of modularity, even though the rest of the partition captures all essential features of
the community structure [4].
More fundamentally, modularity implicitly imposes the clustering structure of
graphs with randomly distributed edges as a null model to quantitatively evaluate the
exhibited clustering structure against [10]. However, since the problem of finding a
partition into clusters lacks clarity of rules and a unified definition of what constitutes
a good clustering solution, we have no guarantee that relying on this null model
should in fact yield an appropriate measure of quality and, hence, a reasonable
division into clusters.
In line with the foregoing discussion, we recall two additional internal measures.
The underpinning motivation behind conductance [36, 47] is the observation that
each pair of distinct clusters should only be loosely connected to each other. Let
C = {Ci}i denote the collection of all clusters corresponding to the clustering solution
c : V → {1, 2, . . . , |C|}, i.e., Ci = c−1(i). Then the conductance of cluster Ci is
defined by the expression
ϕ(Ci) =
∑︁
u∈Ci,v∈V \Ci auv
min{∑︁u∈Ci,v∈V auv,∑︁u∈V \Ci,v∈V auv} .
That is, ϕ(Ci) compares the size (weight in the case of a weighted graph) of the
edge-cut [Ci, V \ Ci] := {uv | u ∈ Ci, v ∈ V \ Ci} with the size (weight) of the
smallest of the two subgraphs induced by this cut, namely G[Ci] and G[V \Ci], plus
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the size (weight) of the edge-cut [Ci, V \ Ci]. In essence, the smaller the resulting
ratio, the better separated cluster Ci is from the rest of the graph.
Following [36], we now introduce the conductance of graph G with respect to the
clustering solution C as the average of the cluster conductances ϕ(Ci) subtracted
from 1, i.e.,
ϕ = 1− 1|C|
∑︂
Ci∈C
ϕ(Ci) ∈ [0, 1].
Consequently, a high value of ϕ indicates an intuitively more appealing clustering
solution with a high degree of inter-cluster sparsity. Although conductance per se
does not account for intra-cluster density, which is another prominent feature of
a good clustering solution, extensive studies have demonstrated that it correlates
best with information recovery metrics [36]. These turn out to give a more accurate
assessment of the clustering solution (provided there exists a ground-truth clustering)
and will be thoroughly investigated in the second part of this subsection.
To compensate for the neglect of intra-cluster density, coverage [4, 47] is employed
as a tool to evaluate the performance of clustering algorithms in terms of the quality
of the produced clustering solutions. Coverage is measured as the fraction of the
number (weight) of all intra-cluster edges to the number (weight) of all edges in the
graph, namely
γ =
∑︁
u,v∈V auvδ(c(u), c(v))∑︁
u,v∈V auv
∈ [0, 1].
Again, the greater the coverage, the more intertwined the vertices in each of the
clusters are. Nevertheless, notice that this measure inevitably exhibits a strong bias
towards partitions with a small number of clusters. At the extreme end – in the
case of a connected graph – the maximum score of 1 is attained precisely when the
entire graph consists of a single cluster. This points to the fact that the problem
of finding a satisfactory partition into clusters is twofold and involves identifying
the optimal balance between inter-cluster sparsity (conductance) and intra-cluster
density (coverage).
External Measures
We now move on to explore in detail external measures that provide a means
to measure how accurate a clustering solution is given the ground-truth clustering.
Although a myriad of various information-theoretic measures and a range of measures
of similarity from a statistical analyst’s toolkit will be covered, the list is far from
exhaustive. And, yet again, since these measures do not necessarily give equal
weight to each aspect of the clustering solution, they may lead to contradictory,
but complementary, results. In our experiments, we made use of the Python library
Scikit-learn [124] (version 0.19.1) to carry out the actual computations of these
metrics.
Let C = {C1, C2, . . . , C|C|} and G = {G1, G2, . . . , G|G|} denote an arbitrary and the
ground-truth partition into clusters, respectively. Further, recall that the Shannon
entropy [23] of a discrete random variable X with probability mass function pX(x),
one of the most fundamental concepts in information theory, is defined by
H(X) = −
∑︂
x
pX(x) log pX(x). (4.4)
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Analogously, the joint entropy of discrete random variables X and Y with a joint
probability mass function pX,Y (x, y) is defined by
H(X, Y ) = −
∑︂
x
∑︂
y
pX,Y (x, y) log pX,Y (x, y).
Intuitively, Shannon entropy measures the expected amount of information conveyed
by a stochastic source of data. It is established on the belief that a datum which
occurs with a low probability brings more information to the table and should, as
such, be reflected in a high score.
This brings us to the notion of mutual information [23, 28], a measure of “infor-
mation overlap” between variables X and Y ,
MI(X, Y ) =
∑︂
x
∑︂
y
pX,Y (x, y) log
pX,Y (x, y)
pX(x)pY (y)
= H(X) + H(Y )− H(X, Y ).
After normalising the expression above to the range [0, 1], we are finally adequately
equipped to introduce our first external measure of clustering quality, the normalised
mutual information [172], that is,
NMI =
MI(C,G)√︁
H(C)H(G) ∈ [0, 1].
Here, we took pC(Ci) = |Ci|/|V |, pG(Gj) = |Gj|/|V |, and pC,G(Ci, Gj) = |Ci∩Gj|/|V |
to represent probabilities that a randomly chosen vertex is assigned to cluster Ci ∈ C,
to cluster Gj ∈ G, and to both clusters Ci ∈ C and Gj ∈ G, respectively. Note that a
score of 1 (resp. 0) is reached only when there is a perfect match (resp. mismatch)
between the given partition C and the ground-truth partition G.
Incidentally, at the same time, NMI in its current form tends to increase with the
number of clusters even when a greater number of clusters does not lead to an increase
in the information overlap. To resolve this issue, adjusted mutual information [172]
was proposed. It is a variant of the normalised mutual information that is adjusted
for chance, meaning that it attains its minimum value of 0 whenever the mutual
information MI(C,G) between the clustering solution and the ground-truth clustering
equals its expected value E[MI(C,G)]. Thus,
AMI =
MI(C,G)− E[MI(C,G)]√︁
H(C)H(G)− E[MI(C,G)] ∈ [0, 1].
Let ci := |Ci| and gj := |Gj| denote the cardinalities of clusters Ci ∈ C and Gj ∈ G,
respectively. Then the computation of E[MI(C,G)] boils down to
E[MI(C,G)] =
|C|∑︂
i=1
|G|∑︂
j=1
min{ci,gj}∑︂
nij=(ci+gj−|V |)+
nij
|V | log
(︃ |V |nij
cigj
)︃
·
· ci!gj!(|V | − ci)!(|V | − gj)!|V |!nij!(ci − nij)!(gj − nij)!(|V | − ci − gj + nij)! .
Before introducing the remainder of the external measures, some additional
auxiliary notation and terminology is required [182]. We shall denote the number of
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pairs of vertices that are correctly assigned in the same cluster by TP (true positives),
the number of pairs of vertices that are correctly assigned in different clusters by
TN (true negatives), the number of pairs of vertices that are incorrectly assigned in
the same cluster by FP (false positives), and the number of pairs of vertices that are
incorrectly assigned in different clusters by FN (false negatives).
The Rand index [136] assesses the agreement between partition C and the ground-
truth partition G on the basis of the ratio of the number of correctly assigned pairs
of vertices to the number of all pairs of vertices,
RI =
TP + TN
TP + TN+ FP + FN
∈ [0, 1].
As it suffers from a similar problem as the normalised mutual information, the adjusted
Rand index , its counterpart that offers a correction for chance, was developed [67,
172],
ARI =
RI(C,G)− E[RI(C,G)]
max (RI)− E[RI(C,G)] =
=
2(TP · TN− FP · FN)
(TN + FP)(FP + TP) + (TN + FN)(FN + TP)
≤ 1.
Here, max (RI) denotes the maximum value of the Rand index, i.e., max (RI) = 1,
and the expression E[RI(C,G)] corresponds to the expected value of the Rand index
under the assumption of a generalised hypergeometric distribution of the |C| × |G|
contingency table, that is, assuming that the two clustering partitions are picked
at random subject to having the same number and sizes of clusters as C and G,
respectively.
Thus, a value of 0 indicates a degree of overlap between the clustering solution
C and the ground-truth clustering G that would be expected due to chance, and a
value of 1 is attained when there is a perfect agreement between the two.
Following the analysis in [182], we will also explore how the clustering algorithms
fare in terms of the F1- and the F2-score. In general, Fβ-score for an arbitrary
parameter β ∈ R+ is defined as the weighted harmonic mean of Precision :=
TP/(TP + FP) and Recall := TP/(TP + FN), which makes it less sensitive to
extreme values. Thus,
Fβ =
(1 + β2) · Precision · Recall
β2 · Precision + Recall =
(1 + β2) · TP
(1 + β2) · TP + β2 · FN + FP ∈ [0, 1].
Notice that F2-score lends more weight to Recall than Precision as opposed to the
F1-score, where both factors are of equal importance. As usual, a higher value of Fβ
indicates a better performance.
In contrast, the Fowlkes–Mallows index [182] is defined as the geometric mean of
Precision and Recall,
FM =
√
Precision · Recall = TP√︁
(TP + FP)(TP + FN)
∈ [0, 1].
Values close to 1 correspond to significant agreement between the given partition C
and the ground-truth partition G.
84
Chapter 4. An Evolutionary Approach to Clustering
The Jaccard index , on the other hand, is only concerned with the ratio of the
number of pairs of vertices correctly assigned together in a cluster to the number of
pairs of vertices assigned to the same cluster either in C, or G, or both. Namely,
JI =
TP
TP + FP + FN
∈ [0, 1].
Last but not least, the V-measure [182] is the harmonic mean between homogeneity
h := 1−H(C | G)/H(C) and completeness c := 1−H(G | C)/H(G), where H(X | Y )
denotes the conditional entropy [23] that can be equivalently expressed by H(X |
Y ) = H(X, Y ) − H(Y ) via the chain rule. As it turns out, the normalised mutual
information metric reduces precisely to the V-measure if the arithmetic average
instead of the geometric average is used for normalisation. It can thus be formulated
as
V =
2hc
h+ c
=
2MI(C,G)
H(C) + H(G) .
This concludes our brief survey of a selection of clustering validity metrics that
will be applied later on in the experiments and brings us to the final ingredient of
our experimental setup.
4.3.3 Graph Data
Choosing adequate test data to empirically assess the performance of clustering
algorithms poses a challenging task. Predominantly, two main avenues are pursued [10,
36, 41]. In the first approach, algorithms are run on synthetic graphs with embedded
clustering structure against which the resulting partitions into clusters are validated.
However, the key issue with this approach is that the models with the help of
which such graphs are generated have an inherent flaw. As each of them assumes
a particular data generating mechanism, they consistently fail to capture the full
complexity and heterogeneity of graphs constructed from real-world data. Yet, the
latter were the driving force behind establishing the field of cluster analysis.
The second strand of research is concerned with real-world instances of graphs
(with known ground-truth partitions), but it suffers from its own weaknesses. On the
face of it, graph representations provide a valuable tool when it comes to studying real-
world applications. Nevertheless, since they only offer a structural perspective and
the ground-truth clusters themselves often depend on additional latent components,
one has to be wary when comparing these clusters to the clusters obtained using
various clustering algorithms that primarily only use structural information.
Still, these issues aside, the best that one can do to gain insight into strengths,
limitations, and peculiarities of a clustering algorithm is to explore its performance
on a sufficiently large number of artificial and real-world graphs emerging across a
diverse range of disciplines. Accordingly, a brief description of those that will be
used in the experiments follows.
Synthetic Models
As far as computer-generated graphs are concerned, we will focus on the widely
used Lancichinetti–Fortunato–Radicchi (LFR) benchmark [83]. For graphs generated
by this benchmark, labels of the form LFR(|V |, γ, β, µ, k_avg, k_max, c_min, c_max)
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will be adopted. All input parameters with the exception of c_min and c_max are
mandatory.
The LFR benchmark is capable of generating graphs of arbitrary order |V | and
with a variable number of clusters |G| ∈ [c_min, c_max] that, at least to an extent,
incorporate heterogeneity in vertex degrees and cluster sizes, which is often observed
in their real-world counterparts. Thus, each vertex is assigned a degree from a power-
law distribution with a predefined exponent 2 ≤ γ ≤ 3 subject to constraints specified
by the desired average degree k_avg and the maximum degree k_max. Similarly, the
sizes of clusters follow a power-law distribution with a chosen exponent 1 ≤ β ≤ 2.
There is one additional parameter, the mixing parameter µ ∈ [0, 1] that can be
tuned to adjust how pronounced the clusters are. It is defined as the fraction of the
neighbours of a vertex that belong to different clusters than its own. Therefore, the
greater the value of µ, the more indistinguishable and the less well defined clusters
become.
Notice that for µ > 0.5, clusters in the strong sense disappear [10, 184] as the
inequalities degin(v) > degex(v) cease to hold for all vertices v ∈ V . Here, degin(v)
and degex(v) denote the internal and the external degree of vertex v, that is, the
number of neighbours of v that belong to the same cluster as v and the number of
neighbours of v that belong to different clusters, respectively. At the same time, at
µ ⪆ 0.5 clustering algorithms typically begin to struggle and it becomes increasingly
difficult for them to recover the planted partitions into clusters.
Despite the relative richness of the LFR benchmark model, notice that its ex-
planatory power of the mechanisms underlying graph generation is rather limited.
For example, it does not attempt to account for degree correlations [10] and network
motifs [98], which are typically observed in real-world graphs.
Real-World Graphs
Among the dozens of real-world graphs at our disposal, we made a selection of a
few that have either become iconic in the network science community or have an
associated ground-truth annotation that, at least superficially, seems to correlate
well with the graph structure, or do not have one, but whose potential candidates
for partitions into clusters can easily lend themselves to a sanity check.
For this reason, we narrowed the scope to social networks of different kinds of
interactions at the level of individuals, species, and groups, and to technological
and infrastructural networks. To simplify further analysis, all graphs are treated as
unweighted and undirected, and we only consider their largest connected components.
We refer to Table 4.1 for a quick overview of all the graphs (and their basic
properties) that will be utilised in the experiments; a detailed summary of each of
them follows below. For each graph with a known ground-truth partition we also
compute the ratio between the sum of the external degrees of the vertices and the
sum of the vertex degrees [184], which we denote by µˆ, namely
µˆ =
∑︁
v∈V degex(v)∑︁
v∈V deg(v)
.
This parameter can be interpreted as a measure of how blended the clusters are (cf.
Section 4.3.3).
The first graph in our collection, Zachary’s karate club [185], represents a
university-based karate club in the United States. The data was compiled through
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Graph Vertices Edges Ground truth µˆ |G|
Zachary’s karate club [185] 34 78 Yes 0.141 2
Dolphins [89] 62 159 Yes 0.038 2
UK faculty [104] 79 552 Yes 0.210 3
Political books [81] 105 441 Yes 0.159 3
American college football [38, 51] 115 613 Yes 0.357 19
US airports [24] 745 4618 No - -
International E-road network [37, 162] 1040 1305 No - -
Political blogs [1] 1222 16714 Yes 0.094 2
Cora citation network [22, 163] 23166 89157 Yes 0.458 70
Table 4.1: Real-world graphs used in our experiments
observation over a period of three years and collecting information from archived
club records with the intent to study fission in small groups – at the beginning of
the observation period, there was a conflict between the president of the club and
the karate instructor over the price of karate lessons, which led to a split into two
clubs led by the two. Thus, the vertices of the graph correspond to the members
of the club, an edge connects two members if they were consistently observed to
interact outside of karate classes and club meetings, and the ground-truth division
into clusters consists of two clusters that coincide with the two clubs formed following
the split.
A brief detour from archetypal social networks involving human interactions
brings us to the next example, Dolphins [89]. This graph is the outcome of a 7-
year observational study of a population of dolphins located in Doubtful Sound in
New Zealand. Researchers photo-identified schools of dolphins, that is, close-knit
aggregations of dolphins that moved in a coordinated fashion, and they translated
their observations into a graph by drawing edges between pairs of dolphins that were
spotted together more often than it would be expected by chance. The ground-truth
partition into two clusters is extracted from the biological classification proposed
by the authors [41]. As it is evident from a significantly low value of µˆ, there is a
marked segregation between the two clusters – they are connected only via six edges.
Back in the realm of human interactions, the UK faculty [104] graph depicts
personal friendships among the academic staff of a faculty at one of the universities
in the United Kingdom. Its edges were extracted on the basis of a questionnaire that
was completed by every member of the academic staff. The ground-truth cluster
partition matches school affiliations of the individuals – the faculty as a whole is
divided into three schools. Note that in the original dataset two members of the
faculty lack school affiliations and are thus omitted from subsequent analysis.
Further sources of data that lend themselves naturally to clustering analysis are
studies of political polarisation. The Political books [81] graph was published in
the midst of the 2004 presidential elections in the United States to facilitate the
discovery of patterns that characterise the readership in relation to political leanings.
It is a graph of books related to politics in the United States, where an edge between
two books indicates that a buyer who bought one of them would frequently buy the
other one as well. The ground-truth clustering consists of three clusters representing
political alignments (liberal, neutral, conservative) of the books as perceived from
their descriptions and reviews [108].
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In American college football [51] the vertices do not represent individuals as
was the case with previous examples, but they correspond to groups of individuals,
namely to American football college teams in the Division I-A. A pair of teams
is connected by an edge if a match was played between the two teams during the
regular season Fall 2000. The ground-truth division into clusters corresponds to the
assignment of teams into conferences. It should be pointed out that the original
dataset [51] erroneously assumes the 2001 season conference assignments, which was
spotted and corrected in [38]. Accordingly, we ran the experiments on the revised
version.
In contrast, two of the graphs, US airports [24], which represents passenger flights
between airports in the United States in December 2010, and International E-road
network [37, 162], whose vertices are cities across Europe and parts of Central Asia
connected by E-roads, were not supplied with a ground-truth partition into clusters.
Instead, to judge the plausibility of the resulting partitions, we visualised both graphs
on a map since their vertices correspond to geographical locations. The geolocation
data (latitudes and longitudes) was gathered with the help of the Python library
GeoPy [49] (version 1.19.0), and the maps were created using the Python library
Folium [40] (version 0.8.2).
Political blogs [1] is another graph emanating from the long series of studies
examining political polarisation. In this particular case, the degree of interaction
between weblogs whose content predominantly consists of either liberal or conservative
topics was investigated. The data was assembled from a single-day snapshot from the
period of two months preceding the 2004 presidential election in the United States.
The political inclination of a weblog (liberal or conservative) was either acquired
from blog directories or determined manually, and the edges between weblogs were
derived from crawls of their front pages.
Ultimately, trials were also run on the Cora citation network [22, 163] obtained
from the well-known Cora dataset [95], which contains information about research
papers in computer science automatically harvested from the web along with refer-
ences that were parsed from their respective bibliographies. Ergo, the vertices of
the corresponding graph encode computer science research papers, an edge between
two papers indicates that the first one cites the second one or vice versa, and the
ground-truth labels classify the papers by subfields of computer science that fit them
best.
This concludes our detailed account of the experimental data, measures, and
techniques. We now proceed to summarise the main findings of our pilot experiments.
4.4 Results
In this section, we report the numerical results on the real-world and synthetic
datasets that were presented previously (cf. Table 4.1 and Section 4.3.3, respectively).
The weight parameter ω of the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm was set to the
constant value of 6 for all test runs, and the tolerance tol was chosen by trial-and-
error but was kept within the range of [10−4, 10−2].
A key insight that led to the deployment of tol as a stopping criterion in the
first place was a typical steady decline in the number of bad edges followed by a
flatter region observed across all experiments (as shown in Figure 4.1 for illustrative
purposes).
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Figure 4.1: An initial rapid
decrease in the number of bad
edges is typically followed by
a stable trend.
It is worth noting that optimising the initial parameters ω and tol through, e.g.,
dynamic adaptation to the speciﬁcs of the problem under consideration should lead
to an improvement in overall performance. Undertaking this task lies beyond the
scope of this work but nonetheless deserves more attention in an independent study.
As a general remark, clustering algorithms that rely on random choices – Spinglass
and Label propagation in addition to the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm – were
run several times (as speciﬁed below) and the best (i.e., highest) result (for each
measure individually) over all runs is reported in the results below. The resulting
number of clusters |C| is the only parameter for which the median is reported.
It should be noted that running the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm repeatedly
does not come at the expense of an increased execution time – as the algorithm has
linear runtime complexity with respect to the number of edges, a single run only
takes a small amount of time (cf. Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: Average running time in seconds (note the logarithmic scale) across clustering
algorithms applied to six real-world networks with known ground-truth partitions and
two real-world networks with unknown ground-truth partitions. In order to be able to
benchmark the Python implementation of the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm against
the (python-igraph) C implementations of the other algorithms, only running times of the
code compiled to C are measured (excluding the initialisation phase and the termination
process).
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4.4.1 Results on Real-World Graphs
Let us ﬁrst touch upon the results on real-world graphs with known ground-truth
partitions. For a complete overview of the results pertaining to individual graphs,
we refer to Tables 4.2 to 4.8 (values highlighted in green indicate maximum values
attained column-wise). Besides, Figures 4.3 to 4.8 provide a graphical summary
by aggregating the results across all graphs and separately portraying three of the
most popular external measures, NMI, AMI, and ARI, and three internal measures,
conductance φ, coverage γ, and modularity Q.
As one can see, Edge betweenness was not run on Political blogs and the Cora
citation network in view of its prohibitive computational cost (cf. Section 4.3.1).
Relatively faster but still rather computationally expensive Spinglass was run 100
times on graphs of order smaller than 700, 10 times on Political blogs, and was not
applied to the Cora citation network. The number of runs of Label propagation and
the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm was set to 100 in all cases except for the Cora
citation network, where we resorted to 10 runs.
A careful inspection of Tables 4.2 to 4.8 reveals that, typically, the modiﬁed
Petford–Welsh algorithm either correctly recovered the inherent ground-truth clus-
tering or yielded a solution with high scores on the external quality metrics in a
reasonable number of runs (refer to Figures 4.3 to 4.5). Moreover, the tables also
demonstrate that it tends to outperform or at least perform on a par with the rest
of the state-of-the-art clustering algorithms oﬀered by the python-igraph package.
Figure 4.3: Normalised mutual information across clustering algorithms applied to seven
real-world networks with known ground-truth partitions. A score of 1 achieved by the
modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm (mPW) in the case of the Zachary’s karate club graph
and the Dolphins graph indicates that the corresponding ground-truth partitions were
fully recovered. On top of that, mPW was either the best-performing or among the
best-performing algorithms on the majority of graphs (see Tables 4.2 to 4.8 for exact
values).
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Figure 4.4: Adjusted mutual information across clustering algorithms applied to seven
real-world networks with known ground-truth partitions. A score of 1 achieved by the
modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm (mPW) in the case of the Zachary’s karate club graph
and the Dolphins graph indicates that the corresponding ground-truth partitions were
fully recovered. On top of that, mPW was either the best-performing or among the best-
performing algorithms on the majority of graphs (see Tables 4.2 to 4.8 for exact values).
Observe that, for mPW, the correction for chance incorporated in the formulation of AMI
is negligible compared to the original values of NMI.
Figure 4.5: Adjusted Rand index across clustering algorithms applied to seven real-world
networks with known ground-truth partitions. A score of 1 achieved by the modiﬁed Petford–
Welsh algorithm (mPW) in the case of the Zachary’s karate club graph and the Dolphins
graph indicates that the corresponding ground-truth partitions were fully recovered. On
top of that, mPW was either the best-performing or among the best-performing algorithms
on the majority of graphs (see Tables 4.2 to 4.8 for exact values).
Furthermore, our experimental results conﬁrm that modularity (cf. Figure 4.8)
is certainly not necessarily the best measure to assess the quality of a clustering
partition, as already suggested by some studies [4, 42]. In contrast, our ﬁndings
that the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm tends to achieve the highest values of
both information recovery metrics and conductance (cf. Figure 4.6) are consistent
with the study [36], which claims that the strongest correlation between information
recovery metrics and diﬀerent internal measures occurs, indeed, with conductance.
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Figure 4.6: Conductance across clustering algorithms applied to seven real-world networks
with known ground-truth partitions and two real-world networks with unknown ground-
truth partitions. High values of conductance attained by the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh
algorithm demonstrate a good degree of inter-cluster sparsity (see Tables 4.2 to 4.10 for
exact values).
Figure 4.7: Coverage across clustering algorithms applied to seven real-world networks with
known ground-truth partitions and two real-world networks with unknown ground-truth
partitions. High values of coverage attained by the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm
demonstrate a good degree of intra-cluster density (see Tables 4.2 to 4.10 for exact values).
Figure 4.8: Modularity across clustering algorithms applied to seven real-world networks
with known ground-truth partitions and two real-world networks with unknown ground-
truth partitions. The modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm achieved modularity scores similar
to other algorithms. Refer to the accompanying text and Section 4.3.2 for a detailed
discussion of why modularity may not be an adequate clustering quality measure.
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Moving on to real-world graphs with unknown ground-truth partitions into
clusters, US airports and the International E-road network (refer to Tables 4.9
and 4.10 and Figures 4.6 to 4.8), analogous conclusions regarding internal measures
may be drawn. Thus, for the sake of brevity, we will only point out the particularities
of these cases.
Again, for the same reasons as above, Edge betweenness was not applied to either
of the graphs, Spinglass was run 10 times on each of them, and the number of runs
was set to 100 in the case of Label propagation and the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh
algorithm.
On top of the numerical results, which again substantiate the observation that
the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm is likely to achieve high values of conductance,
we also illustrate the resulting clusters on geographical maps, shown in Figures 4.9
to 4.11 (diﬀerent colours represent diﬀerent clusters). This can be done easily since
we are dealing with spatial data. Evidently, the maps are in accordance with everyday
intuition.
Particularly, the partition of the US airports graph (cf. Figure 4.9) consists of 13
clusters, of which there is one giant cluster with 488 vertices covering the majority of
the airports located in the continental United States with the exception of the non-
contiguous state of Alaska, one cluster corresponding to The Trust Territory of the
Paciﬁc Islands, one cluster consisting of 9 vertices located in the state of Washington,
9 clusters forming a decomposition of Alaska, and one seemingly bewildering cluster
comprised of airports in the vicinity of Boulder City (NV), Peach Springs (AZ),
Sedona (AZ), and Lake Tahoe (CA), respectively.
Yet, upon closer scrutiny, these airports turn out to form a pendant star-shaped
structure well isolated from the rest of the graph. Indeed, Peach Springs, Sedona and
Lake Tahoe are only connected to Boulder City, whereas the latter shares precisely
one edge with the remainder of the graph, namely with the airport in the proximity
of Grand Canyon (AZ).
Figure 4.9: A partition of the vertex set of the US airports graph into clusters C as
generated by the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm with the tol parameter set to 0.001.
The corresponding performance statistics are Q = 0.284, φ = 0.776, γ = 0.976, and |C| = 13.
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On a similar note, the partition of the vertex set of the International E-road
network into clusters returned by the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm reveals a
natural division of Europe and Central Asia into countries (cf. Figure 4.10).
Moreover, relaxing the tolerance tol on the variance in the number of bichromatic
edges combines these clusters into coarser geopolitical regions within both continents
(cf. Figure 4.11). This illustrates that the input parameter tol may be tuned to
account for application-speciﬁc purposes; varying it controls the granularity of the
structure of the resulting clustering solution.
Figure 4.10: A partition of the
vertex set of the International
E-road network into clusters C
as generated by the modiﬁed
Petford–Welsh algorithm with
the tol parameter set to 0.001.
The corresponding performance
statistics are Q = 0.830, φ =
0.847, γ = 0.933, and |C| = 20.
Figure 4.11: A partition of the
vertex set of the International
E-road network into clusters C
as generated by the modiﬁed
Petford–Welsh algorithm with
the tol parameter set to 0.0007.
The corresponding performance
statistics are Q = 0.721, φ =
0.947, γ = 0.974, and |C| = 5.
Tables 4.2 to 4.10 (with rows the clustering algorithms and columns the quality
measures and the median number of clusters |C|), which appear below, present
detailed numerical results on real-world graphs (Table 4.1 provides a summary of
graphs addressed in our study). In the ﬁrst seven tables, corresponding to real-world
graphs with known ground-truth partitions, internal as well as external quality
measures (refer to Section 4.3.2 for precise deﬁnitions) are reported. Given that
the underlying ground truth of the US airports graph and the International E-road
network is unknown, the last two tables, which correspond to these two graphs, only
display internal measures. Values highlighted in green (yellow) indicate the highest
(second-highest) values attained column-wise.
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Method NMI AMI ARI ϕ γ Q F1 F2 FM JI V |C|
Edge betweenness 0.517 0.480 0.392 0.424 0.692 0.401 0.588 0.490 0.624 0.417 0.485 5
Fastgreedy 0.576 0.560 0.568 0.574 0.756 0.381 0.746 0.683 0.755 0.595 0.565 3
Infomap 0.578 0.561 0.591 0.668 0.821 0.402 0.764 0.712 0.770 0.619 0.568 3
Label propagation 0.837 0.833 0.882 0.773 0.949 0.416 0.939 0.940 0.939 0.886 0.837 3
Leading eigenvector 0.612 0.591 0.435 0.486 0.667 0.393 0.620 0.518 0.656 0.449 0.579 4
Multilevel 0.516 0.489 0.392 0.558 0.731 0.419 0.598 0.506 0.627 0.427 0.490 4
Spinglass 0.619 0.598 0.465 0.558 0.744 0.420 0.646 0.547 0.677 0.477 0.588 4
Walktrap 0.531 0.499 0.321 0.434 0.590 0.353 0.509 0.405 0.563 0.342 0.490 5
mPW 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.773 0.949 0.402 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2
Table 4.2: Zachary’s karate club
Method NMI AMI ARI ϕ γ Q F1 F2 FM JI V |C|
Edge betweenness 0.600 0.583 0.395 0.570 0.799 0.519 0.608 0.499 0.653 0.437 0.554 5
Fastgreedy 0.602 0.589 0.451 0.575 0.824 0.495 0.670 0.574 0.698 0.504 0.573 4
Infomap 0.541 0.519 0.291 0.526 0.730 0.519 0.491 0.379 0.564 0.325 0.481 6
Label propagation 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.880 0.962 0.526 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 4
Leading eigenvector 0.497 0.478 0.283 0.544 0.711 0.491 0.495 0.387 0.560 0.329 0.449 5
Multilevel 0.564 0.547 0.327 0.585 0.755 0.519 0.533 0.419 0.597 0.363 0.511 5
Spinglass 0.659 0.645 0.401 0.582 0.774 0.529 0.601 0.485 0.656 0.430 0.605 5
Walktrap 0.565 0.551 0.417 0.613 0.824 0.489 0.648 0.553 0.677 0.480 0.537 4
mPW 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.880 0.962 0.519 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2
Table 4.3: Dolphins
Method NMI AMI ARI ϕ γ Q F1 F2 FM JI V |C|
Edge betweenness 0.875 0.871 0.898 0.540 0.841 0.441 0.933 0.930 0.933 0.874 0.875 4
Fastgreedy 0.882 0.877 0.854 0.564 0.783 0.457 0.899 0.850 0.903 0.816 0.878 4
Infomap 0.838 0.832 0.817 0.583 0.763 0.461 0.872 0.818 0.878 0.774 0.834 4
Label propagation 0.898 0.895 0.920 0.722 0.953 0.443 0.948 0.954 0.948 0.901 0.898 3
Leading eigenvector 0.898 0.894 0.913 0.495 0.772 0.408 0.942 0.924 0.942 0.890 0.897 4
Multilevel 0.948 0.947 0.957 0.683 0.826 0.446 0.972 0.974 0.972 0.946 0.948 3
Spinglass 0.894 0.889 0.842 0.583 0.764 0.461 0.890 0.835 0.895 0.802 0.888 4
Walktrap 0.838 0.832 0.817 0.583 0.763 0.461 0.872 0.818 0.878 0.774 0.834 4
mPW 0.951 0.950 0.968 0.743 0.953 0.443 0.979 0.981 0.979 0.958 0.951 3
Table 4.4: UK faculty
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Method NMI AMI ARI ϕ γ Q F1 F2 FM JI V |C|
Edge betweenness 0.562 0.543 0.682 0.626 0.905 0.517 0.800 0.771 0.802 0.667 0.558 5
Fastgreedy 0.531 0.516 0.638 0.648 0.918 0.502 0.778 0.768 0.778 0.636 0.531 4
Infomap 0.503 0.480 0.536 0.584 0.855 0.523 0.688 0.625 0.698 0.525 0.493 6
Label propagation 0.631 0.622 0.726 0.917 0.957 0.526 0.841 0.872 0.842 0.725 0.630 3
Leading eigenvector 0.525 0.512 0.547 0.555 0.778 0.467 0.697 0.635 0.706 0.535 0.520 4
Multilevel 0.516 0.503 0.558 0.675 0.853 0.520 0.708 0.653 0.715 0.548 0.512 4
Spinglass 0.581 0.565 0.675 0.629 0.896 0.527 0.789 0.737 0.794 0.651 0.576 6
Walktrap 0.544 0.529 0.653 0.687 0.914 0.507 0.786 0.770 0.786 0.647 0.543 4
mPW 0.645 0.637 0.727 0.917 0.957 0.524 0.840 0.873 0.841 0.724 0.645 3
Table 4.5: Political books
Method NMI AMI ARI ϕ γ Q F1 F2 FM JI V |C|
Edge betweenness 0.929 0.905 0.829 0.533 0.710 0.600 0.844 0.931 0.854 0.730 0.927 10
Fastgreedy 0.761 0.709 0.503 0.567 0.731 0.550 0.555 0.732 0.606 0.384 0.746 6
Infomap 0.969 0.957 0.957 0.505 0.690 0.601 0.961 0.984 0.961 0.924 0.969 12
Label propagation 0.967 0.954 0.947 0.563 0.742 0.604 0.951 0.980 0.952 0.907 0.967 11
Leading eigenvector 0.758 0.690 0.494 0.456 0.641 0.493 0.544 0.670 0.573 0.374 0.751 8
Multilevel 0.935 0.912 0.858 0.547 0.708 0.605 0.870 0.944 0.878 0.770 0.933 10
Spinglass 0.978 0.968 0.965 0.562 0.729 0.605 0.967 0.987 0.968 0.937 0.977 11
Walktrap 0.937 0.915 0.869 0.547 0.705 0.603 0.880 0.948 0.887 0.786 0.935 10
mPW 0.967 0.954 0.947 0.661 0.822 0.605 0.951 0.980 0.952 0.907 0.967 9
Table 4.6: American college football
Method NMI AMI ARI ϕ γ Q F1 F2 FM JI V |C|
Edge betweenness - - - - - - - - - - - -
Fastgreedy 0.659 0.657 0.785 0.451 0.923 0.427 0.889 0.871 0.889 0.800 0.654 10
Infomap 0.519 0.509 0.647 0.248 0.895 0.422 0.801 0.743 0.808 0.668 0.487 40
Label propagation 0.725 0.724 0.816 0.838 1.000 0.426 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.831 0.725 3
Leading eigenvector 0.693 0.693 0.781 0.854 0.926 0.424 0.891 0.894 0.891 0.804 0.693 2
Multilevel 0.651 0.649 0.774 0.476 0.920 0.427 0.882 0.858 0.883 0.788 0.645 9
Walktrap 0.646 0.644 0.760 0.484 0.925 0.425 0.878 0.869 0.878 0.783 0.644 11
Spinglass 0.645 0.641 0.781 0.293 0.922 0.427 0.885 0.860 0.886 0.794 0.636 15
mPW 0.730 0.730 0.816 0.856 0.927 0.426 0.908 0.910 0.908 0.832 0.730 3
Table 4.7: Political blogs
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Method NMI AMI ARI ϕ γ Q F1 F2 FM JI V |C|
Edge betweenness - - - - - - - - - - - -
Fastgreedy 0.373 0.347 0.085 0.701 0.906 0.693 0.119 0.220 0.184 0.063 0.361 159
Infomap 0.574 0.474 0.122 0.505 0.678 0.670 0.127 0.088 0.188 0.068 0.559 1162
Label propagation 0.546 0.472 0.170 0.580 0.793 0.721 0.186 0.197 0.190 0.103 0.539 722
Leading eigenvector 0.157 0.152 0.008 0.252 0.853 0.311 0.050 0.114 0.142 0.026 0.113 11
Multilevel 0.450 0.442 0.190 0.792 0.860 0.790 0.215 0.293 0.240 0.120 0.446 42
Walktrap 0.522 0.434 0.127 0.523 0.797 0.710 0.152 0.193 0.163 0.082 0.520 1204
Spinglass - - - - - - - - - - - -
mPW 0.537 0.480 0.184 0.602 0.771 0.729 0.200 0.205 0.201 0.111 0.532 517
Table 4.8: Cora citation network
Method ϕ γ Q |C|
Edge betweenness - - - -
Fastgreedy 0.594 0.771 0.431 18
Infomap 0.477 0.913 0.310 49
Label propagation 0.772 0.979 0.280 20
Leading eigenvector 0.682 0.806 0.410 3
Multilevel 0.617 0.790 0.441 16
Walktrap 0.342 0.788 0.337 84
Spinglass 0.597 0.775 0.440 19
mPW 0.816 0.984 0.283 16
Table 4.9: US airports
Method ϕ γ Q |C|
Edge betweenness - - - -
Fastgreedy 0.860 0.917 0.861 24
Infomap 0.655 0.782 0.773 133
Label propagation 0.748 0.857 0.829 83
Leading eigenvector 0.794 0.887 0.835 26
Multilevel 0.873 0.921 0.867 24
Walktrap 0.757 0.886 0.828 67
Spinglass 0.868 0.922 0.873 25
mPW 0.940 0.983 0.847 16
Table 4.10: International E-road network
4.4.2 Results on Synthetic Graphs
Finally, we devote the rest of this section to a discussion of results on artificial graphs
generated by the LFR benchmark model [83]. We studied three conceptually different
regimes of parameter combinations (more details below) with the aim of analysing
the interplay between the mixing parameter µ and the performance of clustering
algorithms as measured by NMI, AMI, ARI, and modularity Q. In each regime, the
number of vertices |V | was set to 1000 and as we varied the parameter µ in the range
of 0.1 to 0.9 with a step size of 0.1, ten graphs were generated in each of the nine
settings of µ.
All algorithms except for Edge betweenness and Spinglass were then applied to
each of the resulting graphs and, for each particular value of µ, averages over the 10
graphs were recorded. Again, Label propagation and the modified Petford–Welsh
algorithm were not only applied once to each of the graphs but a 100 times and
the best results among the 100 were taken. It should also be noted that Leading
eigenvector did not converge on some of the generated graphs, so new instances of
graphs had to be generated occasionally.
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In the ﬁrst regime (cf. Figure 4.12), the power-law exponents of the degree
distribution and the cluster sizes were set to γ = 2 and β = 1, respectively, the
average and the maximum degree were taken to be k_avg = 15 and k_max = 100,
and the sizes of the embedded ground-truth clusters were conﬁned to the interval
[50, 100].
This was followed by a series of tests run on a family of graphs with power-law
exponents γ = 3 and β = 2, the average and the maximum degree equal to k_avg = 15
and k_max = 50, and no constraints imposed on the sizes of the ground-truth clusters
(cf. Figure 4.13).
At last, a set of trials was carried out on a collection of graphs generated using
parameters γ = 2, β = 1, k_avg = 25, k_max = 150, and again unspeciﬁed boundaries
c_min and c_max on the size of clusters (cf. Figure 4.14).
Figures 4.12 to 4.14 demonstrate that the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh is among
the best-performing clustering algorithms with respect to NMI, AMI, ARI, and
modularity Q as long as the clusters are relatively well deﬁned, which is roughly
up to μ ≤ 0.4. A further increase of μ drastically reduces clarity of the ground-
truth clustering structure (see also Section 4.3.3) and thus causes an overall drop in
performance pertaining to all clustering algorithms.
Figure 4.12: NMI, AMI, ARI, and modularity Q plotted as functions of μ ∈ [0.1, 0.9];
graphs were generated using the LFR(|V | = 1000, γ = 2, β = 1, k_avg = 15, k_max =
100, c_min = 50, c_max = 100) benchmark.
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Figure 4.13: NMI, AMI, ARI, and modularity Q plotted as functions of μ ∈ [0.1, 0.9];
graphs were generated using the LFR(|V | = 1000, γ = 3, β = 2, k_avg = 15, k_max = 50)
benchmark.
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Figure 4.14: NMI, AMI, ARI, and modularity Q plotted as functions of μ ∈ [0.1, 0.9];
graphs were generated using the LFR(|V | = 1000, γ = 2, β = 1, k_avg = 25, k_max = 150)
benchmark.
4.5 Discussion
Ever-expanding amounts of data call for novel methods capable of uncovering tacit
and explicit rules imposed upon them. A structured approach to decipher data
that lends itself to representation as a graph should, inter alia, necessarily tackle
determining its clustering structure and, hence, its functioning at the meso level.
One of the constant challenges encountered when trying to identify clusters that
form the backbone of a graph is the issue of scalability. Adapting the Petford–Welsh
algorithm, a fast heuristic that addresses the question of vertex colourability, to the
speciﬁcs of vertex clustering allowed us to mitigate it. The resulting method, called
the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh algorithm, scales eﬃciently to large graphs, uses only
very local information – vertex neighbourhoods, and produces meaningful clusters
whenever the clustering structure is fairly clear-cut. Being a non-deterministic
approach, much of its potential lies in extracting clustering structure that optimises
any predetermined quality measure, as was seen in the experiments.
Indeed, the empirical results demonstrated that the modiﬁed Petford–Welsh
algorithm – provided the graphs were equipped with an unambiguous ground-truth
partition to begin with – either discovered the correct assignments into clusters
(as was the case with Zachary’s karate club, Dolphins, and the graphs generated
by the LFR benchmark for μ ≤ 0.4) or outperformed other algorithms in terms
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of the majority of quality measures (see, for example, the numerical results on
UK faculty, Political books, and Political blogs). Even when there was no ground
truth provided (in the case of US airports and the International E-road network), it
produced clustering solutions with high scores on internal measures and an intuitive
interpretation. These results should come as no surprise given that the modified
Petford–Welsh algorithm is based on local proliferation of colours and should thus
successfully discover dense clusters, as long as they are reasonably well separated
from one another. However, as soon as the clusters become tightly interwoven, the
algorithm is likely to struggle – see, for instance, the Cora citation network and the
graphs generated by the LFR benchmark for µ ≥ 0.5 – but still yields comparable
results to other clustering algorithms under observation.
4.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we introduced a novel clustering method, the modified Petford–
Welsh algorithm. To assess its suitability as a tool to reveal clustering structure in
graphs, we conducted a series of experiments on nine graphs extracted from various
real-world datasets – seven of which were given a ground-truth cluster annotation –
and on three families of graphs generated by the LFR benchmark. In the scope of
experiments, eight clustering algorithms integrated into the python-igraph network
toolkit were run on these graphs in addition to the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm,
and the resulting clustering solutions were evaluated by means of classical internal
and external measures of clustering quality.
Our work suggests a number of avenues for future research. Namely, given the local
nature of the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm, it should be readily parallelisable,
which would drastically cut down the execution times. Constant time complexity of a
parallel variant of the original Petford–Welsh algorithm [188] renders parallelisation
even more promising. Secondly, the weight parameter ω that affects the propensity
of colours to spread was held constant under all treatments of our experiments, and
the input parameter tol was varied only on an ad hoc basis. Exploring how these
parameters impact the performance and adjusting them to the specific characteristics
of a given problem would certainly lead to faster convergence and better-fitting
solutions.
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Part II
Evolving Graphs
“ Dann sprach er weiter: “Man darf nie an die ganze Straße aufeinmal denken, verstehst du? Man muß nur an den nächsten Schritt
denken, an den nächsten Atemzug, an den nächsten Besenstrich.
Und immer wieder nur an den nächsten.”
Wieder hielt er inne und überlegte, ehe er hinzufügte: “Dann macht
es Freude; das ist wichtig, dann macht man seine Sache gut. Und
so soll es sein.”
Und abermals nach einer langen Pause fuhr er fort: “Auf einmal
merkt man, daß man Schritt für Schritt die ganze Straße gemacht
hat. Man hat gar nicht gemerkt wie, und man ist nicht außer Puste.”
Er nickte vor sich hin und sagte abschließend: “Das ist wichtig.” ”
Michael Ende, MOMO, 1973
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Contagion Processes
Despite the fact that game theory revolves around the concept of a payoff function,
the utilities of players need not always be outlined explicitly. Notice, for instance,
that in the clustering algorithm with which we concluded the previous chapter, the
payoffs assigned to individuals residing on the vertices of a graph were never spelt
out and are only implicitly encoded in the underlying imitation mechanism. Indeed,
since the algorithm per se encourages individuals to join clusters that are populated
by a large number of their neighbours, one could assume the payoff to be proportional
to the number of neighbours sharing the same cluster as the focal individual.
Needless to say, however, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the payoff
naturally advocated by the update rule governing the population dynamics should
in fact be aligned with the true utility. What is more, there can even be a striking
dissonance between the two, which can be eloquently illustrated by considering the
dynamics of infectious diseases spreading through populations. While these typically
give rise to epidemic outbreaks, it can by no means be meaningful to assume that
contracting a disease could increase any individual’s utility.
Yet, even in the absence of clearly defined payoff functions, understanding how
populations subject to different dynamics and various update rules evolve has proven
to be useful in a variety of applications, as we shall see in the following. Our
main concern will be trying to discern how microscopic rules governing individual
behaviour, which will be derived from empirical observations of the problem at hand,
affect the macroscopic outcome at the level of the population.
As we have already discussed in Section 1.2, in practice, access to complete
information and perfect rationality posited by game theory is rather unrealistic to
expect. Moreover, its static nature does not provide sufficient explanatory power
to help understand which of the scenarios equally favourable to the population will
occur and why this should be the case [13]. Therefore, we will again build upon the
main principles postulated by evolutionary game theory and assume that individuals
adapt their behaviour to the current state of the environment surrounding them by
obeying simple heuristic rules that specify how they respond to internal and external
cues and how they interact with, imitate, and learn from other individuals.
However, the models that will be considered also differ from those studied
previously in several important ways. First and foremost, in many cases, the payoff
function will either only be accessible implicitly or even unknown and irrelevant to
the evolution of the population. This is in stark contrast with both replicator and
imitation dynamics, which are primarily driven by relative differences in payoffs.
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Accordingly, we will not refer to strategies available to the individuals any more but
rather to states that they can find themselves in.
This shift in terminology is not purely linguistic – states will be inherently different
in the sense that the transition probabilities between them will crucially depend on
their properties and the concurrent experience of the individual. Some transitions
will not even be permitted, as opposed to how strategies proliferate – at least in
well-mixed populations, a strategy can be replaced by or imitated by any other
strategy.
An umbrella term for studies of a vast array of such models is agent-based
modelling , and it typically encompasses multi-agent systems of interacting agents,
who can assume and traverse through various states by following predefined rules and
who are often capable of maintaining memory of past events [13]. It is applicable to
a wide range of complex systems in evolutionary biology, economics, social sciences,
physics, and engineering. As a rule, one first examines the system in question and
tries to infer the microscopic rules pertaining to agents that would best reproduce
the observed macroscopic characteristics [52].
For the most part, we will focus on binary-state dynamics, in which every agent
assumes one of the two possible states [131]. Although restricting to two states only
may appear ad hoc and superficial, the resulting framework serves well to explain a
multitude of phenomena. In essence, epidemiology is concerned with analysing the
dynamics between two states – susceptible and infected, and any problem involving
the spread of innovations or ideas effectively boils down to a simple decision problem
of whether to jump on the bandwagon or not. The same holds true when one is
trying to get a grasp on how strikes occur, how policies are adopted, and how prices
in auction markets fluctuate [73].
In all of these situations, the outcome at the end of the day heavily relies on the
decisions that the participating agents make. These kinds of problems that involve
individuals making a decision over two alternatives based on external information
are traditionally referred to as binary decisions with externalities in the economic
literature [14, 179].
Binary-state dynamics will be coupled with various stochastic update rules for
the agents with the aim to investigate and untangle three closely related phenomena
– contagions, cascades, and consensus. For an excellent review of these topics, see [13,
131], and [123].
The concept of a contagion can be broadly defined as “transmission of [any kind
of influence, e.g.,] a disease, idea or behaviour from a person to another by close
contact” [13, 33]. The first mathematical approach to the subject was developed as
early as 1760 by Daniel Bernoulli in the context of smallpox epidemics [123]. Soon
thereafter, especially after the 1920s, a plethora of other epidemic models followed
and, ever since, modelling the spread of infectious diseases has stirred considerable
interest [164].
Tractable mathematical models that are amenable to a rigorous treatment not
only provide insight into how outbreaks of diseases unfold but have also turned out
to be indispensable in predicting and detecting the onset of epidemics and have aided
the design of effective containment and mitigation strategies. In fact, some of the
most sophisticated frameworks at the frontiers of mathematical epidemiology, which
address directly transmitted infectious diseases by also incorporating data on human
mobility and interaction patterns, have achieved unprecedented levels of accuracy,
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which brings us closer to real-time forecasting the spread of viral infections [64, 123].
However, stepping aside from the prototypical use of contagion models of spreading
to describe epidemics, it was soon realised that their potential is far-reaching. Indeed,
since the diffusion of information and social behaviour is akin to the spread of
pathogens, these models have to date been applied to topics as diverse as cyber
attacks and computer viruses, gossip and rumour spreading, opinion formation, the
emergence of social and cultural norms and conventions, language acquisition, the
spread of knowledge and beliefs, outbreaks of mass unrest, the adoption of fads and
innovations, the spread of memes and fake news on social media, and many more [33,
64, 117, 123, 164].
Processes analogous to epidemics and pandemics of viral diseases are of vital
importance also in a more general setting, where they are commonly referred to as
cascades. Typical examples of cascading behaviour include, but are not confined
to, unexpected surges in popularity of particular merchandise, certain movies, and
music genres, sudden substantial attention directed towards a selection of topics,
significant stock price fluctuations, traffic congestion, and many forms of failure
propagation, such as power transmission grid breakdowns, which can potentially
result in widespread blackouts [88, 123, 179].
In behavioural economics, such phenomena are known as information cascades,
and they usually involve herd-like behaviour in which individuals are more prone
to adopt a certain behaviour if they perceive that a large proportion of individuals
around them have already done so [179].
Another distinctive characteristic of cascades is that efforts to predict them seem
to be futile. Take, for example, cascading failures in power grids. Although power
grids are carefully designed to sustain exogenous shocks, there is a solid understanding
of how transformers, distribution lines, and generating plants comprising power grids
function, and they have consistently proven to be robust, a seemingly negligible
failure of limited scope can occasionally nevertheless lead to a serious breakdown
for no apparent reason [179]. Often, such incidents cannot even be attributed and
pinned down to a single source but have more to do with a string of initial failures
triggering failures of components particularly fragile to external shocks, which in turn
cause less vulnerable parts to fail and rapidly exacerbate the impending breakdown.
Thus, a cascade can loosely be defined as “an event of any size triggered by an
initial seed” [179], whereas cascades such as pandemics and blackouts, which tend
to occur rarely but encompass a great deal of the population – a non-zero finite
fraction in the limit of infinite population size [105] (with finite fraction referring
to a fraction scaling with population size) – typically go under the name of global
cascades. They can be conveniently represented in the form of a threshold model,
which will be discussed in more detail later.
Cascades, however, are not the only interesting aspect of contagion dynamics. In
situations where agents are faced with having to collectively decide between equally
appealing options (or, for that matter, alternatives lacking in inherent value), a more
fitting question would be whether a consensus is eventually brought about [13].
As a matter of fact, consensus forms the very foundations of any stable civilisation
– at the very least, a common language, currency, and social norms and conventions
have to be agreed upon as a prerequisite to a fully-fledged and functioning society.
Two main mechanisms are conducive to the emergence of a consensus [13]. It
can either be established by legislation enforced by a central authority, or it can
107
Chapter 5. Contagion Processes
appear spontaneously via multilateral coordination and cooperation between the
parties involved. The latter case, which will be the focus here, closely resembles
Nash equilibrium, since deviant behaviour of a single individual is never profitable
and as such does not pose a credible threat to the collective agreement. Spontaneous
order arising from interactions between constituents of a (possibly chaotic) system is
termed self-organisation in the field of statistical physics and is formally defined as
“the capability of a system to acquire a functional, spatial or temporal structure without
specific interference from the outside” [123]. Abundant examples of self-organising
behaviour can also be found across the animal kingdom, as noted in Section 3.1.2.
A particularly simple model in which consensus is always reached is the classical
Moran process (see Section 1.3.2 for its frequency-dependent variant). Once attained,
the resulting consensus is permanent and, in fact, even global – the agents stand
unanimously behind their decision. This need not always be the case – the naming
game, which was proposed with the intent to portray how languages evolve, exhibits
a clustering tendency with regions of (potentially distinct) local consensus, akin to
how languages and dialects within them form [13].
Before delving into further specifics of these facets to contagion processes, let us
first review some of the common approaches to modelling them in conjunction with
standard background assumptions.
5.1 Modelling Approaches and Assumptions
Even though we will mostly consider the binary-state case, exact solutions can still be
elusive, prompting the resort to approximation techniques. These enable one to gain
insight into the interplay between the model parameters and the qualitative behaviour
of the system. It is especially valuable to identify those transitions in the parameter
space that lead to abrupt and marked changes in the dynamics. In epidemiological
models, such bifurcations occur at the epidemic threshold, which marks the transition
from the phase in which the disease is quickly contained to the endemic state, in
which a significant fraction of the population carries the infection [131].
The epidemic threshold can be thought of as a special case of a critical point of a
phase transition, which is a notion central to the branch of statistical physics that
deals with non-equilibrium systems [123]. A phase transition is characterised as a
sudden shift to a qualitatively different phase as the control parameter λ continuously
passes through the critical (also tipping) point λC at which this change takes place.
Usually, it is detected by means of a suitably chosen order parameter ρ, which
vanishes in one phase and assumes a non-zero value in the other [123].
Accordingly, it will prove useful to consult the statistical physicist’s toolkit. As
it is customary, high-dimensional dynamical systems of interacting agents can be
reduced to low-dimensional systems of (non-linear) ordinary differential equations
with the aid of mean-field approximations, which are strictly valid only in the
thermodynamic limit, where the population is assumed to be infinitely large [61,
131]. Other assumptions behind the derivation of mean-field approximation schemes
are [131] the absence of dynamical correlations, which implies that the agent states
are independent of the states of the particular agents they interact with and only
depend on the overall distribution of the states, the absence of modularity, which
asserts that the state of a prototypical agent can be encapsulated in one variable,
and – when the population is structured – the absence of local clustering, which
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requires the underlying graph to be locally tree-like (see Section 3.2 for further
details). Again, as discussed before, additional correlations can easily be taken into
account using pair-approximation methods or even broader generalisations. This,
alas, also increases the complexity [117].
Although updates of agent states are stochastic per se, framing them as determin-
istic at the population level allows us to compute the fraction of agents in a given
state at any point in time and, therefore, to determine whether cascades are looming
and, if so, to what extent [105]. This is reminiscent of the price-taker assumption in
the economic theory of competitive markets [96], under which the particularities of a
single firm are deemed to have a negligible impact on the market as a whole and are
thus omitted from the analysis on the macro scale. Nevertheless, since mean-field
approximations technically only apply to (infinitely) large populations, they should
be used with appropriate caution. The smaller the population, the more pronounced
random fluctuations can be. For example, the equivalent condition for an outbreak
given in terms of the epidemic threshold turns out to be only necessary in a stochastic
setting [123].
Another key ingredient to consider is the structure of the population. While the
most basic agent-based models take the population to be well mixed, which also
acted as a starting point in the game-theoretical framework, it is often unrealistic
to disregard the underlying spatial structure. As usual, it can be expressed by a
graph where the potential of an agent to exert influence or spread the contagion to
another agent is encoded as an edge between them. Epidemic processes on static
graphs have been the subject of extensive research with approaches ranging from
mean-field methods to generating functions and percolation theory techniques [105,
131]. More recently, graphs with a more elaborate and convoluted structure, such as
multilayer, time-varying, and co-evolving graphs, in which the dynamics occurring
on the graph go hand in hand with the evolution of the network, have attracted
immense attention [123]. These will be brought into focus in due course, especially
in the context of our model of news flow across a co-evolving graph consisting of
two interconnected layers – a media layer and a population layer. We will also
briefly delve into heterogeneity among agents beyond that given by the graph. For
instance, agents can (additionally) differ in their threshold values, which specify their
likelihood to adopt a given state [88].
For now, however, let us rather take a closer look at the different ways of
implementing updates of agent states and the tightly related issue of time scales.
5.1.1 Updating Mechanisms
Analogously to how different order of events in birth–death and death–birth processes
led to contrasting dynamics (cf. Chapter 3), the specific way in which agents update
their states can have a profound impact on the evolution of the system. As far as
the timing of updates is concerned, we will distinguish between two update schedules
– synchronous and asynchronous [131].
When agents update their states synchronously, updates are performed in parallel,
and the agent’s decision hinges upon the states from the previous step. While, without
a doubt, updating all agents simultaneously is beneficial to numerical calculations
and can accelerate simulations, it may not always reflect the true nature of the
problem at hand. A closer inspection reveals that contagions mainly occur in a
progressive manner, albeit the time elapsed between two events may be infinitesimally
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small. Hence, zooming in on the process can, perhaps contradictorily, help see the
big picture.
This brings us to asynchronous updating, in which state updates do not happen
all at once but in successive steps, and the information regarding an update becomes
instantaneously available to other relevant agents as soon as it is carried out. Without
loss of generality, we may assume that precisely one agent is updated at each time
step, which has important implications – relative densities of the different agent
states evolve continuously in the limit of an infinitely large population. Thus,
another important advantage that asynchronous updating has over its synchronous
counterpart is that it lends itself to an interpretation in terms of a real-time dynamical
system.
There are two main approaches to handling how time steps advance – asynchronous
updating can either be time-driven, meaning that time is incremented in (discrete)
constant steps, or event-driven, where events do not take place regularly but at time
intervals determined by the underlying stochastic processes, and the simulation time
jumps from one event to the next.
A simple example of time-driven updating would be the modified Petford–Welsh
algorithm that we introduced in Chapter 4. Indeed, at every time step, a vertex is
picked at random and updates its colour (thus, state) according to the frequency of
colours in its neighbourhood. In this and the following chapters, however, our main
focus will be event-driven updating.
Since in reality not every contact between infectious and susceptible individuals
results in pathogen transmission, it would make little sense to keep track of every
single time interval during which the system is dormant and not subject to any change.
Instead, we will only take into account its active phases and adjust the length of the
time step accordingly. Note that such systems are far from being rare – chemical
reactions, diffusion of news and information, cellular processes, and countless others
all exhibit sequences of events occurring at random times [17]. Stochastic processes
of this kind are generally characterised by the hazard rates of their constituent
events [183].
Definition 5.1.1. Let X denote a non-negative random variable indicating the
waiting time until an event occurs. The hazard (also incident) rate λ(t) of this event
at time t is defined by
λ(t) = lim
dt→0
P(t ≤ X < t+ dt | X ≥ t)
dt
,
where the numerator corresponds to the conditional probability that the occurrence
time of the event falls in the interval [t, t+ dt), given that it has not occurred up to
that point.
Intuitively, the hazard rate λ(t) specifies the likelihood that the event under
consideration happens for the first time at time t. Typically, we will be dealing with
stochastic processes in which a particular entity of interest such as an agent or an
edge connecting a pair of them is equipped with a hazard rate of λ for sustaining a
change in its state [131]. If we assume the length of the time step dt to be sufficiently
small, the probability of this change then amounts roughly to λdt. As a consequence,
the survival probability of this entity not undergoing any change until (at least) time
T is
P(X > T ) = (1− λdt)T/dt, (5.1)
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where we took the per-step survival probabilities to be independent of each other. As
dt tends to 0, the Poisson (point) process with exponentially distributed inter-arrival
times, that is, times between successive events, is retrieved. Namely,
P(X > T ) = lim
dt→0
(1− λdt)T/dt = e−λT . (5.2)
Notice that the derivation above contains an implicit hypothesis that the process is
memoryless (also Markovian), meaning that the subsequent state only depends on
the current state and not on the further history [17, 123]. Although we will take a
short detour to look at when and how to implement non-Markovian processes, these
will not be our principal concern.
Unless stated otherwise, all processes involved in the contagion schemes that
will be studied in the remainder of this thesis will be independent of each other,
memoryless, with constant per-unit hazard rates λ(t), and hence with exponentially
distributed times between consecutive updates.
As a concrete example, the susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR) model that will
be discussed towards the end of this chapter has two types of stochastic processes
associated with it. Recovery processes operate on the level of agents, and every
edge between them – that is, every potential channel for disseminating infection – is
assigned a transmission process [123, 131]. Every (infected) agent has a constant
per-unit probability to recover from the disease, and every (susceptible–infected) pair
of agents that have the capacity to interact with each other has a constant per-unit
probability of passing on the infection. Consequently, both the time period during
which an agent remains in an infected state before it updates to the recovered state
and the time it takes for the disease to spread along an edge follow the exponential
distribution.
A naïve procedure for simulating such processes would be to divide time into
small intervals – ideally, so that they all contain at most one update event – and
then gradually progress through them while at the same time figuring out, for each
process separately, whether an event should occur or not [94]. It takes little effort to
see that such techniques are bound to be computationally ineffective. Nevertheless,
the Gillespie algorithm, which we look at next, offers a practical remedy to this
problem.
Gillespie Algorithm
The driving motivation behind the development of the Gillespie algorithm were
coupled chemical reactions, but it provides a versatile means to simulate sample
realisations of arbitrary (coupled) stochastic processes in a statistically accurate and
numerically efficient manner [17]. It has been successfully applied in a variety of
settings and disciplines – epidemic spreading, circulation of news and information,
and other dynamical systems comprised of sequences of intertwined events [94].
Suppose that we are given a multivariate Poisson process {N(t) | t ≥ 0} =
{(Ni(t))ni=1 | t ≥ 0} whose components {Ni(t) | t ≥ 0} are independent Poisson
processes that simultaneously generate events with exponentially distributed inter-
arrival times according to their hazard rates λi. In the case of the SIR model and
contagion processes in general, for instance, each agent and every relation between
agents carries its own Poisson process [94].
The Gillespie algorithm leverages the property that the sum of independent
Poisson processes (also called their superposition), {N1(t)+N2(t)+· · ·+Nn(t) | t ≥ 0},
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is again a Poisson process with the hazard rate λ simply equal to
∑︁n
i=1 λi [17, 94].
Therefore, its inter-arrival times τ are exponentially distributed, with probability
density function given by ϕ(τ) = λe−λτ . This significantly reduces the complexity
since the initially unwieldy problem essentially boils down to simulating a single
Poisson process.
Hence, at the outset of each step of the simulation, the time to the next event τ
is drawn at random according to the probability density ϕ(τ). This is done by first
generating a uniform random number r ∈ [0, 1] and then obtaining τ from the inverse
of the corresponding cumulative distribution function Φ, i.e., τ = Φ−1(r) where
Φ(τ) =
∫︂ τ
0
ϕ(s)ds = 1− e−λτ ,
which yields
τ = − ln(1− r)
λ
. (5.3)
Without loss of generality, we can substitute 1− r with r as 1− r, again, corresponds
to a uniform random number from the interval [0, 1].
Next, we choose an event (or, more specifically, the stochastic process that
generates it) to occur during the ongoing step. For this, we simply pick one of the
currently active processes {Ni(t) | t ≥ 0} with probability Πi proportional to its
hazard rate, that is, Πi = λi/λ.
Lastly, the step is concluded with incrementing the time variable t by τ , pre-
computed at the beginning of the step. Note that, before a new step is initiated,
the manifested event may have altered the hazard rates λi and/or turned active
processes (that are permitted to occur) into inactive and vice versa [17, 94]. In the
running example of the SIR model, it would be of little use to consider the recovery
process assigned to an agent as active if the agent were not in the infected state,
and the same applies to the transmission process pertaining to an edge between two
non-infected agents. We will also glance at models which allow for hazard rates to
change following the occurrence of an event. This will be the case in our news flow
model, but one could also effortlessly extend the SIR model to bring about the same
effect by, for instance, letting the hazard rates of recovery processes vary depending
on the number of infected agents in one’s neighbourhood. As long as the hazard
rates stay constant for the duration of each step, the Gillespie algorithm can be used.
Thus, at the end of the step, if applicable, we modify the hazard rates λi and
determine the active/inactive state for each of the processes – in fact, the hazard
rates of inactive processes can simply be set to 0 – and proceed to the next step with
the updated values. As the procedure eventually terminates (when, for instance, a
predefined time limit is exceeded), a sequence of events, along with a sequence of
times t at which they should be executed, is given as an output.
Before we conclude this section, let us make a few remarks about non-Markovian
processes and generalisations of the Gillespie algorithm capable of handling them.
Although Poisson processes or, more generally, Markovian processes can enhance
tractability, the ensuing short-tailed distributions of the inter-arrival times do not
necessarily fit the empirically observed time evolution well [17, 94]. As it turns out,
the incubation period of most infectious diseases obeys a non-exponential distribution
that is sharply peaked around its mean and has a long tail [123]. Further examples
that feature non-Markovian behaviour, and where memory effects seem to be integral,
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include, but are not limited to, neuronal firing patterns, cellular memory regulating
gene expression, and other biochemical reactions, bursty patterns evident in many
aspects of human activity such as mobility, crime, finance, and online communication,
and natural disasters such as volcanic eruptions and earthquakes [17, 64, 94, 131].
Non-Markovian effects can be accommodated in the SIR model by allowing the
hazard rates of the processes to vary in time – this allows to account for the fact
that the rates at which infected individuals recover and the rates at which infection
spreads are typically highly time-dependent. Accordingly, every (active) process
has a clock that stores the amount of time elapsed since it has been active, which
undoubtedly complicates matters and renders the problem much less amenable to a
rigorous analysis. Yet, the corresponding dynamics nevertheless lend themselves to
numerical manipulation.
Rather unexpectedly perhaps, an algorithm to tackle coupled systems of non-
Markovian stochastic processes with arbitrary distributions of inter-arrival times was
devised which not only generalises the standard Gillespie algorithm, outlined above,
but also preserves its advantages – most prominently, its computational efficiency
and the statistical accuracy of the simulations. It goes by the name non-Markovian
Gillespie algorithm, which was proposed by its authors [17].
Let {N(t) | t ≥ 0} = {(Ni(t))ni=1 | t ≥ 0} now denote a multivariate process
consisting of n (not necessarily Poisson) processes {Ni(t) | t ≥ 0} with inter-arrival
times τ distributed according to (possibly different) probability density functions
ϕi(τ), which operate in parallel but can depend both on each other and the system
as a whole.
Furthermore, if we denote by {Φi(τ)}ni=1 the survival probabilities of these pro-
cesses not entailing any change until (at least) time τ and by {ti}ni=1 the times elapsed
since each of the processes last occurred until the current time t, the conditional
probability that no event is generated up to time t + τ given the times {ti}ni=1 is
easily found to be [17, 94]
Φ(τ | {ti}ni=1) =
n∏︂
i=1
Φi(τ + ti)
Φi(ti)
.
The non-Markovian Gillespie algorithm is, then, analogous to its original coun-
terpart [17]. At each step, first the time τ to the next event is determined by
drawing a number r from a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and solving the equa-
tion Φ(τ | {ti}ni=1) = r for τ . After that, one of the currently active processes
{Ni(t) | t ≥ 0} is chosen with probability Πi(τ, {ti}ni=1) proportional to its instanta-
neous hazard rate λi(τ) = ϕi(τ)/Φi(τ), i.e.,
Πi(τ, {ti}ni=1) =
λi(ti + τ)∑︁n
j=1 λj(tj + τ)
,
the elapsed time ti is set to 0, and all other elapsed times tj for j ̸= i are incremented
by τ . Finally, the system and the active/inactive states of the processes are updated
before a new round takes place.
Notice the resemblance with the classical Gillespie algorithm – in fact, the
original algorithm can be retrieved as a special case by assuming the inter-arrival
times to be exponentially distributed with ϕi(τ) = λie−λiτ . However, choosing
more general probability distribution functions ϕi(τ) can turn solving the equation
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Φ(τ | {ti}ni=1) = r into a fairly time-consuming task [94]. Since one is usually
interested in a large number of processes n – recall that a classic epidemiological
model can involve as many processes as there are agents and relations between them
and is commonly studied in the thermodynamic limit – the authors proposed an
elegant solution to this by deriving the following approximation [17]
Φ(τ | {ti}ni=1) ≈ e−τ
∑︁n
j=1 λj(tj),
which is exact in the limit of a large number of processes n→∞ and, consequently,
small time step τ ≈ 0. This paves the way to a highly efficient stochastic simulation
algorithm, even more akin to the seminal work of Gillespie – the time updates τ
can be now readily calculated via τ = − ln r/(∑︁nj=1 λj(tj)) and the probabilities
Πi(τ, {ti}ni=1) reduce to Πi({ti}ni=1) = λi(ti)/(
∑︁n
j=1 λj(tj)) after plugging in τ = 0.
The only notable difference is in the instantaneous hazard rates λi, which are no
longer (piecewise) constant but are governed by stochastic processes. Unfortunately,
since they need to be re-evaluated at every step of the iteration, this can still cause
significant computational overhead [94]. Moreover, even though the size of the system
may be large, a lot of the underlying processes can be in a dormant state – for
instance, epidemic outbreaks tend to be initiated by a small number of infected
individuals and, thus, active processes. Blindly applying the procedure above, which
is only valid when there are sufficiently many active processes, can incur a substantial
approximation error.
These issues were addressed by developing the Laplace Gillespie algorithm [94],
which draws on the mathematical machinery of Laplace transforms, generates statis-
tically correct samples for any number of (non-Poisson) stochastic processes, and
even reduces the running time. An in-depth review is beyond the scope of this work.
5.2 Classes of Contagion Models
Contagions, in a broad sense, can be classified as simple and complex. The term
simple contagion typically refers to a process in which the transmission of a disease
or, for that matter, any form of information or influence can follow a single direct
contact [117]. More often than not, such processes also posit that exposures to
pathogens, ideas, or behaviour occur independently, in isolation, and according to
memoryless Markov processes [64]. Hence, a canonical modelling scheme consists
of subjecting agents to a series of perpetual interactions with other agents and
assuming that contacts with infected agents trigger an infection with independent
probabilities [33, 64]. The most paradigmatic examples of simple contagion models
include a host of models of viral epidemics, among which is the briefly described SIR
model [33]. Although postulating that a single contact may suffice for a pathogen
to transmit and that potential channels of infection are independent of each other
seems reasonable in a biological context [117, 131], the same cannot be said about
social contagion in general.
Rarely does an individual acquire a certain behaviour or an attitude after observing
it only once. Quite to the contrary, people tend to require multiple exposures – ideally,
from different sources – to adopt a novelty [13, 117]. And while it is evident that
social reinforcement [64] plays a major role in these phenomena – the propensity
to be influenced by others increases (or possibly decreases in the case of social
inhibition) with the number of recurrent impulses [117], the dependency on the
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(local) environment can be far from simple. In fact, individual channels of influence
need not be independent and can have a combined and interactive impact on the
probability of adoption. As opposed to simple contagion processes, this probability is
not necessarily linear in the number of exposures and can be arbitrarily complex [64,
117], hence the name complex contagion [123]. Note that complex contagion does not
only pertain to social phenomena – processes of this kind are abundant in political
science and economics, formation of fungal and bacterial colonisation patterns,
cascading failures of mechanical systems, and congestion collapse in network routing
systems [33, 64, 123].
5.3 Simple Contagions
We continue our discussion with a brief survey of simple contagion processes. As
we have motivated, we will chiefly focus on modelling how epidemics spread within
populations [17, 123]. A standard approach is to formulate them using compartmental
models [123, 131].
Therefore, suppose that a population subject to an epidemic is composed of n
agents, each of whom finds himself or herself, at any point in time, in exactly one of a
finite number of compartments (or classes), which are nothing but the states of agents.
For the remainder of the chapter, we will only consider three different compartments,
inspired by the main stages of a generic infectious disease – an agent can either be
in a susceptible (S), infected (I), or, if applicable, recovered (R) state [123, 131].
As the names suggest, a susceptible agent is susceptible to contracting the disease,
an infected agent is infected and infectious – can pass the disease on to other agents,
and a recovered agent has already recovered the disease and acquired immunity. When
necessary, explicit time dependence will be indicated by an optional time argument t
– S(t), I(t), and R(t) will thus denote the proportion of susceptible, infected, and
recovered agents at time t, respectively [96]. Note that S(t) + I(t) +R(t) = 1 holds
at all times, which makes one of the equations describing the evolution of these
proportions redundant.
To obtain a dynamical system, we still need to define how agents transition
from one compartment to another. For our purposes, we only need two kinds of
stochastic processes to do this – an agent-based recovery process specifies how an
agent transitions from the infected state to the recovered or the susceptible state
(I → R or I → S), and a contact-based transmission process dictates how transitions
between the susceptible and the infected compartment occur (S → I).
Classically, both recovery and transmission processes are assumed to be Poisson
point processes [17, 123] with exponentially distributed inter-arrival times (see also
Section 5.1.1 for a discussion). As it is customary, the per-unit hazard rate of the
recovery process will be denoted by µ and will be assumed to be constant and equal
for each agent.
Slightly more thought has to be put into implementing the transmission processes.
First of all, we need to decide whether or not to take the population structure into
account. Conventionally, it is represented by means of a graph G = (V,E), with
vertices i ∈ V = {1, 2, . . . , n} corresponding to individual agents and edges ij ∈ E
for i, j ∈ V expressing the specific relations between them.
In the case of the well-mixed regime, all agents in the same compartment are
deemed to be indistinguishable, interactions among all pairs of agents are assumed
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to be conceivable and equally likely to happen, and all agents are assumed to have
the same number of contacts [105, 123]. These assumptions altogether enable the use
of a deterministic approach, which cannot be expected when the interaction patterns
are more intricate.
Recall that, in principle, a well-mixed population can be treated as a structured
population if one places it on a complete graph. In practice, however, structured
populations tend to be rather sparse with O(|V |k) edges for k < 2. One can also
study contagion processes on more complicated population structures modulated by
temporal and multilayer graphs [131]. Alas, introducing realistic features comes at a
cost – the more heterogeneity there is, the more elusive a rigorous analysis becomes.
To keep matters simple, we will take all hazard rates of the transmission processes
to be constant and equal to β [123]. In each time period, an infected agent will spread
the pathogen to every neighbouring agent at this rate, which is at odds with the
birth–death and death–birth processes studied in Chapter 3, in which an individual
was only able to exert influence over one neighbour at a time [123]. Moreover, every
contact that a susceptible agent has with an infected one will be considered as an
independent source of infection, which renders the transition rate of the susceptible
agent to the infected state linear in the number of infected neighbours [17, 117].
Epidemiological models of this kind are usually studied with the intent to predict
how the dynamics of viral outbreaks might respond to varying hazard rates. As a
matter of fact, different rates can lead to qualitatively different outcomes, which
highlights the need to pinpoint the specific combinations of parameters causing
these transitions [17, 131] and will be demonstrated shortly. We will look at three
basic but fundamental compartmental models – the susceptible–infected (SI), the
susceptible–infected–susceptible (SIS), and the susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR)
model [64, 123]. Their specifics aside – they evolve according to somewhat different
update rules – there is also much in common between them.
5.3.1 Susceptible–Infected Model
Although not particularly realistic, the susceptible–infected (SI) model , which is the
simplest of the three, can nevertheless offer some insight into the nature of epidemic
processes [117, 131].
Agents can be in either of two compartments, susceptible (S) and infected (I),
and once a susceptible agent is infected, there is no turning back – the infected state
is permanent. Thus, only the transmission process underpins the dynamics, and it
can be conveniently illustrated using the following stoichiometric equation [123]
S + I
β−→ 2I,
where β denotes the associated hazard rate. As a consequence, the probability that
a susceptible agent i ∈ V becomes infected from a given infected neighbour within
a small time increment dt amounts to βdt. If there are k infected agents in the
neighbourhood of the focal agent i, the probability that i does not fall ill during this
time boils down to (1− βdt)k due to the independence assumption of the sources of
infection, which implies that the probability that the infection does occur within dt is
given by 1− (1− βdt)k. This probability approaches βkdt in the limit of continuous
time dt→ 0 and, hence, a susceptible agent with k infected neighbours has a per-unit
hazard rate of βk to acquire the infection.
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As it was noted in [117], one can easily account for social reinforcement, although
this model per se pertains to a simple contagion. Substituting the derived hazard
rate of infection with, for instance, a piecewise constant hazard rate equal to 0 for
k = 0, to 1 for k = 1, and to β ≫ 1 for k ≥ 2 [117] would indeed lead to significantly
increased infection rates of those agents who have at least two infected agents in
their neighbourhoods.
Returning to the original susceptible–infected model, its dynamics can be approx-
imated using mean-field theory. If we let xi(t) denote the time-dependent indicator
variable of agent i ∈ V which is equal to 1 if agent i is in an infected state and
to 0 otherwise, it takes little effort to derive the following system of differential
equations describing the expected time evolution (averaged over all realisations of
the process) [131]
dE(xi)
dt
= β
n∑︂
j=1
aijE ((1− xi)xj) , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (5.4)
where A = [aij]ni,j=1 denotes the adjacency matrix of the underlying graph. Notice
that, in fact, only an infected neighbour j ∈ N (i) of agent i (with aij = 1 and xj = 1)
can contribute to the infection of agent i and that this can only occur when the agent
i is in a susceptible state with xi = 0. Furthermore, this system is yet to be closed,
which can be done by applying the assumed absence of dynamical correlations (see
Section 5.1), resulting in
E ((1− xi)xj) = (1− E(xi))E(xj), (5.5)
or by resorting to pair approximation or even higher-order approximations [131].
If needed, the ghastly n-dimensional system obtained can be reduced with the
aid of (heterogeneous) pair approximation, in which all vertices of a given degree
are considered to be statistically equivalent [123] (refer to Section 3.2 for details).
For this, k-block variables ρk(t) are introduced that keep track of the densities of
the infected agents residing on vertices of degree k in the passage of time t. Letting
∆(G) and P (k′ | k) denote the maximum degree of the interaction graph G and the
conditional degree distribution of G, respectively, the mean-field equations now read
dρk
dt
= βk(1− ρk)
∆(G)∑︂
k′=0
P (k′ | k)ρk′ , 0 ≤ k ≤ ∆(G), (5.6)
where the index k and the index of summation k′ now run over all vertex degrees,
and we account for the fact that a vertex of degree k can expect to have P (k′ | k)ρk′
infected neighbours of degree k′.
As a side remark, if we take the interaction graph G to be k-regular, which
corresponds to the well-mixed setting, this would yield a single logistic equation
dρk/dt = βk(1 − ρk)ρk [131], which solves as ρk(t) = eβkt/(eβkt + C), where the
unknown constant C is determined by the initial condition ρk(0). However, any
non-trivial value of ρk(0) ∈ (0, 1], even only one infected individual, would cause a
pandemic of catastrophic proportions affecting the entire population since dρk/dt > 0
holds for all ρk ∈ (0, 1). This has prompted the use of models that would exhibit
less dramatic effects, one of which we review next.
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5.3.2 Susceptible–Infected–Susceptible Model
Even a slight modification of the susceptible–infected model can confer greater
explanatory power. Consider the following elementary extension which retains the
transmission process of the SI model but additionally enables an infected agent to
return to the susceptible state. The susceptible–infected–susceptible (SIS) model [123,
131] is thus characterised by transmission processes S → I, occurring at rate β, and
recovery processes I → S with a hazard rate of µ, succinctly summarised in the
following two stoichiometric equations
S + I
β−→ 2I,
I
µ−→ S.
This means that the infection does not confer lasting protective immunity, and agents
can sustain everlasting cycles of recovery and infection, which reflects infections such
as the common cold and influenza [123].
First, let us have a look at the well-mixed setting in the limit of large population
size. In this case, to simplify matters, the hazard rate β can be rescaled to give the
per-unit agent-based probability that an infected agent passes on the infection to β
randomly chosen agents in the susceptible state.
We denote by ρI(t) the density of agents who are in the infected state at time
t and, similarly, ρS(t) will stand for the contemporary density of the susceptible
state. Clearly, ρI(t) + ρS(t) = 1 holds at any given time t. The mean-field system of
equations can easily be found to be [123]
dρS
dt
= −βρIρS + µρI ,
dρI
dt
= βρIρS − µρI ,
(5.7)
where the term βρIρS accounts for the transmission of infection from an infected to
a susceptible agent, and µρI refers to the spontaneous recovery of one of the infected
agents.
At the start of epidemics, when the density of infected agents is low, ρI ≈ 0, this
system can be linearised around the fixed point (ρS, ρI) = (1, 0), which leaves us
with the following equation for the early time evolution of the density of infected
agents [123]
dρI
dt
≈ (β − µ)ρI ,
which can be solved analytically as
ρI(t) ≈ ρI(0)e(β−µ)t (5.8)
at the early stages of infection, t≪ 1. Evidently, if we choose ρI and λ := β/µ as
the order and the control parameter, respectively, this system has a critical point
at λC = 1, which separates the pandemic phase witnessing exponential growth in
the proportion of infected agents from the absorbing phase in which the infection
prevalence decays exponentially. Indeed, the condition λC = β/µ = 1 can be
equivalently written as β − µ = 0. Since the critical point β/µ = 1 marks the
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transition from the healthy to the endemic phase, it is commonly known as the
epidemic threshold [123].
Notice that, due to the fact that an infected agent, on average, infects β other
agents per unit time and that the mean infection period is 1/µ (the infectious period
is exponentially distributed, which can be shown analogously to (5.1) and (5.2)), the
ratio β/µ also expresses the expected number of agents that a single infected agent
in an all-susceptible population would infect during his or her infection or, more
formally, “the number of secondary cases generated by a primary case in a completely
susceptible population” [97]. This, on the other hand, is precisely the definition of the
basic reproduction number R0, a notion which is, perhaps surprisingly, widely used in
demography and epidemiology to guide vaccination policies. The basic reproduction
number of influenza (during the 1918 pandemic), for instance, was estimated to be
in the range of 2–4 [97], whereas for measles – exemplifying the susceptible–infected–
recovered model, discussed in the upcoming section – it is deemed to be as high as
12–18 [101].
The observation that β/µ = R0 is not only intuitively appealing but substantiates
the veracity of the epidemic threshold even further. In fact, it holds in general
that R0 > 1 (a single agent carrying the infection transmitting it to more than one
additional agent on average) sets the scene for a (global) outbreak of the disease and
that R0 < 1 (a single infected individual highly likely not to spread the infection to
other agents) contributes to the containment of epidemics [105, 131].
Regardless of how far-reaching the implications of this may be and regardless
of how ubiquitous threshold behaviour is, it should be stressed that the above
only pertains to large population size in the thermodynamic limit. In reality, the
innate finiteness of the physical world makes it rife with inexplicable phenomena,
fluctuations, and chaos. As it turns out, once the assumption of infinite population
size is abandoned – and, with it, the deterministic approach, the epidemic threshold
β/µ > 1, previously guaranteeing epidemics, is now no longer sufficient but only
necessary [123] – there might just as well be no outbreak even for a reasonably large
R0. This alone merits a closer look at the finite regime.
Consider now a structured population of a finite number of agents n and assume
β to be the per-unit hazard rate of the contact-based transmission process, as usual.
As before (cf. Section 5.3.1), we will make use of the versatile tools offered by the
mean-field theory. In the most standard approach, an indicator variable xi(t) is
assigned to every agent i ∈ V and assumes the value of 1 (resp. 0) when the agent is
infected (resp. susceptible).
Under the assumption of the absence of dynamical correlations (5.5), the expected
infectiousness E(xi) of agent i then evolves according to [123]
dE(xi)
dt
= β(1− E(xi))
n∑︂
j=1
aijE(xj)− µE(xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (5.9)
In comparison with the dynamics of E(xi) in the SI model (5.4), there is now an
additional term −µE(xi) that accounts for the recovery process of agent i, as one
would expect.
By the same analogy, heterogeneous pair approximation brings us to the following
system of equations for the densities ρk(t) of the vertices of degree k carrying the
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infection [123]
dρk
dt
= βk(1− ρk)
∆(G)∑︂
k′=0
P (k′ | k)ρk′ − µρk, 0 ≤ k ≤ ∆(G), (5.10)
which, again, differs from its counterpart (5.6) in the SI model only in the self-
explanatory term −µρk. While the topology of the underlying interaction graph
undoubtedly has a crucial impact on the dynamics of the densities ρk [17, 88], one
can derive closed-form expressions for their equilibrium values in the case of an
uncorrelated interaction graph [123]. Indeed, using the notation of Section 3.2,
equations (5.10) can be put in the form
dρk
dt
= βk(1− ρk)Θ− µρk, 0 ≤ k ≤ ∆(G),
where Θ denotes the probability of finding an infected vertex in the neighbourhood
of a vertex of degree k, i.e.,
Θ =
∆(G)∑︂
k′=0
P (k′ | k)ρk′ =
∆(G)∑︂
k′=0
k′P (k′)
k
ρk′ . (5.11)
Solving the fixed-point conditions dρk/dt = 0 for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∆(G)} now yields
ρk =
βkΘ
µ+ βkΘ
. (5.12)
Since this expression is increasing in the degree k, highly connected agents have a
higher likelihood to contract the disease, which is in line with the fact that they risk
more exposure by maintaining many contacts [123].
Although the solution for ρk is not yet in closed form due to the dependence
of Θ upon the densities ρk for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∆(G)}, we can solve for Θ in the
self-consistent equation arising from substitution of (5.12) into (5.11) [123].
Perhaps more interestingly, this also enables us to determine the corresponding
epidemic threshold λC , which delineates the phase of full recovery, λ < λC , from the
endemic phase, λ > λC [17]. Notice that, in order for an epidemic to occur, ρk needs
to be positive for at least one of the degrees k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,∆(G)} as this means that
a non-zero finite fraction of agents suffer from the disease. This can only be if the
self-consistent equation for Θ admits a positive solution Θ > 0, which turns out to
be the case if and only if [123]
β/µ >
k∑︁∆(G)
k=0 k
2P (k)
,
where the denominator represents the second moment of the degree distribution
P (k).
When the interaction graph is particularly simple, as in the case of uncorrelated
graphs with a (nearly) homogeneous degree distribution P (k) that has a narrow peak
around its mean k, the second moment of the degree distribution is roughly equal
to k2, the square of the first moment. This relation, which holds with equality for
regular graphs but only approximately for, for instance, (large enough) Erdős–Rényi
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random graphs with a Poisson degree distribution [17], permits us to recast the
epidemic threshold in the following elegant form
β/µ > 1/k,
which turns the basic reproduction number R0 into R0 = kβ/µ [123]. This result is
very intuitive – since β now stands for the per-contact hazard rate of transmission of
infection, and an agent has, on average, k neighbours, one can legitimately expect
an infected agent in an overall healthy but susceptible population to spread the
pathogen to kβ/µ other agents during the lifetime of the infection 1/µ.
One more remark is in order here. Even though graphs with a well-behaved
degree distribution give rise to the concise threshold rule β/µ > 1/k, this need not
be so in general. Consider, for example, any uncorrelated scale-free graph with a
power-law degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−γ with 2 ≤ γ ≤ 3. These distributions
are heavier tailed than Poisson distributions, and scaling exponents γ in the range
of 2 ≤ γ ≤ 3 have been reported to fit the degree distributions of a vast array of
empirical graphs. Nonetheless, a simple calculation quickly reveals the divergence
of the second moment of the degree distribution in the limit of large population
size. This implies a vanishing epidemic threshold [123], λC → 0, and impedes any
hope of recovery. The population finds itself in the endemic regime even when the
basic reproduction number R0 is rather small, since β/µ > λC = 0 holds trivially by
definition (a hazard rate of 0 would entail the absence of the corresponding stochastic
process). These findings were soon accompanied by the discovery that increasing the
ratio β/µ slows down the epidemic and, thus, ameliorates its extent [123]. Even so,
these unrealistic characteristics prompted the development of novel models capable
of resolving these issues. A step in this direction is the susceptible–infected–recovered
model, which plays a central role in the next section.
5.3.3 Susceptible–Infected–Recovered Model
The susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR) model [105, 123, 131] builds upon the
susceptible–infected–susceptible model by keeping its basic structure to a large
degree intact and only slightly modifying the recovery process, which now moves an
infected agent to the newly introduced compartment of (permanently) recovered (R)
agents.
Hence, there are three compartments, corresponding to the susceptible (S),
the infected (I), and the recovered (R) state, and two stochastic processes, the
transmission process S → I with a hazard rate of β and the recovery process I → R
happening at a rate µ. The stoichiometric equations thus read [123]
S + I
β−→ 2I,
I
µ−→ R.
Notably, the main difference between the susceptible–infected–susceptible and the
susceptible–infected–recovered model is in the recovery process. In the SIS model, it
is only a matter of time until a recovered agent is infected anew, whereas in the SIR
model, the infection confers lifelong protective immunity – once agents recover from
the infection, they cannot be reinfected [131]. Hence, the SIR model and the variants
thereof can serve as a powerful tool to study infectious diseases such as measles and
mumps.
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As before, our main interest will lie in obtaining the equations governing the
temporal evolution for the densities of agents in the three compartments and in
studying their long-term behaviour. Notice first that the derivation of the dynamics
in a large well-mixed population follows the same pattern as in the previous section
(cf. equations (5.7)) and results in the following system of equations [105, 123]
dρS
dt
= −βρIρS,
dρI
dt
= βρIρS − µρI ,
dρR
dt
= µρI ,
where we added the notation ρR(t) to represent the density of recovered agents at time
t. As it turns out, not much more can be said about this case. Linearisation about
the fixed point (ρS, ρI , ρR) = (1, 0, 0) yields the exact same evolution equation (5.8)
for the density of infected agents at the early stages of infection, t≪ 1, and, therefore,
the exact same epidemic threshold.
The behaviour of the SIR model is nevertheless rather different from that of the
SIS model. Although equation (5.8) in both cases implies an exponential epidemic
growth at early times t≪ 1 when β/µ > 1, discrepancies arise in the longer run. As
far as the dynamics of the SIS model are concerned, this phase is typically followed by
a phase in which the density of infected agents stabilises and the epidemic becomes
persistently endemic. This is unlike in the case of the SIR model, where every single
(infected) agent enters the absorbing recovered state in due course, which guarantees
the ultimate eradication of the infectious disease [123].
Moving on to structured populations, which allow for richer dynamics, there are
two basic types of approaches to analysing them – mean-field approximations on
the one hand and rephrasing the model in the language of percolation theory and
applying generating functions to it on the other [105, 123].
Along the mean-field route, our first stop will be to look at the microscopic agent
behaviour through the prism of the classic mean-field approximation. Note that a
single binary indicator variable xi encoding whether the agent i ∈ V is infected or
not, which was deployed in the SI model as well as the SIS model, is not sufficient any
more – we also need to be able to differentiate whether a non-infected agent is still
susceptible or already recovered from the infection. We can easily circumvent this by
assigning to each agent i ∈ V a pair of indicator variables xSi and xIi where xSi (resp.
xIi ) assumes a value of 1 when agent i is in the susceptible (resp. infected) state and
0 otherwise. By analogy with the SIS model (cf. equation (5.9)), the expected time
evolution of the 2n variables xSi and xIi for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is then given by [123]
dE(xSi )
dt
= −βE(xSi )
n∑︂
j=1
aijE(xIj ),
dE(xIi )
dt
= βE(xSi )
n∑︂
j=1
aijE(xIj )− µE(xIi ),
where we used the assumption of the absence of dynamical correlations, which now
reads E(xSi xIj ) = E(xSi )E(xIj ) for all i, j ∈ V , i ̸= j. If needed, the expected value of
the indicator variable xRi can simply be expressed by E(xRi ) = 1− E(xSi )− E(xIi ).
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However, again in this case, heterogeneous pair approximation has to be consulted
in order to gain insight into the threshold behaviour. As in the previous section (cf.
equation (5.10)), this leads to the system of equations [123]
dρSk
dt
= −βkρSk
∆(G)∑︂
k′=0
P (k′ | k)ρIk′ ,
dρIk
dt
= βkρSk
∆(G)∑︂
k′=0
P (k′ | k)ρIk′ − µρIk,
where k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∆(G)}, and where ρSk (t) and ρIk(t) denote the densities of vertices
of degree k in the susceptible and the infected state, respectively. Evidently, the
density ρRk (t) of recovered vertices of degree k can be calculated using ρRk = 1−ρSk−ρIk.
Proceeding in the same fashion as in the previous section would result in pre-
cisely the same threshold value. Nevertheless, the accuracy of this estimate can be
straightforwardly improved [123]. As opposed to the SIS model, an infected agent
cannot pass on the infection to the agent who infected him or her, since none of the
agents who sustained the disease can ever contract it again. Taking this into account
reflects in the equations in the following way [123]
dρSk
dt
= −βkρSk
∆(G)∑︂
k′=0
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′ | k)ρIk′ ,
dρIk
dt
= βkρSk
∆(G)∑︂
k′=0
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′ | k)ρIk′ − µρIk,
where we implicitly assumed that one of the infected neighbours of an infected agent
is necessarily the source of his or her infection, although this might not always be
the case (e.g., in the case of a prompt recovery of the original infector). Even so,
when the underlying interaction graph is uncorrelated, these adjustments suffice to
provide a qualitatively accurate approximation [123]
λC ≈ k∑︁∆(G)
k=0 k
2P (k)− k
(5.13)
to the epidemic threshold λC , which turns out to be equal to [123]
λC =
k∑︁∆(G)
k=0 k
2P (k)− 2k
. (5.14)
Alternatively, the same estimate can be derived by recognising that the dynamics
of the SIR model are tightly related to bond percolation [131]. Bond percolation can
easily be conceptualised by considering how fluids flow through porous media. If we
associate each pore with a vertex, connect two vertices with an edge (bond) if the
liquid can flow from one to the other, and assign to each bond the same probability
p with which the liquid passes through it, then common questions of interest are to
what extent the liquid permeates the media and how this depends on the probability
p. As a matter of fact, this is yet another problem that exhibits a phase transition
with the probability p as the control parameter and the probability PGC(p) that a
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randomly chosen vertex belongs to the giant component as the order parameter [123].
The term giant component [105] refers to the largest connected component consisting
of vertices connected by occupied (filled with liquid) edges which covers a non-zero
finite fraction of vertices in the graph in the limit of large graph size. Notice that,
by definition, such a component can only emerge for values of p above the critical
point pC . The analogy is clear – the recovery of agents arises across the interaction
graph in the same pattern as the liquid progresses through the porous material [123].
Hence, the proportion of agents who underwent the epidemic is directly related to
the proportion of occupied bonds if we take p = β/µ.
An elegant approach to address such problems is offered by generating functions.
Regardless of the fact that it is strictly only valid for uncorrelated, cycle-free graphs, it
has proven to be a powerful analytical tool able to produce reasonable predictions [105,
123]. Indeed, it has been successfully applied to a vast range of more realistic models,
most of which are well beyond the scope of this work. Thus, exact solutions have
even been obtained for (structured) populations of agents with heterogeneous (and
possibly correlated) infection and transmission processes [105], which resonates well
with the fact that the immune response varies among individuals and that, for
instance, a fleeting encounter with a stranger on the bus is less likely to result in
infection than interactions with family members on a daily basis [96].
Returning to the general SIR model that we have been considering, let us briefly
demonstrate how to derive the epidemic threshold (5.13) with the help of generating
functions [19, 123]. In the context of percolation theory, we are interested in the
probability pC at which the giant component can emerge, i.e., PGC(pC) > 0, or,
equivalently, at which the mean component size c diverges in the limit of large
population size, as the process equilibrates.
Once we have the generating function H0(x) =
∑︁
i≥0 cix
i for the distribution of
component sizes to which a randomly chosen vertex u belongs, the mean component
size c can be computed immediately from c = H ′0(1). Since the connected component
of u includes at least the vertex itself, we have that c0 = 0. Other coefficients ci for
i ≥ 1 can be treated by partitioning every probability ci of u being in a component of
size i into separate contributions that come from each of the neighbouring vertices of
u, whose number follows the degree distribution generated by G0(x) =
∑︁
k≥0 P (k)x
k.
Finding the individual contribution of each v ∈ N (u) is rather similar, with the
only difference that we have to discount the edge uv along which we reached v. Note
that the degree k of a vertex v arrived at by following a randomly chosen edge is not
distributed as P (k) – we are more likely to end up in a vertex of high degree, with
probability proportional to kP (k) (in the absence of degree correlations [13]). The
number of edges incident to v other than the one that led us to it is known as excess
degree [123] and is distributed according to the generating function
G1(x) =
∑︂
k≥0
(k + 1)P (k + 1)
k
xk =
G′0(x)
k
. (5.15)
Accordingly, let the generating function of the distribution of component sizes in
which we can find ourselves in by following a randomly chosen edge be denoted by
H1(x) =
∑︁
i≥0 dix
i. The component that we arrive at can either be non-existent
if the chosen edge is unoccupied, which occurs with probability d0 = 1 − p, or it
can contain at least one vertex with excess degree given by G1(x). Acknowledging
the fact that in the latter case the remainder of the component is comprised of
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components of sizes given by H1(x) that can be further reached, finally yields
H1(x) = 1− p+ pxG1(H1(x))
and, analogously,
H0(x) = xG0(H1(x)).
The sought-after mean component size c then amounts to
c = H ′0(1) = G0(H1(1)) +G
′
0(H1(1))H
′
1(1) = 1 +
pG′0(1)
1− pG′1(1)
.
Evidently, this expression diverges for
p =
1
G′1(1)
=
k∑︁
k≥0 k
2P (k)− k ,
which confirms the previous estimate of the epidemic threshold that was derived
using heterogeneous pair approximation (cf. equation (5.13)). Although the epidemic
threshold for the SIR model still vanishes, λC → 0, in the limit of large population
size n→∞ when the interaction graph has a heavy-tailed degree distribution, the
situation is, nonetheless, much more lifelike and not as bleak as in the SIS model.
In the long run, the infection cannot be sustained – even a widespread epidemic is
eventually contained as soon as the last infected individual recovers.
Moreover, the vanishing epidemic threshold phenomenon in fact sheds some light
on why, historically, restricting (international) travel has not served as a significant
remedy in combating outbreaks of infectious diseases – recall that spatio-temporal
patterns in human mobility tend to be characterised by power-law distributions [123].
Consequently, this omnipresent vulnerability to epidemics has spurred great interest
in developing alternative immunisation strategies and effective measures to enhance
resilience to potential pathogen outbreaks. While computer simulations suggest that
hubs, which induce heavy-tailed degree distributions, play a major role in the spread
of infection [123] and should therefore be immunised, one can hardly do so without
having global information on the population structure at hand. A cunning solution
to this came in the form of the acquaintance immunisation strategy [123], which
leverages the observation above that one is likely to arrive at a high-degree vertex by
following a randomly chosen edge. In particular, in this immunisation programme, a
set of vertices is chosen uniformly at random and then a random selection of their
neighbours, one neighbour per vertex, is immunised – thus, only local information is
utilised.
This begs the question of whether one could also deploy the agents that should
best be immunised to curb the epidemic in the opposite direction – as a medium
to promote the spread of disease or, perhaps more naturally, influence, information,
and behaviour in order to reach the majority of the population. As it turns out,
this need not be so – these agents may not be the most influential, and the opposite
holds as well – immunising the most influential agents may not be the most effective
way to ameliorate the epidemic [123]. While this can be due to the topology of
the underlying interaction graph, even more importantly, intricate mechanisms of
complex contagions could be at play, which take centre stage in the next chapter.
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Complex Contagions
Although the circulation of ideas and knowledge both within and across societies is
in many ways reminiscent of viral proliferation – at the very least, this has led to
the nomenclature complex contagion – there are, nevertheless, decisive discrepancies
between the two [131].
Social contagions are typically intertwined with and shaped by psychological forces
and effects, cognitive biases, and interpersonal factors. As opposed to biological and
chemical contagions, they can be intentional – even premeditated and well thought
out, and they need not be to the detriment of agents, which is not the case with
epidemics [123].
Moreover, it is almost impossible to pinpoint a single reason that could have
attributed to a contagion-like scenario in a social setting and to validate any causal
claims [131]. Indeed, there could have simply been an environmental flux that
triggered the perceived behaviour. However, it could have also been due to homophilic
tendencies of agents, social inertia, perceptual awareness of the circumstances,
detached from external cues, or a combination of some or all of these factors [131].
Nonetheless, all of these phenomena will be assumed to boil down to a complex
contagion.
Although complex contagions will take various forms, a recurrent common thread
at the forefront will be social reinforcement [131]. At its very basic level, social
reinforcement is a mechanism that can help to explain why hearing a rumour from
multiple rather than a single source might make one believe it, but it can also
be hidden behind more convoluted aspects of (human) behaviour reliant on social
endorsement or disapproval.
For the purposes of this work, a complex contagion will be akin to its simple
counterpart, although different in either the recovery process or the transmission
process [123]. The first case will be embodied in the class of rumour spreading models,
which will be discussed in Section 6.1, whereas the second case will be the focal topic
in Section 6.2 on threshold models.
From a technical perspective, both classes of complex contagions can be handled
in two main ways. One can either take an edge-based (also edge-centric) or an
agent-based (also agent-centric) approach [64]. In the first one, the probability of
transmission across an edge is determined by the number of infected neighbours of
both endpoints, and hence the hazard rate of infection explicitly depends on the
agent’s extended neighbourhood. Even so, we will use the agent-based approach
instead and dispense with any dependence beyond the immediate neighbours.
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6.1 Rumour Spreading
Studying social dynamics through the prism of contagion principles became a subject
of great interest in the 1960s when Daryl J. Daley and David G. Kendall proposed a
simplistic model of rumour spreading , similar to the susceptible–infected–recovered
model (cf. Section 5.3.3) [123]. Their model, nowadays known as the Daley–Kendall
model , permits three agent states – an agent may be ignorant of the rumour (or, in
the spirit of the SIR model, susceptible to it), may assume the role of a spreader (or,
equivalently, may be infected by the rumour and infectious), or may know about it
and stifle it by ceasing to spread it further (or, in the language of the SIR model,
may be in a recovered state). To keep the analogy with the SIR model, these states
will be denoted by S, I, and R, respectively.
Again, the model incorporates two stochastic processes – an edge-based transmis-
sion process with a hazard rate of β in which a spreader convinces an ignorant agent
to jump on the bandwagon of rumour-mongers, S → I, and a recovery process with
a hazard rate of µ which does not entail the spontaneous recovery of the SIR model
but is edge-based instead and depends on the particular interactions that the focal
agent engages in. To be more specific, a spreader turns into a stifler, I → R, as soon
as he or she bumps into an agent aware of the rumour. The stoichiometric equations
hence read [123]
S + I
β−→ 2I,
I + I
µ−→ 2R,
I +R
µ−→ 2R.
In the following, we will focus on a popular variant of the Daley–Kendall model, the
Maki–Thompson model with a slightly different second stoichiometric equation, that
is,
I + I
µ−→ I +R,
which conveys the modelling assumption that at most one agent state can change at
a time – when a spreader establishes contact with another spreader, only the former
deems the rumour tiresome after the encounter and puts an end to spreading it any
further by turning into a stifler. As with the SIR model, the phase in which the
agents actively share the rumour with one another is only transient. At the end
of the day, each agent is either ignorant or a stifler, and in order to deduce how
widespread the rumour is, one can simply calculate the final proportion of agents in
the latter state.
Using the conventional notation for the densities of the ignorant agents, spreaders,
and stiflers at time t, ρS(t), ρI(t), and ρR(t), respectively, we are thus interested in
the limiting value of R∗ := limt→∞ ρR(t). As usual, it takes little effort to obtain the
mean-field system of the familiar form
dρS
dt
= −βρIρS, (6.1)
dρI
dt
= βρIρS − µρI(ρI + ρR), (6.2)
dρR
dt
= µρI(ρI + ρR). (6.3)
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Dividing equation (6.2) by equation (6.3) and taking into account that ρS(t)+ρI(t)+
ρR(t) = 1, we have
dρI
dρR
=
β(1− (ρI + ρR))
µ(ρI + ρR)
− 1,
which, upon integration, results in
ρI(t) + ρR(t) + ln(1− (ρI(t) + ρR(t))) + β
µ
ρR(t) = 0,
where we assumed a small initial seedbed of spreaders, ρI(0) ≈ 0, in an otherwise
ignorant population, ρR(0) = 0. Taking the limit as t → ∞ and bearing in mind
that limt→∞ ρI(t) = 0 finally yields
R∗ = 1− e−R∗(1+β/µ), (6.4)
a transcendental equation for R∗ [123]. Obviously, the trivial solution R∗ = 0 always
exists, but it can only be realised if there is no rumour to begin with. Note that
equation (6.4) admits a positive solution R∗ > 0 if and only if the derivative of the
right-hand side evaluated at R∗ = 0 is strictly larger than 1, which leads to the
threshold rule of β/µ > 0. In other words, the rumour can reach a considerable
amount of agents (or a non-zero finite fraction in the limit of large population size)
regardless of the particular choice of the hazard rates β and µ. Recall that this did
not occur in the SIR model – in the absence of population structure, there was an
epidemic threshold of 1, and a far-flung outbreak was only possible if the ratio β/µ
exceeded it.
Moreover, allowing for more complex interaction patterns does not help much –
although the final proportion of stiflers R∗ was found to decrease on scale-free graphs
due to the high-degree vertices rapidly subsuming as well as abandoning the role of
spreader, the threshold of 0 nevertheless still applies [123].
As a side remark, if we added an additional agent-based recovery process I → R
granting an agent the prospect of spontaneously consigning the rumour to obliv-
ion with a hazard rate of µ, a linear term ∓µρI would appear in the mean-field
equations (6.2) and (6.3), respectively, rendering SIR-like dynamics for ρI ≈ 0 [123].
While there is a myriad of other ways to tweak the recovery process, let us take a
look at what happens if we vary the transmission process instead, which brings us to
a rich class of threshold models to be reviewed in the next section.
6.2 Threshold Models
So far, threshold behaviour has emerged in a number of unexpected and unrelated
forms with examples ranging from the simple threshold rule of b/c > k marking the
difference between the prevalence of cooperation and its demise in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game with death–birth updating (refer to Section 3.4) to the strikingly
similar Hamilton’s rule b/c > 1/r pertaining to kin selection and a series of threshold
rules governing the spread of epidemic diseases, such as the β/µ > 1/k rule for the
SIS dynamics on k-regular graphs (refer to Section 5.3.2).
Yet, every single one of these rules dictated the evolutionary dynamics at the
population level – surpassing a certain threshold would only sway the population in
one direction or the other, but no blueprints or guidelines on how to act accordingly
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would be handed out to individual agents. In this section, on the other hand, we
will explore such rules at the level of agents – each one of them will be endowed with
their own thresholds to adhere to.
This introduces some important distinctions between epidemiological and thresh-
old models beyond the fact that they aim to model different phenomena, biological
contagions and the dissemination of socio-cultural memes, respectively. While the
former assume that agents are memoryless and that exposures to the pathogen are in-
dependent both of each other and across transmission channels, the threshold nature
of the latter implicitly integrates extended dependencies beyond pairwise encounters
as well as memory capacities enabling agents to record exposure history [123, 179].
Note that threshold behaviour need not be limited only to the social domain – it
can also be a valuable asset to models in virology – and can arise as a by-product
of other effects. For instance, rather recently, a variant of the susceptible–infected–
susceptible model was developed which, by allowing agents to store the history of
events in memory, aggregates multiple exposures to the pathogen and links them to
a higher risk of infection [64]. In this model, which was dubbed the memory-induced
complex contagion susceptible–infected–susceptible (miccSIS) model, an infected agent
transmits the pathogen to every neighbouring agent with a constant hazard rate,
as before. However, the crucial difference lies in the way how the disease may be
contracted.
A susceptible agent amasses pathogens from neighbouring agents, resulting in a
viral titre of, say κ, and succumbs to the infection with probability ψ∗inf (κ)dκ, where
ψ∗inf (κ) denotes the probability density function of infection. Recovery occurs, again,
spontaneously, and an infected agent returns to the susceptible state. When the last
trace of infection is eradicated from the neighbourhood of a susceptible agent, the
hitherto amassed viral titre commences to decay. This may correspond to a gradual
recovery of the immune system or, in a more social context, an idea losing its appeal
to the focal agent, which is at odds with the rumour spreading model, where agents
abruptly change their mind about the worthiness of spreading the rumour to their
contemporaries.
Hence, although the miccSIS model per se neither involves any social reinforcement
processes nor an explicit threshold scheme, both emanate from the non-Markovian
dynamics coupled with the contagion mechanism.
In yet another example [117], the thresholds may still not be explicitly specified,
but the role of social reinforcement can be easily seen as twofold. First, the hazard
rate βk of infection amidst k infected neighbours is adapted by amplifying β when
k ≥ 2 (refer also to the discussion in Section 5.3.1). Second, the importance of social
reinforcement is additionally acknowledged by taking into account the clustering
structure of the interaction graph, thus recognising the hefty influence that communal
reinforcement has on the propagation of information.
In fact, the more tightly knit a community is, the more often can its members be
presumed to interact, and the more often they do, the more often an idea repeats
– and the more often it does, the more reinforcement there is. Recall that neither
mean-field nor pair approximation could be used to accurately describe contagion
dynamics on clustered graphs, since both assume the absence of short cycles and,
therefore, clusters.
In order to nevertheless achieve analytic results, clique approximation was deployed
under the assumption that the underlying graph is infinitely large, vertex-transitive,
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and, thus, regular. As one can easily guess, clique approximation is concerned with
the time evolution of the relative frequencies ci of cliques with i infected vertices,
but we will not go into further details here.
Although the examples above only implicitly hint at threshold behaviour, explicit
agent-based thresholds triggering specific individual actions are sometimes more
justified, as we will demonstrate shortly. Besides, while a two-compartment model in
which infected agents indefinitely remain so does not seem particularly convincing
with regard to epidemics, this need not be the case in a social setting.
Typically, updating one’s state or opinion does not entail switching back and forth
between the two options whether to adopt the act in question or not. Indeed, firms
contemplating implementing an innovation tend to factor in all the associated costs
before they commit to carrying it out and are likely to stand behind the decision
they have made – even more so when reverting to the previous state incurs additional
costs [154].
Moreover, it has long been well known that people exhibit a high level of inertia
when it comes to adopting a novelty and prefer to stick to their familiar patterns of
behaviour and beliefs – as captured by the adage “old habits die hard”. Consequently,
overcoming this hesitation can involve investing time, effort, and a substantial amount
of persuasion and incentives, but, once reached, it might be equally, if not more,
difficult to turn back [154, 179].
In other situations, regressing to the previous state may not even be a valid
option – one either reads a book, participates in a riot, or shares a news story or not
– some actions cannot be undone. In the following, we will thus assume update events
to be irreversible. As it turns out, this also has an added benefit of mathematical
tractability [131].
All in all, a population of n agents will be facing an irreversible binary decision
with externalities – every agent will have to decide whether or not to update to
a permanent state based on what other (neighbouring) agents do [14]. Relying
on observing the behaviour of others and turning to them for opinion and advice
can be invaluable when information is scarce or, on the contrary, when its sheer
amount is beyond the processing capacity of any human being [179]. Furthermore,
all models in this chapter will be founded on a premise that this dependence is rather
straightforward – the more a meme gains in popularity, the more susceptible to
adopting it other agents become.
Despite the simplicity, countless phenomena can be modelled this way – participa-
tion in strikes and crowd movements, bystander interventions, choosing a restaurant
or a movie to watch, pursuing a degree, downloading mobile applications and adopting
technological innovations, spreading rumours and fake news, and cascading failures
propagating through electrical power grids and infrastructure systems [52, 57, 64,
123, 154, 179].
Historically, such problems were tackled with non-cooperative game theory [57].
An agent would play the two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma game against the rest of the
population acting collectively as a single opponent. While the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game can, to a certain degree, provide insight into unexpected and contradictory
outcomes given agent preferences – a prime example being the tragedy of the commons,
discussed in Section 1.1 – there are several downsides to this approach [57].
First and foremost, the utilities of agents are not necessarily the same and, as
such, should not be reduced to a single payoff matrix. For instance, in a bystander
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intervention setting, some are quick to offer a helping hand due to high perceived
benefits, and yet some seek confirmation in the reactions of others due to fear of
confrontation and associated high costs. Second, blending a multitude of agents into
a single representative discards valuable information about the thought processes
involved and the dynamics building up to the observed behaviour.
Threshold models resolve both obstacles, but flattening the relative costs and
benefits of each action into a threshold value renders it impossible to deduce whether
the equilibrium achieved by the population maximises the utility function of any
of the agents. However, this may not even matter, as we have already seen with
evolutionary game theory. Decisions do not always entail a careful consideration of
all the alternatives and may rely on (external) impulses and intuition.
Still, akin to the rationality of players in standard game theory, agents will have
knowledge about the (local) state of the population and will be assumed to act
rationally in line with their thresholds, which nevertheless optimise their utilities
under the given circumstances [57].
Each agent will thus be assigned an (adoption) threshold (also decision rule) [154,
179] determined by an explicit map from the (local) state of the population to the
next action for the agent to perform, which implicitly carries information about the
costs and benefits associated with every possible state of the (local) environment [14,
33]. As soon as sufficiently many agents – as specified by the threshold – are activated,
the benefits outweigh the costs, and the focal agent immediately changes state [33,
57, 154].
Note that the notion of “sufficiently many” can be expressed in different ways, and
different applications call for different measures [179]. When considering attending
an event, one might be more interested in the proportion of acquaintances that
are likely to gather there as opposed to their absolute number. When choosing a
restaurant, on the other hand, knowing the absolute rather than relative number of
positive reviews might be more appreciated.
Most classical threshold models, which will be described in more detail below,
specify thresholds according to the first regime, in terms of the overall proportion
or local density of agents who have already adopted the behaviour of interest.
Consequently, as the number of influential agents increases, their individual influence
is lost in the crowd [179].
An example of a model operating with absolute thresholds instead is the Centola–
Macy model [131], which stipulates for each agent a threshold in the form of a number
of activated (neighbouring) agents which, if exceeded, triggers an update event. If
all thresholds coincide, the model is equivalent to bootstrap percolation [131].
Intriguingly, while one might quite reasonably hypothesise that on social media,
an absolute number of posts on a topic would spur more related activity than the
proportion of one’s contacts discussing it [131], data-driven experimental studies
indicate there is more to the story. Although they have confirmed that user activity
increases as the number of exposures grows and that the fraction of contacts advo-
cating for a topic further promotes it, there has also been substantial evidence that
one should keep in mind the limitations of cognitive load and the inherent finiteness
of one’s attention span [61]. In fact, additionally accounting for the visibility and
ease of access to information about the activity of other users enabled a qualitatively
correct real-time prediction of user responses on two social media platforms [61].
Highly connected individuals, therefore, have an elevated resistance to cues in social
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media due to the overload of information that they face, which is in contrast with
epidemiological models with the hazard rate of infection rising with the surge of
infected (neighbouring) agents.
Besides the (relative) number of agents propagating a meme or a piece of informa-
tion, other elements should be factored in to faithfully reproduce all aspects of a social
contagion. As per the social impact theory, there are three pillars of the persuasive
power of a group – its (relative) cardinality, its strength – as gauged by, for example,
how influential or credible its members are, and its immediacy – its closeness and
relatedness to the target [13]. Nonetheless, to keep matters simple, we will only be
concerned with the relative proportions of the sources of influence while neglecting
other effects, and updates will occur asynchronously to allow for approximations by
means of continuous dynamical systems (refer to Section 5.1.1) [131].
Having reviewed all the essential ingredients, let us now turn to two seminal
approaches to threshold modelling – the famous threshold model of collective be-
haviour of a well-mixed population of individuals proposed by Mark Granovetter
in the 1970 [57] and its natural extension to structured populations introduced by
Duncan J. Watts a mere two decades ago [179].
6.2.1 Granovetter’s Threshold Model
This classical model of binary opinion dynamics can be seen as a formalisation of
the well-documented concept of behavioural contagion [57]. A well-mixed population
of n agents is assumed, each of whom, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is assigned a fixed (time-invariant)
threshold value of Ri ∈ [0, 1] drawn from a distribution with a cumulative distribution
function denoted by F (ρ) = P(Ri ≤ ρ) [57, 131]. At each (discrete) time step t,
agents can find themselves in either an inactive state, adhering to old habits, or an
active state, having adopted the promoted behaviour.
Let ρI(t) be the density of active agents at time t. As is common practice, a
(small) initial fraction of agents is activated at the outset of the process, ρI(0)≪ 1,
and then, one step at a time, an inactive agent i transitions to the active state if and
only if his or her adoption threshold Ri is attained or exceeded, ρI(t) ≥ Ri, which is
the only permissible update event [131, 154].
Regardless of the apparent simplicity of this model, a series of questions can be
posed. As it turns out, they can be answered with relative ease. Notice that the
dynamics follow a basic difference equation of the form
ρI(t+ 1) = F (ρI(t)).
Thus, for instance, in order to calculate the long-term equilibrium density of active
agents, limt→∞ ρI(t), the equation ρ = F (ρ) has to be solved for ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Even
if it does not admit an explicit solution, a graphical method based on the cobweb
diagram can be used to find its fixed points and determine their stability [57].
Given the intrinsic sensitivity of the problem itself – a single initiator can induce
a global cascade as a result of the domino effect in a population with thresholds,
say, uniformly distributed on the interval [0, n − 1] [57, 179] – it should come as
no surprise that the model is extremely unstable with regard to the distribution of
adoption thresholds. One can easily come up with examples of nearly identical distri-
butions with slightly different standard deviations, leading nevertheless to drastically
dissonant outcomes [57]. Still, as Granovetter himself has already acknowledged, this
effect should, at least to an extent, be ameliorated by a more realistic model which
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restricts agents to only observe and manipulate their immediate neighbours. This
brings us to the Watts’ threshold model, which does precisely that.
6.2.2 Watts’ Threshold Model
Extending Granovetter’s model to include population structure marked an important
milestone in research on complex dynamics and diffusion processes on graphs [123].
As before, every agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, has an associated threshold value of Ri drawn
from an arbitrary distribution over [0, 1] with a cumulative distribution function
given by F (ρ) = P(Ri ≤ ρ). This time, however, the population is not well mixed
but is situated on a graph with vertex degrees k distributed according to P (k) and
an average degree of k =
∑︁
k≥0 kP (k). Hence, agents may now differ both in their
threshold values and in their degrees [179].
At the beginning, only a small proportion of agents is activated, ρI(0)≪ 1, where
ρI(t) again denotes the global density of active agents at time t. As the time steps t
progress, agents are cycled through in a shuffled order. When it is the turn of agent
i, residing on a vertex of degree ki, he or she counts the number ai of neighbouring
agents in an active state, and if their proportion ρIi = ai/ki meets or exceeds the
threshold quota, ρIi ≥ Ri, agent i becomes active [131, 179]. As opposed to the
original threshold model developed by Granovetter, all activities are now solely based
on local surroundings.
All things considered, this model lends itself naturally to a mean-field approxima-
tion [131]. For the sake of computational convenience, assume that the underlying
graph is k-regular. Nonetheless, the same approach could well be used for any degree
distribution P (k). The global density ρI can only change, that is, increase if an
agent i for the time being inactive is under consideration for an update, which
occurs with probability 1 − ρI , and the proportion ρIi = a/k of active neighbours
is at least as large as the threshold value Ri. The probability that Ri takes on a
value in the interval [0, a/k] is, by definition, equal to F (a/k). Note that as the
basic mean-field approach focuses on a prototypical agent, the individual differences
at the level of adoption thresholds blend in, and the model essentially reduces to
the Centola–Macy model [131]. Under the standard assumptions of the absence of
dynamical correlations and the absence of local clustering (refer to Section 5.1 for
details), the probability of there being exactly a active agents within an agent’s
neighbourhood amounts to
Pa(ρ) =
(︃
k
a
)︃
ρa(1− ρ)k−a.
As a consequence, the mean-field equation for the global density ρI of active agents
reads
dρI
dt
= (1− ρI)
k∑︂
a=0
Pa(ρ
I)F
(︂a
k
)︂
,
where we took into account that any value of a, as long as it is compatible with
the threshold value Ri, i.e., Ri ≤ a/k, can cause an agent to turn into an active
state. While this equation can be numerically solved for ρI(t), computer simulations
have revealed poor agreement with these theoretical predictions [131]. This can be
remedied by taking a generating function approach [123, 179] in a similar way as we
did in Section 5.3.3.
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Assuming an infinitely large number of agents and a sufficiently sparse – locally
tree-like interaction graph, our goal will be to find out under what conditions a global
cascade, activating a non-zero finite fraction of agents, can occur.
Since we took the seedbed activation to be very small, ρI(0)≪ 1, a cascade can
only take off if at least one of the initially activated agents has a vulnerable vertex
as a neighbour, a vertex of degree k with a threshold of Ri such that Ri ≤ 1/k.
The term vulnerable was coined by Watts, who further conjectured that a global
cascade can only be possible if the largest connected component of vulnerable vertices
percolates throughout the graph, which then tips over the rest of the graph [179].
By analogy with the derivation in Section 5.3.3, let H0(x) =
∑︁
i≥0 cix
i and
H1(x) =
∑︁
i≥0 dix
i be the generating functions for the distributions of sizes of
components consisting of vulnerable vertices to which a randomly chosen vertex and
a vertex at the end of a randomly chosen edge, respectively, belongs. Again, we are
interested in the divergence of the mean component size c = H ′0(1).
In order to determine the first generating function, notice that a component can
either be non-existent with a probability of c0 = 1 − G0(1), which occurs if the
randomly chosen vertex v is not vulnerable, or includes at least v, and the rest of
the members can be reached by following edges incident to this vulnerable vertex.
Hence, the accompanying enumeration problem can be dealt with as before, with the
only exception that we ought to investigate the local environment of a vulnerable,
not a general vertex.
Due to the fact that the probability of a randomly chosen vertex simultaneously
having a degree of k and being vulnerable is equal to P (k)F (1/k), the degree
distribution of vulnerable vertices can easily be seen to be generated by
G0(x) = P (0) +
∑︂
k≥1
P (k)F
(︃
1
k
)︃
xk,
and, as was previously the case, the generating function for the degree distribution
of a vulnerable vertex arrived at by following a randomly chosen edge is given by (cf.
equation (5.15))
G1(x) =
G′0(x)
k
.
This finally yields
H0(x) = 1−G0(1) + xG0(H1(x)),
where the yet unspecified generating function H1(x) can be obtained from the
self-consistent equation
H1(x) = 1−G1(1) + xG1(H1(x)).
After some elementary algebraic manipulations, bearing in mind the relation H1(1) =
1, we find that
c = H ′0(1) = G0(1) +
(G′0(1))
2
k −G′′0(1)
,
which evidently diverges for
k = G′′0(1) =
∑︂
k≥1
k(k − 1)P (k)F
(︃
1
k
)︃
. (6.5)
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Note that this cascading condition requires a much more laborious analysis given
its dependence on both the degree distribution P (k) and the threshold distribution
specified by the cumulative distribution function F (1/k).
Moreover, since the terms k(k− 1) and F (1/k) exhibit contrasting effects – while
k(k − 1) grows monotonically as the degree k increases, F (1/k) does exactly the
opposite – one can reasonably suspect that equation (6.5) may have more than one
or no solution at all, a case in point being a population on an Erdős–Rényi random
graph with all adoption thresholds equal to the same value R [179].
As a matter of fact, even in this simple example, a global cascade can take place
over a whole range of average degrees k, namely for k ∈ (1, 1/R) [123, 179]. Clearly, if
k ≤ 1, the graph is largely disconnected, comprised of small isolated components, and
a global cascade is impossible for topological reasons alone – there are only minuscule
components of vulnerable vertices, whose sizes follow a power-law distribution.
At the other end of the spectrum, when k ≥ 1/R, large vertex degrees prevent
the cascade from rapidly propagating from one agent to another. Still, a bimodal
distribution of component sizes can be observed, implying that while the vast majority
of cascades quickly dwindle and only reach a small number of agents, a global cascade
can nevertheless occur – albeit admittedly rarely.
Recall that a similar threshold rule – with the ratio β/µ in place of R and the
inequality sign reversed – was derived in the case of SIS dynamics on an Erdős–Rényi
random graph (refer to Section 5.3.2). Thus, while the pandemic phase in the Watts’
threshold model is characterised by the rule R < 1/k, the corresponding inequality
for the SIS model is instead given by β/µ > 1/k. This indicates that the two models
display qualitatively different behaviour – increasing the average degree k of a graph
on the one hand reduces the likelihood of a global cascade but on the other hand
facilitates an epidemic outbreak.
As opposed to the results obtained by using the mean-field approach, the estimates
stemming from the use of the generating function methodology have turned out to
be well aligned with numerical outcomes. What is more, the observations above
seem to hold in general, regardless of the particular choice of distributions of degrees
and thresholds [179].
However, greater variability in vertex degrees, as demonstrated, for example, by
the power-law distribution, rendered the population more resistant to global cascades,
whereas elevated variation in adoption thresholds expedited the cascading process
by allowing the global cascade to occur in a greater region of the parameter space
in terms of both the average degree k and the average adoption threshold R [179].
There is a clear intuition behind this – a large number of agents with a low adoption
threshold increases the vulnerability to cascades, but a large number of agents with
only a few neighbours effectively slows down the proliferation by diminishing the
influence that they exert on each other.
Another important subject that we have not touched upon yet is that of com-
mencing a cascade. For now, the set of initiators, initially activated agents, was
presumed to be appropriately small, ρI(0) ≈ 0, but it was never hinted at how small
it should be. This apparently hinges upon the problem, but numerical experiments
have uncovered that a fraction of ρI(0) ⪅ 10−3 of the total population generates
simulations in line with theoretical expectations [179]. This naturally raises the
question of what impact would more initiators have and, perhaps more crucially, how
to position them strategically on the graph to maximise the influence of the cascade.
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To address this concern, all adoption thresholds were set to an arbitrary (possibly
high) value of R < 1, and it was investigated whether one can find the minimum
fraction ρIR of initiators, along with their arrangement on the graph, that would
suffice to trigger a global cascade on an Erdős–Rényi random graph [154]. The
answer was affirmative even when the adoption threshold R was high. Moreover, for
a fixed value of ρI(0), the extent of the cascade was the furthest and its propagation
the fastest when the vertices were activated in decreasing order with respect to their
degrees, truncated at ρI(0). The results also confirmed that global cascades are
limited to a bounded range of the average degree k, which now depends on both R
and ρI(0) – the greater the density ρI(0), the higher k and R can be.
While one cannot deny the extraordinary power of minority influence and could
even argue that social interactions form the backbone of societal dynamics, function-
ing, and organisation, in reality, a population of interacting individuals is not isolated
from other effects. This has prompted the development of models in which agents are
additionally exposed to external cues broadcast, for instance, by a media outlet. An
interesting example demonstrating this is an analytical framework concerned with
the interplay of information dynamics and intrinsic threshold response mechanisms
in a potential evacuation scenario [14].
Agents, who are occupying the vertices of a complete graph, are faced with a
decision whether to evacuate or not given a potential threat of a natural disaster.
Every agent j ∈ V is equipped with an internal state variable Sj(t) ∈ [0, 1] measuring
the agent’s degree of belief at time t that a disaster is imminent and a publicly visible
action variable Aj(t) ∈ {0, 1} embodying the decision met by the agent – to evacuate,
Aj(t) = 1, or not, Aj(t) = 0. The latter variable is determined by a simple threshold
rule – if the perceived risk Sj(t) exceeds the agent’s risk tolerance Rj, Sj(t) ≥ Rj,
then he or she makes plans to evacuate, and if not, Sj(t) < Rj, then he or she stays
put.
The dynamical evolution of the system is governed by three processes: at each
time step t, a global media source broadcasts its threat estimate G(t) ∈ [0, 1] to
every agent j, who either receives it, uj(t) = 1, or not, uj(t) = 0, according to some
probability distribution uj(t) over {0, 1}. At the same time, interactions among
agents take place. For every pair of agents i ̸= j, agent i either shares his or her
concerns Si(t) with j, aij(t) = 1, or not, aij(t) = 0, and agent j either observes the
action Ai(t) of agent i, bij(t) = 1, or not, bij(t) = 0, where aij(t) and bij(t) are, again,
probability distributions over {0, 1}.
The state of agent j at time t+ 1 is then given by
Sj(t+ 1) =
∑︁n
i=1 aij(t)Si(t) +
∑︁n
i=1 bij(t)Ai(t) + uj(t)G(t)∑︁n
i=1 aij(t) +
∑︁n
i=1 bij(t) + uj(t)
.
As the authors point out, this model could also be applied to herding behaviour in
animals, when a foraging animal, acting as a “global media source”, informs the rest
of the herd about the location of food, who then pass the information on to each
other and self-coordinate their movement to collect the nutrients.
Besides, notice that it also lends itself to an interpretation in terms of a multilayer
graph evolving in time – the population layer takes the shape of a complete graph,
with two types of edges, aij and bij, superimposing each other and appearing and
disappearing in the course of time t, and an “apex” vertex in the media layer, perpet-
ually establishing and cutting off contact with its readership in the population layer.
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Thus, a plausible assumption that information spreads faster than the interaction
graph evolves can be simply modelled by letting aij and bij be invariant in time [14].
Nevertheless, further details are left for the sections to follow, where, inter alia, we
introduce a model for the spread of news across a co-evolving graph, which generalises
the media layer to an arbitrary number of media outlets.
Both adaptations of the Watts’ threshold model discussed so far modified the
exposure procedure – by increasing the initial number of sources of persuasion,
tweaking their configuration on the graph, allowing them to be selective about the
information they share, or even completely changing their type. We can also take the
route in the opposite direction and instead explore the reaction at the receiving end.
The threshold model posits a rather naïve agglomeration rule to guide the adoption
behaviour, but the dependence on the statistics of activation alone – confounding
factors aside – can be much more convoluted. In practice, an individual’s threshold
may involve personal inclinations and reservations, local activity perceived in the
neighbourhood, and global popularity trends [131].
In addition, when agents are given several options to choose from – or, again,
a binary choice for that matter – taking into account only cumulative popularity
aggregated across the entire population results in preferential attachment with regard
to popularity, accompanied by the rich-get-richer phenomenon (see also Section 2.1),
which is not justified in this context [52, 53].
Indeed, when faced with a selection of alternatives with a virtually equal appeal
and no clear winner, people tend to be drawn to some of the choices more than to
others – a few options experience a rapid growth in popularity, and a restrained
interest in others is displayed.
Denoting by Ni(t) a random variable representing the number of times an alter-
native i was opted for by time t – which can be thought of as its interim popularity, a
wide array of empirical evidence has suggested that Ni(t) (over a long time scale) has
a power-law distribution P(Ni(t) = n) ∼ n−γ with a fairly heavy tail, γ ≈ 1.5 [53],
which is at odds with the preferential attachment process, for which a range of
γ ∈ [2, 3] is typically observed. Examples include, but are not limited to, the dis-
tribution of given names, views per video on video sharing services, topic trends
and the number of shares of posts and memes among the users of social networking
websites, and counts of downloads of software applications [53].
Intriguingly, as far as mobile applications are concerned, it is not the accumulated
popularity Ni(t) of an application but its recent popularity ∆Ni(t) := Ni(t)−Ni(t−1)
that is decisive when it comes to choosing which one to use [52]. In fact, when
agent-based simulations of a model that incorporates both factors were performed,
biasing the model towards recent download statistics accurately reproduced the
temporal evolution extracted from the actual data on downloads of applications
harvested from tens of millions of Internet users [52].
Even when data augmentation of the model was kept to the bare minimum,
and it was only fed with the overall number of downloads
∑︁
i∆Ni(t) during each
hour t of the observation period, a heavy-tailed distribution of the total number of
application downloads Ni(t) up to a given time t correctly emerged. Moreover, a
closer inspection of applications with a high volume of downloads showed that during
the initial stages, their popularity Ni(t) exhibits an exponential increase – as was
the case with epidemic models – followed by steady linear growth.
Similar outcomes were also reported in an analytical model of meme sharing
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among social media users [53]. The users inhabit the vertices of a directed graph
with outgoing edges pointing from users to their followers, whose numbers follow
some out-degree distribution with an average of k, and every one of them is endowed
with a screen which displays either one meme or none at all.
At each point in time, a randomly chosen user either comes up with a new meme
with probability µ or sticks to the old one (or none if the screen was blank) with the
complementary probability 1− µ. In both cases (unless there is no meme to share),
the meme is broadcast to all of the followers, and its popularity increases by 1.
If the model permits no novelty, µ = 0, and there are only two memes to share,
the mean-field system for their relative densities ρ1(t) and ρ2(t) at time t is easily
found to be [53]
dρ1
dt
= −kρ2ρ1 + kρ1(1− ρ1),
dρ2
dt
= −kρ1ρ2 + kρ2(1− ρ2).
As usual, an initial scarcity of spreaders, whose screen is not blank, is assumed,
ρI(0)≪ 1 for ρI(t) := ρ1(t) + ρ2(t). Notice that their density ρI(t) evolves according
to the standard logistic equation dρI/dt = kρI(1− ρI), which we also encountered in
the susceptible–infected model (cf. Section 5.3.1). Hence, at the outset, the density
ρI(t) finds itself in a regime of exponential growth until ρI = 1 is established, and
from then on dρ1/dt = 0 and dρ2/dt = 0 are satisfied.
Since the expected popularities E(N1(t)) and E(N2(t)) of both memes at time t can
be approximately calculated from E(N1(t)) ≈
∫︁ t
0
ρ1(s)ds and E(N2(t)) ≈
∫︁ t
0
ρ2(s)ds,
respectively, an exponential avalanche is supervened by a phase in which gain in
popularity is linear with time – which, curiously, was also noted in the dynamics of
some of the most popular mobile applications.
On the other hand, when users may produce their own content, µ > 0, and there
are plenty of memes to choose from, a clash between memes is ignited and escalates
quickly due to the slim chances of being broadcast or even noticed on the tiny screen
at a user’s disposal, which only carries one meme at a time. As a side effect, one can
asymptotically predict a heavy-tailed power-law distribution of meme popularity by
resorting to the generating function approach [53], which, again, is in good agreement
with empirical data.
Still, it should be clear by now that cascading phenomena of this kind can be
viewed from countless angles. While most of the examples above are built on a
premise that a pair of agents can only exchange one signal in either direction, in
reality, individuals can repeatedly – and with varying strengths and degrees of success
– exert influence on each other [131]. Moreover, decisions need not always be binary,
and adoption thresholds as well as the likelihood to actively engage in propaganda
may depend on various factors, which has been the focus of a number of distinct
multi-stage models [131].
What is perhaps surprising is how thin the line between simple (epidemic)
contagion mechanisms and complex (threshold) contagion processes is. As a matter of
fact, in the absence of population structure, a contagion model which generalises both
the SIR model (refer to Section 5.3.3) and the threshold model due to Granovetter
(refer to Section 6.2.1) was devised [33] by ingeniously combining the concept of a
stochastic viral titre, which was also utilised in the miccSIS model [64] discussed
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in Section 6.2, with spontaneous recovery and (heterogeneous) adoption thresholds
delegated to agents [33, 123].
At initiation, each agent 1 ≤ i ≤ n is assigned a fixed threshold value Ri drawn
from a given distribution and can thereafter find himself or herself in a susceptible
(S), infected (I), or recovered (R) state. At each step in time t, every agent i interacts
with one agent j randomly chosen from the population. If agent j is in the infected
state and agent i in the susceptible one, agent j transmits, with probability p, an
infective dose of di(t) sampled from an associated distribution to agent i. Every
susceptible agent i stores the toxins thus accrued over the time span permitted by the
available memory capacity T , which results in a viral titre of Di(t) =
∑︁t
s=t−T+1 di(s).
If Di(t) ≥ Ri, an infection occurs, and once an agent is in the infected state, recovery
may ensue, with probability r, if Di(t) < Ri.
If all of the infective doses di(t) are equal to some constant d, the agents have
identical thresholds, Ri = R, and the infection is not certain, p < 1, the SIR model
is recovered. Otherwise, when the pathogen transmission is impending, p = 1, and
the thresholds Ri may differ, the model reduces to a broad class of threshold models,
which can either be deterministic – if the infective doses di are held constant – or
stochastic – if they are allowed to fluctuate. A stochastic threshold model may prove
convenient when modelling, for instance, cascading failures in infrastructure systems,
which are frequently subject to additional stochastic disturbance [88].
Furthermore, as it turns out, any realisation of this general model – keeping
the memory capacity T fixed – can be classified, on the basis of its behaviour at
equilibrium, as one of three mutually exclusive types [33]. The resulting contagion
scheme can either be epidemic, such as the SIR model, or a threshold model that
requires an initial critical mass – typically a non-zero finite fraction in the limit of
large population size n – to trigger a global cascade.
A threshold model can be further differentiated into two subtypes – a pure-
critical-mass threshold model where a finite critical mass is always necessary and a
vanishing-critical-mass threshold model where the critical mass shrinks altogether
for p < 1. Note that these two cases not only subsume the threshold model proposed
by Granovetter but include a much richer spectrum of models.
What is more, the type of a given model can be discerned solely from two
parameters, P1 and P2, which stand for the average densities of agents that fall into
a state of infection upon receiving only one or two units of pathogen, respectively.
There is a clear analogy with the notion of vulnerable vertices paramount to the
Watts’ threshold model (see Section 6.2.2). The “weakest links” of a population – the
agents most susceptible to persuasion (matched with an influential minority) – may
thus play a pivotal role when it comes to contagion dynamics [33].
Nevertheless, we should emphasise that a common paradigm unifying simple
epidemic models and threshold models of cascade dynamics is not reserved for
unstructured populations only – a framework which interpolates between numerous
models of cascades and standard contagion models of disease spreading and even
embeds the voter model, which will be reviewed later on, was designed for populations
on graphs with non-trivial interaction patterns as well [88].
These models arise as special cases by choosing appropriate fragility functions
ϕi(t), where the fragility ϕi(t) of a vertex i captures all contributions towards its
likelihood to “fail” or, in a more general sense, to adopt a particular behaviour, which
happens as soon as its threshold value Ri is exceeded, ϕi(t) ≥ Ri.
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Hence, fragility can be seen as an extension of the (local) accumulation of
popularity that is usually assumed to be the driving force behind cascading effects
and can, as such, rely in a complicated way on the states of (neighbouring) agents
or, by extension, their fragilities, and can even depend on the intrinsic structure of
the graph per se [88].
While the topological features of the graph at hand undoubtedly have a significant
impact on the evolution of (contagion) processes and population dynamics, this
prompts the question of whether the opposite also holds true. To what extent can
a process modulate the underlying graph and how does this in turn reflect back in
its dynamics? This issue is addressed in the next chapter, where the co-evolution of
both is put under scrutiny.
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Chapter7
Co-evolution of Graph Structure and
Epidemic Spreading
Graphs, providing the backbone on which actions can take place, play an integral
part in the unfolding of (evolutionary) processes governing systems of interacting
entities. This is corroborated by the plethora of phenomena studied thus far –
interaction, connectivity, and mobility patterns in human and animal societies,
consumer trends, political uprisings, technological sensations, financial breakdowns,
social networking platforms shaping the spread of opinions and (mis)information,
among many others [14, 53, 123].
Most prominently, we have seen that the configuration and distribution of contacts
among individuals substantially affect the transmission of infectious diseases as well
as the vulnerability to failure cascades [96, 154]. In fact, in the physical world,
people genuinely only have a handful of contacts with whom they regularly interact
or are at least exposed to, and even those who only pass them by are necessarily
limited in number [105]. Still, these statistics can differ markedly from one individual
to another, which shifted the modelling endeavours from simple random graphs
characterised by degree distributions with a pointed peak followed by an exponential
decay to power-law random graph models with degrees that span more than one
order of magnitude, allowing for the presence of hubs [13, 123]. The latter, while
admittedly more realistic, come at a price of reduced tractability – recall, for example,
the analysis of epidemiological models in Section 5.3.
All of these processes are, moreover, also greatly influenced by the (local) clustering
structure of the graph and the communities into which the population is split [154].
Although this is an aspect which we have not yet examined, note that it has been dealt
with in many of the models considered in the previous chapters. More concretely, in
the model of contagion on clustered graphs that deploys clique approximation [117]
(refer to Section 6.2), pronounced clustering was observed to promote, both spatially
and temporally, the spread of disease. Since this model assumes that all vertices
have the same degree and identical local clustering coefficients, one can effortlessly
investigate the impact of community structure by fixing the degree and varying the
amount of clustering. Similar results were reported in the study [154] of the interplay
of the fraction of initiators ρI(0), the adoption threshold R, and the reach of the
cascade limt→∞ ρI(t) in the Watts’ threshold model, which was briefly discussed in
Section 6.2.2. Albeit it primarily focused on the Erdős–Rényi random graph, it
also looked at cascade dynamics on real-world instances of highly clustered graphs.
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To isolate the effect of clustering, their edges were rewired in ways such that the
clusters were destroyed, but the degrees were preserved, and the cascades in the
resulting graphs were compared with those in the original ones. Again, cascades
were on a larger scale and more likely to wreak havoc when the level of clustering
was significant. The importance of unravelling the intricate connection between
evolutionary processes on graphs and their community structure is further justified
by the plentiful empirical evidence presented in Chapter 4 that organisation into
clusters is vital for the functioning of various complex systems best construed as
graphs.
However, even if we envisaged an interaction graph with an arbitrarily complicated
structure under the current constraints, it would still be rather simple – the vertices
are perceived to be of the same type with the same set of feasible states, the edges
convey the same relations, and the entire graph as a whole is frozen in time. This
misses out on a whole range of nuances that may be decisive in the complementary
dynamic process and drastically limits the scope of its applicability. An important
step towards resolving this conundrum came in the form of multiplex and multilayer
graphs, which are principally intended to tackle the issue of indistinguishability of
both edges and/or vertices.
7.1 Multiplex and Multilayer Graphs
A multiplex graph consists of several layers of graphs, each of which portrays a
different environment (with different kinds of relationships) within which a given
set of individuals – which is the same for all layers – interacts [123]. Hence, each
individual is associated with a vertex, copies of which are embedded in a subset of
layers. Edges within layers correspond to the relationships specific to the environment,
and there may as well be edges between the layers. More formally, this can be stated
as follows.
Definition 7.1.1. Let V be a base set of vertices. A multiplex graph G = (V , E)
over the set V is a graph with the set of vertices V = ⋃︁li=1 Vi and the set of edges
E = ⋃︁li=1Ei ∪ E that consists of l layers of graphs Gi = (Vi, Ei), 1 ≤ i ≤ l, where
Vi ⊆ {vi = (v, i) | v ∈ V } and Ei ⊆ {uivi | ui, vi ∈ Vi} denote the set of vertices and
the set of intra-layer edges in layer i, respectively, and E ⊆ ⋃︁i ̸=j{uivj | ui ∈ Vi, vj ∈
Vj} is the set of inter-layer edges between all pairs of different layers 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l,
i ̸= j.
For example, the set of vertices V could represent the residents of a city, and
there could be a layer of kinship and family bonds, a layer of colleagues at work, or
a layer of friends [154]. Note that the layers could also describe connectivity in the
digital sphere by means of landline and mobile networks, the Internet and diverse
online social networks, or other telecommunication networks [123]. While these
layers would not be particularly relevant in the context of disease transmission, they
would undoubtedly be indispensable in the study of information cascades. Clearly,
different layers can also coexist, thereby permitting one to simultaneously probe
their (combined) contribution.
As far as the formulation of a dynamical process on top of a multiplex graph is
concerned, it is common practice to endow each layer independently with possibly
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different and unrelated (contagion or cascade) dynamics and then impose an inter-
layer coupling between the individual stochastic processes, which enables them to
affect one another to a greater or lesser extent [79]. Accordingly, there have already
been attempts at recasting epidemic contagion models – with different epidemic
thresholds across layers and a varying degree of coupling [123, 154] – as well as
threshold models of cascade dynamics [154] in the framework of multiplex graphs.
Despite the fact that multiplex graphs do enjoy higher explanatory power by
embracing a more sophisticated and diversified conceptualisation, they are still
somewhat restrictive. By postulating that the underlying base set of vertices is the
same in all layers of the multiplex, they do not realise their full potential. Indeed, it
is hard to conceive a scenario where the inter-layer edges are meaningfully utilised
in a non-trivial way – although, in theory, they can be chosen arbitrarily, typically,
vertices (v, i) ∈ V i are only connected to their exact copies (v, j) in other layers,
1 ≤ j ≤ l, j ̸= i [79].
This motivated the introduction of the multilayer graph, which generalises the
multiplex graph by permitting the vertices in different layers to come from different
base sets. We summarise this in the following definition.
Definition 7.1.2. A multilayer graph G = (V , E) is a graph with the set of vertices
V = ⋃︁li=1 Vi and the set of edges E = ⋃︁li=1Ei ∪ E that consists of l layers of
graphs Gi = (Vi, Ei), 1 ≤ i ≤ l, where Vi and Ei ⊆ {uivi | ui, vi ∈ Vi} denote
the set of vertices and the set of intra-layer edges in layer i, respectively, and
E ⊆ ⋃︁i ̸=j{uivj | ui ∈ Vi, vj ∈ Vj} is the set of inter-layer edges between all pairs of
different layers 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l, i ̸= j.
Notice that a multilayer graph offers a more holistic perspective on the heteroge-
neous interdependencies inherent to a multitude of systems of interacting entities (of
distinct types). In the next chapter, it will be made use of in our model of the flow
of the news, in which the interacting entities – the members of the population and
the media, in fact, differ across layers. To reflect the true nature of the problem even
more, we will take a step farther and additionally let this multilayer graph evolve
with time and co-evolve with the process. The next section sets the stage for this to
happen.
7.2 Temporally (Co-)evolving Graphs
Evolution, in the broadest sense, does not only drive individuals to adapt their
behaviour to the environment but, in a feedback loop, also alters the environment
itself and, in particular, its topological structure and connectivity. While all the
graphs that we have considered up to now are static – positing ties among actors as
permanent and invariable in time, in reality, contacts are intermittent and perpetually
subject to change.
Referring back to the running example of contagion dynamics, it would be foolish
to assume that people would not try to isolate themselves from visibly infected
individuals and do their best to avoid contracting the disease [123]. Thus, to mimic
the progress of an epidemic as accurately as possible, edges should break and reappear,
form from scratch or rewire, in coordination with agents or spontaneously, without
any apparent cause. Yet, in other applications, it may prove useful to let the agents –
or both – (re-)enter or depart, although we will not go down that avenue. All in all,
such dynamics can best be expressed in the form of an evolving graph [123, 131].
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Definition 7.2.1. An evolving (also dynamical, time-varying, time-dependent, or
temporal) graph G = (V,E) is defined by a set of vertices V and a set of time-stamped
edges E ⊆ {(u, v, t) | u, v ∈ V, t ≥ 0}, where (u, v, t) denotes a (directed) edge from
u to v at time t.
Instead of specifying an evolving graph G = (V,E) in terms of the set of vertices
V and the set of time-stamped edges E, one could equivalently provide a sequence
(Gt)t≥0 of snapshots Gt = (V,Et) of G at times t ≥ 0, where Et = {uv | (u, v, t) ∈ E}
designates the set of edges concurrent at time t.
Evidently, rendering graphs contingent upon time t ≥ 0 creates a further dimen-
sion of complexity. Even though it may be compelling to simply merge the time
segments Gt = (V,Et) up to a given time T by projecting them onto a static graph
representation PT (G) = (V,ET , w) with ET standing for the set of edges which have
occurred up to time T , i.e., ET =
⋃︁T
t=0Et, supplemented with an edge-weighting
function w : ET → R+ measuring the number of times (or the total duration of
time) an edge uv ∈ ET was present, w(uv) = ⃓⃓{t | (u, v, t) ∈ E}⃓⃓, this approach is
fundamentally flawed [123]. Not only does it fail to exhaust all the data at hand,
the inferred dynamics may – quite possibly – not even be valid. As a matter of
fact, against a backdrop of imminent epidemics, if there is no direct contact between
agents u ∈ V and v ∈ V at any point in time t ≥ 0, uv /∈ ⋃︁t≥0Et, agent u could
not have contributed to the infection of agent v (or vice versa) unless there exists a
time-coherent sequence of edges
(︁
(vi, vi+1, ti)
)︁T
i=1
with v1 = u, vT+1 = v, and ti ≤ ti+1
for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T − 1} – a necessary prerequisite for an outbreak of epidemics
is a series of unfortunate events unfolding in an orderly manner [123]. However,
one can easily think of many situations in which the static projection PT (G) of the
evolving graph G would nevertheless exhibit a path from u to v, conveying a false
impression that the infection can be borne along this path. Hence, the transitivity of
the reachability via paths, which holds for all static graphs, does not translate into a
corresponding property with respect to time – a time-respecting path between vertices
u and w and another one passing from w to v do not guarantee a time-respecting
path reaching v from u.
As the example above illustrates, the order of interactions and, more generally,
the evolution of the graph of contacts matters even more when it is coupled with a
dynamical system governing the behaviour of the agents [131]. An unprecedented
surge in interest in the topic has only been witnessed in the past decade, but the
first ventures into the field of dynamical processes on evolving graphs date back
already to the 1990s, with the advent of models of biochemical reaction networks
with adaptive state spaces [131]. Ever since, a breadth of applications has sprung up,
ranging from various (game-theoretical) models of imitation and opinion dynamics
to numerous extensions to epidemic contagion models [123].
Furthermore, evolution on a graph which itself is evolving implies a concomitant
feedback loop in which a change of dynamics elicits a change in the graph, eliciting
a change of dynamics, and so forth. This results in a synergistic co-evolution of the
two, which has catalysed and brought about an impressive amount of research [123,
131]. Still, this alone does not tell the whole story – constructing models that bear
a close resemblance to realistic co-evolving systems and thus furnish a means to
produce reliable predictions also has to entail non-Markovian effects. Recall, as
remarked in Section 5.1.1, that human activity and interactions tend to feature bursty
characteristics – the distribution of inter-arrival times elapsed between consecutive
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contacts as well as the distribution of their duration are typically heavy-tailed, there
may be spatio-temporal correlations between events, and they may even occur at
different time scales [123]. Remarkably, this can lead to peculiar and/or considerably
accelerated or decelerated dynamics [123], but we will not go into further details. We
will rather assume that both the evolution of the graph and the evolution on it are
dictated by Poisson processes – the co-evolutionary framework alone already yields a
rich repertoire of possible dynamics and is not particularly trivial to tackle, either.
Specifically, denoting by tG the time scale at which the graph evolves and by
tD the time scale at which the dynamical process on the graph operates, one can
identify three qualitatively different regimes [131].
Case 1. The dynamical process evolves much faster than the graph, tD ≪ tG.
This scenario can be resolved effortlessly by taking the interaction graph to be static,
thereby completely disregarding the evolutionary mechanisms underpinning it [123],
which is an intuitively plausible approximation, given that the topological structure
of the graph may take a relatively long time to adapt to the ever-changing state of
the population incurred by the dynamics obeyed by all agents.
Case 2. The dynamical process is significantly outpaced by the graph, tD ≫ tG.
In analogy with the previous case – with the roles now reversed, we may stop
the (independent) Poisson alarm clocks that drive the dynamics, freeze the (barely
changing) state of the population, and only deal with the evolution of the graph,
albeit some caution should be exercised [131]. If the graph undergoes structural
changes exceptionally rapidly, the co-evolving system in question might effectively
boil down to a dynamical process on an ensemble average of all graph realisations,
and, therefore, this reduced problem has to be analysed instead [123, 131].
Case 3. The time scales of the evolution of the graph and the dynamical system
running on it are comparable, tD ∼ tG.
By contrast, when the time scales tD and tG of the two processes are of a similar
order – which is often the case in practice – one cannot merely neglect the one or
the other since they get entangled with and crucially influence each other [123, 131].
In such situations, the affected graph is commonly referred to as an adaptive or a
co-evolving graph [131], and this convention will be adhered to in the following.
In fact, from now on, our main concern will be with co-evolving graphs, and it
should be stressed already at this point that they must be handled by explicitly
taking into account the evolution of and on the graph as well as the interplay between
them [123]. Although this will be exemplified in more detail in the next chapter,
where we introduce our news flow model, let us briefly look at a few prototypical
models of such coupling.
The first example, which pertains to epidemiology, has already been motivated
in our discussion of preventive measures impulsively deployed by people to avoid
catching an infection. In essence, it builds upon the classical susceptible–infected–
susceptible model (refer to Section 5.3.2) by including a mechanism which, with
some probability p, enables each susceptible agent to cut off contact with any
infected neighbour and, in its place, establish a new contact with a randomly chosen
susceptible agent [123]. The resulting adaptive SIS model can be investigated by
deriving a mean-field approximation for the global densities ρSS, ρII , and ρSI of
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edges between susceptible, infected, and mixed pairs of agents, respectively, or by
applying the approximate master equation (AME) approach [131].
In this approach, which shows high alignment with simulations, the susceptible and
infected compartments are further subdivided into smaller ones which also keep track
of the number of (infected) neighbours of the focal agent, and the transitions from one
subcompartment to another are approximated by a system of (∆(G) + 1)(∆(G) + 2)
ordinary differential equations [131].
As one would expect, modifications of this kind can shift the epidemic threshold
value, but also, more notably, the rewiring process impacts the evolution of the
agent states by lessening the spread of infection and is at the same time reflected
in the evolution of the graph structure by assortative mixing and the formation of
two well-separated clusters of infected and susceptible agents [123]. While different
connectivity patterns can evolve rather differently, there seems to be a general
tendency that heterogeneity hinders the spread of a contagion [123].
However, note that neither (higher-order) mean-field approximations nor approxi-
mate master equations are particularly useful when it comes to co-evolving graphs
serving a practical function. For all intents and purposes, real-world graphs are likely
to display broad degree distributions with a fairly large maximum degree ∆(G), so
the number of equations, usually of order O(∆(G)2), can quickly get out of hand.
It turns out that one can drastically trim this number by using edge-based
compartmental models, which trade off interpretability for simplicity and succinctness
by bringing randomly chosen neighbours to centre stage [96]. Accordingly, these
parsimonious models hold exactly on infinitely large random graphs generated by the
configuration model, where the vertex degrees are drawn randomly and independently
from a specified distribution P (k), but their neighbours are chosen according to the
excess degree distribution, generated by (5.15).
Edge-based compartmental modelling has allowed for the development of a myriad
of generalised models, which for instance incorporate intricate disease chronologies
and/or heterogeneous distributions of distinct psychographic and demographic traits
across individuals and can – most importantly – be extended to co-evolving graphs
(with intermittent edges and assortative mixing) in an obvious way [96].
Stepping aside from epidemiological models and the spread of viral infections,
plenty of further applications of co-evolving graphs coupled with dynamical systems
can also be found elsewhere. Nonetheless, for now, we will only consider one more,
a variation of which is implemented in the population layer of our model of the
dissemination of news.
In the standard model, which starts off with a static graph G = (V,E), every
agent assumes one of the two possible opinion states, frequently modelled as two rival
political parties or two opposing opinions. The agents thus form an electorate, and
the model is fittingly given the name voter model [131]. The process then proceeds
in successive steps, where at each step a randomly chosen voter v ∈ V imitates the
opinion of one of the neighbours u ∈ N (v) who is picked uniformly at random. One
can also carry out these updates in an edge-based manner by randomly selecting
an edge uv ∈ E and one of its endpoints, say v, who then copies the opinion of
neighbour u.
This simple model already exhibits intriguing phenomena, and it has been observed
that hubs play a paramount role towards reaching an overall consensus [13]. Even so,
one can also study adaptive voter models, as was the case with contagion models [131].
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In an edge-based scheme, at each step of the process, a random edge uv ∈ E
is picked. If the two voters incident to the edge share opposing views, then one of
them with probability p adopts the point of view of the other, as before, or with
the complementary probability 1− p discards this edge and attains a new one. This
adaptive framework, which can again be examined with the aid of approximate
master equations, brings about only local consensus with disconnected islands of
uniformly opinionated agents, unlike the static case, which leads to unanimous
consensus among the actors [131].
Consensus, one of the fundamental cornerstones of any functional society, also
forms the third building block – besides contagions and cascades – of the second,
ongoing, part of this work and, as such, paves the way for the narrative of the next,
final, chapter.
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Chapter8
Application to Modelling the Flow of
the News
Up to this point, we have mainly focused on diverse problems related to the propaga-
tion of opinion, disease, or failure and many variations thereof which lent themselves
naturally to an interpretation in terms of a contagion or a cascading process. While
they typically involved an inductive approach that, at the outset, postulated the basic
principles and mechanics driving the system in question and then drew conclusions
based on the outcomes, we will now invert the question. To be more specific, our
primary intent will be to deduce and understand how either (local) consensus – or
discord for that matter – comes to be.
This paradigm shift has profound consequences in several aspects. So far, our
efforts revolved around discovering whether pandemics or global cascades were about
to occur or not. Indeed, every epidemiologist and every infrastructure engineer
are respectively well aware that it would be rather utopian to expect every single
individual to be in a healthy state and every single cog in the system to be in an
impeccable condition, but detecting a potential global threat, on the other hand, is
of utmost importance to both.
However, when consensus is concerned, global concordance may not be plausible
or even required for a community to survive and thrive. Moreover, one may also
have an ambivalent attitude in the aftermath of the decision-making process – the
competing options do not necessarily have well-defined advantages over one another
or, as opposed to epidemic outbreaks and infrastructural breakdowns, an inherent
right or wrong.
Take, for example, the process of arriving at consensus on language. There is no
universal language spoken by the entire human population, and one could hardly
argue that one set of grammatical rules is objectively more valuable than another, yet
people still manage to communicate with each other on the basis of local consensus.
This, then, implicitly points to the issue of discerning to which of the broad range of
feasible equilibria will the opinion dynamics settle [13, 131].
Notwithstanding this equilibration process, note that the states attained, whether
viable or not, are rarely permanent. Even languages or currencies in circulation,
which are often deemed to be long-lasting, in fact do evolve, change, and adapt,
albeit at a much slower pace compared to any short-term consensus, such as the
prices of market commodities. Threshold models already demonstrated that at times
a slight tilt can evoke conspicuous phase transitions, but these were absorbing, which
is a stringent assumption that we now revoke [13].
151
Chapter 8. Application to Modelling the Flow of the News
Setting off on a quest to explore the realm of human behaviour demands even
greater precaution. People can neither be perceived as impulsive nor as completely
rational and reflective, and while they do, at least for the most part, behave con-
sciously, they may be highly (and even subconsciously) influenced by their social
environment and exogenous factors, such as the media [132]. Thus far, most attention
was devoted to the forms of consensus that arose as a by-product of self-organisation
within the local communities (refer also to the discussion in Chapter 5), but the
potency of external forces has been largely ignored [13]. In this chapter, on the
contrary, the agenda will be set both by group dynamics and the broadcasting media
shaping the discourse [13].
Although the advent of the social media and the digitalisation of broadcasting
services undeniably culminated in a wealth of data on patterns of human interaction,
habits of news consumption, and engagement with the media, extrapolating the
rules guiding decision-making and dissecting the interworking of both internal and
external sources of information and influence are far from trivial tasks [14]. In light
of this, it is even more imperative to resort to the resources at the disposal of other
disciplines, such as (social) psychology, anthropology, and behavioural economics.
In particular, by turning to cognitive science, we can gain invaluable insight
into a long list of heuristics and biases ingrained in human nature that may impair
judgement and objectivity. When faced with new information, people are likely to
fall into the trap of believing it only if it is consistent with their prior knowledge and
beliefs and if, as such, it confirms the perception that they hold. This is commonly
known as confirmation bias or selective exposure, and it also holds the other way
around – people tend to seek evidence that supports their standpoint and selectively
filter out arguments that refute it [84, 85].
This bias is further reinforced by familiarity heuristics, which steers people
towards uncritical trust and regarding familiar sources as credible and – maybe even
more worryingly – convinces them into thinking that a familiar piece of information
is true, although it may, in disguise, be a lie repeated often enough [84, 85].
Then there are also biases at work at the group level – most prominently, confor-
mity bias, inclining people to conform to the group they belong to by adhering to
social pressure or by leaning towards the most popular option among its members [13].
By and large, on the path to reaching consensus, people turn to each other for
information and guidance, learn and (re)act in line with these heuristics subject to
various decision and behavioural biases, and through communication and coordination
eventually find their way to a compromise [13, 85].
Intriguingly, even though the dynamics may be initialised from a disordered
population of selfish individuals with little care for compromise, and their biases
compound, further exacerbating the situation, the mechanisms of evolution still
accomplish to propel the population towards an equilibrium [13]. But yet, there
is no guarantee whatsoever that the equilibrium thus enforced is, by any means, a
prosperous one.
In fact, as it turns out, already one of the prime endeavours of mankind, the
creation and dissemination of news content and collective knowledge, has backfired
badly by having led to a highly polarised society and, therefore, precluding public
debate [13]. While a variety of confounding circumstances could lie at the root of
this problem, the remainder of this work will be solely inspecting the process of
exchanging news that could have resulted in the build-up of polarisation in the form
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of an extremely localised consensus.
Investigating the mechanics of news flow may well just be a piece of the puzzle,
but to resolve this conundrum, a lasting solution to which is still pending, we
first need to understand its internal workings. Only then can we combine all the
fundamental ingredients – building trust through repetition, curtailing the spread of
misinformation and falsehoods, and incentivising the demand for fact-checking – to
design an environment conducive to truth and veracity [85].
Accordingly, in the sections to come, we will delve into the crux of the matter
and elaborate on the (historical) liability of the media, immerse ourselves in the nuts
and bolts of the society at large that might be further contributing to the symptoms,
and finally interweave these threads to observe how they interact, co-evolve, and
shape the entire story.
8.1 Evolution of the Media
Ever since Johannes Gutenberg invented the mechanical printing press at the dawn
of the 15th century, the media have been some of the key actors in providing the
public with timely and topical information and news [14]. Mass media originally
emerged in printed form, but retrospectively the name mass medium can only be
truly justified in the context of what was about to unfold.
The early 20th century experienced tectonic shifts in the media sphere, which were
predominantly triggered when broadcast media, such as television and radio, were
brought into mainstream use. Subsequently, in the years to follow, (dis)information
has been generated and disseminated at an ever-increasing pace and at a wider scale
than ever before [14].
Nevertheless, one has to concede that the media has not only granted widespread
access to a virtually unlimited amount of information – the history of reporting
has been fraught with falsities, propaganda founded on unfounded claims, and
inaccurate or partly accurate news with the intent to interfere with and manipulate
the public opinion [85]. This came to the fore especially during World War I with the
manifestation of atrocity propaganda aimed at mobilising the wider population [85].
Upon the disclosure of these tactics, an upheaval of distrust and scepticism towards
the media ensued – but on a brighter note, it also ushered an era of relatively objective,
non-partisan reporting, which witnessed the pinnacle of investigative journalism and
set the standards of ethical and impartial news coverage [84, 85].
Soon thereafter, the media landscape was further disrupted in the 1990s when
the Internet entered the scene [14]. All of a sudden, information would flow at
unfathomable speed, spurring the need for instant production of news and on-
demand access to it. Moreover, with the appearance of social media at the turn
of the millennium, their recent rise in popularity and permeability in everyday
life, the population as a whole suddenly transitioned from passively consuming
media broadcasts to proactively reacting to the news content, providing the media
outlets with information, and forcing them to continually adapt to the tastes of
their readerships, thereby inducing fierce competition among them to attract large
audiences [132]. This, combined with the fact that the Internet significantly reduced
publishing costs and eased the broadcasting process, dramatically increased the
number of competitors and rendered many well-established, highly reputable news
sources incapable of coping with the trend, pressuring them to close down or to trade
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off quality for speed, causing the posited editorial norms to dwindle [84, 85].
As a result, over the past decade, dubious news outlets have been sprouting up,
generating unprecedented volumes of falsified news stories, and the public’s trust
in media has been suffering a steady decline [85, 174]. This immense wave of false
news has had a series of adverse effects, perhaps the most troublesome being the
toll it has taken on the trustworthy media sources by concurrently damaging their
reputation [84]. To understand better how this might have come to be, let us first
peer into the characteristics of (the dissemination of) false news stories that make
them markedly different from their true counterparts.
8.1.1 False-News Cascades
In the wake of the negative connotation that the phrase fake news nowadays carries,
we will rather designate news as false instead, and we will follow the convention
proposed in [174] that news is any “asserted claim”, which is true if one can objectively
verify it and, analogously, false if it can be objectively disproved.
While, as discussed above, the phenomenon of false news is far from new, it has
been thriving particularly well only recently by exploiting the fast-paced (social)
media environment [85]. The main threat that false news poses lies in the fact that,
at first glance, it closely resembles true news and can thus be mistakenly identified
as such, although it clearly lacks the standardised editorial quality checks [84].
Furthermore, it seems that no topic is immune to it – the fabricated news reports
that have been circulating around pertain to subjects as diverse as medical practices,
such as vaccination and nutritional guidelines, rumours in the entertainment industry,
scientific facts, conspiracy theories, and – by far in the lead in terms of sheer quantity
– politics [84, 174]. The consequences have often been devastating – false news
regarding stock market prices have led to failed financial investments, misinformation
accompanying elections has resulted in political turmoil, and fictional stories about
natural disasters have brought about inefficient allocations of resources [174].
One of the most comprehensive and large-scale empirical studies conducted on the
matter analysed a deluge of data streams from a major social networking platform
over the course of eleven years, covering cascades of posts on more than 100,000 news
stories, which were rigorously annotated as either true or false [174]. Its authors
define a (rumour) cascade as an uninterrupted chain of posts stemming from a
single common assertion posted about a given news story – evidently, more than one
cascade can refer to the same story and they can even be propagating in parallel.
In total, roughly three million unique users published several million posts, and the
analysis revealed a striking disparity between the cascades relating to true and false
news.
Cascades of untruths turned out to be substantially broader, deeper, and faster – a
falsified claim would typically spread to 1500 people six times as fast as the truth [174].
Taking into account the speed with which false news diffuses, pre-emptive measures
to subdue its impact and curb its spread should be taken as early as possible. In
addition, whereas true news having a reach of more than 1000 people was more of
an exception than a rule, the most widely discussed false news could easily reach up
to 100,000 users [174].
Astonishingly, contrary to the popular belief, internet bots can hardly be blamed
for this – even when the researchers detected and controlled for social media bots,
a greater number of (unique) users participated in the dissemination of false as
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opposed to true news. Overall, the results were only more distressing when it came
to politically flavoured topics [174].
Pinpointing the defining properties of false news that might have contributed
to these phenomena remain to a large extent elusive. Still, it has been speculated
that the element of surprise that fabricated news tends to contain could be one of
the crucial factors. In fact, more often than not, falsities exhibit more novelty and
uniqueness than the truth does and are likely to provoke stronger (negative) emotions,
such as shock, disgust, outrage, and dismay [174]. Bearing in mind that mankind
is naturally inclined to value novelty for bringing new information to the table
and that people are inherently subject to negativity bias – meaning that negative
information affects one’s actions and cognitive processes, such as attention, memory,
and perception, much more than positive information with comparable emotional
charge does – it is perhaps no wonder that false news draws more attention.
However, as is the case with most human activities, these internal biases do not
work in isolation, there are also external (social) cues at play. As the empirical
evidence summarised above already demonstrates, the branching structure resulting
from the diffusion of a news story largely hinges upon its veracity. In order to discern
whether this is just a symptom of other factors or one of the principal causes for the
ubiquity of false news, one should take heed to the underlying connectivity of the
population. For this reason, the next section takes a look at how people form bonds
and interact with each other and how these bonds, in turn, shape them.
8.2 Dynamics of Social Interactions
Let us take a step back from the proliferation of news within a society and focus
instead on the connectivity patterns that, in the first place, enable the emergent
information flows. In order to gain a clearer understanding how people, intrinsically
social beings, react to impulses from the societies that they are a part of and how
they themselves influence their surroundings, we first need to review the cognitive
biases operating at the level of groups.
The generally observed similarity between members belonging to the same group
can be attributed both to social pressure, the impact of reputation and authority, and
the urge to fit in. The more individuals interact with each other, the more alike they
become over time [13, 85]. Hence, people are predisposed to align their attitudes,
beliefs, and behaviour according to the normative expectations of the communities
that they find themselves in [84, 85].
This also works the other way around – those who share an affinity for each other
actively seek to strengthen these ties and spend more time with one another, and
likewise, people have a tendency to avoid individuals with whom they share nothing
in common [13]. In the social sciences, this principle commonly goes under the name
of homophily, and it even gave rise to a well-known folk proverb that “birds of a
feather flock together”.
While in certain circumstances this might be advantageous, it has repeatedly
failed us as a society attempting to reach a (global) consensus. As we shall see in
the following, it has become easier than ever – essentially, at the click of a button –
to fend off unsolicited arguments, ideas, and conversations.
Lack of communication bridges across individuals holding diverging views or
standing for opposing causes does not only reduce the potential to use this plurality
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of aspects as a means to the advantage and the advance of everyone – choosing to
only engage in conversation with like-minded people and closing oneself off from
ideas that challenge one’s standpoints at length causes the development of filter
bubbles and echo chambers, further aggravating the problem and diminishing any
prospect of a constructive and civilised dialogue between disparate voices [85].
This, inter alia, is one of the reasons why false news is so pervasive. When a
group of individuals falls into the trap of firmly believing a lie and (purposefully)
turns a blind eye to any debunking argument, there is little hope to convince it
otherwise.
A plethora of mathematical models for the dissemination of information and
consensus dynamics in populations have confirmed that the structure of the underlying
social network can indeed play a decisive role in how the evolutionary processes
unfold. For instance, a sharp delineation into clusters may lead, on the one hand, to
cohesive agreement within each of the clusters, but it may also delay the onset of –
or even completely rule out – a global consensus [13].
However, rather curiously, suitably chosen propagation mechanisms can imply
similar scenarios regardless of the fundamental interaction structure – a variant of
the voter model (refer to Section 7.2 for the original version) permits distinct local
consensuses to be established concurrently even when the population is placed on a
lattice, or when there is an absence of any structure [13].
Still, this does not lessen the importance of the population connectivity patterns.
Quite to the contrary – to accurately reconstruct the behaviour of a population
in response to information diffusion among its members, merely taking the flow of
communication into account does not suffice – besides the basic interaction graph,
one might also need to slice the relations between individuals into several layers,
superimpose them on each other, and then consider the entire multilayer structure
to get the bigger picture.
A two-layer multiplex model already can shed light on how a population might
respond to the transmission of information among its members. In fact, if one couples
– in an appropriate manner – a layer where imitation dynamics occur with a layer
which serves as a communication channel, polarisation may arise, which frequently
goes hand in hand with, e.g., opinion dynamics observed in practice.
More specifically, this was attained by introducing a layer throughout which
two strategies governing individual actions spread according to one of the classical
imitation rules (see also Section 3.1.2) along with a layer for the exchange of personal
preference for either of the two strategies, which follows the voter model with
an additional parameter β ∈ [0, 1], expressing inclination towards one option or
another [5]. As for the coupling, the model is equipped with a tunable parameter
γ ∈ [0, 1], which dictates the consistency between one’s actions and attitudes towards
them. All in all, this induces a complex interplay of social imitation, influence, and
competition among strategies [5].
The significance of the interaction graph in consensus dynamics has been further
validated in diverse experimental setups. When the naming game was played in
the laboratory among randomly mixed subjects, it consistently led to a global
consensus. Incorporating spatial structure, on the other hand, resulted in a partition
into clusters, each having reached its own consensus [13]. Experimental research
also uncovered that long-range connections between separate clusters foster the
achievement of concordance and that increasing the number of participants in a joint
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maze navigation task puts a break on but also stabilises it [13].
Apart from behavioural trials in the laboratory, important aspects of consensus
processes have been elucidated by analysing a multitude of real-world datasets.
Studies on various collaboration and social media platforms have revealed, for
example, that if consensus does emerge, the ideas that outcompete the alternatives
and prevail in the end are typically those initiated by highly connected and influential
individuals [13].
Moreover, social networking websites are not only indispensable for discerning
how (dis)agreements evolve over time – they also have a non-negligible effect when it
comes to the circulation of information. Many people these days primarily consume
news online via social media [84, 85], which additionally grant anyone the ability
to publish and distribute information, providing him or her with the potential to
rapidly reach many others [14, 132, 164]. Given that social media platforms are very
easily accessible – even on handheld devices carried around by millions of people in
their pockets – the way that communication across them pans out merits a proper
discussion.
Arguably, the dissemination of news content throughout a population can be
interpreted as a form of complex contagion – individuals act as broadcast sources,
transmitters, and receivers, and as they interact, messages are dispersed from one
to another through social influence, which is likely to occur in a rather intricate
fashion [14, 164]. As an apparent consequence of the decentralised nature of this
contagion, an enormous amount of data is generated on a daily basis [132]. Even so,
human capacities to gather and process information are inherently bounded. The
issue seems to be twofold – first of all, a person can only establish a finite, rather
small number of contacts, and secondly, an average human being has a relatively
short attention span and only limited time on hands.
As far as social circles are concerned, it has been repeatedly noticed that one
can maintain – as a rule of thumb – 150 stable interpersonal relationships at a
time due to restricted cognitive capacity and the cost and energy associated with
social bonding. This concept has become widely known as Dunbar’s number , and
it has been empirically substantiated across a variety of areas that involve human
interactions of different kinds [123].
Therefore, it should hardly be a surprise that real-world social networks, en-
capsulating communication patterns within populations, commonly exhibit sparse
connectivity, i.e., their average degree k is tremendously exceeded by their order n,
k ≪ n [179]. This property will also be adhered to in our model of the flow of the
news, which will be introduced in the last section of this chapter.
Thus, at the end of the day, an individual will only have received updates
from a restricted number of acquaintances. The already trimmed-down scope of
information is additionally limited by the fact that even a few contacts can produce
an incomprehensible flux of content, which cannot possibly be reviewed, let alone
verified, by a single person, given that he or she can only devote so much time,
attention, and energy to it [61, 79, 164]. Accordingly, people resort to a series of
cognitive and social heuristics in order to filter out relevant information and evaluate
their credibility [85]. This is where interaction graphs come to the fore – individuals
turn to others for feedback to help them steer through the jungle of data [61, 132].
Nonetheless, this reliance is a double-edged sword – keeping in mind the lengthy
list of socio-cognitive biases at play, it becomes evident why it may pose a serious
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obstacle to a society that values and promotes truth. Regardless of the validity of a
specific claim, if someone influential or closely related to the target audience supports
it, it is more probable to catch on [84]. This is further accentuated by the ease with
which one can (dis)connect to other users on social media platforms [13, 85]. While
it might be tempting to only communicate with those who are cut from the same
cloth, this can, in the blink of an eye, lead to echo chambers – isolated, highly dense
clusters of like-minded individuals [13, 85].
As soon as such segregation kicks in, this creates optimal conditions for false
news to flourish. Strong homogeneity combined with familiarity heuristics, integral
to human nature, enables falsities to efficiently circulate and reinforce [85]. On top of
that, adding confirmation bias to the equation results in a situation which is far from
ideal – it intensifies polarisation, amplifies intolerance, and enhances ignorance [84].
Curiously, it does not take much for such circumstances to emerge. One does not
necessarily have to be irrational per se to fall into the trap of false news. What is
more, being aware of the pitfalls that social media can bring as well as being fond of
the truth does not shield against fabricated news – one may nevertheless be fooled
into erroneously believing it or even into endorsing it by sharing.
As a matter of fact, analysing streams of data revealed a great many of the most
broadly distributed news stories to be false [85]. Uncannily, their dissemination was
not concentrated among some narrow set of users – they attracted massive crowds
and were passed on by a larger proportion of the general public and more quickly
than the truth [84, 174].
Individual differences between users did not change much – falsities turned out
to be shared nearly twice as often as factual information even when statistically
controlling for the effects of user activity and the number of contacts [174]. Rather
unexpectedly perhaps, those who were most eager to spread false news did not have
a far reach – they had fewer connections, spent less time on social media platforms,
and had a general tendency to share news [85, 174].
Taken altogether, this indicates that the media sphere is riddled with falsehoods
because of their propagation among ordinary, everyday users, which might also explain
why false content is so persistent in the face of all countermeasures. Indeed, the
proliferation of misinformation often displays endemic characteristics – sporadically
recurring outbreaks with bursty patterns of spreading [164].
Social networking platforms, by design, are not doing any favours either. Grasping
the attention of the masses to boost user activity is required for their business models
to succeed [84, 85]. Hence, their user interfaces are set up in a way that facilitates
the spread of information and maximises outreach and engagement [61, 85], which
makes them particularly potent as a tool for manipulation. Contagions in social
networks, as opposed to viral contagions, involve intentional and conscious decisions
to share content [61] – apropos, one can easily choose to disseminate fabricated news
stories [84, 85, 164]. This misuse can even be automated – (social) bots were devised
precisely with the purpose of promoting the diffusion of false information by taking
advantage of human fallibility and gullibility [85].
While on the surface, these issues may seem to be abstract and constrained to
the online realm, their implications are much more far-reaching – social media have
already proven their ability to mobilise and unleash the power of crowds in the form
of humanitarian aid, riots, and other collective actions [14, 85]. This alone calls for
practical interventions to mitigate risks associated with false news.
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In essence, two main routes can be followed – one can either take a more structural
approach by, e.g., bridging the gaps between disparate communities [85] or appeal
to psychological mechanisms, such as encouraging fact-checking [84]. The latter,
however, has yielded contradicting results.
Repeating an inaccurate claim – even if it is for the sake of correcting it – can
actually strengthen one’s belief in it due to familiarity heuristics and other biases to
which human reasoning is vulnerable [84, 85]. Yet, pairing it with the task which
instructs participants to ponder and expound on how a particular system functions
or how a given process works may convince them to reassess their points of view [85].
The efficiency of debunking methods was also evaluated analytically by developing
and analysing a theoretical model that describes the circulation of a false rumour in
a social interaction graph [164]. The model proposed builds upon the analogy with
disease propagation – the rumour assumes the role of a pathogen and its proliferation
is dictated by an adaptation of the susceptible–infected–susceptible compartmental
model, which we reviewed in Section 5.3.2.
As in the SIS model, the gossip is passed on and adopted by a susceptible individual
with some predefined transition rate, but the specifics of the infection stage are
rather different. The pool of infected individuals is subdivided into those who
believe in the gossip and those who do not, and the category to which a susceptible
individual is assigned to is (probabilistically) determined by the neighbouring states.
Moreover, a gossip-monger can become a sceptic according to an ex-ante likelihood
of verifying the validity of the rumour, and individuals from both subcompartments
are eventually brought back to the susceptible state with an a priori probability of
forgetting altogether what the gossip was all about.
By employing mean-field approximations of the resulting model and performing
computer experiments on various classes of graphs ranging from artificially generated
Erdős–Rényi and Barabási–Albert graphs to real-world social networks, it was found
out that there exists a (parameter-dependent) threshold value for the probability of
fact-checking above which the rumour is completely eliminated from the population.
Still, as it was documented by empirical investigations, it is not sufficient to solely
rely on such fact verification initiatives. While social media is nowadays undoubtedly
one of the main conduits for the exchange and dispersal of (mis)information, other
forms of media, such as newspapers, television, and radio stations, are also crucial
factors when it comes to shaping public narratives and discourse [132].
In fact, recall that false news seems to be ubiquitous because the average man
on the street spreads the word about it [85]. Thus, as soon as a falsehood reaches
masses, the damage can already be irrevocable. Given that mass media, at the
bottom line, are nothing but amplifiers, instantly broadcasting messages to people
from far and wide, they bear a burden of exercising cautiousness and responsibility
towards reporting and, as such, deserve a closer look in the remainder of the chapter.
8.3 Coupled Diffusion of Opinion and Influence
The role that the media play has already been briefly discussed in Section 6.2.2
in connection with the evacuation dilemma model, which involved a global news
service that perpetually injects external signals into a social network [14]. Although
this model was presented in the context of threshold modelling frameworks, it is
also interesting from the viewpoint of information dissemination in response to the
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coupled effects of social interactions and media influence. Recognising this potential,
its basic scheme was extended through the introduction of a parameter weighting
the relative contributions of the social interaction graph and the media broadcasts
towards individual attitudes [14].
As it turned out, tipping the balance in favour of interpersonal communication
homogenised individual stances on the threat but also impeded opinion dynamics
and hence, by extension, delayed disaster reaction in spite of the media strongly
advocating evacuation. Dampening the influence of the social network, on the other
hand, granted more power to the media source, whose calls to action, however, echoed
the most and the farthest when the population retained some of its autonomy and
participated in promulgating the agenda set by the media.
In reality, though, a media outlet rarely acts alone – quite to the contrary, it
is typically confronted by a barrage of competition [13]. Consequently, not only
does it have to strive for the attention and trust of the public, but it also has to
resist the fierce rivalry from its opponents. To gain intuition into the co-evolution
of public opinion and competition among the media, a model was devised in which
both processes occur concurrently on two separate but coupled layers [132].
One layer represents the population structure, the other one captures the domain
of the media industry, and a piece of news is propagating throughout both of them.
Each agent, be it an individual in the public sphere or a news agency, holds an
opinion about this datum, which is treated as a continuous variable in [0, 1] that
evolves as time goes by.
Individuals adjust their opinions through conversation with their neighbours and
by following the media coverage – as long as the opinion they face does not differ too
much from their own. Accordingly, at each time step t, a vertex i in the population
layer turns to a randomly selected neighbour j ∈ N (i) and updates his or her existing
opinion xi(t) by obeying the rule
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + µ
(︁
xj(t)− xi(t)
)︁
θ
(︁
σ − |xj(t)− xi(t)|
)︁
,
where θ(x) stands for the unit step function equal to 0 for x < 0, to 1/2 for x = 0,
and to 1 for x > 0, µ determines the time scale of the dynamics, and σ denotes the
maximally permissible deviation from one’s opinion. The media conveys its influence
in an analogous manner – only that this time, index j refers to a randomly picked
media outlet. Clearly, the higher the tolerance value σ, the more individuals are
attentive to each other, and the more unanimous they become with time.
As far as the news agencies are concerned, they seek to amass large audiences by
means of two main mechanisms, competition and mimicking the strategies of the
most popular rivals (whose views may or may not be aligned). In general, media
outlets adapt their behaviour by implementing a move towards the best practice
observed in the media layer, whereby two approaches were pursued.
In the first one, the size of the readership was the sole decisive criterion in choosing
a role model to emulate, whereas in the second one news providers only looked up
to those best-performing competitors with whom they had a positive association.
Namely, in the latter case, every pair of media sources was assigned a (positive,
negative, or neutral) sentiment in advance, reflecting the polarisation of the media
landscape and prompting competition among rival agencies. The model further
brought to light that consensus across the board is unattainable in the presence of
such heterogeneity of the media spectrum, which rather leads to highly diverse, yet
stable, arrangements of clusters within which diversity is preserved.
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Note, however, that under this scheme, a pivotal aspect is overlooked – brand
loyalty, stirred up with familiarity heuristics. In the model above, individuals get
news updates by trial-and-error, catch a glimpse of a randomly chosen broadcast,
and acknowledge the information it transmits if it fits their current beliefs. Needless
to say, although this may be true for social media, it need not be so for its traditional
counterparts. People tend to tune in to a selection of radio stations, stick to the
television programmes of their choice, subscribe to their favourite newspapers, and,
in the digital era, bookmark their preferred news websites. Every now and then,
they might experiment and try out something new, but this exploration can only be
limited due to the sheer supply of news services.
In order to remedy this shortcoming, we propose a novel model of news flow,
which keeps the multilayer scaffolding but introduces explicit coupling between
news providers and consumers and even allows for its rewiring. This is achieved by
endowing the model with a temporal component, thereby leaving the realm of static
graphs; and while an evolving graph structure can accommodate richer dynamics,
it also normally brings about increased complexity. The latter, alas, seems to be
inescapable when it comes to trying to fathom the convoluted human psyche – a case
in point being the static two-layer model of opinion dynamics, which we surveyed
above. Although it only entails some elements of human nature, its authors were
forced to abandon analytical treatment (as it did not even permit a meaningful
mean-field approximation) and consulted numerical simulations instead.
Truth be told, we may never be able to fully decipher the intricate patterns of
human behaviour, which can hardly be surprising since mankind is subject to a wide
range of internal and external biases. Hence, all modelling attempts may be bound
to fail – on the one hand, a reasonable number of degrees of freedom might not
suffice as it would prevent the model from capturing all essential features and on the
other hand, adding new parameters can rapidly render the model infeasible or, at
best, intractable. In view of this, all endeavours thus far may seem to be to no avail
– yet, in order to successfully address the pressing conundrums faced by the society
as a whole, we need to unravel them first, one step at a time.
8.4 Co-evolution of the Multilayer News Flow
8.4.1 Introduction and Preliminaries
To further the line of thought prescribed by this chapter, we embark on the road to
understanding how true, verifiable information, enmeshed with a barrage of false,
fabricated claims, disseminates to and through a population, in turn affecting the
public discourse, guiding the distribution of news consumption, and altering the
popularity of the media. Our goal for this section is therefore to design a model of
the news flow which can provide insight into the evolution of interactions between
the media and the public as they unfold along with the broadcast dynamics.
This will be accomplished by utilising a temporal multilayer graph G = (V , E)
(refer to Sections 7.1 and 7.2 for definitions) which will be composed of two layers, a
layer of (traditional) media outlets GM = (M, EM) and a population layer GR =
(R, ER), the latter serving two purposes. First of all, it will act as a proxy for
social media communication among its members and second, the individual actors
constituting it will form the readership of the media, each of the actors assuming the
role of a media consumer; hence the notation R. Although, technically speaking, the
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term readership only refers to a group of people who regularly consume a written
form of media, in our model, a news station will be allowed to take any form of
one-to-many communication, be it print media, such as newspapers and magazines,
digital media, epitomised in numerous online news providers, or classical broadcast
media, prime examples being radio and television. While the underlying structure of
both layers will be assumed to be static, it is the inter-layer connectivity – which will
model individuals tuning in to the media sources – where evolution will come to the
fore. That is, in addition to the dynamical processes occurring on top of the graph,
which are dynamic per se; ergo, the inter-layer edges will co-evolve with them.
As far as the dynamical processes that will be taking place on the graph are
concerned, they will be built on the foundation that at any given time t ≥ 0, every
agent – a news agency or an individual, associated with a vertex in the media layer
or a vertex in the population layer, respectively – finds itself in either a true (T) or a
false (F) (internal) state. We hereby tacitly view a true (resp. false) state as having
a certain predisposition towards true (resp. false) news. On a practical level, this
means that individuals will be more likely to seek and pass on that kind of news that
matches their state and that a media outlet, while operating in a way to maximise
its reach and grow its readership across the entire population, will nevertheless have
a greater propensity to attract larger numbers of those who agree with the narrative
it promotes. A detailed blueprint for the evolution of these states will be laid out in
due course; at this moment, two more remarks are due.
First, the particular choice of behaviour linked to the agent states does not make
much of a difference for the purposes of the implementation – as long as the rough
idea is adhered to. Likewise, we duly note that the agent states need not have
anything to do with true and false news; they just as easily lend themselves to any
similar interpretation – one might as well take the states to be two opposing stances
on the same topic or a pair of competing strategies of any type.
Before we delve into the matter, let us introduce the notational conventions.
Superscripts on variables will be used to convey states of the agents and more
general notions pertaining to arbitrary (internal) properties, whereas subscripts will
be utilised for identification purposes – as placeholders for the agent indices and
to indicate layers. When applicable, dependence on time t ≥ 0 will be explicitly
denoted in brackets following a (state) variable.
8.4.2 Our Contribution
All in all, we propose a novel model for the flow of bimodal news from the mass
media to the broad public and across it, thereby shaping public opinion and the
media readership; and hence, feeding back into the subsequent flow downstream [72].
The model draws on co-evolutionary dynamics of stochastic processes evolving on
and within a multilayer graph with a population layer, which is subject to opinion
dynamics following a dynamic voter model with a bias towards one mode of news,
a media layer, and temporal inter-layer coupling between the two layers. In order
to assess the overall performance and plausibility of our framework, a series of
numerical experiments was carried out in which we resorted to the versatile Gillespie
algorithm (refer to Section 5.1.1) to generate stochastically exact realisations of
the stochastic processes involved in the dynamics in a computationally efficient
manner. The full source code of our implementation can be accessed at https:
//github.com/ikicab/NewsFlow.
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8.4.3 The Framework of the Model
Without further ado, let us now dig into the static and dynamic building blocks of
our modelling scheme. We begin with the population layer, continue with the media
layer, and finally discuss how inter-layer bonds that bind them together form and
rewire as time passes by.
Population Layer
As motivated above, the population layer GR = (R, ER) represents the social
interaction structure among the members of the population and is assumed to be
static in time. Each of the R individual actors is assigned a vertex ri ∈ R for
1 ≤ i ≤ R and at any given time t ≥ 0 adopts either of the two possible states, true
or false, which will be henceforth – for the sake of simplicity – encoded by (and used
interchangeably with) 1 and 0, respectively. Furthermore, for convenience, this state
at time t will be denoted by ri(t) ∈ {0, 1} with a slight abuse of notation – the label
ri will be used to stand for the actor, the vertex it populates, and its intrinsic state;
the suitable connotation will be apparent from the context.
Moreover, RT (t) and RF (t) will be used to designate the sets of individuals in
the true and the false state at time t, respectively, i.e.,
RT (t) = {ri | ri(t) = 1} and RF (t) = {ri | ri(t) = 0},
with RT (t) and RF (t) as their respective cardinalities, for which R = RT (t) +RF (t)
holds at all times t. In the spirit of compartmental contagion models, which we
thoroughly reviewed in Section 5.3, relevant (and perhaps more informative for
benchmarking) quantities of interest will also be densities ρT (t) = RT (t)/R and
ρF (t) = RF (t)/R of individuals who are in the true and the false state at time t,
respectively.
Moving on to the set of edges ER, serving as communication channels between
individuals, our main focus will lie in a special subset of all unbalanced edges
EFTR (t) = {rirj | ri(t) ̸= rj(t)}
connecting individuals in different states at time t. Any such edge rirj ∈ EFTR (t)
will also be referred to as an active edge in a sense that will be clarified further
down the line and, again, the density of all such specimens will be labelled as
ρFT (t) = |EFTR (t)|/|ER|.
Having established the principal network structure of the population layer, we
may now lay down the ground rules for the dynamics across it. To model the role
of the social media in the dissemination of news (its main features were outlined in
Section 8.2), we posit a simple updating scheme.
At each time step t, one of the unbalanced edges rirj ∈ EFTR (t) is picked at
random according to some probability distribution – to be specified later – and is
balanced out by one of the parties involved in the bond succumbing to the influence
of the other. That is, either ri commits to the state endorsed by rj or, vice versa, the
advocacy of ri convinces rj to abandon the current state in favour of the contrasting
one. Either way, the update that takes place results in unanimity of the two actors.
Notice that this is precisely the edge-based voter model that we briefly touched upon
in Section 7.2, with the transition rates yet to be determined. To do so, we shall
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first consider an abridged procedure, expose its deficiencies, and resolve them by
extending the mechanism.
Accordingly, we start off by assuming that at any time t, an edge rirj ∈ EFTR (t)
between two disparate individuals, ri(t) ̸= rj(t), may turn into a harmonious bond
between individuals with aligned states if either of the two following events occurs:
either the individual in the false state transitions to the true state, which happens
with some hazard rate λT or, analogously, the individual in the true state adopts the
false state at a rate of λF . In the language of stoichiometric equations, this reads as
T + F
λT−→ 2T,
T + F
λF−→ 2F.
(8.1)
Apropos, we entitle the transition rates λT and λF the basic spreading rates of true
and false content, respectively, and take them to be constant over time. Note that
only the ratio of the two rates matters in the resulting dynamics – thus, without
loss of generality, we may rescale them so that λT is kept fixed at λT = 1 and only
λF varies. Evidently, what we end up with is a scheme that is essentially identical
to the edge-based voter model which has a constant bias of magnitude λF towards
false news if λF > 1, is inclined in favour of true news if λF < 1, and reduces to the
standard voter model if λT = λF .
While there is no doubt that true as well as false news propagates at an unprece-
dented speed across the social media landscape [174], the data seems to suggest that
falsities are not only pernicious to the truth but also spread particularly vigorously
and in a much more invasive manner than credible information (refer to Section 8.1.1
for a thorough overview of the symptoms of false news). Hence, it makes sense to
argue that λF > λT ; yet, confining to this region of the parameter space does not
lead to a plausible scenario under the existing scheme.
To be more specific, let us take a look at the mean-field approximation for
the density ρT (t) of the readership of true news in a well-mixed population with
homogeneous mixing, which may be effortlessly derived as
dρT
dt
= λTρTρF − λFρTρF = (λT − λF )ρT (1− ρT ), (8.2)
where the relation ρT (t) + ρF (t) = 1, which holds for all times t ≥ 0, was taken into
account.
Since there are only two fixed points, ρT = 0 and ρT = 1, inevitably, a global
consensus is reached – only polarisation can be sustained. Trivially, if at the outset
of the process the entire population proclaims allegiance to the truth, ρT (0) = 1,
it stays this way forever. This should not be at all surprising because in this case,
neither can an individual be persuaded into believing otherwise by any other, nor
have we allowed a “trembling hand” that could interfere with the system.
What is more unrealistic compared to reality and, as such, especially undesirable,
is that the equilibrium solution ρT = 0, in which no one pays attention to credible
news sources, is globally asymptotically stable, with a basin of attraction of [0, 1) [13].
Indeed, given the modelling assumption λF > λT , we have that dρT/dt < 0 for every
ρT ∈ (0, 1), implying that veracity will be eradicated, limt→∞ ρT (t) = 0, virtually
regardless of the initial distribution of the population as long as the rather lax
condition of ρT (0) ∈ [0, 1) is met.
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It may as well still be reasonable to anticipate a faster and more pervasive spread
of false news, but at the end of the day, neither of the two approaches to news
reporting should drive the other one out of business. The outcome of dynamics
should instead – at any given point in time – resemble a (more or less) bistable
population, with some of its members adhering to verifiable facts and others paying
heed to fabricated news stories.
This inconsistency with factual evidence is no wonder; no expertise is required
to recognise that the present framework is, to put it bluntly, a far cry from reality.
One would be foolish to expect that individuals would hastily switch back and forth
between two options merely upon a fleeting interaction with a proponent of the
opposing position. Sometimes this may actually suffice – yet, at other times, people
stand their ground so firmly that no (external) input could sway them – the key
take-home message being that these processes tend to be intricate and do not unfold
in isolation from the (personal) circumstances and preferences. To ameliorate these
downsides at least to some extent, we will turn to theories and findings that social
science has to offer, a small portion of which has been arduously collected throughout
this chapter.
Although people, de facto, have to perpetually perceive and respond to the (local)
environments that they face in the here and now, this is done on the basis of all the
knowledge, beliefs, history, and experience that they have acquired thus far, while
projecting to the future [14]. Human behaviour exhibits a certain stickiness to the
past by relying on previous decisions and actions, which is further reinforced by
anchoring, adjustment, and familiarity heuristics; hence, the stronger the opinion that
one has, the less amenable it is to change. Taken all together, these observations will
guide us in modifying the updating mechanism, which will relax the time-invariance
requirement on the transition rates by factoring in memory effects and heterogeneity
across individual actors.
To start with, the state ri(t) ∈ {0, 1} of every news consumer ri will be sup-
plemented with information on the number of credible and dubious media sources
that he or she tunes in to at the moment, denoted by rTi (t) and rFi (t), respectively.
Moreover, we impose a natural constraint that rTi (t) + rFi (t) ≥ 2 at t = 0, which will
by design turn out to be fulfilled at all times t ≥ 0; one can never completely detach
oneself from the mass media.
Yet, news consumers will be able to disassociate themselves from either side of
the media spectrum; any such actor ri with either rTi (t) = 0 or rFi (t) = 0 will be
referred to as a polarised individual, the set of all of them at time t will be designated
by P(t), i.e.,
P(t) = {ri | rTi (t) · rFi (t) = 0},
their number by P (t) = |P(t)|, and their density by ρP (t) = P (t)/R.
Equipped with these data, we may now proceed to endow each of the individuals
ri with a false-o-meter xi(t), which will indicate his or her current propensity to
adopt the false state. Formally, we define xi(t) by the following simple dimensionless
measure of asymmetry in the allocation of media subscriptions by actor ri,
xi(t) =
rFi (t)− rTi (t)
rFi (t) + r
T
i (t)
.
Obviously, its values range from −1 to 1, xi(t) ∈ [−1, 1], with the upper (resp. lower)
bound attained if and only if rTi (t) = 0 (resp. rFi (t) = 0), which corresponds to
165
Chapter 8. Application to Modelling the Flow of the News
a high bias towards false (resp. true) news, and where xi(t) = 0 coincides with a
perfectly neutral media consumer, rTi (t) = rFi (t), with no preference whatsoever
regarding the flavour of the news served on the media menu.
This finally brings us to the adaptation of the biased voter model which will
in effect be deployed in our model and its subsequent implementation. While the
principal structure of the voter model will be left intact, the hazard rates at which
unbalanced edges rirj ∈ EFTR (t) are offset will be dynamically evolving in time with
regard to the present as well as the past states of affairs, implicitly encrypted in the
readings of the incident false-o-meters xi(t) and xj(t). In essence, these rates will
stem from the idea that the higher the bias towards the type of news encouraged by
the opposing party, the more malleable the focal actor is to reconcile and change the
state. In contrast, the higher the asymmetry in favour of the existing view that one
holds, the more unlikely one can be meddled with. And lastly, ambivalent situations
will be settled by tossing a coin. In all three cases, a linear relationship will be
assumed between the transition rate with which a media consumer ri adopts the
rival option and the number of news providers supporting it who are followed by ri.
On the whole, at time t, an unbalanced edge rirj ∈ EFTR (t) may either undergo
a transition after which both ri and rj find themselves in the true state, which
occurs with a rate of λTλTij(t), or such a transformation is carried out that the false
state is assigned to ri as well as rj with a rate of λFλFij(t). Both scenarios may
be succinctly illustrated in the appropriately adjusted stoichiometric equations (cf.
equations (8.1))
T + F
λTλTij−−−→ 2T,
T + F
λFλFij−−−→ 2F.
Notice that the hazard rates still accommodate the influence of the basic spreading
rates λT and λF of true and false content, respectively, which we introduced above.
While these are constant over time and universal across all edges rirj ∈ ER, we will
also store time-dependent and edge-specific spreading rates λTij(t) and λFij(t), con-
tributing to the rates at which influence dynamics unfold on a particular unbalanced
edge rirj ∈ EFTR (t), which will be defined shortly.
For this purpose, let xT (t) and xF (t) denote the false-o-meters attached to the
endpoints of the edge rirj ∈ EFTR (t) in the true and the false state at time t,
respectively. Without loss of generality, we can take ri(t) = 1 and rj(t) = 0 and thus
xT (t) := xi(t) and xF (t) := xj(t). Additionally, we will need the auxiliary function
λ(x) := (x + 1)/2. With everything set up, the factors λFij(t) and λTij(t) are then
given by
λFij(t) := λ(xT (t)) =
rFi (t)
rFi (t) + r
T
i (t)
=: ρFi (t) (8.3)
and
λTij(t) := λ(−xF (t)) =
rTj (t)
rFj (t) + r
T
j (t)
=: ρTj (t), (8.4)
respectively. This is indeed in line with the motivational objective that we proposed
– the likelihood that individual ri in the true state imitates the neighbour rj in
the false state is proportional to the value of xi(t), indicated by the corresponding
false-o-meter; equivalently, it is also proportional to the fraction ρFi (t) of false news
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that ri receives at time t from his or her media repertoire. A similar intuition holds
when the parts are reversed and it is up to rj to determine the next move, where we
note that −xj(t) could well be dubbed as the truth-o-meter by the same token as its
false counterpart; it essentially plays the same role of measuring asymmetry – only
this time with the true–false poles turned around.
The rates λTij(t) and λFij(t) also have the natural property that excessively polarised
individuals ri, rj ∈ P(t) always take bold actions – they certainly adopt the opposing
states, λFij(t) = 1 and λTij(t) = 1, if these match those that they inherently adhere to,
rTi (t) = 0 and rFj (t) = 0, respectively, and they unquestionably stay put otherwise,
λFij(t) = 0 and λTij(t) = 0, as rFi (t) = 0 and rTj (t) = 0 are then satisfied.
Lastly, it is high time to justify the terminology of an active edge. Clearly, the
way the updating scheme is laid out does not permit updates to any edge rirj ∈ ER
connecting media consumers of the same kind, ri(t) = rj(t), and the reasoning behind
this is rather straightforward – opinion dynamics operating on any such edge would
be akin to preaching to the choir. Nevertheless, for practical reasons and convenience,
we assume that updates take place on all edges rirj ∈ ER, but we keep balanced
edges with ri(t) = rj(t) in a dormant state by setting their rates to 0, i.e., λTij(t) = 0
and λFij(t) = 0, and accordingly refer to the unbalanced edges as the active edges.
With the population layer now wholly prepared, we may now pass the limelight over
to the media layer.
Media Layer
For now, media outlets have not really entered the picture; in fact, they are only
implicitly embedded in the news repertoires (rTi (t), rFi (t)) that media consumers
ri ∈ R are exposed to. At this stage, the population layer is fully autonomous, and
public opinion evolves in the absence of any interference from the news services.
Members of the public are programmed to act and react based on their distributions
of attention to the media, which are handed over to them in advance, and only total
numbers of trustworthy and deceitful news providers that they tune in to, rTi (t)
and rFi (t), respectively, are kept track of. As a consequence, a lot of information is
discarded during the process, and the multilayer structure is superfluous – from the
point of view of each individual actor, all media sources are indistinguishable apart
from the type of news, true or false, that they produce and distribute to the general
public.
Therefore, as a first step to advance this basic setup, we must be able to dif-
ferentiate between the distinct media outlets. To do so, we assume that the ver-
tex set M of the media layer GM = (M, EM) consists of M vertices mj ∈ M,
M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mM}, portraying the collection of all news agencies in the media
sphere at everyone’s disposal. Again, a media outlet mj can be either in the true or
the false state depending on the agenda that it publicly proclaims and transmits to
its followers.
However, unlike the internal states of the members of the population, the states
mj(t) ∈ {0, 1} underpinning the news stations mj will be permanent – predefined at
the outset and fixed thereafter, mj := mj(t), where we have reused the notation mj to
denote the (constant) state of the namesake media provider mj. The argumentation
in support of this premise is twofold. Firstly, a news source is more likely to retain
its (existing) subscriber base by ensuring consistency in reporting due to brand
loyalty and familiarity heuristics at play (cf. Section 8.3), and secondly, establishing
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and maintaining a mass media apparatus, its reputation, and audience requires
plentiful (financial) resources, throughput, time, and effort. Hence, the mass media
are reluctant to apply rapid changes to their business models and rather carefully
plan them out, as these ought to incur high overhead costs and bring no (short-term)
benefit. In line with this, one can plausibly expect the population dynamics to unfold
on a much faster time scale than the evolution of the media states – the latter may
therefore be neglected.
For exactly the same reasons, incorporating media interaction is of little use in
the context of our proposed modelling framework – the competing news stations are
just as unlikely to affect the foundational set of principles underlying a given media
outlet as the stimuli emanating from the public at large are. The set of edges EM
in the media layer will thus be taken as an empty set, EM = ∅, rendering the news
agencies isolated entities within the media domain.
Note that our setting is in sharp contrast to the model of opinion-shaping across
the public and the media that we encountered in Section 8.3; this merits a word of
commentary. Not only did this model largely overlook the importance of long-lasting
readership ties and habitual decision-making characteristic to human beings – it also
took the media layer to be fully connected by placing it on a complete graph, thereby
permitting the news outlets to copy each other’s best practices (with respect to the
prescribed polarities) and initiating rivalry between them for all it is worth [132].
This does not mean that any of these two models is mistaken per se; they are
rather two sides of the same coin, both right in their own way. Our model revolves
around the dynamics of and among the individual agent states that intrinsically
steer their behaviour, whereas the contending model that mediates between media
competition and social interactions focuses instead on the evolution of the datum
that the agents propagate. While the former examines the strategies and the causes,
the latter observes the resulting actions and the symptoms. Both perspectives,
complementing and supplementing each other, are vital in shedding light on the
intricate co-evolution of public opinion and tactics of the media. Yet, all things
considered, if one is to develop a tractable and manageable model, one must strike a
trade-off between the two, given the inherently limited modelling capacities.
Returning to our modelling scheme, the remainder of the pertinent notation
closely follows that for the population layer. That is, we denote the sets of news
services in the true state and the false state by MT and MF , respectively, i.e.,
MT = {mj | mj = 1} and MF = {mj | mj = 0},
and their respective cardinalities byMT andMF , withM =MT +MF . Furthermore,
akin to how keeping record of the alignment of news content consumed by individual
actors offers insight into how avid they are to follow media outlets from either of the
two categories,MT andMF , tracking subscriptions to a news provider from the two
groups of news consumers, RT and RF , indicates the clientele that it tends to attract.
Accordingly, we let mTj (t) stand for the number of news consumers in the true state
tuning in to the news agency mj at time t, 0 ≤ mTj (t) ≤ RT (t), and, likewise, we
use mFj (t) as the number of individuals from the other end of the spectrum doing
precisely the same, 0 ≤ mFj (t) ≤ RF (t).
Hence, to get a grasp of how a given news outlet mj fares in the media landscape
in terms of its popularity, one can simply consider the sum of the two counters,
0 ≤ mTj (t) +mFj (t) ≤ R. Apropos, a straightforward way to quantify the bias of the
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readership of mj is to compute the (local) relative densities
µTj (t) :=
mTj (t)
mTj (t) +m
F
j (t)
and µFj (t) :=
mFj (t)
mTj (t) +m
F
j (t)
= 1− µTj (t),
which evaluate how much the consumers of mj lean towards the truth and how
much they seem to be lured by the falsities, respectively. The higher either of these
densities is (at the expense of the other), the more monochrome the members of its
audience are with regard to their internal states. Note that this can only occur if
mj is specifically oriented towards or has a particular appeal to only one segment of
the population, RT or RF , or if one of the states eradicates the other, RT (t) = 0
or RF (t) = 0, which trivially implies mTj (t) = 0 or mFj (t) = 0, respectively, for all
mj ∈M.
One can thus argue that a significantly high (or low, for that matter) value of
µTj (t) (or µFj (t)) correlates in a way with the visibility of mj as measured by the
number of people it could potentially reach (but who may or may not then subscribe
to its channel). Indeed, should the readership of a media source be, in large part,
comprised only of like-minded people, it is likely to be off the radar of the rest of the
public for its targeted content that attracted its primary audience in the first place.
What is more, the argument still stands even if a news consumer with alternative
preferences is nothing short of a rara avis, i.e., if ρT (t)≪ 1 or ρF (t)≪ 1 holds. If
this is the case, the public is largely monolithic and since all the media now compete
for the exact same core audience, their best bet is to promote the same agenda – but
then again, their voices are lost in the crowd.
Notice that the manner in which the readership distribution affects the visibility
of a media outlet is conceptually indifferent to the specific category of news, true or
false, and as such calls for a metric that can effectively encapsulate this. To achieve
the desired objective, we need to be able to gauge whether, and to what extent,
the readership of the news agency mj inclines towards either of the two extremes,
µTj (t) = 0 and µFj (t) = 0. The more it does, the less visible mj ought to be; and vice
versa, the more balance it exhibits, the greater the ensuing outreach.
In the spirit of the approaches that were taken to evaluate the quality of clustering
solutions (refer to Section 4.3.2), we shall too resort to the tools of information
theory. We need not go far – the “humble” Shannon entropy (4.4) readily offers a
fairly intuitive solution. Being a measure of uncertainty of a discrete random variable
X, it assumes its maximum value if and only if all outcomes are equally likely, and it
attains its minimum value of zero precisely in the absence of any uncertainty, when
only one of the events may occur.
Therefore, we take Xj(t) (which may depend on time t) for 1 ≤ j ≤M to be a
random variable describing the internal state, 1 (true) or 0 (false), of a news consumer
of the media mj related to the variable and denote its probability mass function by
pXj(t)(x). Evidently, pXj(t)(1) = µTj (t), pXj(t)(0) = µFj (t), and
H(Xj(t)) = −µTj (t) log µTj (t)− µFj (t) log µFj (t).
To ensure that this expression is well defined, we add a technical assumption that in
the case of µ = 0, any term of the form µ log µ is given (by the continuous extension)
by limµ→0+ µ log µ = 0.
Altogether, the required properties are fulfilled. An extremely polarised (in either
direction) readership, µTj (t) = 0 or µFj (t) = 0, implies that H(Xj(t)) = 0; and as one
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side of the readership is more and more offset by the other, the value of H(Xj(t))
monotonically increases until the discrepancies balance out, µTj (t) = µFj (t) = 1/2, at
which point the maximum value of H(Xj(t)) is attained, namely H(Xj(t)) = log 2.
Finally, we normalise this score so that it ranges from 0 to 1 – with 0 corresponding
to accord and 1 coinciding with discord among the audience of mj – and name it as
balance bj(t) of the news service mj at time t, i.e.,
bj(t) =
H(Xj(t))
log 2
=
−µTj (t) log µTj (t)− µFj (t) log µFj (t)
log 2
∈ [0, 1]. (8.5)
Yet, assigning and storing this score for each of the media outlets is not very
helpful per se. For the time being, there is no explicit coupling between the two
layers, and there are no processes taking place that would either grant individuals
control over the news they consume or enable the media to deploy different strategies
to attract the masses. While there are many ways how one could go about this, we
will put the power in the hands of the public – they will wire and rewire to the news
providers, who will, on the contrary, have their say only implicitly, as defined by the
wiring mechanism.
Coupling and Rewiring
Having set up the static scaffolding of our model, we may now at last take care of its
dynamic part and thereby justify the need for a temporal graph. By doing so, we
will address the inter-layer connectivity and its evolution in time in one fell swoop.
First things first – for the sake of convenience, we begin by introducing the notation
pertaining to the interactions between news producersM and news consumers R, as
modelled by the edges connecting the two layers that they populate, GM = (M, EM )
and GR = (R, ER), respectively. As these interactions will continually change in the
course of time, we will adhere to the convention established in Section 7.2, which laid
the groundwork for evolving graphs, and portray any such interaction between an
individual ri ∈ R and a media outlet mj ∈M at time t ≥ 0 as a time-stamped edge
(ri,mj, t). Semantically, it conveys the act of ri tuning in to mj or, equivalently, mj
broadcasting to ri.
Given that we are now dealing with edges of various types and attributes – they
can either be fully contained within a single layer or span across both; stay still as
time slips by or perpetually evolve – it will prove useful to explicitly keep track of
the local topology from the standpoint of individual agents v ∈ R ∪M. Henceforth,
not only spatial, but also temporal aspects will matter – who contacts whom, when,
and where. To avoid confusion and aid clarity, we propose a universal nomenclature
scheme, which is unified across the layers and embraces the notational guidelines
that have been agreed upon right from the start.
For any agent v ∈ R ∪M, be it a news follower (v ∈ R) or a news broadcast
(v ∈ M), we let N SL (v, t) denote the set of its neighbours at time t ≥ 0 who are
located in layer L ∈ {R,M} and find themselves (at the time) in state S ∈ {T, F}.
Again, we use subscripts to label layers, where R stands for the population at large
and M for the media domain, and reserve superscripts for the internal states, which
can be true (T ) or false (F ), as usual. Omitting either the subscript L or the
superscript S will, as is natural to expect, indicate aggregation across layers or
states, respectively; the time dependence t may be dropped when the underlying
structure is constant in time; and if we are to leave all three symbols out, the set of
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all neighbours of v ever to be found in any of the two layers is retrieved, and the
notation reduces to N (v), which is a label that has been extensively utilised to this
end throughout this work. Notice as well that the proposed notation generalises the
one that has been in use in the ongoing section.
In fact, we have that rTi (t) = |N TM (ri, t)|, rFi (t) = |N FM (ri, t)|,mTj (t) = |N TR (mj, t)|,
and mFj (t) = |N FR (mj, t)|. Even so, in these cases – when referring to the cardinalities
of these sets – we will rather stick to the shorthand notation of the form vSL(t) for
v ∈ R∪M, L ∈ {R,M}, and S ∈ {T, F}. While, up to now, there has been no need
to meticulously point out the blatantly obvious distinction between vSL(t) and N SL (t)
– indeed, recall that a news consumer ri operates solely on the basis of variables rTi (t)
and rFi (t) with regard to the media – both concepts will be crucial in extending the
model to accommodate the power of consumer choice.
As far as the news consumers ri ∈ R in the existing framework are concerned,
they might come across as rather erratic. They blindly adjust their inner states
ri(t) according to the regularly prescribed doses of news (rTi (t), rFi (t)) in complete
disregard of their own preferences and motives (as epitomised by ri(t)) whilst, at the
same time, being overly perceptive of their surroundings NR(ri, t).
In reality, however, people tend to be deeply entrenched in their views, display at
least some degree of inertia towards uncritically altering their stance, and – along
the same lines – do not merely digest all the information thrown at them by the
media outlets. To better reflect this, we will introduce an explicit rewiring protocol
that allows the public to actively subscribe to instead of passively being prescribed a
portion of news channels to tune in to.
Although the rewiring process will regulate the formation and degradation of
inter-layer edges (ri,mj, t), which serve as a coupling force between the population
layer GR = (R, ER) and the media layer GM = (M, EM), it will be the former that
will dictate how it unfolds.
The principal mechanics will be fairly simple and founded on the tenet that
individuals are propelled to balance the dichotomy between their stance and how
they “dance” by following news agencies aligned with their internal states. Hence,
individuals ri leaning towards truthful news reporting, ri(t) = 1, will be more likely
to subscribe to the media outlets MT that do so and, likewise, those who tend to be
easily swayed by the allure of false news, ri(t) = 0, will be more prone to be deceived
by the news stationsMF that produce and proliferate fabricated stories. Either way,
news consumers will seek to pursue news sources mj ∈ M compatible with their
beliefs, i.e., mj = ri(t).
In practice, this will be achieved through a straightforward heuristic procedure.
Each individual actor ri ∈ R will be assigned a news-alignment process, which will
occur at some constant rate η (equal for everyone) in two steps. Firstly, the focal
individual ri will refrain from following a randomly chosen news sourcemk ∈ NM (ri, t)
with a clashing ideology, mk ̸= ri(t), and secondly, he or she will substitute it with a
brand new news broadcast mj ∈M\NM (ri, t) not yet in his or her media repertoire
NM(ri, t), with respect to some probability distribution to be identified shortly.
Note that individuals will also be permitted to choose the alternative mj for the
media outlet mk once again from the set of news services not tailored to their tastes,
mj ̸= ri(t), but this will be – by design – highly unlikely. This way, they will be
given some leeway to, from time to time, freely explore the media landscape without
having to rigorously follow any form of self-imposed censorship rules. This appears
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to be a legitimate postulate – in the real world, people have to cope with an immense
influx of (unfiltered) information gushing from numerous news sources and may thus,
quite possibly, take an occasional peek at a news channel advocating a perspective
that challenges their own.
Still, not only do the individuals have to navigate themselves through this flurry
of news – this also applies the other way around. The media have to compete for
the limited public attention and despite the fact that their target audiences may be
different, different people can fit them at different times, and they all come from the
same pool and have access to all the media outlets right at their fingertips.
All in all, should a news broadcast mj ∈ M strive to attract new readership,
ri ∈ R \NR(mj, t), it should – whether their philosophies match or not – cross their
path first. As soon as this prerequisite is met in the face of fierce competitive pressure
from both sides of the media sphere, MT and MF , then and only then can a news
consumer ri ∈ R \NR(mj, t) make a (conscious) decision to subscribe to mj ∈M or
not. In line with this reasoning, we assume the subscription probability P(ri → mj, t)
of mj convincing ri to tune in at time t to be directly proportional to the visibility
of mj as measured by the balance bj(t) (8.5), i.e., P(ri → mj, t) ∝ bj(t).
Nevertheless, it would be illusory to attribute a decisive role to the publicity
of the media bj(t) when it comes to news consumers vetting the plethora of news
providers they can turn to. The general polarisation of the society is not coincidental
– in essence, it is tantamount to people having the tendency to seek information
selectively, in consonance with their principles and desires, whilst being driven by
different (external and internal) factors (refer to Chapter 8 for an overview of the
cognitive and other biases promoting such behaviour). Hence, the likelihood of an
individual actor ri ∈ R subscribing to a media outlet mj ∈ M \ NM(ri, t) should
also take into account his or her internal state ri(t).
Yet, it takes little effort to recognise that it would be nigh on impossible for ri
to search through the vast and turbulent media space for news stations that would
best suit his or her needs. In fact, neither randomly following media outlets without
rhyme or reason nor investing an unreasonably large amount of time in finding the
perfect fit seems to be plausible.
While one could trade off one for the other to find a satisfactory solution, most
people, in reality, do not rely on themselves to orchestrate elaborate news-probing
techniques but at least partially delegate their decision-making power to others by
making use of a host of (social) heuristics. Instead of exploring (conceivably only a
handful of) alternatives in the uncharted territories of the media on their own, they
rather orientate themselves according to the opinion of those whom they cherish –
and especially of those who are alike in virtue (refer to Section 8.2 for a survey of
human social behaviour).
We will follow suit and posit that individual actors ri ∈ R will look up to like-
minded news consumers rl ∈ R, rl(t) = ri(t), and ask them for referral when fishing
for news sources. The more popular a news station mj ∈ M is among them, viz.,
the larger the set N SR (mj, t) with S ∈ {T, F} corresponding to the state ri(t) of the
focal actor ri, the more likely will ri subscribe to mj, i.e., the higher the probability
P(ri → mj, t). That is, unless mj is already in the media repertoire NM(ri, t) of ri,
in which case no change will take place.
Notice that this resembles a form of (bounded) preferential attachment (refer to
Section 2.1) – the larger the clientele N TR (mj, t) and N FR (mj, t) in the two respective
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sectors of the public domain is, the more followers of the like mj will attract [78].
Ideally, however, this mechanism should not prevent, e.g., relatively recently estab-
lished media outlets from acquiring customers; at the very least, they should stand
a chance – albeit a slim one. For this reason, we will additionally require that the
contribution of this imitation process to the probability P(ri → mj, t), henceforth
dubbed partiality pSj (t) of the news consumers in state S ∈ {T, F} for the news
source mj at time t, be always much greater than 0, pSj (t)≫ 0.
As it turns out, all of the stipulated conditions can be satisfied in a very natural
manner, by drawing inspiration from the Fermi rule, which we discussed in the context
of update rules governing the imitation processes on graphs (refer to Section 3.1.2) and
later deployed in our clustering algorithm, introduced and investigated throughout
Chapter 4.
The analogy is clear – here, too, imitation dynamics are at work, although in
the absence of interaction structure. Indeed, a news consumer ri ∈ R in state
S ∈ {T, F} at time t only cares about the aggregate popularity mSj (t) of a news
channel mj ∈M\NM (ri, t) under inspection in flagrant disregard of the underlying
social network – as if the population were homogeneous. Accordingly, we will simply
take the partiality pSj (t) to be
pSj (t) :=
(︁
1 + exp(−mSj (t))
)︁−1
, (8.6)
reminiscent of the paradigmatic spin-flip probability associated with the Glauber
dynamics.
Evidently, its values always fall in the interval [1/2, 1], and it is strictly increasing
in the number mSj of news consumers of mj who are akin to ri in terms of the internal
states – in other words, it complies with the process of preferential attachment, whilst
at the same time lending a helping hand to the under-represented media – which is
precisely what we aimed for.
Both components – the balance bj(t) in news reporting conducted by mj ∈ M
and the partiality pSj (t) for mj expressed by those members rl ∈ R of the public who
are cast in the same mould as the focal individual ri ∈ R, i.e., rl(t) = ri(t) – will be
assumed to have a multiplicative effect on the subscription probability P(ri → mj, t).
Namely, combining both factors, given by 8.5 and 8.6, respectively, yields
P(ri → mj, t) ∝ bj(t)pSj (t) =
−µTj (t) log µTj (t)− µFj (t) log µFj (t)
log 2 · (︁1 + exp (−mSj (t)))︁ ∈ [0, 1],
where S ∈ {T, F} denotes the state ri(t) of ri at time t, viz., S = T if ri(t) = 1 and
S = F if ri(t) = 0.
As a result, the subscription probability with which the news consumer ri ∈ R
will tune in to the news outlet mj ∈M \NM(ri, t) by drawing an inter-layer edge
(ri,mj, t) boils down to
P(ri → mj, t) =
bj(t)p
S
j (t)∑︁
j:mj∈M\NM (ri,t) bj(t)p
S
j (t)
. (8.7)
Here, we took into consideration that, upon removing a randomly selected edge
(ri,mk, t), mk ∈ N S′M (ri, t) with S ′ = F if S = T and S ′ = T if S = F , the individual
of interest ri connects to exactly one of the media mj ∈ M \ NM(ri, t) not yet in
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his or her media repertoire NM(ri, t) in a bid to address its inconsistency with the
internal state ri(t). Hence, the normalisation serves the purpose of ensuring that∑
j:mj∈M\NM (ri,t) P(ri → mj, t) = 1.
Having laid the cornerstones of our model, we may now succinctly summarise
its inner workings. On the whole, the model is built of two interconnected layers,
the population layer GR = (R, ER) and the media layer GM = (M, EM), which
themselves are static in time, but whose coupling,
⋃R
i=1
⋃M
j=1(ri,mj, t), is subject to
perpetual change.
On top of this structure, stochastic processes of three types – two edge-based
and one vertex-based – concurrently take place – every active unbalanced edge
rirj ∈ EFTR (t) in the population layer is essentially a ticking time bomb, waiting to
be brought into balance, one way or another, according to the hazard rates λTλTij(t)
and λFλFij(t) bestowed upon it. Similarly, every news consumer ri ∈ R is endowed
with a Poisson clock running at rate η and every time it ticks, a news-alignment
process is triggered.
Herein also lies the crux of the resulting co-evolutionary dynamics – as the news
ﬂows and the rewiring unfolds, the layers become more and more interlaced. The
individual choices pertaining to which news broadcasts to follow aﬀect the popularity
of the media sources, and this popularity, in turn, moulds the individual choices and
consumer behaviour. Before we turn to the next section, which discusses in greater
depth the technical details of the model, we illustrate it schematically in Figure 8.1
below.
M
mj
R
ri
Figure 8.1: The multilayer structure of our model of news ﬂow. The bottom layer R depicts
the public at large, and the top layer M corresponds to the mass media; green colour is
used to mark agents in the true state, whereas those in the false state are highlighted in red.
Moreover, it holds that ri(t) = 0, rTi (t) = 1, r
F
i (t) = 2, mj(t) = 0, m
T
j (t) = 1, m
F
j (t) = 2,
ri ∈ N FR (mj , t), and mj ∈ N FM (ri, t) for the two explicitly labelled vertices ri ∈ R and
mj ∈ M. Notice that news consumers are heterogeneous with regard to how avidly they
follow the news, indicated by |NM (ri, t)|; likewise, the news stations diﬀer in terms of their
popularity, as measured by |NR(mj , t)|.
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8.4.4 Implementation of the Algorithm
On a purely practical note, our modelling framework appears to be too unwieldy to
allow for efficient computer simulations, let alone an analytical approach. Even if we
are to set aside the multilayer structure of the graph, the sheer number of stochastic
processes cropping up simultaneously seems to be prohibitive.
As a matter of fact, every individual news consumer ri ∈ R is equipped with an
independent Poisson process {Ni(t) | t ≥ 0} which generates, one at a time at a rate
of η, news-alignment events for ri with exponentially distributed inter-arrival times;
here, Ni(t) counts the number of occurrences up to time t. Although this, per se,
already brings about ample activity, the story does not stop here. In the same vein,
each (unbalanced) edge rirj ∈ ER in the population layer is assigned two Poisson
processes {NTij (t) | t ≥ 0} and {NFij (t) | t ≥ 0} with (non-zero) time-varying rates
λTλTij(t) and λFλFij(t), respectively, in charge of redressing the balance of rirj.
Collectively, there are thus R + 2|ER| independent, discrete-state stochastic
processes driving the evolution of the system, R of which are permanently active
while others – associated with edges rirj ∈ ER – may, depending on the time t, be
either active if rirj ∈ EFTR (t) or dormant if rirj ∈ ER \ EFTR (t). To make matters
worse, the fact that the hazard rates λTij(t) and λFij(t) not only vary in time but
do so discontinuously is not helpful either. All of these factors render coherent
and cost-effective sampling of schedules of events to occur nigh on impossible, and
continuous approximations also ought to be out of the question – the masses and
the mass media send and receive discrete units of information at discrete steps in
time [14].
However, as we have seen in Section 5.1.1, the fairly simple, multipurpose Gillespie
algorithm may come to the rescue in such situations [17, 64, 78]. Apropos, let us
quickly run through its routine with the specifics relevant to our application in mind.
At the initialisation stage, t = 0, the hazard rates η, {λTλTij(t)}rirj∈ER , and
{λFλFij(t)}rirj∈ER have to be set. We will take the parameters η, λT , and λF to be
constant (predefined by the user) and compute λFij(0) and λTij(0) directly from (8.3)
and (8.4), respectively. Note that this requires the knowledge of the cardinalities
rTi (0) and rFi (0) for every news consumer ri ∈ R. These, as we shall see in the
following, will be randomly allocated to each member of the public separately under
the constraint that 1 ≤ rTi (0) ≤ MT and 1 ≤ rFi (0) ≤ MF . Thereby, we preclude
polarisation from happening right from the start, that is, P(0) = ∅. Also, rather than
setting to 0 the rates λTij(t) and λFij(t) whenever the corresponding edge is inactive,
rirj ∈ ER \ EFTR (t), edge (in)activity will be stored in a dedicated list.
With these rates at hand, we may turn to the iterative procedure. First of all, we
need to carry out the calculation of the rate λ(t) of the superposition of all active
processes, i.e.,
λ(t) =
∑︂
ri∈R
η +
∑︂
rirj∈EFTR (t)
λTλTij(t) +
∑︂
rirj∈EFTR (t)
λFλFij(t) = Rη + λ
TΛT (t) + λFΛF (t), (8.8)
where we used ΛT (t) and ΛF (t) as shorthand notation to denote the sum of the values
λTij(t) and λFij(t) taken over the set of all unbalanced edges EFTR (t), respectively. Since
the rates λTij(t) and λFij(t) will change after each iteration – due to either updated
values of {(rTi (t), rFi (t))}ri∈R or altered edge (in)activity – the rate λ(t) of the
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superposition cannot be determined in advance but has to be re-evaluated after each
round of iteration.
Next, we may now plug the revised rate λ(t) into the formula τ(t) = − ln r/λ(t)
(cf. equation (5.3)) to obtain the time increment τ(t) to the next event. Although,
strictly speaking, the algorithm instructs us to draw r uniformly at random from
the interval [0, 1] at each step anew, we will, for simplicity, take it to be constantly
equal to r = 1/e; doing so reduces the expression for τ(t) to τ(t) = 1/λ(t). After all,
obliging to the original formulation would only materially modify the time scale and
not the resulting sequence of events and, by extension, the long-term outcome of the
dynamics – which will be our main concern.
Adhering to the recipe, it is now time to pick one of the R + 2|EFTR (t)| currently
active processes to set off an event. To this end, any of the following events may
occur:
• one of the members of the population ri ∈ R is chosen – each with the same
probability η/λ(t) – to align his or her media repertoire NM(ri, t) with the
internal state ri(t),
• one of the active bonds rirj ∈ EFTR (t) is chosen with probability λTλTij(t)/λ(t)
upon which the actor in the false state transitions to the true state,
• one of the active bonds rirj ∈ EFTR (t) is chosen with probability λFλFij(t)/λ(t)
upon which the actor in the true state transitions to the false state.
Notice that instead of directly selecting an event to take place, one can also equiva-
lently (with (conditional) probabilities yet to be specified) first randomly draw an
action – news-alignment AN , balancing out towards the true state A TB , or balanc-
ing out towards the false state A FB , respectively – and only then pick the carrier
entity on which the action should unfold, which can be either a news consumer or
an unbalanced bond between two of them, conditionally on the previously chosen
action A ∈ {AN ,A TB ,A FB }. This interpretation will be retained hereafter and also
integrated into the implementation of our algorithm, which is outlined further below.
Thus, for the sake of rigour, let us provide it with the probabilities P(A ) with which
actions A ∈ {AN ,A TB ,A FB } are selected, i.e.,
P(AN) =
Rη
λ(t)
, P(A TB ) =
λTΛT (t)
λ(t)
, and P(A FB ) =
λFΛF (t)
λ(t)
, (8.9)
and the conditional probabilities P(· | A ) of sampling individuals ri ∈ R and
unbalanced edges rirj ∈ EFTR (t) given that action A was picked at the previous
stage, namely,
P(ri | AN) = 1
R
, P(rirj | A TB ) =
λTij(t)
ΛT (t)
, and P(rirj | A FB ) =
λFij(t)
ΛF (t)
. (8.10)
Either way, as soon as one of the events is selected and comes about, time t is
incremented by τ = 1/λ(t), the relevant parameters of the model and the hazard
rates η, {λTλTij(t)}rirj∈ER , and {λFλFij(t)}rirj∈ER are updated, and the processes are
accordingly (in)activated. With the status brought up to date, the next step of
the iteration may commence, and so forth until the termination criterion (set up
beforehand) is satisfied, and the simulated schedule of events is returned as an output
argument.
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Overall, we have gathered all the essential ingredients to conduct the simulations.
However, before we assemble them together and lay out the algorithm in full detail,
let us briefly touch upon the initialisation and the termination phase.
On the part of the initialisation routine, the system will start off as randomly
disorganised. That is, given the interaction graph GR = (R, ER) of the public sphere
and the distribution of the media (MT ,MF ) across the two states, a random sample
of a desired size RF (0) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , R− 1} from the (otherwise truth-oriented) set of
news consumers R will be assigned to the false state, and the coupling between the
two layers will be – at this stage – completely random and highly heterogeneous both
across the masses R and the media M. Every individual ri ∈ R will be supplied
with a random selection of news sources NM(ri, 0) ⊆ M with at least one of each
kind of the media; but apart from that, the cardinalities rSi (0) ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,MS} for
S ∈ {T, F} will be drawn randomly and independently across the individual actors.
With the passage of time, the dynamics will then shift back and forth until they
equilibrate and/or fulfil any of the stopping conditions. As for the latter, some are
very intuitive. For example, should it at any point in time t hold that |EFTR (t)| = 0,
which can only be if the entire population adopts either the true state or the false
state, ρT (t) = 1 or ρF (t) = 1, respectively, then no further change can occur to the
individual states. Indeed, in either case we can deduce that all edge-balancing rates
vanish, ΛT (t) = ΛF (t) = 0, and therefore that P(A TB ) = P(A FB ) = 0 and P(AN) = 1
hold. Hence, letting the system continue to evolve would not offer any additional
insight – gradually, everyone would refrain from following the media outlets MS in
the state S ∈ {T, F} clashing with the prevailing view in the public, i.e., ρS(t) = 0.
By the same token, even if only one of the equalities ΛS(t) = 0 for S ∈ {T, F} is
true, the progression of the dynamics is rather self-evident. In fact, we have then
that P(A SB ) = 0, meaning that no individual can persuade another to transition to
the state S, and at the same time that rSi (t) = 0 for all ri ∈ R, implying that all the
news stations in the state S are highly unbalanced, bj(t) = 0 for all mj ∈MS, and
thus cannot attract new readership, P(ri → mj, t) = 0 for all ri ∈ R. Ultimately, the
state S would again inevitably be driven out of the public.
As it turns out, it also proves useful to introduce a stopping rule akin to the
one that we implemented in the modified Petford–Welsh algorithm in Chapter 4.
Recall that there, too, the (interaction) graph gravitated towards distributions of
states (conceptualised as clusters or, equivalently, colours) with the least aggregate
discrepancy between neighbouring vertices (as quantified by the number of bad
edges). This motivated us to record the variance of this discrepancy over time and
terminate the execution of the algorithm as soon as it stabilised and dropped below
a specific tolerance level. Moreover, to prevent computational wastefulness, it was
computed over a sliding window of bounded length.
As we shall see in the following section, the cardinality of the set of unbalanced
edges EFTR (t) exhibits remarkably similar dynamics – for this reason, we will again
rely on its sliding-window variance to detect the onset of a stable trend. However,
given that we are now dealing with an additional layer, this does not suffice; it can
well happen that the majority of the activity pertains to the inter-layer coupling,
with disregard to the population layer. To account for this, we will also closely
monitor the number P (t) of polarised news consumers over time and, analogously,
halt the simulation if the corresponding sliding-window variance recedes to a value
less than the chosen tolerance.
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This condition seems to be natural – by design, the set P(t) tends to increase
in the course of time t but not indefinitely; its cardinality cannot surpass the total
number of individuals R. Indeed, once a member of the public ri ∈ R becomes
polarised, ri ∈ P(t), there is seldom a way back. Only if the polarised individual ri is
irrational in the sense that he or she outright shies away from the media outlets that
match his or her internal state, i.e., rSi (t) = 0 for S ∈ {T, F} such that ri ∈ RS(t),
is there a slim chance that a news-alignment event will “right the wrong”. In all
other instances – when the internal state ri(t) is on a par with the state of the media
repertoire NM(ri, t) – the individual ri can only become ever more entrenched.
Accordingly, for the sake of completeness, let us reframe our dynamic approach to
computing the sliding-window variance in the present context. For this, let tn denote
the simulation time at step n ∈ N of the iteration, with t1 = 0 and tn+1 = tn+1/λ(tn)
as defined by the Gillespie algorithm, which was discussed above. The sample mean
µPn and the variance Var
P
n of the number of polarised individuals at step n over the
sliding window of length L then amount to
µPn =
1
L
n∑︂
m=n−L+1
P (tm), (8.11)
VarPn = Var
(︁
[P (tm)]
n
m=n−L+1
)︁
=
1
L− 1
n∑︂
m=n−L+1
P (tm)
2 − L
L− 1
(︁
µPn
)︁2
, (8.12)
respectively. Hence, instead of having to continually, at each step afresh traverse
through the entire history, we will mount a sliding window to the timeline, undertake
an audit of the period covered by the slider, and as we trudge forward with iteration,
we will slide the window along the way and keep on repeating the procedure. Although
substituting the sliding-window variance for the variance over the whole range of
values already makes a marked difference, we will, as was done before for the modified
Petford–Welsh algorithm, use the formulas (8.11) and (8.12) only for the first slice
of the data covered by the sliding window, namely at step n = L, and update
the subsequent values dynamically by tallying the local contributions. Once again,
standard algebraic manipulations lead us to the equation for the mean update
µPn+1 = µ
P
n +
1
L
(︁
P (tn+1)− P (tn−L+1)
)︁
(8.13)
and thereupon the recipe for the variance
VarPn+1 = Var
P
n +
1
L− 1
(︁
P (tn+1)− P (tn−L+1)
)︁(︁
P (tn+1) + P (tn−L+1)− µPn+1 − µPn
)︁
,
(8.14)
which will be deployed at all later steps, that is, for n+ 1 ≥ L+ 1. Note that in the
case of unbalanced edges, the formulas and the update rules for the sliding-window
mean µFTn and the sliding-window variance Var
FT
n at step n follow suit – essentially
the same equations apply with |EFTR (·)| in place of P (·); they will thus be omitted.
Last but not least, it may also be convenient to impose an upper bound on the
simulation time tn as a replacement to or in combination with the tolerance on the
sliding-window variances. In a nutshell, we can summarise the core of our algorithm
using the schematic below (refer to Algorithm 2). While so far we have been long on
theory and short on empirical investigation, let us now redress the balance and put
our model to use.
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Algorithm 2 The NewsFlow (NF)
Input: GR = (R, ER), RF (0) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , R− 1}, η, λT , λF , MT , MF , L, tol
Output: final state/detailed evolution of any quantity of interest
1: n← 1
2: t1 ← 0
3: initialise MT to be MT media outlets in the true state (mj = 1)
4: initialise MF to be MF media outlets in the false state (mj = 0)
5: assign a random sample of RF (0) vertices of R to the false state (ri(t1) = 0) and the
remainder to the true state (ri(t1) = 1)
6: EFTR (t1)← {rirj | ri(t1) ̸= rj(t1)}
7: for all ri ∈ R do
8: choose rTi (t1) ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,MT } and rFi (t1) ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,MF } uniformly at random
9: initialise N TM (ri, t1) to be a random sample of MT of size rTi (t1)
10: initialise NFM (ri, t1) to be a random sample of MF of size rFi (t1)
11: initialise and/or update applicable N SR (mj , t1) and mSj (t1) {where ri ∈ RS(t1)}
12: P(t1)← ∅
13: for all rirj ∈ ER do
14: initialise λFij(t1) (8.3) and λ
T
ij(t1) (8.4)
15: for all mj ∈MT ∪MF do
16: initialise bj(t1) (8.5), pTj (t1), and p
F
j (t1) (8.6)
17: VarFT1 ← tol
18: VarP1 ← tol
19: initialise λ(t1) (8.8) and P(A ) (8.9) for A ∈ {AN ,A TB ,A FB }
20: store all variables in the state of the system S (t1)
21: while (VarFTn ≥ tol) and (VarPn ≥ tol) do
22: tn+1 ← tn + 1/λ(tn)
23: S (tn+1)← S (tn)
24: choose action A ∈ {AN ,A TB ,A FB } with probability proportional to P(A )
25: if A == AN then
26: choose ri ∈ R with probability proportional to P(ri | AN ) (8.10)
27: if rSi (tn) > 0 then {where ri /∈ RS(tn)}
28: choose mj ∈ N SM (ri, tn) uniformly at random
29: N SM (ri, tn+1)← N SM (ri, tn) \ {mj}
30: choose mj /∈ NM (ri, tn+1) with probability proportional to P(ri → mj , tn) (8.7)
31: NM (ri, tn+1)← NM (ri, tn+1) ∪ {mj}
32: else if A == A TB then
33: choose rirj ∈ EFTR (tn) with probability proportional to P(rirj | A TB ) (8.10)
34: ri(tn+1)← 1
35: rj(tn+1)← 1
36: else {A == A FB }
37: choose rirj ∈ EFTR (tn) with probability proportional to P(rirj | A FB ) (8.10)
38: ri(tn+1)← 0
39: rj(tn+1)← 0
40: update all variables and the state of the system S (tn+1)
41: n← n+ 1
42: if (n ≥ L) then
43: VarFTn ← Var
(︁
[|EFTR (tm)|]nm=n−L+1
)︁
44: VarPn ← Var
(︁
[P (tm)]
n
m=n−L+1
)︁
45: return S (tn+1)
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8.4.5 Results and Discussion
In order to assess the appropriateness and qualitative properties of our model, we
performed a series of numerical simulations – generated according to the protocol
proposed in Algorithm 2 with varying input parameters – and repeated them several
times to hold random effects at bay. Before carefully probing the results (a summary
of which can be found at the end of this section), let us concisely review the main
modelling assumptions applicable to all experiment runs.
All population layers – unweighted, undirected, simple graphs – were constructed
by means of the Barabási–Albert model [131] (refer to Section 2.1), the reasons for
which are twofold. First, the resulting graphs exhibit a power-law degree distribution,
typically observed in various real-world social interaction networks, and second, its
simplicity enabled us to both consistently and effortlessly validate the results across
multiple specimens of similar graphs, thus ensuring that the observations are not
instance-specific but hold more generally for the entire class of graphs.
In line with the widely recognised fact that the degree distributions of a large
number of scale-free graphs arising in practice roughly follow the form P (k) ∼ k−γ
for 2 ≤ γ ≤ 3, the power-law exponent was fixed at γ = 2.5, whereas the population
size R was constrained to the set R ∈ {103, 2 · 103, 5 · 103}. Moreover, during the
generating process, each newly introduced vertex established connections to exactly
20 already present vertices, which then led to a mean degree of k ≈ 40, a maximum
degree within the range of 100–150, and – trivially – a minimum degree of 20. Hence,
the number of contacts that individuals ri ∈ R in the public sphere had with their
contemporaries was limited by Dunbar’s number, a well-known concept in the social
sciences (which we also discussed in Section 8.2). Given that Dunbar’s number
provides an upper bound on the number of stable relationships one can sustain,
meaning that many will stick to far less, and that not every interpersonal relation is
necessarily news-related, this seems to be a reasonable choice.
To further reflect reality and put our model on a more solid footing, every news
consumer ri ∈ R possessed a limited attention span 2 ≤ rTi (t) + rFi (t) ≤MT +MF
with regard to the media outlets, where we took both the number MT of media
outlets in the true state and the number MF of those in the false state to be equal
to MT =MF = 10. This brings about more than a few appealing features.
Primarily, at all times t, each member of the population indeed only tunes in
to a narrow – realistically manageable – media repertoire consisting of at most
M = 20 news stations at once, the importance of which was also acknowledged in
the co-evolutionary model of public opinion and media competition [132] that we
became acquainted with in Section 8.3. In addition, the accompanying inequality
M < 103 ≤ R bows to the self-evident fact that the media landscape has to be several
orders of magnitude smaller in size compared to the readership at large, M ≪ R; no
matter how many news agencies there are in the world, their number is necessarily
bounded by the number of people – typically a mere handful of the population as
a whole – who establish and operate them. While this relation also tacitly hints
at more vigorous proliferation of news in the public sphere in our modelling setup,
which may well be plausible given that the average men on the street seem to be the
chief culprits (or at least some of the biggest accomplices) behind the abundance of
false news (see Sections 8.1.1 and 8.2), the distribution of news-dissemination activity
to the media and the social network is actually regulated separately by means of the
hazard rate η.
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In fact, recall that η conveys the per-unit-time probability that an individual
undergoes a news-alignment process, which, in principle, embodies the influence that
the mass media exert on the flow of the news. The higher the value of η, the more
people turn to the media broadcasts rather than to each other to receive news updates;
when η is small, the roles are switched. Overall, two qualitatively distinct regimes
were studied, namely, η was either of comparable order to or one order higher than
the basic spreading rate λS for S ∈ {T, F}. Notice that, due to the sparsity of the
interaction graph, i.e., |ER| = O(Rk) for 1 < k ≪ 2, η ∼ λS implies approximately
equal time scales of all ongoing actions, as indicated by P(AN) ∼ P(A SB ) (refer to
equation (8.9)).
Furthermore, for the sake of systematic comparison of varying pervasiveness of
true and false content, we imposed the constraint that both types of news providers
are equal in number, MT =MF ; observe that the disparity in their presence can be
encapsulated anyway using the basic spreading rates λT and λF of true and false
content, respectively. As far as these are concerned, λT was simply set to λT = 1
in all simulation runs, as we have already announced in Section 8.4.3. Its false
counterpart, on the other hand, was commonly either equal to or twice or five times
as large, λF ∈ {1, 2, 5}; nevertheless, we also explored a range of intermediate values.
These choices can be justified by empirical data – as pointed out in Sections 8.1.1
and 8.2, an in-depth study revealed that falsities, as a rule, spread nearly twice as
often as the truth and reach 1500 people six times faster.
Moreover, although n times less probable diffusion of false claims could be easily
envisaged by taking λF = n and turning the true–false poles upside down, we
laboriously investigated instead how the system evolves upon inputting λF = 1/n.
While this may seem to be an unnecessary workload, it has – besides the obvious
benefit of completeness and symmetry in certain results – an additional advantage in
that it allows us to probe a much larger region of the parameter space with respect
to η.
Supported with all the necessary equipment, we may now finally delve into the
experimental results in more detail. First, we will tackle the dynamics at the macro
level and report our findings with regard to the global densities pertaining to the
population layer, that is, of individuals in the false state ρF , of unbalanced edges
ρFT , and of polarised individuals ρP . The detailed time evolution {ρ(tn)}n≥1 of
any variable ρ will be designated explicitly by ρ(t), whereas ρ per se will refer to
the final simulation state, capturing the expected long-term behaviour, limt→∞ ρ(t).
Next, our focus will shift to the evolution at the micro scale – we will zoom in on
the news-alignment processes by putting ourselves in the shoes of individual news
consumers ri ∈ R and news services mj ∈M and describe the ensuing cross-layer
news consumption {(rTi (tn), rFi (tn))}n≥1 and media popularity {(mTj (tn),mFj (tn))}n≥1,
whereby analogous notational convention will be adhered to.
Macro-scale Dynamics
To get a general grasp of the inner workings of our modelling framework, we begin
by analysing a sample of prototypical trajectories underlying the evolution of the
system. More specifically, we will examine how the global densities ρF (t), ρFT (t),
and ρP (t) unfold over time t in relation to two fundamental parameters to our model,
thehazard rates λF and η. The third crucial ingredient, the initial frequency ρF (0)
of individuals in the false state, will for the moment be assumed to be perfectly
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neutral towards both sides of the public, i.e., ρF (0) = 1/2; thus, at the outset, news
consumers with a tendency to subscribe to either of the two types of news, true or
false, will encompass exactly half of the entire population of R = 1000 members – no
group will be given any advantage over the other.
As for the persuasive power λF of the news content ripe with falsehoods, it will
either be on a par with that of the truthful reporting, λT = 1, or at either of the
two extremes – ﬁve times larger or ﬁve times smaller than λT , i.e., λF ∈ {0.2, 1, 5}.
Further, let us, as a starting point, restrict η to the same set of values, η ∈ {0.2, 1, 5}.
Hence, taken altogether we have 3×3 pairs of input parameters; for each one of them,
a realisation {(ρF (tn), ρFT (tn), ρP (tn))}n≥1 of the system is generated and depicted
in Figure 8.2 below.
10−3 10−1 101 103
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
ρF (t)
10−3 10−1 101 103
ρFT (t)
10−3 10−1 101 103
ρP (t)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0
Simulation time t
0.0
0.2
0.
0.6
0.8
1.0
λF = 0.2
λF = 1
λF = 5
η = 0.2
η = 1
η = 5
Time evolution of ρF (t), ρFT (t), and ρP (t) in dependence on λF and η
Figure 8.2: Time evolution of the trajectories of individuals in the false state ρF (t), of
unbalanced edges ρFT (t), and of polarised individuals ρP (t) (note the logarithmic time
scale). There are 3 × 3 distinct realisations of each trajectory type, each of which is
associated with a pair (λF , η) of input parameters with λF ∈ {0.2, 1, 5} and η ∈ {0.2, 1, 5}.
Observe that λF can be discerned from the colour (green, grey, red) of the curve, whereas
its line style (dotted, dashed, solid) uniquely identiﬁes η.
What perhaps stands out the most is how strikingly similar the behaviour of the
system is across the diﬀerent realisations corresponding to the same values of λF ;
not only in terms of the shapes of the trajectories ρ(t), but even with regard to the
precise timing of the onset of an ascent or, for that matter, a descent; apart from
λF = 1 – which merits its own discussion – there seems to be a perfect overlap. What
is more, notice how well the simulations agree with the theoretical predictions for the
simpliﬁed version of the edge-balancing process taking place in the population layer
(refer to the mean-ﬁeld analysis (8.2) in Section 8.4.3). Indeed, for λF = 5 > 1, the
global density ρF (t) of news consumers inclined towards fabricated claims rapidly
equilibrates to ρF ≈ 1, for λF = 0.2 < 1, it sooner or later converges to ρF ≈ 0, and
for λF = 1, there is a stable coexistence between the two competing options, ρF ≈ 1/2.
This should hardly be a surprise – due to comparable hazard rates, η ∼ λF ∼ λT , and
the fact that every single instantiation of the news-alignment process only slightly
perturbs the state of the system, the speciﬁcs of the inter-layer coupling barely have
any lasting eﬀect on its evolution, and it is then predominantly governed by the
imitation dynamics occurring on the interaction graph GR = (R, ER).
There is nothing profound about the evolution of the density ρFT (t) of unbalanced
edges, either. Unanimity in the readership, ρF ≈ 0 or ρF ≈ 1, is reﬂected in the
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absence of active edges, ρFT ≈ 0; and, on the contrary, preserving plurality, ρF ≈ 1/2,
sustains their presence, ρFT ≈ 1/2. Although there is a downward trend in ρFT (t) in
the latter case as well, it is too feeble to be ascribed, e.g., to a signiﬁcant build-up of
echo chambers; a more plausible explanation boils down to a rather simple reason
that has to do with the parallel decrease or increase in the fraction ρF (t) of the edge
endpoints that ﬁnd themselves in the false state. On the whole, in spite of the marked
ﬂuctuations characteristic for λF = 1, all concomitant trajectories ρ(t) appear to be
endowed with an inertia that pushes them – at least on average – towards the golden
middle, ρ ≈ 1/2.
Intuitive conclusions can also be drawn from the last subplot, which involves the
dynamics of polarised individuals ri ∈ P(t), who have made a (conscious) decision
to immerse themselves fully in only one segment of news broadcasts, rTi (t) = 0 or
rFi (t) = 0. Clearly, the magnitude of the polarisation in the public sphere increases
with increasing η; since the concept of polarisation is – as opposed to that of the
internal states of the news consumers – tightly related to the news-alignment process,
it is understandable why the diﬀerences are much more prominent now. The higher
the η, the more news-rewiring events come about, prompting people to rely less on
others for advice, conform less to the majority, and demand more information tailored
to their needs. In a sense, one could say that the news-alignment process promotes
individualism, whereas edge-balancing enhances collectivity and following the crowd;
there is no doubt that both aspects form a crucial part of human behaviour. While
at ﬁrst glance one may get the impression that, in our model, they are detached
from one another, this, in fact, is not the case. Even in these particular examples,
where η is fairly small, an additional side eﬀect to its (relatively) greater value can
be witnessed. When λF = 0.2  1, η and λT become the leading rates driving the
dynamics of the system; consequently, news-alignment processes and transitions to
true states gain the upper hand. This eﬀectively slows down the dynamics and delays
convergence, which can be easily perceived in the trajectories for both ρF (t) and
ρFT (t) but is even more noticeable when η  1 (refer to Figure 8.3).
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Figure 8.3: Time evolution of the trajectories of individuals in the false state ρF (t), of
unbalanced edges ρFT (t), and of polarised individuals ρP (t) (note the logarithmic time
scale). There are 3 × 3 distinct realisations of each trajectory type, each of which is
associated with a pair (λF , η) of input parameters with λF ∈ {0.2, 1, 5} and η ∈ {10, 20, 50}.
Observe that λF can be discerned from the colour (green, grey, red) of the curve, whereas
its line style (dotted, dashed, solid) uniquely identiﬁes η.
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Here, the input attribute η was taken to be one order higher, namely, η ∈
{10, 20, 50}, and the same set of experiments was performed with the intent to
pinpoint the key features that were grafted into the model by the news-alignment
mechanism. Not only do the results conﬁrm the time lag to the equilibration when
λF = 0.2 along with previous observations; they also demonstrate that suﬃciently
high values of η  1 can shift the equilibria towards compositions of population
which maintain higher levels of diversity, 0  ρF  1. This is especially apparent
when λF = 0.2 – news-rewiring then becomes the dominant evolutionary force, and
the population structure can be altered by as much as up to 20%.
Now that we have acquired some insight into the character of our modelling scheme,
we may more systematically and thoroughly explore the parameter space in its entirety.
To this end, two batches of simulations were carried out. First, the total number of
news consumers was set to R = 5000, and the hazard rate η was assumed to be of a
similar order of magnitude to λF , that is, λF , η ∈ {1/n, n | n ∈ {1, 1.25, 2, 2.5, 5}}.
For each of the 9× 9 pairs (λF , η) of input parameters, we ran the Algorithm 2 ten
times and calculated the averages of the resulting global densities ρF , ρFT , and ρP
over these runs; they are portrayed on the left-hand sides of Figures 8.4, 8.5, and 8.6,
respectively.
The second batch was concerned with a smaller population size, R = 2000, which
was oﬀset by a great deal more repetitions of the algorithm; the number of runs
per parameter pair was elevated to a hundred. Moreover, while the range of values
for λF was left intact, λF ∈ {1/n, n | n ∈ {1, 1.25, 2, 2.5, 5}}, a greater slice of the
parameter region was investigated for η, i.e., η ∈ {0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50}. The
average densities ρF , ρFT , and ρP attained are now visualised on the right-hand
sides of Figures 8.4, 8.5, and 8.6, respectively. In a way, ﬁgures to their left can
thus be thought of as their insets. Note that, for now, the initial frequency ρF (0) of
individuals who have a penchant for false news is still ﬁxed at ρF (0) = 1/2. This
will be revised in just a bit when a variety of initial conditions is studied.
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Figure 8.4: Density ρF of news consumers in the false state extracted from the ﬁnal
simulation state. Left : R = 5000, 10 simulation runs per parameter pair (λF , η), ﬁelds
framed in black correspond to the parameter pairs in Figure 8.2. Right : R = 2000, 100
simulation runs per parameter pair, ﬁelds framed in black correspond to the parameter
pairs in Figure 8.3.
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R = 5000, 10 simulation runs per parameter pair (λF , η), ﬁelds framed in black correspond
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Figure 8.6: Density ρP of polarised news consumers extracted from the ﬁnal simulation
state. Left : R = 5000, 10 simulation runs per parameter pair (λF , η), ﬁelds framed in black
correspond to the parameter pairs in Figure 8.2. Right : R = 2000, 100 simulation runs per
parameter pair, ﬁelds framed in black correspond to the parameter pairs in Figure 8.3.
What can we thus learn from these ﬁgures? We start oﬀ with some general
remarks. As one would expect, Figures 8.4 and 8.5 indicate a high vertical symmetry
– principally, the values at coordinates (λF , η) mirror, mutatis mutandis, those at
coordinates (1/λF , η). Furthermore, the results seem to generalise our toy examples
in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 rather well (compare the terminal states of the trajectories in
these ﬁgures with the boxes encircled with thick black borders in Figures 8.4, 8.5,
and 8.6), extend in a consistent manner to the surrounding ﬁelds (λF , η), and come
across as universal – regardless of the size R of the underlying population and the
stochastic nature of our algorithm.
A careful inspection of each of the ﬁgures separately corroborates our recently
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stated hypotheses. Figure 8.4, for instance, displays a clear delineation between the
two (absorbing) states, ρF = 0 (area shaded green) and ρF = 1 (area shaded red), in
which only one pole of the readership persists, and the area corresponding to λF = 1
is once again retrieved as a safe haven that permits the coexistence of both groups
and is perpetually poised between the two. Yet, the extent to which a trajectory
approaches either of the states ρF ∈ {0, 1} importantly depends on η. An increase
in η dampens convergence, and the associated trajectories ρF (t) become more and
more repelled from either ρF = 0 if λF < 1 or ρF = 1 if λF > 1, as we have discussed
above.
Analogously, Figure 8.5 serves as supplementary evidence to our previous findings
in relation to the density ρFT of active edges. The farther away λF is from the
reference point λF = 1, the faster ρFT dwindles. However, as usual, a growing
hazard rate η at the same time curtails this process and leads to higher prevalence
of unbalanced edges even when λF is close to the extremes of its domain, which goes
hand in hand with the accompanying increase (if λF > 1) or decrease (if λF < 1) in
ρF .
At last, Figure 8.6 reports the data pertaining to the global density ρP of polarised
individuals. Fundamentally, it illuminates why it pays off to examine the parameter
region for λF beyond the conceptually sufficient condition λF ≥ 1; merely exchanging
the true state for the false and vice versa would not help much in this situation. In
fact, the loss of symmetry evident here yields qualitatively different dynamics of
ρP (t) for λF < 1 and λF > 1, respectively; developing a solid understanding of the
phenomenon of polarisation and the news-alignment process underpinning it hence
requires a closer look at both sides of the spectrum. While ρP grows steadily with η
for all values of λF , coupling a large η ≫ 1 with a small λF ≪ 1 on the one hand
only makes this growth even more pronounced; taking λF ≫ 1 to be large on the
other hand hinders it by decelerating the news-rewiring process.
Up to this point, the initial distribution (RT (0), RF (0)) of the public across the
two states was assumed to be uniform, with ρF (0) = ρT (0) = 1/2. As promised,
we will now touch upon this topic and compare the dynamical outcomes of a series
of simulations in which we (additionally) varied the initial fraction ρF (0) of news
consumers with a preference for false news.
Typically one is concerned with initial states with an overwhelming majority
for one of the options, leaving the opposing camp to be thin on the ground. The
question of interest then becomes whether this minority can enforce its alternative
perspective as the new equilibrium by convincing the public as a whole to adopt it.
Note that this is grounded by the fact that this is how numerous phenomena
commence – the diffusion of innovations, viral contagions, infrastructural breakdowns,
riots, and the dissemination of falsities – they all tend to pave their way into the
world by starting small [13].
Accordingly, the values for ρF (0) were taken from the set {0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5},
and we analysed how the global densities ρF (t), ρFT (t), and ρP (t) evolve in the
course of time t ≥ 0. To be able to focus primarily on the dynamics of internal states
– to discern whether the (minuscule) fraction ρF (0)≪ 1 of individuals can push the
rest of the population to discard the old habits and follow their lead, ρF = 1 – we
restricted our attention to moderate parameter values.
In two experimental settings, priority was given to the dispersal of false news,
λF = 2, first with η = 5 and then with η = 0.2; the third batch, on the contrary,
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was devoted to modelling an environment that promotes the truth, λF = 0.5. Since
this represents one more hurdle for the already down-sized readership RF (0) in the
false state, this case was only supplemented with η = 5, as η = 0.2 would only create
further momentum for veracity to thrive. All in all, the trajectories are illustrated in
Figure 8.7.
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Figure 8.7: The three columns of ﬁgures, from left to right, correspond to the phase
portraits of individuals in the false state ρF (t), of unbalanced edges ρFT (t), and of polarised
individuals ρP (t) (note the logarithmic time scale). The trajectories are colour-coded
according to the initial fraction ρF (0) of news consumers in the false state.
Curiously, the long-term behaviour appears to be – for each pair of input attributes
(λF , η) – largely independent of the particular choice of the initial condition ρF (0).
More or less, it bears a strong resemblance to what we have seen so far and, as such,
only reaﬃrms our existing discoveries – increasing η ameliorates the extremes, λF > 1
and λF < 1 (to a greater or lesser extent) encourage the convergence to ρF = 1 and
ρF = 0, respectively, and fusing together a small λF  1 and a large η  1 sets
the scene for polarisation. Still, there is one peculiarity to these cases worth taking
note of – when λF > 1 and ρF (0)  1, there is an initial surge in the number of
active edges, dρFT (t)/dt > 0, which is soon thereafter followed by its steep decline,
dρFT (t)/dt < 0. This too has a straightforward interpretation. In the beginning,
there are only a few active edges due to the composition of the population in the
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early stages, which is permeated with news consumers who are inclined to tune in
to truthful broadcasts, ρT (0) ≈ 1. As more and more false-news followers crop up,
activity intensiﬁes, dρFT (t)/dt > 0, until it reaches the tipping point ρFT ≈ 1/2, upon
which falsehood pervades, ρF ≈ 1, and the number of unbalanced edges diminishes
back to its former value.
Taking everything into consideration, the global densities ρF and ρFT seem to
be mainly aﬀected by the edge-balancing process, which in turn is controlled by the
basic spreading rate λF , whereas (the rate η of) the news-alignment process appears
to be the major culprit when it comes to the dynamics of the density ρP of polarised
individuals.
Thus, as a sanity check, we conducted two more sets of simulations in which
we studied how the long-term outcomes ρF , ρFT , and ρP , returned at the end
of the execution of the algorithm, change as we vary one of the hazard rates,
λF ∈ {n/5 | n ∈ N, 1 ≤ n ≤ 14} or η ∈ {0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50}, while keeping
the other one constant at a relatively conservative value of η = 5 or λF = 2,
respectively. For each value of λF (resp. η), the Algorithm 2 was run repeatedly
using various initial conditions ρF (0) ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5} and, for each of these,
diﬀerent population sizes R ∈ {103, 2 · 103, 5 · 103}. In total, the two respective
batches of experiments comprised of 14× 4× 3 and 9× 4× 3 trials, one for each of
the triples (λF , ρF (0), R) and (η, ρF (0), R), respectively.
The results are presented in the form of phase diagrams 8.8 and 8.9 below, with
ρF , ρFT , and ρP as the order parameters and the hazard rates λF and η, respectively,
as the control parameters (refer to Section 5.1 for the terminology and concepts
related to phase transitions).
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Figure 8.8: Phase diagrams of the global densities ρF , ρFT , and ρP plotted as functions of
λF . To distinguish between the initial conditions ρF (0), a colour palette is utilised; markers
on the lines designate population size.
Turning ﬁrst to Figure 8.8, we see that there is a distinct phase transition with
a critical point at λF = 1, which separates the phase where false-news followers
abound, ρF ≈ 1, from the phase in which they fare rather poorly, ρF ≈ 0. Moreover,
there is almost a perfect match between the plots across all population sizes R; and
while agreement across the spectrum of the initial densities ρF (0) is quite good as
well, notice the slight shifts among the curves along the horizontal axis. There is
intuitive reasoning for this – the more individuals in the false state there are at the
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outset, as measured by ρF (0), the less external impetus λF they require to achieve
dominance over others. Hence, the ﬁnal fraction ρF is always marginally higher for
higher values of ρF (0) at ﬁxed values of λF . As far as polarisation is concerned, the
phase diagram of ρP shows again that it ﬂourishes most when the spreading rate λF
drops well below the tipping point λF = 1.
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Figure 8.9: Phase diagrams of the global densities ρF , ρFT , and ρP plotted as functions of
η. To distinguish between the initial conditions ρF (0), a colour palette is utilised; markers
on the lines designate population size.
Yet, in order to fully disentangle the notion of polarisation from other factors
contributing to the dynamics, we need to isolate the inﬂuence of η from other
confounding variables. This then ﬁnally brings us to Figure 8.9, which showcases
the last panel of phase diagrams, with η as the control parameter. It becomes even
clearer now that a rise in the news-alignment rate η is indeed accompanied by an
escalation in polarisation, which, on the other hand, is traded oﬀ for a reduction
in the terminal density ρF of individuals who are highly attentive to false news –
the fewer of them there are at the starting line, the more these eﬀects stand out.
However, to understand better how this comes to be, we will take a step further into
the realm of individual agents – news consumers and news providers – and shed light
on the news-alignment process from their point of view.
Micro-scale Dynamics
Our main task for the remainder of the chapter will be deciphering the evolution of
the system from a local perspective; we will attempt to ﬁgure out how the dynamics
of the news ﬂow aﬀect an ordinary, run-of-the-mill news subscriber ri ∈ R and,
along the same lines, what kind of impact does it have on an average media outlet
mj ∈ M.
In view of this, the quantities taking centre stage will be the media repertoire
{(rTi (tn), rFi (tn))}n≥1 to which ri is subscribed, the clientele {(mTj (tn),mFj (tn))}n≥1
that mj attracts, and, by extension, the associated relative proportions ρTi (tn), ρFi (tn),
μTj (tn), and μFj (tn), respectively (refer to Section 8.4.3 for deﬁnitions). Since these are
exactly determined by the cross-layer structure
⋃R
i=1
⋃M
j=1(ri,mj, tn) of the underlying
multilayer graph G = (V , E) and its temporal component, news-rewiring, which is
principally guided by news-alignment events, edge-balancing in the population layer
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will from now on be completely set aside and controlled for by assuming λF = 1
and ρF (0) = 1/2. This way, neither news consumers ri ∈ RT (t) in the true state
nor those ri ∈ RF (t) in the false state – with R = 1000 for all further experimental
trials – will be given any preferential treatment. The hazard rate η, in contrast,
will be investigated at its extremes, η = 50 – to subject the public to vigorous
news-alignment activity, and η = 0.2 – for benchmarking purposes.
We begin our journey at the receiving end of broadcasting, in the public sphere.
To gain a ﬁrst impression of how the media tastes at the individual level adapt in the
progress of time t ≥ 0, we plot the temporal evolution of the distribution of the local
density ρFi (t) of false news that members of the public ri ∈ R routinely follow. In a
nutshell, the vast majority of individuals exhibit a strong tendency to align their
news consumption with their internal states, i.e., [dρFi (s)/ds]s=t > 0 for ri ∈ RF (t)
and [dρFi (s)/ds]s=t < 0 for ri ∈ RT (t), whereby a small η keeps diversiﬁcation in
check, and a large η facilitates it (cf. Figures 8.10 and 8.11 with η = 0.2 and η = 50,
respectively).
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Figure 8.10: Time evolution of the distribution of per capita relative false-news consumption
ρFi (t) across the two types of news consumers, RT (t) (green) and RF (t) (red). Quartiles
are marked with horizontal lines of the boxplots.
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Figure 8.11: Time evolution of the distribution of per capita relative false-news consumption
ρFi (t) across the two types of news consumers, RT (t) (green) and RF (t) (red). Quartiles
are marked with horizontal lines of the boxplots.
In fact, for η = 0.2, the median values for both groups of news consumers, RT (t)
and RF (t), stay at all times t close to ρFi (t) = 1/2 and, therefore, close to each other
(albeit there is a signiﬁcant increase in variance). In the case of η = 50, however,
the extensive amount of news-rewiring, characteristic for it, pulls the median values
farther apart – along with the rest of the data, which is now more tightly condensed
around them. Larger values of η thus widen the gap between the two groups and
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as such carry a greater risk of polarisation, which we already know from our prior
analysis at the macro scale.
What we do not know yet, though, is to what extent casual, everyday news
enthusiasts explore the entire assortment of options mj ∈ M served on the media
menu M. Local densities ρFi (t) by themselves are not too informative – even if
the media repertoires of a pair of individuals ri, rj ∈ R contain precisely the same
relative proportions of false news, ρFi (t) = ρFj (t), it may well be that one of them
tunes in to a much narrower segment of news broadcasts than the other, who may,
for that matter, subscribe to a lion’s share of them.
To remedy this, we complement the results with two more experimental treatments
– one for each η ∈ {0.2, 50} – in which we examined how well the individual allocations
(rTi (t), r
F
i (t)) of news resources, where 0 ≤ rTi (t), rFi (t) ≤ MT = MF , cover the whole
array of news channels available to the public, as gauged by the ratios rTi (t)/MT and
rFi (t)/M
F , and how they vary in time t ≥ 0 (refer to the scatter plots in Figures 8.12
and 8.13 with η = 0.2 and η = 50, respectively).
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Figure 8.12: Time evolutions of individual-level distributions (rTi (t), r
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Recall that during the initialisation procedures, at t = 0, each member ri ∈ R of
the population is provided with a media repertoire (rTi (0), rFi (0)), where the integers
rTi (0) and rFi (0) are – independently of each other and independently across ri ∈ R –
picked uniformly at random from the interval [1,MT ] = [1,MF ]. As a consequence,
not only do the ensuing repertoires differ in composition, but they also differ in size
rTi (0) + r
F
i (0) right from the start, which is also evident from the left-most scatter
plots (labelled as t = 0) in Figures 8.12 and 8.13, as suggested by the coordinates
(rTi (0)/M
T , rFi (0)/M
F ) and the sizes of the individual dots, respectively; the latter
are proportional to |NM(ri, 0)| = rTi (0) + rFi (0).
While the disparities between news consumers ri ∈ R in terms of the subscription
capacities |NM(ri, t)| = rTi (t) + rFi (t) are kept intact over time – note that the
cardinalities |NM(ri, t)| are unaffected by news-rewiring events, i.e., |NM(ri, t)| =
|NM(ri, 0)| for all t ≥ 0 – this is not the case with the distributions (rTi (0), rFi (0))
of these subscriptions across the two media poles, MT and MF , respectively. They
undergo changes as time passes by, which seem to emerge even when the hazard
rate η is rather small, η = 0.2; although, admittedly, only in traces – at least when
measured against the tectonic shifts that η = 50 brings (compare the scatter plots at
t = 40 and t = 100 across the two values of η ∈ {0.2, 50}).
In both examples, there is a build-up of polarisation, which can be discerned
from the distinct thickening at the left (rTi (t)/MT = 0) and bottom (rFi (t)/MF = 0)
borders of the scatter plots at t = 40 and t = 100 caused by the formation of two
elongated groups of polarised individuals, one at each of the two boundaries. One
can quickly observe that both sides of the readership, RT (t) and RF (t), seem to
be equally vulnerable to this effect and that it chiefly pertains to the most avid
“mediaphobes” ri ∈ R, who only follow a small number of news channels |NM(ri, t)|.
Apart from this, the two cases η ∈ {0.2, 50} do not share much more in common. As
a matter of fact, their news-rewiring dynamics lead to dissimilar spatial arrangements
in the two accompanying collections of visuals (cf. Figures 8.12 and 8.13 at t = 40 and
t = 100, respectively); at the same time, the evolution in the case of η = 50 appears
to be quite a few steps ahead of η = 0.2, as indicated by the rapid materialisation of
the distinctive pattern noticeable in the corresponding graphics (refer to Figure 8.13).
What this pattern in essence shows is that when η = 50, the individual-level
distributions (rTi (t), rFi (t)) of news sources follow a bimodal distribution at the
population level. Apparently, the members ri of the public – as a whole, R, as well as
within each of its categories, RT (t) and RF (t) – fall into two types. On the one hand,
a slice of the population is polarised, with either rTi (t) = 0 or rFi (t) = 0, as already
discussed. But on the other hand, more interestingly, the range of permissible media
repertoires (rTi (t), rFi (t)) for the rest of the population considerably shrinks in size;
namely, to {(rTi (t), rFi (t)) | rTi (t) + rFi (t) > M/2}. Hence, a whole new phenomenon
surfaces – a generation of well-read news consumers, who are subscribed to at least
half of the total number of news stations M on the media scene.
Alas, by the look of things, there is no way of telling how conspicuous the two
peaks of the bimodal distribution are. Scatter plots, as helpful as they are, bring
their own pitfalls. Indeed, due to the relatively high volume of data and too little
space, there is a high degree of overlap in Figures 8.12 and 8.13, rendering it an
impossible task to count the number of representatives ri ∈ R of each group in
question – one cannot even tell apart the points associated with them. Thus, we need
to resort to alternative visual aids, but we need not look far – a stacked histogram
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will bring a solution to the table (refer to Figures 8.14 and 8.15).
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(stacked) corresponding frequency densities for S ∈ {T, F} (green, red).
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Notice first that polarisation is now all the more evident. Already at η = 0.2,
we find that roughly 20% and 15% of news consumers ri in the true, ri ∈ RT (t),
and the false state, ri ∈ RF (t), respectively, exclusively pay attention to the media
of their preference, rSi (t) = 0 if ri /∈ RS(t) (refer to the top and bottom panel of
Figure 8.14 at t = 100). As usual, increasing η only exacerbates this trend; this time,
the membership of both polarised groups from the opposing coalitions, RT (t) ∩ P(t)
and RF (t)∩P(t), even exceeds 20% of individuals from their respective communities,
RT (t) and RF (t) (cf. Figure 8.15).
As far as the rest of the public, R \ P(t), goes, two distributions need to be
inspected simultaneously – that of subscriptions {rTi (t)}Ri=1 to truthful media sources
MT and that of subscriptions {rFi (t)}Ri=1 to overwhelming producers of fabricated
news MF . However, it matters that we differentiate between both sides of the
readership, RT (t) and RF (t); one should expect that, by design, their affiliates ought
to be drawn to the news content aligned with their narratives and to be, to a greater
or lesser extent, repelled by the broadcasts challenging them.
As it turns out, for the distribution of rSi (t) across RS(t) with S ∈ {T, F}, there
in fact seems to be a concentration of density towards the upper end (refer to the
histograms at t = 100 coloured green for RT (t) and red for RF (t)). Although this
can be witnessed for both values of η ∈ {0.2, 50}, the distributions corresponding
to η = 0.2 are much more bell-shaped, albeit skewed to the left. For η = 50,
this phenomenon is significantly amplified by the emergence of a pointed peak at
MT =MF =M/2, which supports our previous speculations (refer to Figure 8.13
and the related discussion).
By comparison, a quick glance at the distribution of rS′i (t) across RS(t) with
S ̸= S ′ for S, S ′ ∈ {T, F} is sufficient to see that this distribution is qualitatively
completely different from rSi (t) (refer to the histograms at t = 100 coloured red for
RT (t) and green for RF (t)). It exhibits a sharp peak at rS′i (t) = 0, which symbolises
polarised individuals, but beside it the distribution is more or less uniform.
This tendency – to have an at least somewhat balanced media diet – can be
ascribed to the influence of the metric bj(t) of balance of news sources mj ∈ M
(refer to equation (8.5)), which co-navigates the news-alignment processes by encour-
aging individuals to subscribe to the news services with a greater balance in their
subscription base, hence (as posited in Section 8.4.3) more visible to the naked eye.
Fusing both distributions into one, that of the media repertoires (rTi (t), rFi (t)),
then finally reveals a characteristic bimodality, which becomes most apparent when
η is large, η = 50 (refer to the joint histograms at t = 100 in Figure 8.15). Moreover,
since the results are comparable across the two poles of the society, RT (t) and RF (t),
they also apply to the public R = RT (t) ∪RF (t) at large.
Altogether, in the case of η = 50, a whopping portion of news consumers falls into
two similarly sized groups, whereby utterly polarised individuals P(t) with either
rTi (t) = 0 or rFi (t) = 0 comprise the first group, and the second one consists of
strongly news-oriented consumers with a subscription to all media outlets of their
flavour and even to a tiny segment of news broadcasts not to their taste; in a sense,
both groups display some sort of polarisation in their own way.
While this seems to suggest that individuals alike tend to be attracted to the
same kind of media, note that the analysis up to this point does not even tell us
much about the news stations in general, let alone about the composition of their
subscribers. To gain an insight into their perspective and to find out how their
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readership bases evolve with the ﬂow of the news, let us now turn the multilayer
structure upside down and shift our focus to the news services mj ∈ M, their overall
popularity (mTj (t),mFj (t)), and the structure (μTj (t), μFj (t)) of their clientele.
The analysis of the media landscape from a local perspective of individual media
outlets mj ∈ M will be carried out in a manner akin to the one employed for
the individual news consumers ri ∈ R. After all, news consumers R and news
providers M play complementary roles in the evolution of the system – the action of
ri subscribing to mj can be reinterpreted as mj broadcasting to ri. Accordingly, we
proceed by retracing the steps that we took above.
Our ﬁrst stop along the route is the temporal evolution of the distribution of the
local relative density μFj (t), evaluating the share of the readership of mj ∈ M with a
predisposition towards false news; the results are portrayed in Figures 8.16 and 8.17
with η = 0.2 and η = 50, respectively.
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As was the case with the local densities ρFi (t) of per-individual false-news con-
sumption (cf. Figures 8.10 and 8.11), here, too, one can see a similar trend – the
densities μFj (t) for mj ∈ MF swiftly jump to μFj (t) > 1/2, whereas those for MT
concurrently drop to μFj (t) < 1/2; and the greater the η, the farther the swing. Al-
though this clearly indicates that a broadcasting service mj ∈ MS with S ∈ {T, F}
is, at least in principle, more apt to draw an audience RS(t) that it is intended to
appeal to by the book, the situation is not as straightforward as before.
Following the initial surge or decline in μFj (t), there is, for all intents and purposes,
barely any change thereafter. Indeed, when η = 0.2, the densities μFj (t) appear to
oscillate about μFj (t) ≈ 0.35 for mj ∈ MT and μFj (t) ≈ 0.55 for mj ∈ MF ; and
when η = 50, these reference points translate to μFj (t) ≈ 0.25 for mj ∈ MT and
μFj (t) ≈ 0.7 for mj ∈ MF (refer to the right-hand sides of Figures 8.16 and 8.17,
respectively).
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Yet, this is not due to an invisible hand holding the system still in its ﬁrm grip;
it again boils down to the features of our model, which prompt news consumers
ri ∈ RS(t) with S ∈ {T, F} to tune in to popular, well-balanced media outlets
mj ∈ M with partiality pSj (t) and balance bj(t) (refer to equations (8.6) and (8.5),
respectively) ideally close to 1. There is a perpetual interplay between them – while
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the former pushes apart the distributions of μFj (t) across the two poles of the media,
MT and MF , the latter pulls them back together; the combined eﬀect of the two
forces then cancels out and leads to a standstill.
What is more, within each of the two classes of media, MT and MF , there
is virtually no deviation between the individual densities μFj (t); like-minded news
sources have more or less equal distributions (μTj (t), μFj (t)) of clientele. However, to
see how they compare against each other on a global scale in terms of the proportions
(mTj (t)/R
T (t),mFj (t)/R
F (t)) of the entire population reached by their broadcasts,
we again take a graphical approach and inspect Figures 8.18 and 8.19 with η = 0.2
and η = 50, respectively.
These reveal that not only is the state of the media mj ∈ MS for S ∈ {T, F}
reﬂected in the composition (μTj (t), μFj (t)) of its subscription base by the fact that
μSj (t) > 1/2, but it is also highly correlated with signiﬁcant, across-the-board outreach
mSj (t)/R
S(t) to its target group RS(t). In fact, at t = 100, we have that
(
mTj (t)
RT (t)
,
mFj (t)
RF (t)
)
≈
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(0.7, 0.4) for mj ∈ MT and η = 0.2
(0.4, 0.7) for mj ∈ MF and η = 0.2
(0.8, 0.3) for mj ∈ MT and η = 50
(0.3, 0.8) for mj ∈ MF and η = 50
,
which also suggests that as the hazard rate η boosts news-alignment activity, the
distributions drift farther apart. Nevertheless, as noted, this diverging behaviour is
restrained – as opposed to its analogue pertaining to the public sphere, which, at its
extreme, can trigger polarisation.
Perhaps even more importantly, the public and the media domain diﬀer from
each other in one more crucial aspect. While the former permits diversity among
the individual agents, as evident from the plurality of their internal states ri(t) and
the media repertoires (rTi (t), rFi (t)), the latter tends to bring about uniformity by
blending diﬀerences and keeping change at bay. The states of the media mj ∈ M
are, by deﬁnition, held constant right from the outset, and as far as the make-ups
(mTj (t)/R
T (t),mFj (t)/R
F (t)) of their clientele are concerned, they seem to be largely
indistinguishable at all times t (cf. Figures 8.18 and 8.19).
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Figure 8.20: Time evolutions of individual-level compositions (mTj (t),m
F
j (t)) of readership.
Each bar represents a media outlet mj ∈ M, whose height corresponds to the fraction
of the total population R in its subscription base NR(mj , t); it is broken down into two
compartments (green, red) displaying the shares of subscribers in the true and the false
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Each bar represents a media outlet mj ∈ M, whose height corresponds to the fraction
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compartments (green, red) displaying the shares of subscribers in the true and the false
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This becomes even more apparent from the very last pair of plots in Figures 8.20
and 8.21 with η = 0.2 and η = 50, respectively, which depict aggregated popularity
of the individual news stations mj ∈ M across the two poles of the readership, RT
and RF . They further conﬁrm that there indeed is high homogeneity within the two
classes of media, MT and MF , with respect to the total volumes of subscriptions
amassed, mTj (t) + mFj (t), as well as the intrinsic structure (mTj (t),mFj (t)) of the
corresponding clientele. Moreover, setting one class against another illuminates that
when it comes to news consumption (or, equivalently, news subscriptions), unlike in
magnetism, like poles attract and unlike poles repel – an increase in polarisation in
one of the segments, the mass media M or the masses R, therefore inevitably goes
hand in hand with an increase in the other. In order to curb either, one needs to
tackle both.
Having reviewed the results from both angles, macro and micro, let us brieﬂy
summarise our main ﬁndings. From a technical perspective, the model exhibits
stability both under random ﬂuctuations, arising due to its stochastic character, and
perturbations in the input parameters; most notably λF and η, driving the edge-
balancing and the news-alignment processes, respectively, and the initial condition
ρF (0). As a matter of fact, the experiments uncovered substantial agreement not
only among multiple realisations of the system as a whole and hence its population
layer GR = (R, ER), but even across diﬀerent orders R of the latter; and as we varied
the rest of the variables, seamless transitions occurred. What is more, there was a
consistent trend across the (long-term) outcomes of the dynamics regardless of the
particular choice of these as long as the magnitude of η was roughly the same and
λF was picked from the same side of its permissible range of values relative to the
critical point λF = 1. This indicates that there are four characteristic regions in the
parameter space regulating the evolution of the system – associated with parameter
pairs (λF , η) with either λF > 1 or λF < 1 and either η  1 or η  1 – and brings
us to their semantic interpretation.
Turning ﬁrst to the hazard rate λF , we note that it plays a decisive role in the
distribution of the agent states across the population layer. As soon as one type of
news has, in any sense, a greater persuasive power than the other, that is, either
false news if λF > 1 or true news if λF < 1, the majority of the public ends up
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advocating for it and consequently strives for more news alike. This aligns with
empirical evidence rather well – the faster a news cascade diffused and/or the stronger
reaction it provoked, the more user activity in the form of responses and shares
ensued, and the longer its reach was. Furthermore, the same observations apply in
spite of the initial arrangement of agent states, encoded in ρF (0). One could well take
ρF (0) ≈ 0 or ρF (0) ≈ 1, respectively, akin to the fact that as news stories emerge,
whether they induce global cascades or not, their seed sources tend to be rare.
Yet, as the results show, the extremely homogeneous readership composition
implied by λF ≷ 1 – and, as such, highly improbable in reality – can in fact be
mitigated by choosing a sufficiently large rate η ≫ 1 of news-alignment, which, in
contrast to λF , is a crucial factor behind the distributions of news sources at the level
of individual members of the public. Large values of η encourage news consumers
to rely less on their peers, which in a way dissolves the filter bubbles that they
are trapped in and promotes diversity. While this also has an undesired side effect
of increased polarisation, a handful of despite-it-all polarised individuals may well
be plausible. And even more importantly, at the same time, a cohort of well-read
readership, which does not shy away from the opposing stance, is brought to light –
bringing the prospect of harmony between the two sides a step closer to reality.
8.4.6 Conclusion and Future Work
All in all, the present study was an attempt to elucidate the dissemination of news
content that emanates from the media, grasps the attention of the public, rapidly
diffuses throughout it, and, in turn, shapes the reach of the media and the narrative
of the public.
Yet, as usual, there is plenty of room for improvement. In reality, countless
(hidden) factors are at play, and although it is impossible to take them all into
account, one can untangle them one by one and then merge the pieces back together
to get (a peek at) the big picture. Accordingly, we conclude with an outlook on
potential extensions of our model.
As far as the population layer GR = (R, ER) goes, note that it is unrealistic to
presume that all parties involved share news with each other equally vigorously, or
that they even do so. What one can do instead is to introduce an additional internal
state, that of neutral (N) individuals RN , and impose a rule that only when an agent
ri ∈ RN becomes entrenched enough in one type of news (i.e., when the associated
false-o-meter score xi(t) either exceeds or recedes, |xi(t)| > ξ, some appropriately
chosen threshold ξ), may he or she transition from the neutral state and commence
to spread the news. This could also be paired with a mechanism encapsulating the
“capability to forget”, enabling agents to, at a given rate, lose interest in the agenda
of the media they support and retrieve back to the neutral state.
Even more can be done with regard to the media sphere GM = (M, EM ). Besides
the obvious generalisation in the form of allowing a non-empty set of edges EM by,
e.g., explicitly permitting competition among the news channels mj ∈M, one can
offset the balance of power over the news-rewiring process in favour of the media.
Even though news stations cannot enforce subscription quotas to be filled by the
members of the public, what they can is to tweak their broadcasting strategies, build
their reputation, and strengthen the bonds with their readerships. When all is said
and done, unravelling the evolutionary tenets of any human activity is an ongoing
story to be continued.
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“ Ko hodiš, pojdi zmeraj do konca.Spomladi do rožne cvetice,
poleti do zrele pšenice,
jeseni do polne police,
pozimi do snežne kraljice,
v knjigi do zadnje vrstice,
v življenju do prave resnice,
a v sebi – do rdečice
čez eno in drugo lice.
A če ne prideš ne prvič ne drugič
do krova in pravega kova,
poskusi
vnovič
in zopet
in znova. ”
Tone Pavček, Deček gre za soncem, 1998
213

Uvod
Motivacija
Vse odkar je Charles Darwin sredi 19. stoletja z objavo svoje knjige O izvoru vrst (v
izvirniku On the Origin of Species) utemeljil teorijo evolucije z naravnim izborom,
je postajalo vedno bolj jasno, da njena načela veljajo tudi za pojave, ki presegajo
okvire bioloških populacij vrst in njihovih dednih lastnosti. Prav tako je tudi pojem
grafa, ki je ugledal luč sveta ob približno istem času, vzbudil ogromno zanimanja
v neštetih vedah, čeprav ga je navdihnil zelo specifičen primer – problem sedmih
mostov Königsberga, ki ga je Leonhard Euler rešil stoletje prej.
Njuna vseprisotnost ni presenetljiva; tam, kjer so spremembe (v času), je evolucija;
in kjer je struktura (v prostoru), tam je graf. Lahko bi celo rekli, da gre za dve strani
istega kovanca – medtem ko ena predstavlja odnose v času, druga uteleša odnose v
prostoru. In če potegnemo lekcijo iz prelomnega dela Alberta Einsteina na področju
teorije relativnosti, ki se ga je lotil kmalu za tem, ko so na dan prišla Darwinova
načela evolucije in je bila skovana beseda graf, je odnos med prostorom in časom vse
prej kot enostaven.
Kot se izkaže, to velja tudi, kadar vzamemo hkrati v ozir evolucijsko dinamiko
sistema in strukturo interakcij v njem, še bolj pa pride do izraza, kadar je slednja
tudi sama po sebi podvržena evoluciji skozi čas. Osrednja tema tega dela je vzajemno
delovanje obeh, pri čemer grafi nudijo temelje, na katerih se – v dveh glavnih oblikah
– odvija evolucija, gonilna sila sprememb. V prvem delu se evolucija odraža v
evolucijskih procesih, ki potekajo na grafih, v drugem delu pa se nanaša tudi na
grafe same.
Naš glavni cilj je boljši vpogled v zamotane mehanizme, ki se skrivajo v ozadju
nastanka in delovanja (razvijajočih se) grafov, ki izhajajo iz pojavov, s kateri imamo
običajno opravka v praksi. Kot takšni so pogosto slabo razumljeni, zelo zapleteni in
ne dopuščajo analitičnega pristopa; tako praviloma od nas zahtevajo, da se zatečemo
k – v najboljšem primeru uporabi prikrojenim – numeričnim metodam. Pri snovanju
ustreznih hevristik zato izhajamo iz vpogleda, ki nam ga nudijo različne vede, pri
čemer nam znova na pomoč priskoči fizika.
Bolj natanko, različica Glauberjeve dinamike ne najde svojega mesta le v prireje-
nem Petford–Welshevem algoritmu, ki ga razvijemo v prvem sklopu dela kot orodje
za odkrivanje osnovnih gradnikov grafov, ki so zajeti v njihove strukture gruč, vendar
je vpletena tudi v ogrodje modela, ki ga zasnujemo v drugem sklopu, da bi razkrili
poglavitne značilnosti pretoka novic. V obeh primerih bi jo lahko označili za Glauben
(nemško za verjeti) dinamiko; grajenje zaupanja prek vezi grafa poganja evolucijo, ki
teče v zakulisju.
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Pregled literature
Tri ključne teme v tej disertaciji so povzete predvsem po naslednjem izboru knjig:
• evolucijska teorija iger [50, 63, 111] (klasična teorija iger [46]),
• kompleksna omrežja [10, 107],
• dinamični procesi na omrežjih [131].
Podrobnosti strojne in programske opreme
Strojna oprema
Vsi računalniški poskusi in simulacije so bili izvedeni na računalniku, opremljenem z
1.80 GHz procesorjem Intel Core i7-8550U s 16.0 GB fizičnega pomnilnika (RAM).
Programska oprema
Tako prirejeni Petford–Welshev algoritem (gl. Algoritem 1) kot tudi algoritem
NewsFlow (gl. Algoritem 2) sta bila implementirana v programskem jeziku Python
in prevedena s programskim jezikom Cython [15]. Njuni izvorni kodi sta dostopni
zaporedoma na povezavah
• https://github.com/ikicab/mPW,
• https://github.com/ikicab/NewsFlow.
Z vsemi grafi v eksperimentalnih študijah smo rokovali z uporabo programskega
paketa python-igraph [24].
Slike so bile pripravljene z naslednjimi orodji:
• paket za risanje TikZ [167] v sistemu LATEX (Slike 2.1, 3.1 in 8.1),
• paket za risanje tikz-network [168] v sistemu LATEX (Slika 8.1),
• knjižnici GeoPy [49] in Folium [40] v programskem jeziku Python (Slike 4.9,
4.10 in 4.11),
• knjižnici Matplotlib [68] in seaborn [150] v programskem jeziku Python (pre-
ostale slike).
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Doprinos
Poglavje 4 (prirejeni Petford–Welshev algoritem [71, 74]) in razdelek 8.4 (model
pretoka novic [72]) predstavljata izvirno delo avtorice Barbare Ikica, ki je
• zasnovala modele,
• implementirala algoritma (Algoritma 1 in 2),
• načrtovala in izvedla poskuse in simulacije,
• obdelala eksperimentalne podatke, izvedla analizo in interpretirala rezultate,
• napisala besedilo in ustvarila slike.
O raziskovalnih idejah je razpravljala z/s
• Poglavje 4: Janezom Žerovnikom (Univerza v Ljubljani) in Janezom Povhom
(Univerza v Ljubljani),
• Razdelek 8.4: Kajem-Koljo Kleinebergom (ETH Zürich).
Barbara Ikica je tudi soavtorica naslednjih člankov: [30], [31], [32], [73] in [158].
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To delo temelji na dveh osrednjih konceptih – evoluciji, na kateri slonijo relacije v
času, in pojmu grafa, ki odraža medsebojne relacije (v prostoru). Podobno kot v
teoriji relativnosti se tudi tu izkaže, da obravnavanje soodvisnosti prostora in časa ni
lahek zalogaj; z roko v roki lahko privedeta do nepričakovanih pojavov.
Njuno vzajemno delovanje si ogledamo z dveh zornih kotov – v prvem delu se
osredotočimo na evolucijske procese, ki se odvijajo na statičnih grafih, v drugem
delu pa evolucijsko dinamiko razširimo še na grafe same; evolucija zdaj poteka tudi
znotraj njih. Končni cilj dela ni le boljše razumevanje mehanizmov, ki se skrivajo v
ozadju (razvijajočih se) grafov, vendar nas zanima tudi to, kako jih obrniti sebi v
prid. Teorija, s katero se seznanimo v prvem delu, nas tako privede do prirejenega
Petford–Welshevega algoritma, ki je namenjen odkrivanju strukture gruč, vpete v
graf; znanje, ki ga pridobimo tekom drugega dela, pa izkoristimo pri modeliranju
kroženja novic. Ob koncu povzetka podamo slovensko–angleški slovar uporabljene
terminologije.
I Evolucijska dinamika na grafih
Prvi sklop dela sestoji iz štirih večjih poglavij – pričnemo s temelji (evolucijske)
teorije iger, jo s pomočjo orodij teorije grafov razširimo na strukturirane populacije, se
zazremo v procese imitacije znotraj posamičnih soseščin vozlišč in naposled preučimo
povezovanje slednjih v gruče, pri čemer svoja dognanja strnemo v prirejenem Petford–
Welshevem algoritmu.
1 Evolucijska teorija iger
Poglavje 1 tvorijo trije večji sklopi, v katerih spoznamo osnove tradicionalne teorije
iger, bistvene definicije v evolucijski teoriji iger in glavna načela determinističnega in
stohastičnega pristopa k evoluciji.
V izhodišču razdelka 1.1 predstavimo definicijo igre (v strateški oz. normalni
obliki), ki je enolično določena z množico igralcev P = {1, 2, . . . , n}, množico profilov
(čistih) strategij S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn, ki so jim na voljo, in množico plačilnih
funkcij {π1, π2, . . . , πn}, pri čemer πi : S → R določa izkupiček, ki ga je igralec i ∈ P
deležen v primeru, da populacija ubere strateški profil s ∈ S.
V skladu s tem, da utegne biti v praksi strateško obnašanje posameznikov v visoki
meri nepredvidljivo ali podvrženo napakam, profil čistih strategij s nato posplošimo
na profil mešanih strategij σ, ki dopušča, da strategijo igralca i ∈ P izrazimo v
obliki verjetnostne porazdelitve na množici razpoložljivih čistih strategij Si; skladno
razširimo tudi funkcijski predpis plačilne funkcije. Oboroženi z vsemi potrebnimi
sestavinami povzamemo bistvo Nashevega ravnovesja σ∗ , trdno uveljavljenega kon-
cepta rešitve v teoriji iger, v katerem vsak igralec i ∈ P igra pod taktirko strategije
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σ∗ i, ki je hkrati najboljši odziv na strateške odločitve vseh preostalih igralcev, tj.
πi(σ
∗
i,σ
∗−i) ≥ πi(σ i,σ∗−i) za vse σ i ∈ Si.
Diskusijo zaokrožimo z izrekom o obstoju (ne nujno enoličnega) Nashevega
ravnovesja, ki zahteva le to, da so množice čistih strategij Si posameznih igralcev
i ∈ P končne, in vpeljane pojme na kratko ponazorimo na primeru igre Zapornikova
dilema.
V razdelku 1.2 ovržemo predpostavko o racionalnosti igralcev in jo nadome-
stimo z dinamično komponento v obliki evolucijske dinamike. Končno množico
igralcev nadomestimo z neskončno populacijo, ki pripada končnemu številu vrst
S = {1, 2, . . . ,M}, pri čemer vsaki vrsti i ∈ S priredimo fiksno (mešano) strategijo
σ i, ki predstavlja njene genetske, fenotipske ali kulturne značilnosti, in se omejimo
na igre med (naključnimi) pari igralcev. Pripadajočo plačilno matriko izkupičkov
posledično nadomestimo z matriko A = [aij]Mi,j=1 pričakovanih izkupičkov aij, ki jih
pripadniki vrste i ∈ S lahko pričakujejo ob interakciji z vrsto j ∈ S. Ker zdaj uspeh
igralca torej ni odvisen le od strategije σ i, ki ji sledi (ali, ekvivalentno, od vrste i ∈ S,
ki ji pripada), temveč tudi od relativnih frekvenc drugih navzočih vrst, posežemo po
konceptu rešitve, v katerem se slednje ustrezno odraža.
To nas privede do evolucijsko stabilne strategije, ki se vselej, ko je v prevladi, v
povprečju odreže bolje od vsake (redko zastopane) invazivne vrste. Kljub temu, da
na prvi pogled nima nič skupnega z Nashevim ravnovesjem, saj oba pojma izhajata
iz različnih predpostavk, se izkaže, da sta v resnici v tesni relaciji – vsako strogo
Nashevo ravnovesje je evolucijsko stabilna strategija in vsaka evolucijsko stabilna
strategija je Nashevo ravnovesje.
Ker pa z evolucijsko stabilnimi strategijami dinamiko vnesemo le implicitno, se v
razdelku 1.3 posvetimo načinom, s katerimi lahko evolucijske procese na populacijah
izrazimo eksplicitno v obliki determinističnih ali stohastičnih pravil, ki uravnavajo
njihovo preobrazbo skozi čas. Najprej si podrobneje ogledamo prva, ki na nivoju
populacije predpisujejo stopnje rasti frekvenc posamičnih vrst, nato druga, ki regu-
lirajo posodobitve sistema na nivoju posameznih agentov, in končno osvetlimo še
prehod med obema pristopoma.
Deterministična pravila so osnovana na diferencialnih enačbah in opisujejo časovni
razvoj stanja populacije x = (x1, x2, . . . , xM ), ki zajema relativne frekvence xi = xi(t)
prisotnih vrst i ∈ S in privzema, da je njihov fitnes (oz. reprodukcijska sposobnost) fi
neposredno odvisen od trenutnega stanja, v katerem se nahajajo, tj. fi = fi(x). Vpliv
fitnesa fi na stopnjo rasti frekvence xi si nato ogledamo skozi prizmo replikatorske
in imitacijske dinamike, pri čemer prva išče navdih v naravni selekciji, druga pa v
(socioloških) procesih učenja skozi posnemanje drugih.
Prva, podana v obliki sistema diferencialnih enačb ẋi = xi(fi(x)− f(x)) za i ∈ S,
ki je običajno poznan pod imenom replikatorska enačba, spodbuja porast tistih
vrst, ki presegajo povprečje, in zavira tiste vrste, ki ga ne dosegajo. Druga, ki jo
definira soroden sistem enačb oblike ẋi = xi
∑︁N
j=1(fij(x) − fji(x))xj v kontekstu
čistih strategij si za i = 1, 2, . . . , N , pa daje prioriteto tistim strategijam si, ki so z
večjimi možnostmi fij(x) posnemane s strani drugih strategij sj.
Ob primerni izberi funkcij fij(x) se imitacijska dinamika prevede na replikatorsko,
linearna različica le-te, za katero velja fi(x) = (Ax)i, pa igra, kot se izkaže, pomembno
vlogo veznega člena med statično in dinamično komponento evolucijske teorije
iger. Ravnovesja dinamičnega sistema, ki ga določa, so namreč močno povezana
z Nashevimi ravnovesji (in posledično tudi z evolucijsko stabilnimi strategijami)
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statične igre, ki jo določa plačilna matrika A. Zvezo med njimi, ki zgolj dodatno
utemelji smotrnost uporabe obeh konceptov rešitev, jedrnato povzamemo z izrekom
in jo zopet ilustriramo na primeru igre Zapornikova dilema.
Pozornost nato preusmerimo na nabor stohastičnih pravil, ki v nasprotju z
determinističnimi izražajo verjetnost prehodov med posameznimi stanji populacije,
in pri tem s pridom izkoristimo teorijo Markovskih verig. Ker število stanj, ki jih
veriga lahko obišče, z velikostjo populacije n raste eksponentno (z osnovo enako
številu strategij N), pripadajoči sistem kaj kmalu postane neobvladljiv. Zato se za
potrebe obravnave stohastičnih pravil znova vrnemo na končno število igralcev n,
število strategij N , ki so jim na voljo, pa omejimo zgolj na dve, N = 2. Populacijo
nadalje podvržemo Moranovemu procesu, ki na vsakem časovnem koraku izbere
enega od njenih članov z verjetnostjo, proporcionalno fitnesu fj(i) strategije sj , ki jo
dotični član uporablja, strategijo sj reproducira in z njo opremi (ne nujno različnega)
naključno izbranega posameznika. Pri tem fitnes fj(i) strategije sj v stanju populacije
(i, n− i) izrazimo kot uteženo povprečje nevtralnega zdrsa in njenega pričakovanega
izkupička π(sj, i), tj. fj(i) = 1− ω + ωπ(sj, i), kjer ω ∈ [0, 1] označuje intenzivnost
selekcije.
Največja prednost posplošenega zapisa fitnesa je v tem, da posebni primer šibke
selekcije v limiti ω → 0 pogosto dopušča analitični pristop, četudi ga v primeru
splošne intenzivnosti selekcije ni moč uporabiti. Slednje ponazorimo na raznih
primerih v navezavi z verjetnostjo ustalitve ρj, s katero en sam zastopnik izbrane
strategije sj sčasoma doseže njeno prevlado nad začetno večinsko strategijo sk ̸= sj.
Poglavje zaključimo z izpeljavo replikatorske enačbe iz Moranovega procesa v
limiti neskončne populacije, kar vzpostavi most med determinističnim in stohastičnim
nazorom; spotoma skiciramo še ekvivalentnost naprejšnje enačbe Kolmogorova (oz.
Fokker-Planckove enačbe) in Langevinove enačbe.
2 Temeljna struktura grafa
Nato preidemo na poglavje 2, ki populacijo igralcev postavi na graf in s tem v zgodbo
vključi netrivialno strukturo interakcij med njimi. Pri tem uberemo podobno pot
kot prej; na prvem koraku pod drobnogled vzamemo razširitev klasične teorije iger
na strukturirane populacije, na drugem pa evolucijskim silam prepustimo tudi le-te.
Razdelek 2.1 igro v strateški obliki posploši na igro na omrežju in s tem postavi
temelje nadaljnji razpravi. Množico igralcev nadomesti z grafom interakcijG = (V,E),
ki vsakemu od njih, i ∈ P , priredi eno od vozlišč v ∈ V in ga poveže z množico tistih
igralcev N (v), s katerimi je v kakršnikoli (abstraktni) relaciji; od tod naprej je v
interakciji (v obliki iger) le še z njo. Na tem mestu navedemo tudi nekaj modelov, s
katerimi se običajno ustvarijo grafi, namenjeni opisu strukture populacij.
Pričnemo z naključnim grafom Erdős–Rényija, katerega Poissonova porazdelitev
stopenj vozlišč ne odraža potenčne porazdelitve P (k) ∼ k−γ z 2 ≤ γ ≤ 3, na katero
naletimo običajno, ko imamo opravka z grafi, ki predstavljajo podatke iz realnega
sveta. Grafom s tovrstno porazdelitvijo stopenj vozlišč so nadeli ime brezlestvični grafi,
tipično pa se jih modelira z generativnim modelom Barabási–Alberta ali različicami
le-tega, katerih osnovna ideja je v tem, da novo dodano vozlišče vzpostavi dano
število povezav s starimi, ki jih izbere z verjetnostmi, proporcionalnimi njihovim
stopnjam. Lastnosti grafov, ki jih srečamo v praksi, pa lahko seveda modeliramo
kako drugače – model malega sveta za razliko od prejšnjega modela poskuša raje
posnemati visoko stopnjo gručenja, značilno za njih.
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Preden se posvetimo evolucijskim procesom na grafih, se za kratek hip vrnemo
k definiciji igre na omrežju in posplošimo še njen zadnji del, plačilno funkcijo, pri
čemer privzamemo, da vsako vozlišče v ∈ V odigra po eno igro z vsakim od sosedov
u ∈ N (v), s katerimi je obdano, in pridobljene izkupičke iz posameznih iger preprosto
sešteje.
To nas pripelje do razdelka 2.2, v katerem igri ob bok postavimo še populacijsko
dinamiko, ki omogoči igralcem, da ubrane strategije širijo znotraj svojih soseščin.
V ta namen še enkrat posežemo po Markovskih verigah in se najprej osredotočimo
na igre med pari sosednjih igralcev, ki sta jim na razpolago dve strategiji, ki se
reproducirata podobno, kot narekuje Moranov proces – z edino razliko v tem, da lahko
izbrano vozlišče v ∈ V svojo strategijo postavi le na mesto (naključno izbranega)
soseda.
Za trenutek odmislimo igre, ki potekajo v ozadju, in dodatno predpostavimo, da
sta fitnesa obeh strategij, s1 in s2, kar konstantno enaka r ̸= 1 in 1 zaporedoma.
Pripadajočo verjetnost ustalitve na polnem grafu – ki dopušča interakcije med vsemi
igralci in dinamiko torej reducira na klasični Moranov proces – označimo z ρM in jo
uporabimo kot izhodišče za klasifikacijo (usmerjenih) grafov z ozirom na to, kakšen
je njihov vpliv na evolucijo.
Če velja ρG = ρM za verjetnost ustalitve ρG poljubnega grafa G, pravimo, da je
G ρ-ekvivalenten Moranovemu procesu; če iz r ≷ 1 sledi ρG ≷ ρM , rečemo, da je G
ojačevalec selekcije, saj izraža večjo naklonjenost strategijam z višjimi fitnesi; če pa
r ≷ 1 nakazuje ravno nasprotno, tj. ρG ≶ ρM , pa grafu G nadenemo ime zaviralec
selekcije.
Ob koncu poglavja s konstruktivnim dokazom utemeljimo obstoj grafov, ki
so poljubno močni zaviralci selekcije, in nenazadnje le opustimo predpostavko o
konstantnih fitnesih in o skromnem naboru dveh strategij – odslej lahko igralci
izbirajo med N strategijami si za 1 ≤ i ≤ N , fitnes igralca, ki uporabi strategijo si in
je obdan s kj igralci s strategijami sj , pa tudi tokrat izrazimo s pomočjo intenzivnosti
selekcije, tj. f(si, k) = 1− ω + ωπ(si, k), kjer π(si, k) označuje celoten izkupiček, ki
je osrednjemu igralcu dodeljen po tem, ko odigra po eno igro z vsakim od sosedov.
3 Procesi imitacije na grafih
Različice Moranovega procesa, ki smo jih preučevali do zdaj, so privzele, da na
vsakem koraku najprej z verjetnostjo, proporcionalno fitnesu, določimo posameznika
za reprodukcijo, in s strategijo, ki jo uporablja, nadomestimo strategijo z enakomerno
verjetnostjo izbranega (drugega) igralca (v njegovi okolici).
Seveda pa je to le eno od različnih možnih pravil posodobitve, ki nadzorujejo
širjenje strategij znotraj (lokalnih) okolic posameznih igralcev. V poglavju 3 si
ogledamo še cel kup drugih, se s spremljajočim porastom v kompleksnosti spopademo
z njihovim približkom, predstavimo primer uporabe le-tega, s katerim replikatorsko
enačbo posplošimo na strukturirane populacije, in opazujemo, kakšne posledice nosita
recipročnost in tvorjenje gruč enakih strategov, ki ju slednja sugerira.
V duhu deterministične dinamike na homogenih populacijah v razdelku 3.1 zopet
obravnavamo dva tipa pravil posodobitve – pravila replikacije in imitacije. Z enim
pravilom replikacije, s procesom rojstvo–smrt, smo se že spoznali v (prirejenem)
Moranovem procesu, drugo, ki nosi ime proces smrt–rojstvo, pa – kot že sugerira
njegovo ime – vrstni red dogodkov v posodobitvi preprosto zamenja, kar kljub
navidezni enostavnosti vodi do neslutenih vplivov na (replikatorsko) dinamiko, kot
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vidimo v nadaljevanju.
V sklopu pravil imitacije pa osrednjo vlogo igrajo tri – replikatorsko, multipli-
kativno replikatorsko in Fermijevo pravilo, katerih kombinacija nam (med drugim)
priskoči na pomoč tudi v prirejenem Petford–Welshevem algoritmu, s katerim se
seznanimo v naslednjem poglavju. Replikatorsko pravilo vsakič izbere naključno
vozlišče v ∈ V , ki nato posnema strategijo enega od sosednjih vozlišč u ∈ N (v), izbra-
nega z verjetnostjo pu→v, proporcionalno pozitivnemu delu razlike med fitnesom (oz.,
kot se izkaže, izkupičkom) vzornika in posnemovalca, tj. pu→v ∝ f(su, ku)− f(sv, kv).
Multiplikativno replikatorsko pravilo upošteva celotno soseščino N (v) vozlišča v ∈ V
hkrati in le-temu dovoli, da z verjetnostjo
∏︁
u∈N (v)(1− pu→v) obdrži svojo trenutno
strategijo, Fermijevo pravilo, ki je bilo navdihnjeno s procesi v kvantni statistični
fiziki, pa verjetnost imitacije pu→v izrazi skozi Fermijevo funkcijo.
Ker že ob analizi preprostih primerov stohastične dinamike na homogenih po-
pulacijah hitro naletimo na prepreke v obliki preobsežnih sistemov enačb, ki jih
ni moč ukaniti z analitičnimi metodami, nas stohastični procesi na strukturiranih
populacijah še toliko hitreje privedejo v še bolj kočljiv položaj.
V razdelku 3.2 zato raziščemo, kako si lahko pri tem pomagamo s približkom
povprečnega polja, ki v središče postavi povprečnega člana populacije, si pobliže ogleda
njegovo tipično ravnanje in ga strne v sistem diferencialnih enačb, kar nedvomno
pripomore k lažjemu rokovanju z njim. Pri tem se poleg standardnega približka
povprečnega polja spoznamo še s približkom parov, ki se naprej deli na homogenega in
heterogenega v odvisnosti od tega, s katero (istoimensko) porazdelitvijo stopenj vozlišč
imamo opravka, in se v razdelku 3.3 posvetimo praktični rabi homogene različice.
Natančneje, dodobra nam služi v izpeljavi replikatorske enačbe na regularnih grafih
v limiti šibke selekcije ω → 0, ki ne le da posploši klasično linearno replikatorsko
enačbo, ampak to stori na zelo intuitiven način; matriki pričakovanih izkupičkov A
preprosto prišteje matriko B, ki vključuje vpliv lokalnih interakcij na evolucijo.
Kljub temu, da je oblika matrike B predpisana z izbiro pravila posodobitve repli-
kacije, ki usmerja celoten dinamični proces, pa je vsem izhajajočim replikatorskim
dinamikam skupno to, da vodijo do nastanka tesno povezanih gruč posameznikov,
ki se držijo enakih strategij, kar je tema diskusije zadnjega razdelka 3.4. V po-
sebnem primeru igre Zapornikova dilema gruče istovrstnih strategov doprinesejo k
pojavu recipročnosti znotraj tesno povezanih klik posameznikov, ki so nagnjeni k
medsebojnemu sodelovanju, kar jih obvaruje pred izkoriščanjem s strani uporabnikov
alternativne strategije in jim naposled, pod določenimi pogoji, omogoči prevlado v
populaciji.
4 Evolucijski pristop h gručenju
Vsa dosedanja opažanja nas motivirajo, da se v zadnjem poglavju 4 prvega sklopa
dela v celoti posvetimo gručenju grafov z zornega kota evolucije. V razdelku 4.1
najprej opišemo teoretične osnove, pri čemer opazimo, da je problem gručenja že sam
po sebi le ohlapno definiran – njegov končni cilj je razbitje dane množice podatkov
X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} na končno število nepraznih, paroma disjunktnih podmnožic oz.
gruč C = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck} (bolj ali manj) podobnih elementov, katerih unija obsega
celotno množico vhodnih podatkovX. Pri tem praviloma ne poznamo niti števila vseh
gruč k niti njihovih posameznih velikosti (ki se lahko medsebojno razlikujejo), pojem
(takšne ali drugačne) podobnosti pa je opredeljen s predvideno uporabo podatkov
in dobljenih gruč. Pomanjkljiva definiranost se posledično prenese tudi na nalogo
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določanja razporeditve vozlišč v gruče, ki običajno zahteva le čim boljšo povezanost
znotraj posameznih gruč in čim manjše število povezav med različnimi pari gruč.
Ker pa to z lokalnega vidika večinoma privede do visokih koncentracij pripadnikov
istih gruč znotraj posameznih soseščin in celo do monolitnosti znotraj klik – ravno
nasprotno kot pri pravilnem barvanju vozlišč, ki vodi do raznobarvnih klik – problem
gručenja na novo ubesedimo kot dualni problem barvanja tako, da gruče poistovetimo
z barvami in poskušamo najti barvanje s čim manjšim – vendar ne premajhnim –
številom dvobarvnih povezav. Pri tem se naslonimo na (posplošeni) Petford–Welshev
algoritem, hevristični pristop k odločitvenemu problemu k-obarvljivosti danega grafa
za želeno število barv k ∈ N (v originalni izvedbi je k = 3, vendar se je kaj kmalu
pojavila splošna oblika algoritma).
Ne odlikuje se le po tem, da v teku iteracij ustrezno k-barvanje (oz. karseda bližnji
približek le-tega) dejansko tudi ustvari, ampak tudi po tem, da med izvajanjem operira
le z lokalnimi podatki o soseščinah vozlišč in ga je torej zlahka moč paralelizirati,
kar je dandanes, ko imamo opravka z vedno večjimi količinami podatkov, nedvomno
dobrodošla lastnost. Posledično to velja tudi za prirejeni Petford–Welshev algoritem,
ki ga kot orodje za iskanje gruč vozlišč razvijemo z vnosom ustreznih sprememb v
prvotni algoritem, ki je primarno namenjen barvanju vozlišč v klasičnem pomenu
besede; obe različici opišemo v razdelku 4.2.
V grobem poteka prirejeni Petford–Welshev algoritem tako, da na začetku procesa
vozlišča danega grafa G = (V,E) naključno obarva s poljubno izbranim začetnim
številom barv k, ki predstavlja zgornjo mejo končnega števila gruč. Za vhodni
parameter k lahko izberemo celo kar število vseh vozlišč |V |, saj se število realiziranih
barv zmanjšuje skozi čas, dokler se sčasoma ne uravna, ko algoritem odkrije dovolj
naravno razporeditev gruč.
Nato se prične iterativni postopek, v katerem je na vsakem koraku naključno
izbrano eno od volišč v ∈ V , ki se nahaja v večbarvni soseščini, in je prebarvano z eno
od sosednjih barv 1 ≤ i ≤ k, W(v, i) ̸= 0, določeno z verjetnostjo, proporcionalno
ωW(v,i) za ustrezno izbrani utežni parameter ω > 1, pri čemer W(v, i) označuje
vsoto uteži po povezavah med vozliščem v in njegovimi sosedi barve i. Postopek
se nato ponavlja, dokler bodisi ne zmanjka tovrstnih vozlišč bodisi varianca števila
dvobarvnih povezav, ki jo računamo po drsnem oknu s sprotnim prištevanjem in
odštevanjem lokalnih prispevkov, ne pade pod določeno toleranco.
Do konca poglavja se zvrstijo še razdelek 4.3, v katerem temeljito pregledamo in
pripravimo ključne dele računalniških eksperimentov, s katerimi preučimo delovanje
našega algoritma (v primerjavi s sorodnimi algoritmi gručenja), razdelek 4.4, ki
povzame njihove rezultate in numerične izsledke, kratka diskusija 4.5 in zaključek 4.6.
Če povzamemo, v seriji eksperimentov prirejeni Petford–Welshev algoritem pože-
nemo na devetih grafih iz realnega sveta – od tega sedmih z znano strukturo gruč – in
na umetno ustvarjeni družini grafov, ki ima sestavo gruč znano po zasnovi; dobljene
rešitve ocenimo na podlagi treh mer, ki ovrednotijo njihovo sestavo samo po sebi, in
osmih mer, ki jo ovrednotijo glede na znano gručenje, kadar je slednje poznano; ter
rezultate primerjamo z osmimi algoritmi gručenja, ki so implementirani v programski
paket python-igraph. Vzeto v celoti se izkaže, da prirejeni Petford–Welshev algori-
tem dosega primerljive rezultate, se še posebej dobro odreže, kadar je struktura grafa
dovolj jasna, ponaša pa se tudi z izrazito hitrostjo, h kateri v veliki meri doprinese
njegova lokalna narava.
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II Razvijajoči se grafi
S tem, ko opravimo s pregledom prvega sklopa tega dela, se lahko lotimo drugega, ki
končno upraviči tisti del imena, ki se nanaša na razvijajoče se grafe.
Za potrebe modela cirkulacije novic, ki ga ustvarimo čisto na koncu, si v prvem
poglavju ogledamo (splošne) modele okužb, nato preidemo na mehanizme v ozadju
bolj zapletenih procesov okužb – pretežno v sociološkem kontekstu, uvedemo bolj
zamotane populacijske strukture v obliki večplastnih in razvijajočih se grafov ter jih
podvržemo soevoluciji z dinamičnimi procesi, ki so jim podrejeni, in se nazadnje
seznanimo s teoretično platjo interakcij znotraj socialnih omrežij, ki jo pospremimo s
kratkim uvidom v zgodovino in značilnosti (množičnih) medijev, preden se naposled
le lotimo samega modeliranja pretoka novic.
5 Procesi okužb
Z novim sklopom se nekoliko odmaknemo od teorije iger v klasičnem smislu; namesto
igralcev, ki posegajo po strategijah na podlagi sklepanja, imitacije ali dedovanja, se
posvetimo agentom, ki se v vsakem trenutku znajdejo v enem od (tipično skopem
številu) danih stanj, prehode med katerimi narekujejo – lahko tudi prepovedujejo
– (stohastična) hevristična pravila, ki jih usmerjajo, kako ravnati na podlagi dane
situacije in razmer v danem okolju. Kot razkrijejo modeli v naslednjem poglavju, se
lahko ta pravila med agenti tudi razlikujejo.
Do konca dela se osredotočimo predvsem na procese, ki dopuščajo dva ali tri
(notranja) stanja in se vrtijo okoli treh glavnih pojavov – okužb, kaskad in soglasja.
Okužba, ki za nas predstavlja aktivnost prenosa kakršnekoli vrste vpliva – bolezni,
ideje ali vedenja – z enega agenta na drugega z njunim neposrednim stikom, je povečini
predmet razprav prvega poglavja, čeprav je v nekoliko bolj sociološko obarvanem
kontekstu v resnici vpeta tudi v preostala.
Kaskada, dogodek v kakršnemkoli obsegu, ki ga sproži začetno seme agentov in
je kot tak tesno povezan s konceptom okužbe, oz. globalna kaskada, ki prizadene
neničelni delež populacije, ki raste skupaj s številom agentov v limiti neskončne
populacije, najdeta svoje mesto v drugem poglavju, ki se pomakne v smer pragovnih
modelov in se ne vrti več primarno okoli tradicionalnih epidemioloških modelov
okužb.
Soglasje, ki se ga dotaknemo v zadnjem poglavju dela, pa nas zanima zlasti z
vidika, kako je doseženo – in če sploh je doseženo – s samoorganizacijo sistema brez
posebnih zunanjih vzgibov.
Kakorkoli, v poglavju 5 tega sklopa raziskujemo le procese okužb. V skladu s
tem v razdelku 5.1 spoznamo osnovne pojme in predpostavke, ki jih potrebujemo
za nadaljnje delo; tako posežemo po terminologiji faznih prehodov v neravnovesni
statistični fiziki, povzamemo bistvene sestavine približka povprečnega polja, dobršen
del vsebine pa namenimo pravilom posodobitve.
Natančneje, privzamemo, da se stanja agentov posodabljajo asinhrono – in ne
sočasno, kar bi bilo numerično sicer ugodneje, vendar bi slabše odražalo realnost –
in ne z enakomernimi časovnimi koraki, vendar na podlagi dogodkov, pri čemer se
simulacijski čas ustrezno posodobi šele po nastopu dogodka pod taktirko stohastičnih
procesov. Vsak od teh procesov je opremljen s stopnjo (tveganja) λ(t), ki – kot
namiguje že njeno ime – nosi informacijo o tem, kakšno je tveganje za pojav dogodka,
ki ga opisuje. Izraz λ(t)dt namreč v primeru majhnega časovnega koraka dt intuitivno
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predstavlja verjetnost, da se dogodek zgodi prvič prav ob času t ≥ 0.
Navzlic temu, da se v delu omejimo le na (pozabljive) Poissonove procese z
odsekoma konstantnimi stopnjami λ(t), lahko njihovo modeliranje hitro postane
zahtevno – še posebej z ozirom na to, da se v modelih, ki jih v nadaljevanju opazujemo,
ponavadi vsako vozlišče in včasih še celo vsaka povezava ponaša s svojim lastnim
procesom. K sreči se izkaže, da lahko uberemo precej lažjo pot – pri tem nam priskoči
na pomoč Gillespiejev algoritem, ki omogoča statistično natančne in numerično
učinkovite simulacije stohastičnih procesov. Namesto da bi simuliral vsakega od
procesov posebej, izkoristi dejstvo, da je superpozicija Poissonovih procesov zopet
Poissonov proces, in posledično modelira le njo.
V razdelku 5.2 osvetlimo razliko med enostavnimi in zapletenimi procesi okužb. V
prvem primeru za prenos okužbe zadošča en sam direkten kontakt med prenašalcem
virusa ali poljubnega (abstraktnega) tipa informacij in agentom, dovzetnim za okužbo,
pri čemer vsakega njegovega soseda smatramo kot povsem neodvisen vir okužbe. Ti
procesi so običajno obravnavani v okviru bioloških in epidemioloških modelov, čim
imamo pa opravka s sociološkimi pojavi, se reči hitro zapletejo.
Ljudje morajo biti isti informaciji praviloma izpostavljeni večkrat in to s strani
večjega števila drugih, ki jih cenijo ali jim še posebej zaupajo, preden tudi sami
postanejo podvrženi njenemu vplivu. To je privedlo do vpeljave zapletenih procesov
okužb, ki pa se jim posvetimo šele v naslednjem poglavju. Za zdaj ostajamo pri
enostavnih in tri prototipne predstavnike njihovih modelov postavimo v središče
razdelka 5.3.
Vsem trem razrednim modelom je skupna predzgodba – populacija n agentov,
umeščenih na graf, ki se v vsakem časovnem trenutku nahajajo v enem od treh
razredov, tj., dovzetnih, okuženih (in hkrati kužnih) ter okrevanih – z očitnimi
vzporednicami s stadiji nalezljivih bolezni – ki opisujejo njihova notranja stanja.
Vsaka povezava med dovzetnim in okuženim agentom nosi Poissonov proces prenosa s
konstantno (in enako za vse) stopnjo tveganja prenosa okužbe β, vsak okuženi agent
pa je podobno opremljen s Poissonovim procesom okrevanja s stopnjo okrevanja µ.
Podrobneje, model dovzetni–okuženi prehodov iz razreda okuženih ne omogoča, tj.
µ = 0, in je kot tak sicer preprost za analizo, vendar tudi nerealističen v biološkem
kontekstu – ne pa nujno tudi v sociološkem, kot vidimo v kratkem. Nasprotno
model dovzetni–okuženi–dovzetni iz razreda okuženih vodi nazaj v razred dovzetnih
in je torej primeren za simulacijo bolezni, kot je prehlad; proces okrevanja modela
dovzetni–okuženi–okrevani pa pusti okuženemu agentu trajno imunost, kar je značilno
npr. za ošpice.
V vseh treh primerih nas zanima predvsem časovna evolucija deležev agentov
v posameznih razredih in njihova končna stanja ter fazni prehodi med različnimi
(globalnimi) izidi populacijske dinamike v odvisnosti od parametrov β in µ. Pri
tem se izkaže, da razmerje β/µ, ki je odločilno v pripadajočih kritičnih točkah, tu
poznanih tudi pod imenom prag epidemije, ravno sovpada z osnovnim reprodukcijskim
številom R0, dobro uveljavljenim pojmom v demografskih in epidemioloških krogih.
Prag epidemije, ki loči fazo, v kateri epidemija hitro zamre, od faze, v kateri
doseže razsežnosti pandemije, zopet določimo z uporabo približka povprečnega polja,
pri čemer najprej izpeljemo enačbe pričakovane evolucije indikatorskih spremenljivk
vseh agentov, vendar dobljeni sistem kaj hitro oklestimo s pomočjo heterogenega
približka parov, in – pri modelu dovzetni–okuženi–okrevani – še posebej z rodovnimi
funkcijami.
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6 Zapleteni procesi okužb
V poglavju 6 tega sklopa zapustimo domeno širjenja nalezljivih bolezni in pod drob-
nogled postavimo bolj zapletene procese okužb, ki dodatno vključujejo še razne
psiho-socialne elemente in utegnejo biti posledično še bolj zamotani in nepredvidljivi.
Vpliv širše družbe ali bližnje okolice na posameznika praviloma ne zajema le po-
drobnosti njihovih medosebnih odnosov, ampak tudi vrsto drugih spremenljivk, ki
so lahko pogojene z značajem dotične osebe ali pa celo zadevajo človeško naravo v
splošnem, kar se med drugim odraža v obširnem naboru miselnih napak, ki jim je
slednja podvržena.
Ne glede na vse, v tem poglavju privzamemo, da velja širjenje informacij, pre-
pričanj in vpliva med ljudmi v celoti pripisati interakcijam med njimi, pri čemer
poglavitno vlogo igra družbena okrepitev – več, kot je sugestij s strani večjega števila
somišljenikov, bolj verjetno posameznik zavzame promovirano stališče in ga sčasoma
le še bolj utrdi. Kljub temu, da so modeli socialnih okužb v tem poglavju v dobršni
meri podobni tistim, ki jih obravnavamo v prejšnjem, med njimi vseeno najdemo kar
precej bistvenih odstopanj.
Prva skupina modelov, ki jih preučujemo v razdelku 6.1, t.i. modeli širjenja
govoric, se od klasičnih modelov okužb razlikuje v procesih okrevanja oz. pozabe
(govorice). Ti niso več dodeljeni posameznim (okuženim) agentom, vendar potekajo
na nivoju povezav med pari agentov, ki so (bili) okuženi z govorico, pri čemer je vsaj
še eden izmed njiju ni prestal. V razdelku 6.2 pa se obrnemo na pragovne modele, ki
priredijo proces okužbe, okrevanja pa – sorodno modelu dovzetni–okuženi – agentom
niti ne omogočajo. Pri tem predpostavimo, da je vsak član populacije soočen s
poljubnim binarnim odločitvenim problemom, ki je lahko zgolj miselni – verjeti
določeni informaciji ali ne – ali vedenjski – ravnati na neki način ali ne, odločitev
nanj sprejme z ozirom na (svojo bližnjo) okolico, nakar pa si ne more več premisliti.
Nepovratnost odločitev se zdi smiselna, saj ne odraža le nagnjenja k stalnosti, ki
je del človeške nravi, ampak povratek včasih v resnici niti ni izvedljiv – ko je pot
enkrat prehojena, “poti nazaj več ni”. Tudi obračanje k drugim po nasvet je hitro moč
upravičiti; poleg dejstva, da so ljudje že sami po sebi socialna bitja, zgledovanje po
vrstnikih včasih predstavlja tudi nujo, kar še posebej velja takrat, ko je razpoložljivih
podatkov v zvezi z odločitvijo nepredstavljivo ogromno, časa za njo pa le malo.
Najprej si ogledamoGranovetterjev pragovni model na homogenih populacijah brez
kakršnekoli posebne interakcijske strukture. Vsakemu posamezniku i za 1 ≤ i ≤ n
je na začetku dodeljen (naključno določen) lasten prag (sprejetja) Ri ∈ [0, 1], nato
pa se na vsakem koraku zazre naokoli in če delež celotne populacije, ki se zavzema
za eno od obeh možnosti, preseže prag Ri, se jim pridruži tudi sam, sicer pa ne
stori ničesar. Podobna pravila veljajo tudi v Wattsovem pragovnem modelu, ki za
razliko od Granovetterjevega populacijo umesti na graf – agenti se zdaj ravnajo
le po svojih neposrednih soseščinah, kar botruje k dodatnim razlikam med njimi,
slednje pa – kot ponavadi – oteži analizo. A vendar, čeprav se izkaže, da se približek
povprečnega polja le slabo ujema z računalniškimi simulacijami, rešitev ponudijo
rodovne funkcije, ki so se izkazale kot nepogrešljiv pripomoček že v primeru modela
dovzetni–okuženi–okrevani.
Ob koncu poglavja opišemo še nekaj različic, razširitev in primerov uporabe
pragovnih modelov; med drugim v grobem povzamemo model difuzije informacij v
morebitnem scenariju evakuacije, ki sestoji iz socialnega omrežja agentov, ki drug
drugega obveščajo o preteči nevarnosti, in enega globalnega medija, ki jim sporoča,
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kakšna je trenutna stopnja grožnje. Vsak agent se nato sam zase odloči, ali naj
se umakne nekam na varno ali ne, kar stori na podlagi praga sprejetja, ki mu je
pripisan na začetku, in ocene nevarnosti, ki jo sproti določa na podlagi vseh vhodnih
informacij. Čim le-ta preseže njegov prag, agent sledi evakuaciji. Čeprav model
sam po sebi vključuje le en sam statični graf, si ga lahko zlahka predstavljamo kot
dvoplastni, razvijajoči se graf, s kakršnimi se srečamo v naslednjem poglavju. Preden
zares opustimo diskusijo procesov okužb, nekaj besed namenimo še posplošitvam
pragovnih modelov, ki kot posebni primer vsebujejo tudi paradigmatične razredne
modele okužb in celo model volivcev – ta pa je že tema nadaljnjih poglavij.
7 Soevolucija strukture grafa in širjenja epidemije
V poglavju 7 naposled le zapustimo svet klasične teorije grafov in koncept grafa
najprej posplošimo v prostorskem smislu, nakar se posvetimo še njegovemu časovnemu
aspektu. V razdelku 7.1 se tako seznanimo z multipleksnim grafom iz več slojev, ki
predstavljajo različne tipe relacij na isti množici vozlišč, in pa z večplastnim grafom,
ki dodatno dopušča, da se množice vozlišč med posameznimi plastmi razlikujejo.
Čeprav lahko vsako od plasti opremimo z (neodvisnim) dinamičnim procesom in
nato plasti poljubno povežemo, s čimer vnesemo njihov medsebojni vpliv, pa pride
evolucijska dinamika še posebej do izraza na razvijajočih se grafih, obravnavanih v
razdelku 7.2. Tu spremembam v času niso podvrženi le procesi na njih, temveč tudi
njihova notranja struktura – in če se ene in druge spremembe odvijajo približno
enako hitro, nastopi hkratna soevolucija vseh, v kateri pomembno vplivajo druga na
drugo, kar izdatno prispeva k težavnosti, vendar kljub temu bolje odseva pojave v
sistemih, s katerimi se srečujemo v vsakdanu. To nas privede do zadnjega poglavja
v delu, kjer modeliramo pretok novic, pri čemer posežemo po vseh orodjih, ki smo
jih spoznali do zdaj – od modelov okužb do večplastnih, razvijajočih se grafov in
soevolucije.
8 Uporaba v modeliranju pretoka novic
Zadnje poglavje 8 se v celoti vrti okoli modela, s katerim skušamo zajeti glavne sesta-
vine prenašanja in krojenja novic od medijev do publike, po njej in – v povratni zanki
– zopet nazaj. V razdelku 8.1 izvemo več o bistvenih lastnostih medijev poročanja in
o njihovem vplivu na javno mnenje, v razdelku 8.2 si pobliže ogledamo, kakšno vlogo
igra pri tem družabno omrežje in v splošnem sporazumevanje ljudi, razdelek 8.3 oba
vidika preplete, razdelek 8.4 pa končno oriše naš model. Njegov osnovni gradnik je
dvoplastni graf s statičnim slojem medijev GM = (M, EM), ki ustvarjajo dva tipa
novic, in statičnim slojem njihove publike GR = (R, ER), ki je podrejena modelu
volivcev s pristranskostjo do enega tipa novic – vsaka (neuravnotežena) povezava
rirj ∈ ER(t) nosi dva stohastična procesa, ki jo uravnovesita v eno ali drugo smer s
stopnjama tveganja zaporedoma enakima λTλTij(t) in λFλFij(t). Dinamični del grafa
v pravem pomenu besede pa se skriva v povezavah med plastema, ki se vzposta-
vljajo in prekinjajo pod taktirko tretjega sočasnega stohastičnega procesa, ki je
dodeljen vsakemu članu publike posebej in s stopnjo tveganja η uravnava njegov
bralni repertoar ter s tem tudi doseg in priljubljenost medijev. Simulacije izvedemo
s pomočjo Gillespiejevega algoritma, rezultati pa nakazujejo, da več suverenosti v
rokah posameznikov pri izbiri virov novic ne le razblini informacijske mehurčke in
ohrani raznolikost, ampak tudi gradi mostove med drugače mislečimi.
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V tem delu smo razvozlavali preplet evolucijskih in strukturnih faktorjev v populacijski
dinamiki – evolucija namreč ni le močno pogojena z okoljem, v katerem poteka, ampak
slednje tudi spreminja skozi čas; če želimo doumeti njene skrivnosti, se moramo torej
posvetiti soevoluciji obeh. V ta namen smo najprej podrobneje preučili področja
evolucijske teorije iger, populacijske dinamike in razvijajočih se grafov vsako zase,
nato pa smo poskušali osvetliti njihovo medsebojno odvisnost in z matematičnim
pristopom obrazložiti, kateri procesi do te soodvisnosti sploh privedejo in kakšni so
njeni obeti na dolgi rok.
S tem smo dobili orodja, s katerimi smo se lotili reševanja problema odkrivanja gruč
in raziskovanja poglavitnih dejavnikov v cirkulaciji novic med mediji in njihovo ciljno
publiko. Prvi primer nas je privedel do razvoja nove metode gručenja, prirejenega
Petford–Welshevega algoritma, ki smo ga nato izdatno preizkusili v seriji računalniških
eksperimentov na pestrem naboru tako umetno generiranih kot tudi resničnih grafov,
dobljene rešitve ovrednotili s pomočjo uveljavljenih mer kakovosti gručenja in rezultate
primerjali z nizom sorodnih algoritmov. Spodobnim rezultatom navkljub ostaja
manevrskega prostora za izboljšavo še kar nekaj – algoritem velja zlahka paralelizirati,
saj se je v tem izvrstno odrezal že Petford–Welshev algoritem v izvorni obliki,
prihodnjim raziskavam pa smo prepustili tudi optimizacijo utežnega parametra ω, ki
določa, v kolikšni meri je izbiranje novih barv vozlišč prepuščeno naključnim pojavom.
V drugem primeru pa smo ustvarili model pretoka novic po dvoplastnem, razvijajočem
se grafu s plastjo medijev in plastjo populacije, v katerem poteka sočasna soevolucija
notranjih stanj agentov in repertoarjev virov novic, na katere so naročeni. Za potrebe
analize njegovega obnašanja v odvisnosti od vhodnih parametrov smo se poslužili
simulacij, ki so razkrile celo vrsto karakteristik, ki jih je moč pripisati človeški naravi
ali zaslediti v dejanskih podatkih o širjenju novic med uporabniki družabnih omrežij.
Seveda tudi tu ne moremo mimo možnosti za nadaljnje delo; čim imamo opravka
s kakršnimkoli vidikom človeške dejavnosti, dejavnikov, ki (pomembno) vplivajo
nanj, v resnici nikoli ne zmanjka. A vendar, že ogrodje modela, ki smo ga postavili,
nudi številne priložnosti za nadgradnjo. Na nivoju populacije GR = (R, ER) bi
tako lahko opustili v veliki meri nerealno predpostavko, da vsi njeni člani (enako
silovito) sodelujejo v razpravljanju ali deljenju novic, in jo nadomestili z vpeljavo
novega notranjega stanja nevtralnih posameznikov, ki postanejo dejavni šele takrat,
ko neomajno zavzemajo svoje stališče. Za še boljši odraz resničnega obnašanja ljudi
lahko pri tem vpeljemo dodaten mehanizem “pozabe”, ki dopušča, da se še tako
goreča mnenja skozi čas lahko ohladijo. Mnogo več pa je mogoče storiti na področju
novičarske sfere GM = (M, EM). Poleg očitne posplošitve v obliki eksplicitno
omogočenega rivalstva med posameznimi mediji jim lahko (hkrati) dodelimo tudi
večji vpliv pri privabljanju novega bralstva z marketinškimi strategijami, grajenjem
ugleda in utrjevanjem stikov s publiko. Ne glede na vse ostaja odkrivanje tančic
človeške nravi nedokončana zgodba, ki se nadaljuje.
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